

The 3rd International Conference of the HK Russia • Eurasia Research Project

20 Years since the Disintegration of the Soviet Union: Looking Backward, Looking Forward

Conference Programme

October 6-7, 2011

- **VENUE** : Video Conference Room, 7th Fl. Graduate School Bldg.,
Hanyang University, Seoul, Korea
- **Hosted by** : Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University
- **Sponsored by** : National Research Foundation of Korea

Program

October 6th, 2011 (Thursday)

10:00-10:30 **Opening Ceremony**

- Opening Address
 - **Eom, Gu Ho** (Director, Asia-Pacific Research Center)
 - Congratulatory Speech
 - **Lim, Duk Ho** (President, Hanyang University)
-

10:30-13:00 **Session I**

Historicizing the Disintegration of the Soviet Union: "Re"-interpretations and "New" Perspectives

Chair: **Lee, In-Ho (Former Ambassador to the Russian Federation)**

Papers:

- **Sakwa, Richard** (Professor of Russian and European Politics, University of Kent, UK)
 - "The Soviet Collapse: Contradictions and Neo-Modernisation"
- **Min, Kyoung Hyoun** (Professor, Dept. of History, Korea University)
 - "Russia-Korea Relations and the Soviet Collapse"
- **Kashchenko, Sergei G.** (Professor, Dept. of History, St. Petersburg State Univ., Russia)
 - "Study of the History of Russia after the Disintegration of the USSR: Traditions and New Trends"

Discussants:

- **Kang, Yun-Hee** (Professor, College of International Studies, Kookmin Univ.)
 - **Park, Sang-Cheol** (Professor, Dept. of History, Cheonnam National University)
 - **Ki, Kyehyeong** (Hk Research Professor, Hanyang University)
-

13:00-14:30 Luncheon

14:30-17:00 Session II

The “Evolution of the Dissolution”: a Balance Sheet between 1991 and 2011

Chair: **Ko, Jae Nam** (Professor, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security)

Papers:

- **Malle, Silvana** (Professor, Dept. of Economic Science, Univ. of Verona, Italy)
 - “The Present Challenges to Russia: Modernisation and Diversification”
- **Ko, Sangtu** (Professor, Graduate Program of Area Studies, Yonsei Univ.)
 - “Democratic Consolidation and Political Parties in Russia”
- **Cooper, Julian M.** (Professor of Russian Economic Studies, Associate Member of the Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, UK)
 - “The Russian Economy Twenty Years after the End of the Socialist Economic System”

Discussants:

- **Lee, Sangjoon** (Professor, College of International Studies, Kookmin Univ.)
- **Kim, Seoung-Jin** (Professor, Dept. of Political Science and International Relations, Dukseong Women’s Univ.)
- **Kim, Young-Jin** (HK Professor, Hanyang Univ.)

October 7th, 2011 (Friday)

13:30-16:00 Session III

From “Post-Soviet” to “What?”: Futuring the Soviet *Erfahrungsraum* and the Post-Soviet *Erwartungshorizont*

Chair: **Kim, Hyun Taek** (Professor, Dept. of Russian Literature, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

Papers:

- **Günther, Hans** (Professor, Dept. of Linguistics and Literary Studies, Bielefeld University, Germany)
 - “Postsovetskaia pustota (u v. Makanina i v. Pelevina)”

- **Golubkov, Mikhail M.** (Professor, Dept. of Russian Literature of the Twentieth Century, Moscow State University, Russia)
- “Slovesnost' i russkii kul'turnyi kod v nachale XXI veka”
- **Byun, Hyun-Tae** (Professor, Dept. of Russian Literature, Seoul National University)
- “Ob odnom postsovetskom literaturnom spore: v sviazi s ‘bol'shoi teoriei’”

Discussants:

- **Oh, Wonkyo** (HK Professor, Hanyang University)
- **Park, Hye-Kyung** (Professor, Dept. of Russian Studies, Hanrym Univ.)
- **Lee, Kang Eun** (Professor, Dept. of Russian Literature, Kyungpook National University)

16:00-16:30 Coffee Break

16:30-17:30 Session IV
Roundtable: Prospects of Russian and Eurasian Studies beyond the “Post-Soviet”

Chair: **Eom, Gu Ho** (Director, Asia-Pacific Research Center)

Discussants:

- All participants
- Research Professors, the HK Russia · Eurasia Research Project

17:30-17:40 Closing Ceremony

18:30-20:30 Dinner

Contents

Session I: Historicizing the Disintegration of the Soviet Union:

"Re"-interpretations and "New" Perspectives

- Sakwa, Richard - *The Soviet Collapse: Contradictions and Neo-Modernisation* ----- 9
 - Min, Kyoung Hyoun - *Russia-Korea Relations and the Soviet Collapse* ----- 35
 - Kashchenko, Sergei G. - *Study of the History of Russia after the Disintegration of the USSR: Traditions and New Trends* ----- 43
-

Session II: The "Evolution of the Dissolution":

a Balance Sheet between 1991 and 2011

- Malle, Silvana - *The Present Challenges to Russia: Modernisation and Diversification* ----- 57
 - Ko, Sangtu - *Democratic Consolidation and Political Parties in Russia* ----- 87
 - Cooper, Julian M. - *The Russian Economy Twenty Years after the End of the Socialist Economic System* ----- 97
-

Session III: From "Post-Soviet" to "What?":

Futuring the Soviet *Erfahrungsraum* and the Post-Soviet *Erwartungshorizont*

- Günther, Hans - *Postsovetskaia pustota (u v. Makanina i v. Pelevina)* ----- 115
- Golubkov, Mikhail M. - *Slovesnost' i russkii kul'turnyi kod v nachale XXI veka* ----- 127
- Byun, Hyun-Tae - *Ob odnom postsovetskom literaturnom spore: v sviazi s 'bol'shoi teoriei'*

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**20 Years since the Disintegration of the Soviet Union: Looking Backward,
Looking Forward**

Session I: Historicizing the Disintegration of the Soviet Union:
"Re"-interpretations and "New" Perspectives

**"The Soviet Collapse:
Contradictions and Neo-Modernisation"**

Paper presented at the conference

"20 Years since the Disintegration of the Soviet Union: Looking Backward, Looking Forward,"
Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University, Seoul, Korea

October 6-7, 2011

Sakwa, Richard

Professor of Russian and European Politics,
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THE SOVIET COLLAPSE: CONTRADICTIONS AND NEO-MODERNISATION

Richard Sakwa

Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 the debate over the causes and consequences is far from over. The nature of the phenomenon is itself contested. What exactly ended in 1991? We know that the Communist order was formally dissolved, with the banning of the Communist Party in Russia on 22 August 1991, in the tumultuous days following the failed coup of 18-21 August. Yet the dissolution of Communist power had begun much earlier, and in effect the reforms conducted under the moniker of perestroika by Mikhail Gorbachev since 1985 had achieved an astonishing self-transcendence of the earlier political system. In other words, by 1991 the traditional Soviet-style communist system had already given way to something else. The organisational power of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had been destroyed by the abolition of the traditional branches of the Secretariat in September 1988, in the wake of the various reforms launched by the Nineteenth Party Conference in June-July 1988. Equally, the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991 had already been presaged by a qualitative change in the nature of the country, reflected in continuing debates over changing the name of the new entity to something along the lines of a Union of Sovereign States. The 'what collapsed' question could be indefinitely extended to include, *inter alia*, long-term processes such as the collapse of empire in Russia and the exhaustion of the communist ideal in the world at large.

In examining the Soviet collapse there is a permanent search for an interpretative framework. While there is no doubt that the Soviet Union collapsed as a result of its own contradictions, the nature of these contradictions needs to be explored, something that I will explore later. The contradictions that led to '1989' (taken as the symbolic date for the collapse of the Soviet 'empire' in Eastern Europe), moreover, were different from those that precipitated 1991 (the combined dissolution of the communist system and the disintegration of the Soviet state). It is now clear that the 'meaning' of 1989 is very different from that of '1991'. The 'revolutions' in 1989 in Eastern Europe shrugged off Soviet power and influence (even though by then the Soviet Union was reforming itself out of existence), the structures of communist rule, and reoriented the countries to the path of Western integration. The 'return to Europe' represented a powerful ideal, but it was a spatial rather than a philosophical programme.¹ The meaning of 1991 is far less

¹ On this, see Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (London, Pimlico, 2007).

clear. The former Soviet republics could not share the spatial (geopolitical) orientation of 1989, except for the Baltic republics and possibly Moldova, and it was precisely the attempt of some other countries to shift from the problematic of 1991 to that of 1989 that in the end provoked conflict, notably the Russo-Georgian war of 2008. Russia always considered itself to be a distinct geopolitical pole of its own and later perpetuated '1991' as a separate project, while the countries in the 'new Eastern Europe' along the Soviet Union's western borders remain trapped between 1989 and 1991.

The fundamental contradiction that precipitated the Soviet fall was that between the attempt to create a 'modern' society, defined as one characterised by industrialisation, secularisation, urbanisation and rationalisation, and the simultaneous attempt to create an alternative modernity. The central features of this alternative modernity included the abolition of the free market, the attempt to achieve the direct expression of popular sovereignty as represented in the party-state, the inversion of typically modern forms of class hierarchy (which in the event allowed a bureaucratic class to predominate), and a permanently revisionist stance in international affairs, defined as the aspiration to revise the existing international order, even though in practice the Soviet Union became in effect a status quo power. The contradiction in international affairs, as in all other aspects, was never resolved. In the next section I briefly examine some of the immediate factors precipitating the fall, and then I turn to some of the broader questions associated with modernisation, democratisation and the larger phenomenon of the communist collapse.

The 'why' question

At the heart of debates over 1991 is the 'why' question. Why did a system that had defeated the world's most powerful military force in 1941-45, that had launched the world's first artificial satellite (Sputnik 1) into earth's orbit on 4 October 1957, achieved the first circumlocution of the globe by Yuri Gagarin on 12 April 1961, gained strategic parity with the United States in the mid-1970s, and attained standards of living typical of a mid-level developed country, collapse so precipitously? The answers can typically be categorised into short, medium and long-term factors, but at all levels the various factors are contested. Let us look at some of the immediate factors.

- a) There is no simple answer to the question about the economic viability of the Soviet order. Although by the late 1980s there were clear signs of economic strain, with a long-term decline in economic growth rates and stagnating standards of living, accompanied by declines in economic competitiveness, productivity and rates of investment and innovation. Very few sectors or industries were internationally competitive. Nevertheless up to 1989 growth continued at some 3 per cent. This may well have represented a fall from what had been achieved earlier, but in part the decline reflected a maturing of the economy. The sharp fall in the price of oil, from

\$66 a barrel in 1980 to \$20 a barrel in 1986 (in 2000 prices), as Saudi Arabia released a surplus onto a saturated market, provoked a severe budgetary crisis. Yegor Gaidar in his *End of Empire* stresses the distorted nature of the Soviet economy, and in particular the catastrophically high proportion of resources devoted to serve the needs of the military-industrial complex.² The economy had become 'structurally militarised', with at least 18 per cent of GDP devoted to servicing its needs. However, Michael Ellmann and Vladimir Kontorovich take a more sanguine view, arguing that although under strain there was no terminal crisis of the Soviet economy.³

Others refuse to contrast the Soviet and Western systems as two discrete orders. The status of the Soviet Union as an alternative was increasingly eroded. Immanuel Wallerstein notes that Western radicals after 1968 'attacked the role of the Soviet Union, which they saw as a collusive participant in US hegemony, a feeling that had been growing everywhere, since at least 1956'.⁴ Wallerstein and others argue that it was precisely Soviet, and even more Eastern European participation in the world economic system, that provoked their collapse.⁵ This would lead to the region becoming 'third worldised', which Frank intimated was the purpose of Western 'assistance'.

A different type of structural perspective argues that the Soviet system was unable to make the transition from a Fordist-Keynesian industrial system of mass production and mass consumption to what David Harvey calls a 'flexible accumulation regime', no longer dominated in the West by the old triad of big state, labour and capital or in the East by the monolithic planning system.⁶ In other words, the Soviet collapse was in part precipitated by the challenge of globalisation, although this could well be to confuse cause and effect: it was only after the fall of communism that globalisation theory became the dominant paradigm of our age.⁷ Indeed, the removal of the European communist challenge allowed a triumphal capitalism to emerge, that was in the end beset by its own contradictions once bereft of the disciplining and constraining effect of the Soviet experiment.

² Egor Gaidar, *Gibel' imperii: uroki dlya sovremennoi Rossii* (Moscow, Rosspen, 2006).

³ Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich (eds), *The Destruction of the Soviet Economic System: An Insiders' History* (New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1998).

⁴ Immanuel Wallerstein, 'Dynamics of (Unresolved) Global Crisis', in Craig Calhoun and Georgi Derluguian (eds), *Business as Usual: The Roots of the Global Financial Meltdown* (New York, New York University Press, 2011), p. 76.

⁵ André Gunder Frank, 'Nothing New in the East: No New World Order', *Social Justice*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1992, pp. 34-61.

⁶ David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Inquiry into the Origins of Political Change* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1990). For an application of these ideas to Eastern Europe, see Katherine Verdery, *What Was State Socialism, and What Comes Next?* (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1996).

⁷ For a systematic deconstruction of the 'theory' see Justin Rosenberg, 'Globalization Theory: A Post-Mortem', *International Politics*, Vol. 42, No. 1, March 2005, pp. 2-74. See also his *The Follies of Globalisation Theory: Polemical Essays* (London, Verso Books, 2001).

- b) The same division of views applies when it comes to political factors. The fundamental contradiction in the political sphere was the attempt to implement elements of ‘commune democracy’: the fusion of executive and legislative functions in the soviets, and the absence of the separation of powers (despite constant carping against *podmena*, the excessive intervention of party structures in state organs). Commune democracy assumes that the interests of the principal (in this case, the sovereign people) and the agent (communist political structures) were one and the same, thus denying any space for political pluralism or even socialist forms of contestation. The Tsarist claim to embody the deepest interests of the people was perpetuated in new forms by the CPSU, and thus this archaic form of governance was reproduced by the Soviet counter-modernity, and thus it became, in this respect at least, anti-modern. The pseudo-constitutionalism of the late Tsarist era gave way to the sham constitutionalism of the Soviet epoch.⁸ Gorbachev’s initial attempts to revive commune democracy during perestroika only exacerbated the problems rather than resolving them.⁹

Political reform had long been urged on the Soviet leaders, but although long-delayed, when it came it was in a tumultuous rush that refuted the arguments of those who argued that the Soviet Union was incapable of political reform. Since at least the late 1950s a generation of more critical and open-minded individuals worked in the system itself, notably those advanced by Yuri Andropov when he was head of the CC’s International Department under Nikita Khrushchev such as Alexander Bovin, Yuri Shakhnazarov, Georgy Arbatov and Nikolai Shishlin. A range of critical *institutshchiki* appeared based in the Soviet Academy of Sciences, notably in IMEMO.¹⁰ The problem was that the reform tsunami was too much, too late; overwhelming the system’s ability to absorb innovation and rupturing existing political ties and systems of governance. Stephen Cohen is certainly right to stress that there had always been historical alternatives within the Soviet order, not from the perspective of counter-factual history but ‘alternative possibilities that actually existed at turning points in Soviet history’.¹¹ From the very days of the Bolshevik revolution there had been alternative political currents to the one represented by the Leninist leadership. Cohen makes a powerful case for the Bukharinist alternative,¹² but at various points there were others, notably the Democratic Centralists in the early

⁸ Richard Sakwa, ‘Liberalism and Neo-Patrimonialism in Post-Communist Russia’, in William Simons (ed.), *Private and Civil Law in the Russian Federation: Essays in Honor of F. J. M. Feldbrugge* (Leiden & Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), pp. 327-46.

⁹ Richard Sakwa, ‘Commune Democracy and Gorbachev’s Reforms’, *Political Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 2, June 1989, pp. 224-43.

¹⁰ Roderic Pithey, ‘Imagining Liberation: Russian Critiques of Stalinism’, *Debatte*, Vol. 17, No. 1, April 2009, pp. 99-116.

¹¹ Stephen F. Cohen, *Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives: From Stalinism to the New Cold War* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2009), p. x.

¹² His classic recovery of the Bukharinite line in Soviet politics is Stephen Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888-1938* (New York, Vintage, 1975).

days who fought for a more participatory form of commune democracy. The alternatives, however, after the 'ban on factions' in 1921 could never take institutionally articulated forms, and thus inevitably appeared as *démarches* when launched from above, and 'oppositions' and 'deviations' when arising from below. In other words, there appeared to be no evolutionary mechanism for intra-systemic political change, and instead change came in the form of shocks and ruptures. The programme of 'reform communism' advanced during the Prague Spring in 1968 represented a qualitative change whose radicalism lay precisely in opening up a historical space for communist evolutionism, but the invasion by Warsaw Pact forces on 21 August of that year closed off this option for the communist counter-modern project.

- c) Change in ideological perspectives and public politics is one thing, but the destruction of communist governance mechanisms is another. The main charge that may be laid against Gorbachev as leader is that he lacked an effective strategy of *statecraft*: the mobilisation of resources to make a country more self-confident, more powerful, more respected and more prosperous. Instead, Gorbachev frittered away the governmental capital accumulated by the Soviet regime, and in the end was unable to save the country which he had attempted to reform. This is the fundamental difference with the Chinese reformers since the death of Mao Zedong, who have been masters at the art of managing the Chinese state while nurturing its prestige and strength. From the perspective of statecraft, as Machiavelli long ago taught us, democracy is dispensable; whereas for Gorbachev by the end it became an end in itself, even if it came to be seen by his opponents as sacrificing the state.

The institutional destabilisation prompted by Gorbachev's reforms is undoubtedly one of the central factors provoking the collapse. The attack on the *nomenklatura* as a class provoked a mass defection, compounded by cack-handed economic reforms that opened the door to opportunistic entrepreneurs while stifling the opportunities for the development of legitimate businesses. The destruction of Party management, notably in the September 1988 reforms to the Secretariat, cut the managerial spine of the whole system, provoking what Steven Solnick calls an extended bank run, in which the state was 'stolen'.¹³ Governance swiftly disintegrated, with executive decrees left unfulfilled as the country became increasingly ungovernable. This decay of governance has still not been entirely reversed.

- d) The exhaustion of communist ideology is often suggested to be one of the key elements in the Soviet collapse. Put simply, people no longer believed in the ideal of building communism, and were no longer willing to endure sacrifices to support

¹³ Steven L. Solnick, *Stealing the Soviet State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1998).

Soviet ‘internationalist’ ambitions abroad. Already in 1974 Alexander Solzhenitsyn had urged the Soviet leaders to give up what he claimed to be their erroneous and exhausted ideology, and devote themselves to the national good.¹⁴ In other words, he called on them to retain power by giving up their ideology. Andrei Sakharov in 1968 gave this argument a new inflection,¹⁵ and a whole generation of ‘dissidents’ sought to live by ‘conscience’ rather than by what were perceived to be the increasingly irrelevant nostrums of the regime.¹⁶ If the Soviet leaders had taken these ideas on board as a fresh analysis of facts rather than a challenge to their power, history would no doubt have taken a very different turn and the Soviet Union could well be in existence today. The modernist challenge of rationalisation in the Soviet form of counter-modernity took the form of technocratism and managerialism, and failed to sustain a systemic process of public reasoning. In other words, the system could have saved itself if it had been able to absorb critique to adapt its own governing mechanisms.

Instead, the Soviet leadership under Leonid Brezhnev appeared to do everything possible to undermine the internal sources of renewal, a process watched over by Mikhail Suslov, the Vladislav Surkov of his day. Indeed, Suslov’s unrelenting war against theoretical innovation and his dogmatic interpretation of ideology renders him the prime candidate to the title of ‘gravedigger of the revolution’. Even the development of the innovation centre in Akademgorodok in Novosibirsk, which appeared to offer the prospect of the renewal of Soviet science accompanied by greater openness, gradually succumbed to the stifling of initiative and relative pluralism that was taking place elsewhere.¹⁷ Given the remarkable ability of the capitalist system not only to survive but also mightily to prosper in the post-war years, and the USSR’s rather grubby reality of increasing social stagnation, it appeared to many that the revolutionary socialist challenge to market democracies had failed. Belief in the inherent superiority of the socialist system to deliver public and commodity goods in greater abundance and quality once the contradictions of capitalism had been overcome was no longer credible.

The reappraisal of the ideological foundations of the regime had begun even before Gorbachev came to power, notably with the December 1984 ‘ideological conference’ convened by Gorbachev, accompanied by the paper on the ‘living creativity of the people’.¹⁸ Gorbachev began by espousing the principles of ‘reform

¹⁴ Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *Letter to the Soviet Leaders* (London, Collins/Harvill, 1974).

¹⁵ Andrei Sakharov, *Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom* (New York, W. W. Norton, 1968).

¹⁶ See Philip Boobbyer, *Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia* (London, Routledge, 2005); Robert Horvath, *The Legacy of Soviet Dissent: Dissidents, Democratisation, and Radical Nationalism in Russia* (London, Routledge, 2005).

¹⁷ The vision of plenty and its disappointment is well-described by Francis Spufford, *Red Plenty: Inside the Fifties’ Soviet Dream* (London, Faber and Faber, 2010).

¹⁸ Mikhail Gorbachev, ‘Zhivoe tvorchestvo naroda’, in Mikhail Gorbachev, *Sobranie sochinenii* (Moscow, Ves’ mir, 2008), Vol. 2, pp.77-112.

communism' but this soon evolved into an even more contradictory programme for the 'reform of communism': a project that sought to combine reform communism with the transcendence of communism itself, a hopelessly utopian project (in the worst sense of the term) that failed to enthuse the masses while alienating loyal communists. Reform communism is predicated on the maintenance of the communist alternative modernity, whereas the reform of communism is a syncretic project seeking to combine the Soviet experience with elements of liberalism, democracy and – ultimately – the free market. Gorbachev hoped to create a 'humane, democratic socialism',¹⁹ but he was unable to provide a coherent rationale or discussion of how communism was to be both reformed and transcended.

At the heart of perestroika was the attempt to shift from a legitimation based on the rhetoric of building some sort of socialism, accompanied by notions of socialist democracy, to one based on incorporating a more liberal and pluralistic view of democracy into the project of renewing socialism.²⁰ As Pierre Hassner notes, 'Communism was dying from its lack of legitimacy, but its death came when it attempted to acquire democratic legitimacy. As soon as it submitted itself to free elections, it was repudiated almost everywhere'.²¹ During perestroika a distinctive subaltern form of democracy took shape, still subject to an extrinsic purpose (the achievement of a humane, democratic socialism within the nomos of reform communism), and not one in which democracy is removed from a teleological perspective entirely, which is the characteristic feature of liberal democracies.

Thus, the contradiction between reform communism and a communism of reform created an abyss into which perestroika fell. Gorbachev by the end appeared to be completely lost, and even earlier he seemed to lack the political experience to anticipate the results of his actions. It is for this reason that some speak of the 'suicide' of the Soviet system.²² The decay of belief in the Soviet future and political mismanagement has carried over into the post-communist era. Russia still does not have a viable model of its own future, caught in a perestroika-like contradiction of achieving liberal democracy on the western model and some sort of Russian-visaged democratic liberalism.

- e) Ethnic and federal problems are often adduced as central factors that condemned the Soviet mode of state construction to failure. This is certainly a highly contested argument, and as Henry Hale stresses, very special circumstances have to come into

¹⁹ 'K gumannomu, demokraticeskomu sotsializmu' *Pravda*, 13 February 1990; 'K gumannomu, demokraticeskomu sotsializmu', *Pravda*, 15 July 1990.

²⁰ Neil Robinson, *Ideology and the Collapse of the Soviet System: A Critical History of the Soviet Ideological Discourse* (Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1995).

²¹ Pierre Hassner, 'Communism: A Coroner's Inquest', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 1, No. 4, Fall 1990, pp. 3-6, at p. 5.

²² Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., 'The Suicide of Soviet Communism', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 1, No. 2, Spring 1990, pp. 18-26.

play to precipitate a breakdown of the system.²³ In conditions of democratisation where a number of republics were as wealthy or even wealthier than Russia, and with a rich arsenal of potent symbolic and actual grievances, the shift from coercion to consent in the management of federal relations proved too wide a chasm to be bridged by the methods of perestroika. The ethno-federal structure in all three communist federations (USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) provided the catalyst for disintegration, with the splits following the lines of republican division.²⁴ The Soviet Union had in effect been confederal, with the unitary CPSU acting as the integrative factor. Valerie Bunce stresses that the structures provided the fracture lines of disintegration, but these had been present for decades: it took a particular set of political circumstances set in train by the specific form of Gorbachev's liberalisation to provoke the global disintegration of the system. As Mark Beissinger has demonstrated, it took a peculiar set of circumstances for the 'impossible to become the inevitable'.²⁵ This raises the question about the precise point that disintegrative processes became irreversible.

Hale stresses that Gorbachev came remarkably close to pulling off the renewal of the Soviet Union, and that there was nothing inevitable about the disintegration until the August 1991 coup. As late as 1 August 1991, in his infamous speech in Kiev President George H. Bush had warned the Ukrainians against 'suicidal nationalism' and warned of the risks of independence. Gorbachev himself now argues that he should have begun the reform of federal relations earlier, since by the time he sought to give more power to the 15 republics, the three Baltic states had already declared independence.²⁶ However, a strong case could be made that the tipping point was the Soviet Union's first (and last) referendum held on 17 March 1991. The question itself was posed in a complex way: 'Do you consider necessary the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms of persons of all nationalities would be fully guaranteed'. Although over 70 per cent of those who participated voted in favour, six of the fifteen republics refused to participate (the Baltic republics plus Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova). Five republics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Armenia and Georgia), moreover, held their own referendums in which the people voted overwhelmingly for independence. Elsewhere the question was subtly changed,

²³ Henry E. Hale, 'Divided We Stand: Institutional Sources of Ethnofederal State Survival and Collapse', *World Politics*, Vol. 56, No. 2, January 2004, pp. 165-93; Henry E. Hale, *The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008).

²⁴ Valerie Bunce, *Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999).

²⁵ Mark Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002).

²⁶ Jonathan Steele, 'Twenty Years on from the End of Empire, Gorbachev Looks Back', *The Guardian*, 17 August 2011, p. 16.

as in Kazakhstan where the people were asked ‘Do you think it is necessary to retain the USSR as a union of equal sovereign states’, and in other places a supplementary question was added. In Russia a motion to create a separate Russian presidency was overwhelmingly carried, and it was clear that anyone elected to become chief executive of a quasi-sovereign Russia would come into conflict with the Soviet state. In Ukraine the people were also asked: ‘Do you think Ukraine should be part of the union of soviet sovereign states on the basis of the declaration of state sovereignty of Ukraine?’. The crisis of the USSR was above all a crisis of federalism, and by this time sovereignty had effectively become a synonym for independence. The referendum process demonstrated that the federation was over, and the USSR would continue at best as a confederation, a particularly unstable form of territorial governance.

- f) Leadership is obviously a central factor in the fall. Even before coming to power Gorbachev demonstrated a propensity for Faustian bargains that would later shape his period in office. An early indication of the compromises to come occurred even before he became leader. In October 1984, at the height of the miners’ strike in the UK, Soviet miners donated over a million dollars from their wages to support their British comrades in the National Union of Miners (NUM). Soviet officials tried to channel the money into the NUM’s bank account in Zurich but for some reason the money bounced back. Margaret Thatcher, who at the time was committed to the destruction of the miners’ union, was furious. Gorbachev was intent on improving relations with western powers and thus hoped to put an end to the ‘second cold war’. Three days before his planned visit to the UK in December she applied enormous diplomatic pressure on the Soviet authorities, demanding to know whether they had sanctioned the transfer of funds to Zurich. During his visit Thatcher confronted Gorbachev, insisting that the funds represented interference in British domestic matters and that they would help prolong the strike. Gorbachev stonewalled and claimed to know nothing about the matter, even though a month earlier he had personally signed the papers authorising the transaction. In the end Gorbachev decided that cultivating the British government, in anticipation of later reforms in the Soviet Union, was a price worth paying, even if it meant sacrificing solidarity with British workers.²⁷

²⁷ Rob Evans and David Hencke, ‘The Iron Lady and the Red Gold: How Soviet Aid for UK Miners was Blocked by Thatcher’, *The Guardian*, 30 August 2010, p. 3. Material clandestinely obtained by the young Russian historian Pavel Stroiлов from the Gorbachev Foundation is purported to show other instances of what could be interpreted as Gorbachev’s duplicity, including his knowledge of and involvement in the killing of unarmed civilians on the night of 8-9 April 1989 in Georgia, and then in the Baltic republics on 13 January 1991. See Christian Neef, ‘The Gorbachev Files: Secret Papers Reveal Truth Behind Soviet Collapse’, *Der Spiegel*, 11 August 2011; in *Johnson’s Russia List*, Issue 145, Item 30, 2011.

Much has been made of the disastrous consequences of the personal conflict between Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Archie Brown²⁸ and Cohen suggest that without Yeltsin Gorbachev would have gained a historically significant breathing space to have pursued his reforms to the point at which a new political equilibrium could have been established. This is denied by Leon Aron, who argues that the Gorbachev reforms were doomed to fail by their very nature.²⁹ The Russian leadership around Yeltsin recognised this failure as inevitable, and from this perspective, that was their major achievement. The key was Ukraine, since once that country prepared to defect from the Soviet Union, then Yeltsin realised that the Soviet national project would no longer be viable. The leadership factor is clearly crucial, focusing in particular on evaluations on Gorbachev's qualities as a leader. He was certainly a 'magnificent failure', but he was also a 'tragic success'. His unstable mix of reform communism and communism of reform failed to achieve the aspirations of either, while his statecraft failed to keep the country together; but he presided over the internal transcendence of the Bolshevik system that avoided civil war, oversaw the disintegration of the country without inter-state war, and achieved the end of the Cold War without international conflict.

- g) This brings us on to the role of the August coup as precipitating the disintegration. Gorbachev had clearly shown poor judgment in selecting his final team, picking a group who in the end almost entirely betrayed him: Gennady Yanaev as vice-president, his former university friend Lukyanov, and the new prime minister, Valentin Pavlov. Even before the coup his former associates, notably Eduard Shevardnadze and Alexander Yakovlev, had been marginalised. In that context it would probably be an exaggeration to argue no coup, no disintegration. Yet, to balance this, if the new Union Treaty had been signed as planned on 19 August (admittedly, by only 8 out of 15 republics), then the prospects for the continuance of sort of union would have immeasurably increased. As Gennady Burbulis (president Yeltsin's state secretary) argues 'The failure of the August coup was both ironic and tragic. In taking the extraordinary measures they believed were necessary to hold the union together, the putschists ensured its destruction. Without the coup, the union would likely have endured, albeit in a form that might eventually resembled the European Union more than the old Soviet Union. But the three-day stand-off in Moscow exploded that possibility'.³⁰

²⁸ Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996); and for a collection of his essays, see Archie Brown, *Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007).

²⁹ This is one of the themes of his forthcoming book on the subject.

³⁰ Gennady Burbulis with Michele A. Berdy, 'Meltdown', *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2011.

- h) The role of the West is no less contested. The argument up to now is that the demise of the USSR was largely a result of endogenous factors, yet there is a view that exogenous pressures provided the final push over the edge. In America there is a triumphalist discourse which suggests that the Soviet demise was a deliberate act plotted and executed by president Ronald Reagan, notably through engineering lower oil prices and then by launching the Star Wars initiative, accompanied by the arming of the mujahadeen in Afghanistan with Stinger rockets and by forcefully pressing ahead with an irreconcilable human rights agenda. In West Berlin in 1987 Reagan was uncompromising: 'Tear down this wall, Mr. Gorbachev'. A contrary view, adumbrated by Stephen Cohen, Raymond Garthoff and Archie Brown, holds that the role of the West in the collapse was minimal.³¹ When Gorbachev in July 1989 made it clear that he would no longer defend the Eastern European communist regimes, their fate was sealed.³² Indeed, President George H. Bush sought to keep the Soviet Union together, although he was not forthcoming with the massive economic assistance that could have provided a short-term lifeline to keep the Soviet enterprise afloat.
- i) Internal decay was accompanied by an increasing proportion of resources devoted to the military-industrial complex, with little benefit for the rest of the economy. As David Reynolds notes, '... the "iron curtain" between its [the USSR's] military system, on the one hand, and its civilian economy and society, on the other, was a significant factor in the Soviet collapse'.³³ No less important was the increasingly bold initiatives undertaken by the this complex, as the Soviet leadership became increasingly geriatric, in intervening militarily, initially indirectly, in Angola and the Horn of Africa, and then finally in the most direct manner possible in the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. The American withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 gave an impression of exaggerated American weakness, which raised expectations in Moscow that the West was on the retreat and that the perceived advantage should be pressed home. This provoked 'imperial overstretch' on a grand scale.³⁴

The paradox still remains: how could a major world power, with a full armoury of conventional and strategic weapons and with pretensions to act as an alternative civilisation to that practised in the West and the second pole in a bipolar world order,

³¹ Stephen F. Cohen, *Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia* (New York, W. W. Norton, 2000); Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, revised edition (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1994); Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1994); Archie Brown, 'Perestroika and the End of the Cold War', *Cold War History*, Vol. 7, No. 1, February 2007, pp. 1-17.

³² Garthoff, *The Great Transition*, p. 400.

³³ David Reynolds, 'Science, Technology and the Cold War', in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. 3, *Endings* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 399.

³⁴ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Reality from 1500-2000* (London, Fontana, 1989).

collapse so swiftly and conclusively. In his study of the role of ideology and foreign policy, Nick Bisley argues that the Cold War gave meaning and purpose to the Soviet state, and when the country retreated from confrontation with the West, the rationale for its continued existence was removed. According to Bisley, the various stages and manifestations of the Cold War had become internalised into the institutional-structural fabric of the Soviet system. Gorbachev during perestroika tried to remove the Cold War fighting aspects of the Soviet system to leave what he believed would be a truer form of socialism and a more effective and dynamic society and economic system. Instead, he removed what turned out to be the essential core of the system, leaving it vulnerable to collapse.

Bisley repudiates what he considers the rather simplistic arguments of authors such as Mary Kaldor or Noam Chomsky, who suggest that the Soviet leaders used the Cold War as a way of exercising control over its population. Things were far more complicated than that. He does not suggest that removal of the Cold War prop on its own caused the collapse, but he does argue that this was an important part of the story. In essence, during perestroika the Soviet Union could no longer perpetuate itself as system of values or institutional structures. However attenuated the class war aspect of Soviet power may have been by the end, the structure of values that it represented, including the prohibition on private ownership of the means of production, was essential for the normal functioning of the communist system. Take that away (through the communism of reform), and all that was left was a power system, naked and greedy. With its system of legitimation gone, its demise would only be a matter of time. Under the three-fold blows of elite fragmentation, economic crisis and nationalism the system disintegrated. Bisley seeks to transcend the typical stark contrast between domestic and international by redefining the characteristics of both.³⁵

- j) The role of popular mobilisation, reflecting according to some the maturation of a Soviet civil society, is also a key factor. The role of the labour movement was crucial at decisive turning points.³⁶ The mobilisation against the coup, moreover, was impressive, given the speed with which the attempted putsch unravelled. Harley Balzer takes issue with those who suggest that the coup was met with widespread passivity, except for some limited resistance in Moscow and St Petersburg, and examines the politics of memory which has distorted the true scale of resistance. He places this in the context of the potential for collective action, and concludes that 'Russians mobilized to resist in August 1991 in greater numbers and with more positive effect than populations in Europe and Latin America who were faced with

³⁵ Nick Bisley, *The End of the Cold War and the Causes of Soviet Collapse* (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

³⁶ For a larger review, see Walter D. Connor, *Tattered Banners: Labor, Conflict, and Corporatism in Postcommunist Russia* (Boulder, Westview, 1996).

military coups'.³⁷ By the end an astonishing 200,000 people had gathered to defend the Russian White House against the putschists.

- k) Ultimately, the system may have been retrievable if Gorbachev had been willing to use extensive coercion. The Soviet Union had multiple layers of security forces, ranging from various KGB specialist forces, a whole MVD army as well as a newly-established specialist riot police, the OMON, and several layers within the Soviet Army itself. Given these forces at its disposal, it is astonishing that the political leadership simply gave up without a fight. The absence of sustained coercion in part derived from Gorbachev's fundamental refusal to operate within the framework of Petr Stolypin's well-known injunction that 'in Russia liberal reforms can only be possible if the regime first clamps down, because for a Russian any relaxation in the system represents weakness'. This, however, is an injunction which Vladimir Putin appears to have taken to heart.
- l) The lack of will to fight emerged from what has often been described as the total corruption of the elite, accompanied by their total incompetence. The system, from this perspective, was so corroded from within that it lacked the capacity to resist. The *nomenklatura* system had become a corrupt, piratical, privileged and corrupt elite,³⁸ incapable of evolving into an active middle class, let alone an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie. The collective ownership of the means of production, Milovan Djilas argued, had spawned a 'new class', and although industrialisation and other modernist projects could be achieved under its aegis, the fundamental features of the counter-modern programme could not. As Djilas puts it, 'The Communist revolution cannot attain a single one of the ideals named as its motivating force'.³⁹ This was accompanied by popular disillusionment after several years of the corrosive effect of the glasnost' revelations about the crimes of the past and the incompetence of the present. These came to a head over the initial attempts to suppress news about the explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power station on 26 April 1986, with the May Day marches proceeding as normal in nearby Kiev a few days later as if nothing had happened.
- m) Perestroika generated a range of social movements and proto-parties, described at the time as the rebirth of civil society. However, a notable feature of oppositional movements at the time is what we may call their 'terminal discourse', the belief in the

³⁷ Harley D. Balzer, 'Ordinary Russians? Rethinking August 1991', *Demokratizatsiya*, Vol. 13, No. 2, Spring 2005, pp. 193-218, at p. 214.

³⁸ The outstanding example of this genre of literature is Michael Voslensky, *Nomenklatura: Anatomy of the Soviet Ruling Class* (London, Bodley Head, 1984).

³⁹ Milovan Djilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (New York, Praeger, 1957), pp. 30-31.

irremedial nature of the Soviet project and its inevitable collapse.⁴⁰ The inability to adapt and incorporate elements of ‘Soviet anti-communism’ into an evolutionary form of reform communism, introduced terminality into the practices of the communism of reform.⁴¹ In other words, the fall was prefigured in the behavioural patterns of the political process. It was balanced, of course, by the obdurate belief in the system’s survivability by a rump of the old elite.⁴²

It is clear from the above that no single condition can be identified in precipitating the fall, and that a combination of factors came together in an unpredictable combination to create the ‘perfect storm’ that swept the Soviet Union away. The most sustained attempt to give institutional form on a national scale to aspirations to achieve a counter-modern society went with it, leaving a ‘ground zero’ in social consciousness.

Modernisation, modernity and the fall

Having examined the ‘why’ issue, we will now look at the ‘what’ question, which extends our temporal horizon to long-term factors.⁴³ Standard accounts of the transitions from authoritarianism to democracy examine the preconditions necessary for the emergence of a stable social order. The central problem is the dynamics of social and economic change, processes that can be summed up as modernisation (and the obstacles to it), however ambivalent and questionable the term might have become. There has long been a debate over whether development is a prerequisite for democracy, and by the same token, whether democracy is a precondition for development. This debate is part of the larger literature examining problems of ‘transition’, a term which is at best no more than a code word for the processes shaping accelerated and conscious transformation of a society from one type of social order to another, and can thus be contrasted with normal evolutionary development. The politics associated with a ‘transitional’ period will by definition contain elements of the extraordinary and the emergency, even when the transition is intended to create a liberal democratic order in which these features are sublimated into the operative codes of the order itself. In the transition to communism, by contrast, the extraordinary measures remained extrinsic to the norms of the desired

⁴⁰ This was reflected vividly in the writings of Alexander Tsipko, for example his *Is Stalinism Really Dead?* (New York, Harper Collins, 1990).

⁴¹ For an interesting late discussion, see Vladimir Kutyrev, ‘Smysl i perspektivy sovetskogo antikommunizma’, *Dialog*, No. 6, April 1991, pp. 21-29.

⁴² On the eve of the collapse a large-scale survey of views within the CPSU argued that the party had a great future since its members had adapted to ‘general civilisational values of freedom of conscience, civil society, and the market economy’, Vladimir Boikov, ‘Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya: Partiya’, *Dialog*, No. 6, April 1991, p. 3.

⁴³ This section draws on my ‘Modernisation, Neo-Modernisation and Comparative Democratisation’, part of the Special Issue ‘Why Democracy for the Post-Socialist States’ edited by David Lane, for *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* (East European Politics from March 2012), forthcoming 2012.

society and thus were visible and exposed, and hence vulnerable to the special type of terminal critique practiced in the Soviet regime's declining years and during perestroika.

Modernisation and development

The fundamental premise of modernisation theory is that there is some essential link between economic development and political change, yet the nature of this link remains contested. In the Soviet case, Isaac Deutscher and others had long argued that Stalinism was its own gravedigger, in that it was creating a modernised society that would ultimately throw off the archaic forms of rule represented by the Communist dictatorship, yet few were able to predict the timing and dynamics of the fall.⁴⁴

As far back as 1969 Zbigniew Brzezinski observed that 'the effort to maintain a doctrinaire dictatorship over an increasingly modern society has already contributed to a reopening of the gap that existed in pre-revolutionary Russian society between the political system and the society, thereby posing the threat of the degeneration of the Soviet system; ... transformation of the bureaucratic communist dictatorship into a more pluralistic political system – even though a system of one-party rule – seems essential if its degeneration is to be averted'.⁴⁵ Lucian Pye argued with equal conviction that authoritarian regimes were undermined by modernisation processes.⁴⁶ As a recent study notes,

Modernization is a syndrome of social changes linked to industrialization. Once set in motion, it tends to penetrate all aspects of life, bringing occupational specialization, urbanization, rising educational levels, rising life expectancy, and rapid economic growth. These create a self-reinforcing process that transforms social life and political institutions, bringing rising mass participation in politics and – in the long run – making the establishment of democratic political institutions increasingly likely.⁴⁷

Thus the Soviet case only added to the long debate about the various modes of causality and appropriate methodologies. In the West there had been a general turn away from modernisation theory, on the assumption that ultimately the whole model was grounded on hieratic westernising logos. Instead, for some three decades the field of comparative democratisation overshadowed modernisation as the dominant paradigm through which

⁴⁴ For a discussion of the role of prediction and political scientists, see Michael Cox (ed.), *Rethinking Soviet Collapse: Sovietology, the Death of Communism and the New Russia* (London and New York, Pinter, 1998).

⁴⁵ Zbigniew Brzezinski (ed.), *Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1969), chapter. 1, 'The Soviet System, Transformation or Degeneration?'.
⁴⁶ Lucian W. Pye, 'Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 84, No. 1, March 1990, pp. 3-19.

⁴⁷ Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, 'How Development Leads to Democracy: What We Know About Modernization', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 1, Jan.-Feb. 2009, pp. 33-48, at p. 34.

the process of accelerated change has been examined. The Soviet collapse forces us once again to 'bring back' modernisation theory, but as we shall see below, no longer in the old form.

The comparative democratisation approach focuses attention on the mechanics of political transition, the actors and agents involved, and the broad process of the creation of new democracies, accompanied by analysis of the reasons for 'failed transitions'. The central issue of the political economy of transforming societies, however, was too often subsumed the notion of civil society as the determinative variable,⁴⁸ or into glib applications of 'globalisation theory'. Out of the debris of classical modernisation theory and its successors a new focus on political economy, the power relations of transforming societies, and the possibility of alternatives *within* the transition to democracy, have emerged. While linear versions of modernisation theory have been discredited, the creation of capitalist democracies on the western model has encountered resistance in both Russia and China. This 'resistance' is both particularistic (appealing to the distinctive traditions and world role of the two countries), and universalistic, in that the shift to sublimated coercion and neoliberal forms of governmentality encounter civilisational obstacles in societies where the exercise of state power has traditionally been extrinsic to the operative norms of the society itself, generating in Russia a whole literature on the historical gulf between state and society.⁴⁹

Although there are many different aspects to modernisation theory, there is one fundamental feature that occurs throughout in its many manifestations, namely that in one way or another there is a causal link between economic and political development. Jeffrey Alexander identifies four stages in the trajectory of modernisation theory.⁵⁰ The first is the classical period, from the 1940s to the 1960s, which suggested a staged process of development,⁵¹ the 'evolutionary universals' of Talcott Parsons, accompanied by a strong relationship between economic modernisation and political democratisation. In numerous studies Seymour Martin Lipset analysed the relationship between the level of economic development and the emergence of democracy, concluding that there remains a positive (but not deterministic) correlation.⁵² In a later re-evaluation of the issue he made a

⁴⁸ For example, in the Soviet case Moshe Lewin, *The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1988).

⁴⁹ R. C. Tucker, 'The Image of Dual Russia', in R. C. Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind* (London, George, Allen & Unwin, 1972), pp. 121-42.

⁵⁰ Jeffrey C. Alexander, 'Modern, Anti, Post and Neo', *New Left Review*, No. 210, March/April 1995, pp. 63-101.

⁵¹ W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1960).

⁵² Seymour Martin Lipset, 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 53, No. 1, March 1959, pp. 69-105; Seymour Martin Lipset, 'Economic Development and Democracy', in S. M. Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Democracy* (London, Mercury Books, 1963), pp. 45-76; Seymour Martin Lipset, 'Reflections on Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 4, No.2, 1993, pp. 43-55; Seymour Martin Lipset, 'On the General Conditions for Democracy', in Lisa Anderson (ed.), *Transitions to Democracy* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1999).

point of direct relevance to the Russian experience: 'In many countries during the 1980s and early 1990s, political democratization occurred at the same time as a profound economic crisis'.⁵³ These arguments have now been incorporated, often in an uncritical manner, into the core postulates of democratisation theory.⁵⁴ Another implicit feature of modernisation theory has also seeped into comparative democratisation studies, namely the contrast between some sort of negatively-characterised traditional society and more positively charged modern (or democratic) society. The fact that the key features of a modern society are almost entirely drawn from the repertoire of actually-existing modernity in the western world (particularly America) was a key criticism of classical modernisation theory, yet when the same trope re-emerged in the guise of comparative democratisation, it has been subject to less comment. At the heart of both is a concept of modernity defined in terms of individualism, secularism, science, incremental progress, all tending to some sort of universal model and convergence on a single model of industrial society.

From the late 1960s the classical model was challenged by a range of radical theories, focusing in particular on the relationship between the core and periphery of the world capitalist system. While classical theory assumed linearity in development that precluded the need for radical disjuncture, radical theories once again restated the centrality of the concept of revolution as a mode of social progress. The classical model was inverted, and capitalist modernity was condemned as exploitative and in peripheral settings as de-developmental. Under-development could only be overcome by a radical break that would instate some form of social control over the means of production. The Soviet Union was both a model and a warning, hence the emphasis in much of this literature on a more humane and democratic form of socialism. As we have seen, notable challenges to the classical model came from André Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein.⁵⁵ Many of these were rooted in a neo-Marxist structural materialism that was susceptible to empirical challenge, as well as lacking a multiple dimension that could incorporate agency and ideology.

It is for this reason that a challenge to modernisation theory was launched from another flank, often allied to radical theories but refusing to be limited by its rather limited structuralist intellectual imagination. These are dubbed post-modern theories by Alexander, and they remain influential to this day. Instead of the emphasis on formally organised systems, post-modernism emphasises the contingent and the fluid in a

⁵³ Seymour Martin Lipset, 'The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited', *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 59, No. 1, February 1994, pp. 1-22, at p. 1.

⁵⁴ For example, Terry L. Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, 'Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe', *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. 128, 1991, pp. 269-84; Dankwart A. Rustow, 'Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1970, pp. 337-63; Axel Hadenius, *Democracy and Development* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992).

⁵⁵ André Gunder Frank, *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution. Essays on the Development of Underdevelopment and the Immediate Enemy* (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969); André Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil*, revised and enlarged edition (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969); Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System* (New York, Academic Press, 1974) and later volumes in the series.

representation of reality that is fragmented, privatised and commodified. The exhaustion of the old model of industrial society and the development of consumer capitalism, the decline of traditional forms of collective representation is accompanied by a shift from government (of the old statist sort) to governance, which operates according to new forms of governmentality in which the citizen effectively becomes the subject of self-disciplining. The onset of more liberal social policies, and greater acceptance of social and personal diversity represents a model of late capitalism that in its social forms is very different from the rigidities of the capitalism analysed by Marx and Engels. As Terry Eagleton argued, late capitalism appeared to have negated all opposition to itself: the citizen was rendered a consumer, and greater social and personal freedoms were accompanied by the marginalisation of the political in its entirety.⁵⁶ By contrast, Alexander argues that in fact postmodernism is little more than another version of classical modernisation's emphasis 'on the private, the personal, and the local'. Both deflated grand narratives of critique and collective empowerment: 'The resemblances to radical antimodernism, then, are superficial and misleading. In fact, there is a much more significant connection between postmodernism and the period that preceded radicalism, that is, modernization theory itself'.⁵⁷

Neo-modernisation theory

This brings us to the fourth stage of modernisation theory, which Alexander and others dub as neo-modernisation theories. In response to fragmentation and the amorphous circularity of post-modern theory the paradigm of neo-modernisation, dubbed 'Modernisation II' by Edward Tiryakian, took shape.⁵⁸ The paradigm took issue with the emphasis on exogenous factors stressed by dependency and world system theories by focusing once again on endogenous factors as well as the scope for agency ('the voluntaristic basis of action theory' as Tiryakian puts it), but in contrast with earlier theories of modernisation argues that 'It seems patent that "modernisation" in the world today means more than upgrading the conditions of economic production, although it means that also. It also means upgrading the conditions of the life space of individuals and collectivities which have been circumscribed by political arrangements of the state that are viewed as illegitimate'.⁵⁹ The main charge against earlier versions of modernisation was that they lacked at their core a developed notion of 'modernity', to be

⁵⁶ Terry Eagleton, 'Where Do Post-Modernists Come From?', *The Monthly Review*, Vol. 47, No. 3, July-August 1995, pp. 59-70.

⁵⁷ Alexander, 'Modern, Anti, Post and Neo', p. 82.

⁵⁸ Edward A. Tiryakian, 'Modernization: Exhumateur in Pace (Rethinking Macrosociology in the 1990s)', *International Sociology*, Vol. 6, No. 2, June 1991, pp. 165-180, at p. 171, and who outlines some of the key propositions of the paradigm at pp. 172-5. Alexander calls this period 'neo-modernism'.

⁵⁹ Tiryakian, 'Modernization', p. 172.

distinguished from mere contemporaneity.⁶⁰ They also lacked reflexivity and an embedded notion of critique.

Further, as Tiryakian states in a rebuke to those who succumbed to post-communist triumphalism, 'Part of the delusion of Westernisation is that there should be a model of development exportable, applicable everywhere, and superior morally and technically to all other forms of societal development'. He goes on to take aim at Parsonian structuralists and partisans of the 'end of history': 'What makes the delusion pernicious is when this model of modernity is equated with a contemporary empirical society, viewed as the culminating point, the *summum bonum*, of societal evolution, and imposed by coercive means (military or economic) on other societies'.⁶¹ Rather than the fall of the communist systems denoting an end stage of modernity, the modernisation perspective was itself modernised to treat 'personality, society and culture as interactive dimensions of societal change. ... eschewing presuppositions of a single model of development or the primacy of any sector'.⁶² Neo-modernisation contains a dimension of immanent critique lacking in standard theories of comparative democratisation.

Marxist historicism, the view that the revolutionary communist movement had somehow unlocked the key to history and all that revolutionaries had to do was help events along, in the post-communist era was replaced by a powerful liberal historicism, in which the real subjects of change were represented as walk-on actors in a play written by others. This was indeed a type of 'inverted Marxism' in which Francis Fukuyama and others practiced an 'idealist version of historical materialism'.⁶³ Instead of active subjects being engaged as agents in the making of their own history, historicism irreducibly reduces a people and political agents into little more than subjects of a historical process whose inner workings are understood by no more than a select few. In his critique Karl Popper 'refutes the possibility of predicting historical developments to the extent to which they may be influenced by the growth of our knowledge'.⁶⁴ As the post-communist 'transitions' began, the sentiment was repeated by Ralf Dahrendorf, who advocated a piecemeal and incremental process of change based on open-ended negotiations between civic associations and governments.⁶⁵ This is neo-modernisation at its best.

There are two versions of neo-modernisation theory. The first, which in this paper will be dubbed 'critical neo-modernisation', arose in response to the perceived

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 174.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 173.

⁶² Edward A. Tiryakian, 'The New Worlds and Sociology: An Overview', *International Sociology*, Vol. 9, No. 2, June 1994, pp. 131-48, at p. 142.

⁶³ Alex Callinicos, *Reflections on the Philosophy of History* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995), pp. 17, 18.

⁶⁴ Karl R. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism* (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), p. vi. Popper's central argument is that 'the belief in historical destiny is sheer superstition, and that there can be no prediction of the course of human history by scientific or any other rational methods...', *ibid.*, p. iv. It is for this reason that Popper, together with Friedrich von Hayek, supported 'piecemeal social engineering' against 'utopian engineering', *ibid.*, pp. 58, 64-70.

⁶⁵ Ralf Dahrendorf, *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe* (London, Chatto & Windus, 1990); see also his *After 1989: Morals, Revolution and Civil Society* (Basingstoke and London, Macmillan, 1997).

inadequacies of classical theories; while the second, which in this paper will be called ‘civilisational neo-modernisation’, deals with issues that transcend narrow interpretations of both modernisation theory and the concerns of much of the comparative democratisation literature. Critical neo-modernisation seeks to overcome the shortcomings of classical theories of modernisation, with its linearity and assumed convergence on a western-type model. The second, civilisational neo-modernisation, takes a much broader view of the modernisation process to place it in the long-term context of cultural adaptation of civilisational complexes to the challenges of modernity.

Critical neo-modernisation theory reasserts the grand narratives and the logic of causality of classical modernisation theory, although in a more reflexive form. This was given a major boost by the collapse of communism in 1989-91, which appeared to confirm that the western form of modernity was, after all, the only viable one, and thus gave rise, as we have seen, to the liberal historicism of the ‘end of history’ type.⁶⁶ The three key sub-systems of western modernity became the subject of endless theorising in the democratisation literature, all of which confirmed their centrality: the market economy, the liberal democratic polity, and a Tocquevillean representation of civil society. At the heart of this neo-modernising model, which shaped the intellectual foundations of the whole field of comparative democratisation, was the notion that the market could act as an instrument of emancipation through privatisation, competition, individualism and contract; all beliefs reinforced by the failure of Soviet-style collectivism and solidarity. Globalisation theory then emerged as a way of generalising these principles on a universal scale. Globalisation theory restored a linear trajectory for the modernisation of markets and societies based on convergence with the model devised in the advanced centres of global modernity.

A second key aspect of critical neo-modernisation theory reformulated earlier debates about the need for the appropriate ‘civic culture’ to sustain democracy in terms of the notion of ‘social capital’ as the intervening cultural variable between path dependent and continuous economic modernisation and democratisation.⁶⁷ The debates of the 1960s about the role of civic culture and popular orientations to politics had never gone away,⁶⁸ and indeed, Harry Eckstein devoted his academic life to the study of the question.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History’, *The National Interest*, Summer 1989, pp. 3-17; Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York, Free Press, 1992). The paradox is that just at the point that Marxian materialist historicism hit the buffers of history, it was replaced by a powerful liberal form of materialist historicism (typically taking the form of globalisation theory).

⁶⁷ The doyen of the field is Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1993). See also Robert D. Putnam, (ed.), *Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society* (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2002).

⁶⁸ The key work is by Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Boston, Little, Brown, 1965), followed by the reconsiderations in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Newbury Park, CA, Sage, 1989).

⁶⁹ For a collective review of his ideas from a Russian perspective, see Harry Eckstein, Frederic J. Fleron Jr., Erik P. Hoffmann, and William M. Reissinger, *Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia? Explorations in State-Society Relations* (Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998).

However, during the ‘third wave’ era of comparative democratisation these debates assumed a peculiar inflection, focusing on the idea of ‘social capital’ and related issues of trust. The notion of social capital purported to explain why societies at similar levels of development, and even with similar institutional arrangements, can have such diverse democratic outcomes. Terms such as patrimonialism, clientelism and corruption have been enlisted to explain the persistent personalisation of power and deinstitutionalisation, the absence of generalised trust, and the lack of differentiation between the public and private spheres. A vast literature developed discussing the supposed cultural basis for Chinese economic success, and indeed, the role of Chinese diaspora communities in Southeast Asia’s development.⁷⁰ Thus, critical neo-modernisation reasserted the tangibility and relevance of the modernisation project; that is, a theory of neo-modernity, together with elements of linearity and the isomorphism of social forms on a convergent trajectory.

This time, however, in contrast to earlier modernisation theory, it was the democratic revolution itself that was exalted, as a form of social renewal as much as a developmental model. This was accompanied by the moral drama of the fall of communism in 1989-91, the struggle on Tiananmen Square in 1989, all the way through to the North African and Middle Eastern revolutions in 2011. Thus the sacred goal of neo-modernism is no longer represented as ‘modernisation’ but ‘democratisation’, which is now the form in which universal goals can be couched in particularistic forms.⁷¹ Contradictions however remain, since it has been precisely Russia’s demand that the hegemonic powers in the international system apply their universal principles in a genuinely general manner that has rendered it something of an outsider;⁷² accompanied by Russia’s own selective and partial incorporation of the fundamental norms underlying its engagement with European and international society.⁷³ By the same token, engagement with the agenda of universalism renders Russia part of the neo-modern project.

Neo-modernisation restored the primacy of the civilisational complex that had been devised in the west and which had thereafter transformed the rest of the world. The narrowness and linearity of the original modernisation paradigm, however, gave way to a broader appreciation of the contradictions of western modernity while reinstating the centrality of its key features such as openness and uncertainty. It is precisely these issues that are at the heart of civilisational neo-modernisation, an approach that tempers the particularistic limitations of the critical version. The concept of ‘civilisation’ in this

⁷⁰ For example, Peter L. Berger, *The Capitalist Revolution: Fifty Propositions about Prosperity, Equality and Liberty* (New York, Basic Books, 1986), p. 166 and passim.

⁷¹ Alexander, ‘Modern, Anti, Post and Neo’, p. 93.

⁷² For a general consideration of the problem, see Raymond Geuss, *Philosophy and Real Politics* (Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2008).

⁷³ Richard Sakwa, ‘Russia and Europe: Whose Society?’, special issue, Ioannis Stivachtis and Mark Webber (eds), ‘Europe After Enlargement’, *The Journal of European Integration*, Vol. 33, No. 2, March 2011, pp. 197-214.

context is contrasted to other 'social formations as political regimes, different forms of political economy or collectivities like "tribes", ethnic groups or nations, or else religions or cultural traditions', and instead represents 'the combination of ontological or cosmological visions (visions of transmundane and mundane reality), with the definition, construction, and regulation of the major arenas of social life and interaction'.⁷⁴

At the heart of civilisational neo-modernisation is the idea of multiple modernities; or put another way, countries can be modern in different ways, and thus the equivalence between westernisation and modernisation is challenged. Shmuel Eisenstadt described the emergence of a 'civilisation of modernity' that was first devised in the West, but which from the first was beset by contradictions and antinomies. As he notes, 'This gave rise to continual critical discourse and political contestations which focused on the relations, tensions and contradictions between its premises and the institutional developments in modern societies'.⁷⁵ These tensions, combined with international pressures, in his view gave rise to 'multiple modernities', and by implication, multiple routes to modernity.⁷⁶ For him, Japan 'crystallized the first successful non-western modernity'.⁷⁷ Japan ultimately was able to create a hyper-modern society cast in traditional forms. Although for modernising societies 'the original Western model of development represented the crucial (and usually ambivalent) reference point', the various life worlds of modernity (ranging from the family, urbanisation, economic organisation, political structures, media spheres and individual orientations) were defined and organised in many different ways. Thus the idea of 'multiple modernities' is best seen 'as a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs'.⁷⁸

It is this combination that eluded the Soviet Union and which contemporary Russia is now looking for. The Tsarist regime failed to incorporate economic modernisation into the procrustean bed of the autocracy, and when faced by the pressure of world war, the system collapsed in 1917. Despite its internationalist revolutionary origins, Soviet communism under Stalin sought to fulfil certain Russian national goals; but unlike China (or Japan), the Russian subject was embedded in a larger Soviet ideal. This precluded the evolutionary adaptation of the revolutionary socialist ideal to a narrow nation-centred modernisation project. As I argued above, the Soviet developmental experiment represented an attempt to create an alternative modernity, but in the end failed to sustain itself as a coherent alternative social order.⁷⁹ Arnason dismisses those who

⁷⁴ S. N. Eisenstadt, 'The Civilizational Dimension in Sociological Analysis', *Thesis Eleven*, Vol. 62, No. 1, 2000, pp. 1-21, at p. 2.

⁷⁵ Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, 'The Civilizational Dimension of Modernity: Modernity as a Distinct Civilization', *International Sociology*, Vol. 16, No. 3, September 2001, pp. 320-340, at p. 325.

⁷⁶ S. N. Eisenstadt, 'Multiple Modernities', *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1, Winter 2000, pp. 1-29.

⁷⁷ Eisenstadt, 'The Civilizational Dimension of Modernity', p. 328.

⁷⁸ Eisenstadt, 'Multiple Modernities', p. 2.

⁷⁹ Johann P. Arnason, *The Future that Failed: Origins and Destinies of the Soviet Model* (London, Routledge, 1993).

argue that the communist episode represented ‘a failed revolt against modernity’, and instead argues that the Soviet system was ‘a distinctive but ultimately self-destructive version of modernity, rather than a sustained deviation from the modernizing mainstream’.⁸⁰ It was thus not anti-modern but mismodernised.

Soviet-style communism represented a signal case of mismodernisation, not because of any essentialist view that there is one correct way of achieving modernisation, but simply because this form of modernity was ultimately unsustainable.⁸¹ Soviet adaptation to the challenges of modernity, while responding to some of its contradictions, failed to develop a coherent model to cope with the whole ensemble of challenges represented by modernity. The Soviet system was founded on the notion of emulation of the western form of modernity while claiming to resolve its defects, but ultimately was unable to find a way of achieving similar goals by different methods.⁸² Soviet Russia failed to pull off the Japanese trick of achieving an evolutionary form of neo-modernisation that could adapt ‘the civilisation of modernity’ with Russian particularistic traditions, let alone the universalistic concerns of Soviet-style socialism. The Soviet system was thus a failed model of modernity because of its limited adaptive potential; yet this is not to deny its substantial modernising achievements, albeit at great cost.

The Eisenstadt version of civilisational neo-modernisation rejects the isomorphism that underlies classical and in a more attenuated form in critical neo-modernisation and democratisation theories. Instead, his work sought to give valance to diversity of experiences and differences in cultural forms. Already historical sociologists like Theda Skocpol had restored the framework for diverse paths to modernity, while re-examining the basis of what it means to be ‘social’.⁸³ The fall of communism, of course, re-asserted a liberal form of historicism, but the simplifications of this approach could not long endure the diverse and harsh realities of the post-communist world. In a rather different way Samuel Huntington made an analogous case when he talked about the ‘clash of civilisations’, although his work remained firmly at the level of superficial cultural analysis, with no discussion whatsoever of the socio-economic or ideational foundations of diversity.⁸⁴ The ‘varieties of capitalism’ paradigm, which had long been at the heart of discussions of ‘embedded capitalism’ and the state-led modernisation paths

⁸⁰ Johann P. Arnason, ‘Communism and Modernity’, *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1, Winter 2000, pp. 61-90, at p. 61.

⁸¹ Richard Sakwa, *Communism in Russia: An Interpretative Essay* (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 15-16, 94-99, and *passim*.

⁸² Piotr Sztompka calls the result ‘false modernity’, containing a large element of pre-modernity. Piotr Sztompka, ‘Devenir social, néo-modernisation et importance de la culture: quelques implications de la révolution anticommuniste pour la théorie du changement social’, *Sociologie et sociétés*, Vol. 30, No. 1, 1998, pp. 85-94, at p. 89.

⁸³ For a discussion of the issue, see Theda Skocpol (ed.), *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984).

⁸⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 23-49; later reworked as a book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996).

devised by Germany and Japan, was now applied to the post-communist world to analyse the very different types of capitalism that have emerged from a similar starting point.⁸⁵

Conclusion: 1991 and neo-modernisation

The debate over what really happened in 1991, and what it signifies, is far from over. The focus in this question focuses to the long-term. In certain respects the Soviet disintegration is not over, with the emergence of Abkhazia as an independent state, and possibly South Ossetia as well. Equally, the dissolution of the communist order in the Soviet Union does not betoken the end of the communist ideal, as Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek, and many others now argue.⁸⁶ Contrary to the arguments of the liberal historicists, the dissolution of the communist project is not over, and neither is the communist challenge. The fate of communism after communism has become more relevant with the passage of time since the problem of the radical critique of the market and liberal democracy is far from over. While the comparative democratisation literature analyses how to create and to consolidate democracy in specific countries, the fundamental question may be how to ensure the fundamentals of justice in new combinations – the core of the original communist challenge to Western modernity.

While the Soviet collapse may have been inevitable, it was no less unpredictable. The old debate about the failure of Sovietologists to predict the systemic collapse is misleading. From the very beginning of Soviet power there had been voices proclaiming the system's inherent lack of viability; but to anticipate the system's collapse is not the same thing as to be able to predict the precise timing of the end of a particular order. Andrei Amalrik and Emmanuel Todd are considered the most prescient in this respect, but they too failed to identify the fundamental dynamics of the collapse.⁸⁷ In the end Beissinger's impossible becoming the inevitable took place in the blink of historical time. Or, as Alexei Yurchak puts it, 'Everything was forever, until it was no more'.⁸⁸ The debate on the alleged failure of Soviet experts has clear ideological resonance, since it is

⁸⁵ David Lane and Martin Myant (eds), *Varieties of Capitalism in Post-Communist Countries* (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

⁸⁶ Alain Badiou, *The Communist Hypothesis* (London, Verso, 2010); Costas Douzinas and Slavoj Žižek (eds), *The Idea of Communism* (London, Verso, 2010).

⁸⁷ Andrei Amalrik, *Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970); Emmanuel Todd, *La chute finale: Essai sur la décomposition de la sphère soviétique* (Paris, Robert Laffont, 1990).

⁸⁸ The same strictures of course apply to a possible collapse of the USA. For example, Ted Rall in his *The Anti-American Manifesto* (New York, Seven Stories Press, 2010) argues 'But we're not here to talk about the vague possibility of collapse at some point in the future. We are here – in this book and within this historical moment – because the collapse feels as though it is currently in progress'; excerpted on www.alternet.org/story/148796, posted 16 November 2010.

alleged that ‘revisionist’ scholars ‘tended to exaggerate the Soviet system’s stability and legitimacy’.⁸⁹ The political resonance of this historiographical debate is far from over.

This applies equally to the modernisation debate. The civilisational neo-modernisation debate about the viability of alternative socio-economic systems has been revived in connection with the ‘rise of China’, and in general with the emergence of what has been called the model of ‘authoritarian capitalism’.⁹⁰ However, the view that the spread of capitalism can be accompanied by profound political incompatibilities has been challenged on the grounds that ‘the classic indictment of illiberal government is essentially correct’, giving rise to unchecked corruption and other pathologies.⁹¹ In a ringing endorsement of modernisation theory, Deudney and Ikenberry argue that ‘Looking at the overall situations in Russia and China, there is little evidence for the emergence of a stable equilibrium between capitalism and autocracy such that this combination could be dignified as a new model of modernity’.⁹² The argument is reinforced by Inglehart and Welzel, who reprise the classical modernisation case that ‘the conditions conducive to democracy can and do emerge – and the process of “modernization”, according to abundant empirical evidence, advances them’.⁹³ They concede that ‘modernization does not automatically lead to democracy’, but they insist that ‘in the long run [it] brings social and cultural changes that make democratization increasingly probable’.⁹⁴ Thus, while classical modernisation theory was more concerned with the problem of ‘backwardness’ and how to achieve development, neo-modernisation shifts the emphasis to the consequences, above all in opening up the potential for democracy. It also makes possible different appreciations of how that democracy can be achieved and the different forms of social order in which it can be sustained.

Gorbachev sought to ‘derevolutionise’ the system, just as Deng Xiaoping had done, but whereas in China this opened up the potential for massive economic growth and the country’s ‘quiet rise’, in the Soviet Union it had the opposite effect. The long-term effects of the Soviet fall remain debated. The West had long lived in the shadow of a communist ‘other’, which in part shaped the West itself. The development of social welfare systems and inclusive labour processes in the post-war era can in part be ascribed to the existence of the Soviet Union, and the Cold War threat posed by a powerful protagonist. With the Soviet demise a new quality of historical time has been introduced. Already in 1934 Andrei Platonov had written, ‘A world without the USSR would

⁸⁹ Leon Aron, ‘Everything You Think You Know about the Collapse of the Soviet Union is Wrong: And Why it Matters Today in a New Age of Revolution’, *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2011.

⁹⁰ Azar Gat, ‘The Return of the Authoritarian Great Powers’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 4, July-August 2007, pp. 56-69.

⁹¹ Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, ‘The Myth of the Autocratic Revival: Why Liberal Democracy Will Prevail’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 1, January-February 2009, pp. 77-93, at p. 84.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁹³ Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, ‘How Development Leads to Democracy: What we Know About Modernization’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 1, January-February 2009, pp. 33-48, at p. 34.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

undoubtedly destroy itself of its own accord within the course of the next century'.⁹⁵ The Soviet collapse betokens a broader challenge to the modernity to which it had posed itself as the alternative.

⁹⁵ Andrei Platonov, 'On the First Socialist Tragedy', *New Left Review*, No. 69, May-June 2011, pp. 31-32, at p. 32.

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**20 Years since the Disintegration of the Soviet Union: Looking Backward,
Looking Forward**

Session I: Historicizing the Disintegration of the Soviet Union:
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"Russia-Korea Relations and the Soviet Collapse"

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The Soviet Collapse and a Study of the History of Korean-Russian Relations

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I.

It has been twenty years since the Republic of Korea and the Soviet Union normalized their diplomatic relations on September 30th, 1990. The diplomatic links between the two countries had been severed as a result of Russo-Japanese War that followed the 1905 Protectorate Treaty, which deprived Korea sovereignty of the Chosun Dynasty. Russia established formal relations with North Korea forty years later, and it took another half century to do so with Republic of Korea. Since then, Russia has achieved constructive cooperation with the two Koreas.

In November 1992, President Roh Tae-Woo signed a pact known as ‘A Treaty on Basic Relations between the Republic of Korea and Russia’ and Presidents Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung of the Republic of Korea and President Vladimir Vldimirovich Putin of Russia visited the other party’s country. Summits between them had resulted in various agreements on international issues such as ‘A Treaty on Economic Cooperation,’ ‘A Treaty on Criminal Justice Cooperation,’ ‘A Treaty on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Power,’ and ‘A Memorandum of Understanding on the Industrial Production Sector.’ These treaties showed that important changes had occurred in the Russo-South Korean relations.

On the other hand, after a couple of conflicts, North Korea and Russia improved their relationship in the 1990s. In the middle of this decade Russian leaders rejected the one-way line policy toward South Korea. In April 1996, Russia and North Korea held the first meeting of ‘The Committee on the Inter-Governmental Level Cooperations of Trade and Scientific Technology,’ and in the following autumn they signed ‘The Treaty on the Cultural and Academic Cooperation between North Korea and Russia.’

As such, the Russo-North Korean relations had achieved remarkable progress. In February 2002, after long talks, Russia and North Korea signed ‘A Treaty on Friendship, Good-Neighbourhood, and Cooperation.’ Since then leaders

from both countries, President Vladimir Vldimirovich Putin and Chairman of the North Korean National Defense Commissson, Kim Jung Il, visited each other and resumed formal relations.

It deserves attention that the South Korea-Russia and North Korea-Russia talks led to discussions on the prospects of the three countries cooperation in the economic sector and other areas. This progress was influenced by the reconciliatory atmosphere derived from the first-ever summit between South and North Korea held in Pyongyang in 2000. From this historical summit the two countries signed 'The Joint Communique between South Korea and North Korea.'

The positive and reconciliatory change among these three countries stimulated new issues such as Russia's foreign policy toward Korea, which is mainly concerned with the independence of Korea and the maintenance of a unitary nation-state. The inviolability of territory due to various causes and history of Russo-Korean relations also needs to be examined thoroughly and investigated objectively. In addition, it is necessary to do away with past stereotypes. By these works, Russia can exercise its historical rights as a country of North-East Asia to engage actively with issues on the Korean Peninsula including peaceful reunification of Korea.

II.

In can be said that Russo-Korean relations started in earnest back in 1860 when they shared borders. The historiography of the relationship during the pre-Soviet period has characteristics of ideal description of the Tsar's despotic rule over Korea and other Asian countries. Russian scholars conferred legitimacy to the Tsar's foreign policy and criticized other powerful nations' colonial policies. Those researchers condemned the Chinese and Japanese policies in Korea, while glorifying the Tsar. During the Soviet Union period, an in-depth study of the policy toward Korea had emerged. In the 1920s and 1930s, many papers on the history of Russia's policy in the Far East were published, and some of them covered the Korean Peninsula¹⁾. In 1948 Nihamin completed his

1) Б.А.Романов. Россия в Маньчжурии. Очерки по истории внешней политики самодержавия в эпоху империализма (1892-1906).-Л., 1928; В.Я.Аварин. Империализм в Маньчжурии. Т. 1-2. - М.-Л., 1931-1934; А.Л.Попов. От Босфора к Тихому океану //Историк-марксист.-1934.-#3; А.Л.Попов

PhD thesis, ‘The Russo-Japanese Relations from 1894 to 1898 and the Korean Peninsula.’ This dissertation analyzed diplomatic activities in the Korean Peninsula where Russia and Japan competed with each other during the Sino-Japanese War. Nihamin dealt vast amounts of foreign relations documents and other materials from ‘The Foreign Relations Archives under the Soviet Union Department of Foreign Affairs (Currently it is referred АВПРИ)’. In his works, Nihamin described Russia’s position on the Japanese invasion into Korea, the Korean royal refuge at the Russian legation from 1896 to 1897, and activities of Russian military instructors and financial advisors during 1896 and 1898. In 1951 Galperin attempted to prove the thesis that Russia was the only world power which continuously supported Korea’s independence after the Russo-Japanese War²⁾.

International relations scholars on the Far East from the Soviet Union period contributed significantly to the research on Russo-Korean foreign relations. Their collective work, *The Foreign Relations in the Far East*³⁾, and A. Narochnitski’s seminal work⁴⁾ deserve attention. These two books disclose Russia’s policy toward the Chosun Dynasty during periods when great powers forcefully coerced the dynasty to open her ports to trade and when tensions between China and Japan on the Korean Peninsula escalated. Narochnitski argues that “Russia attempted to persuade Ching Dynasty not to collaborate with the United States at the time of ‘The Chosun-the U.S. Friendship and Commerce Treaty of 1882.’ Also on December 4th, 1884, the Gapsin Coup took place when China, Japan, the Great Britain and other powerful nations engaged in a heated competition. After the coup Russia defended the principle of Chosun’s independence and inviolability of territory. In his work, revealed China’s reactionary policy on the Korean Peninsula and focused on the attitude of Chosun’s ruling class between 1885 and 1895.

в. Дальневосточная политика царизма в 1894-1901гг.// Историк-марксист.-1935.-КнигаXI; А.Л. Попов. Кризис дальневосточной политики царизма накануне революции 1905 г.//Историк-марксист.-1935.-КнигаXII.

- 2) А.Л.Гальперин. Корейский вопрос в международных отношениях накануне аннексии Кореи Японией (1905-1910)// Вопросы истории.-1951.-#2.
- 3) А.Л.Нарочницкий, А.А.Губер, М.И.Сладковкий, И.Я.Бурлингас. Международные отношения на Дальнем Востоке. Кн. первая. С конца XVIв. до 1917г.-М.,1973; Г.В.Ефимов, А.М.Дубинский. Международные отношения на Дальнем Востоке. Кн. вторая. 1917-1945гг.-М.,1973. 참조.
- 4) А.Л.Нарочницкий, А.А.Губер, М.И.Сладковкий, И.Я.Бурлингас. Международные отношения на Дальнем Востоке. Кн. первая. С конца XVIв. до 1917г.-М.,1973; Г.В.Ефимов, А.М.Дубинский. Международные отношения на Дальнем Востоке. Кн. вторая. 1917-1945гг.-М.,1973. 참조.

B. Romanov⁵⁾ sheds lights on the role of Korea in the competition between Russia and Japan in the Far East from 1895 to 1907 through his major works on the history of foreign relations during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). L. Kutakov⁶⁾ published a paper on Russia's diplomatic efforts to protect Korea's independence during 'The Treaty of Portsmouth,' and S. Grigortsevich⁷⁾ conducted research on Russia's position toward the Korean Peninsula when Japan began its preparation for the annexation of Korea. Moreover, papers on the Russo-Chinese relations⁸⁾ and other foreign policy⁹⁾ dealt with Russia's policy toward Korea.

Russian scholars of Korean studies during the Soviet Union period contributed to researches on Korean social, economic and political history¹⁰⁾ and the colonization process of Korea by Japan and national independence movements under Japanese rule. With these research results, understanding of the economic basis of foreign policy pursued by Korea's feudal regime and the factors that influenced to the power struggle within the Korean ruling class advanced. The motivations for Korean people's migration to Russia from the late 19th century to the early 20th century also became clear. The research papers mentioned above provide a great deal of important information on Russo-Korean relations¹¹⁾ and Russia's policy toward Korea¹²⁾ during this period, as well as the relations between the peoples of the two countries¹³⁾.

5) Б.А.Романов. Очерки дипломатической истории русско-японской войны (1895-1907). М., 1955.

6) Л.Н.Кутаков. Портсмутский мирный договор. (Из истории отношений Японии с Россией и СССР. 1905-1945). - М., 1961.

7) С.С.Григорцевич. Дальневосточная политика империалистических держав в 1906-1917 гг. - Томск. 1965.

8) И.В.Бестужев. Борьба в России по вопросам внешней политики. 1906-1910. - М., 1961.

9) Г.В.Ефимов. Внешняя политика Китая. 1897-1899 гг. - М., 1958.

10) Ю.В.Ванин. Экономическое развитие Кореи в XVII-XVIII веках. - М., 1968; М.Н.Пак. Очерк из политической истории Кореи во второй половине XIX в. // Доклады и сообщения исторического факультета МГУ. Вып. 8. - М., 1948; М.Н.Пак. К характеристике социально-экономических отношений в Корею в XIX в. // Сборник статей по истории стран Дальнего Востока. - М., 1952; М.Н.Пак. Корея в середине XIX в. // Всемирная история. Т.6. - М., 1960; Г.Д.Тягай. Очерк истории Кореи во второй половине XIX в. - М., 1960; Г.Д.Тягай. Общественная мысль Кореи в эпоху позднего феодализма. - М., 1971; Г.Д.Тягай, В.Н.Пак. Национальная идея и просветительство в Корею в начале XX века. - М., 1996.

11) Г.Д.Тягай. Крестьянское восстание в Корею 1893-1895 гг. - М., 1953 - С.66-72; История российской духовной миссии в Корею. Сборник статей. - М., 1999.

12) В.И.Шипаев. Колониальное закабаление Кореи японским империализмом (1895-1917). - М., 1964. - С.72-77.

13) Г.Ф.Ким, Ф.И.Шабшина. Пролетарский интернационализм и революции в странах Востока. - М., 1967; Ф.И.Шабшина. Ленинизм и победа народно-демократической революции в Корею // Лен

The first volume of *The History of Korea*, a collective work, includes invaluable materials. In this book, the authors tried to provide an analysis of the development of Korean society's socio-economic, domestic and foreign policy for the first time in the Soviet Union period. However, Korea's relations with Russia and China were not considered as research topics to experts on the history and economy of Korea in the Soviet Union.

III.

The establishment of the Russo-Korean diplomatic relations in 1990 and the development of relations between the two countries in almost every sector provided new stimuli to the research on Russo-Korean relations. The research mainly consisted of 3 areas:

1. Comprehensive research on economic, political, and cultural relations between the two countries. On this issue, Mihail Pak¹⁴⁾, Iu. Rosalie¹⁵⁾, Bella Pak¹⁶⁾, Bolohova¹⁷⁾, S. Kurbanov¹⁸⁾, G. Tiagay¹⁹⁾ have published academic papers. Iu. Piskulova²⁰⁾ also published PhD dissertation, 'The Foreign Relations Academy under the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs.' This dissertation aims to provide comprehensive characterization of the Russo-Korean relations from the late 19th century to the early 20th century based on historiography by Russian historians and new historical materials from archives in both Russia and Korea.

2. Studies on 'Russian foreign policy and Korea,' and 'Korean diplomats in

ин и национально-освободительное движение в странах Востока.-М.,1970.-С.235-242.

14) М.Н.Пак. Взгляд на историю российско-корейских отношений (XIX-XXвв.)//Россия и Корея: Модернизация, реформы, международные отношения. -М.,1997.

15) Ю.Н.Розалиев. Из истории российско-корейских отношений. -М.,1998.

16) Б.Б.Пак. Русско-корейские отношения: уроки истории //Россия и Корея на пороге нового столетия. Материалы III научной конференции. Москва. 25-26.03.1999.-М.,1999.-С.105-125.

17) А.А.Волохова.Из истории российской политики на Дальнем Востоке: МИД, Министерство финансов и учреждение Российской духовной миссии в Корею//Проблемы Дальнего Востока.-1998.-#1.

18) С.О.Курбанов. Россия и Корея//Россия и Восток: Учебное пособие.-СПб.,2000.-С.356-388.

19) Г.Д.Тягай. У истоков русско-корейских культурных связей //Сборник статей к восьмидесятилетию со дня рождения профессора М.Н.Пака.-М., 1998.-С.297-308.

20) Ю.Е.Пискулова.Российско-корейские отношения в конце XIX- началеXX веков. Автореферат кандидат. дисс.-М.,2002.

Russia.' subjects not dealt with enough yet. The topic of the Russian foreign policy and Korea' was mainly conducted by Bella Pak, a senior scholar from 'The Institute of East Asian Studies of Russian Scientific Academy,' who edited a series of papers published in the 1990s into a book, *The Foreign Relations of Russia and Korea* in 1998. This work covers the Russian diplomatic activities around the establishment of foreign relations between Russia and Korea from vast amounts of diplomatic documents. It especially sheds light on treaties made in 1884 and 1888, and Russia's diplomatic struggle, which stood against the active infiltration by western countries and Japan, demands from China, and supported the status quo of the Korean Peninsula. On this topic, A. Hohlov²¹⁾, A. Salishev²²⁾, O. Sukovichin²³⁾, and M. Ryjenkov²⁴⁾ also published papers. Meanwhile, the topic of "Korean diplomats in Russia' was out of Russian scholars' interests. However, in recent years, interesting research papers have been written about Korean diplomats such as Min Young-Hwan, Lee Beom-Jin, Lee Wi-Jong by Boris Pak²⁵⁾, Nishilov²⁶⁾, Bella Pak²⁷⁾, and Piskulova²⁸⁾.

3. Research on the basic concepts, approach, and main points in the history of Russo-Korean relations from the mid-17th century, when the two countries encountered each other for the first time, until the annexation by Japan. needs

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- 21) А.Н.Хохлов. П.А.Дмитриевский –русский дипломат и востоковед//Корея. Сборник статей к восьмидесятилетию со дня рождения профессора М.Н.Пака.-М.,1998.-С.284-296.
- 22) А.Салищев. Контакты русских и корейцев(1860-е годы) // Проблемы Дальнего Востока.-2000.-#4.-с.128-135.
- 23) О.В.Суковицина. Карл Вебер и его вклад в развитие русско-корейских отношений //Российский корееведение. Вып.2.-М.,2001.-С.128-132.
- 24) М.Р.Рыженков. Документы Российского государственного военно-исторического архива по истории Кореи и русско-корейских отношений в XIX-начале XXв.//Восток.-2000.-#2.-С.26-31.
- 25) Б.Д.Пак. Жизнь и деятельность выдающегося корейского политика и дипломата Ли Бомджин а//Ли Бомджин. Составитель Б.Д.Пак.-М.,2002.-С.30-66; Б.Д.Пак. Корейский посланник в России и Ли Бомджин//Восток.-2002.-#4.-С.25-33;Б.Д.Пак. Дипломатическая деятельность Ли Бомджина (Ли Пом Чина) в России//Вестник Международного центра азиатских исследований .-2002.-#9.-Иркутск,2002.-С.221-230.
- 26) М.А.Насилов. Некоторые подробности пребывания в Санкт-Петербурге Чрезвычайного и Полномочного посла Кореи Ли Бомджина//Вопросы истории Кореи. Петербургский научный семинар. Сборник статей .-СПб.,1997.-С.56-77.
- 27) Б.Б.Пак. Корейская миссия Мин Ёнхвана в Россию летом1896 г./ Bella B. Park. Min Young-hwan's Mission to Russia in the summer of 1896//Вестник центра корейского языка и культуры. Вып.2.-1997.-СПб., 1997.-С.213-224; Б.Б.Пак. Ли Бомджин: последние дни жизни (по материалам российских газет) // Ли Бомджин. Составитель Б.Д.Пак.-М.,2002.-С.67-79.
- 28) Ю.Е.Пискулова. Корейский политик и дипломат Ли Пом Чин //Проблемы Дальнего Востока.-2000.-#6;Ю.Е.Пискулова. Ли Пом Чин-политик, дипломат,корейский патриот//Сотрудничество. Материалы VI международной конференции.- М.,2001; Ю.Е.Пискулова. Ли Виджон(Ли Владимир Сергеевич). Корейский принц и красный командир//Ли Бомджин. Составитель Б.Д.Пак.-М.,2002.-С.80-97.

to be studied. T. **Simbirtseva**'s papers are quite often referred to on this issue. She submitted 'The Modern Korean Historiography on the Early Russo-Korean relation (pre-1895) from 1984 to 2011'²⁹⁾ as her PhD thesis to the Institute of East Asian Studies of Russian Scientific Academy. This dissertation thoroughly investigates positions of Korean historians on the 17th century 'Albajin Battle', an encounter between Russia and Chosun, the 1854 expedition of Putyatin fleet, on the problems of border settlement and Russia's intention on the acquisition of an ice-free port within Korean peninsula, immigration of Chosun people into border areas in Russia, treaties in 1884 and 1888, reactions of Russia on the occupation of the Hamilton Island by British Navy, and foreign relations between the two countries from 1885 to 1887.

IV.

The first research product on the chronological history of Russo-Korean relations is *Russia and Korea* published by Boris Pak published in 1979. He was a student of Narochnitski, who was the first scholar who presented the status quo thesis on Russia's policy towards Korea from 1854 to the Sino-Japanese war. According to his argument, the goal of this status quo policy was to prevent the threat on stability and peace of the Russian side of the Far East, which could have been de-stabilized once one powerful nation held initiative in the Korean Peninsula.

Boris Pak inherited the thesis and applied it to Korea. He argued that Russia's plan to secure an ice-free port within Korean territory, which was often presented as evidence of a threat by Russia to Korea in foreign historiography, was nothing more than an analysis-level exercise by Russian military. Pak maintained that Russia never invaded Korea unlike the United States, France, Great Britain, Japan, or China, and relations between Russia and Korea had been peaceful since the mid-19th century. Pak emphasized neighboring territory, common political and economic interest, and many Korean immigrants living in Russian territory.

Pak also evaluated that Russia cooperated with Korea's independence goal

29) Т.М.Симбирцева. Современная(1984–2001гг.) южнокорейская историография о характере раннего периода русско-корейских отношений (до 1895г.). Автореферат канд.дисс.–М.,2002.

accepting Korean government as a sovereignty, and was against Japanese ambitions in Korea. In 2004, Boris Pak published a revised edition of *Russia and Korea*, and expanded on 50% of the original version. He explained that while in the first edition he tried to elucidate the reactionary element of the Tsar's regime, which pursued expansionary policy to strengthen its control over East Asia, the new edition puts Russia as a successor of Korean policy by showing its active participation on the settlement of the Korean Peninsula problem and peace. In the first edition, Boris Pak endorsed Bolshevik's role in the opposition of the imperialistic policy by the Tsar regime, but in the second edition he admitted the Tsar regime's role to intensify the economic, political, and cultural relations between the two countries.

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"Изучение истории России после распада СССР: традиции и новые течения".

Кащенко С.Г.

Перестроечные процессы и последовавший затем распад СССР привели к наступлению кардинальных экономических, политических и социальных перемен в обществе, способствовали важным изменениям в развитии ряда гуманитарных наук. Сегодня с уверенностью можно сказать, что во второй половине 1980-х- начале 1990-х гг. десятилетиями шлифовавшийся монолит, который назывался советской исторической наукой, зашатался и распался на десятки острых «национальных» осколков. Однако и внутри образовавшихся сегментов не было единства. Большую роль в этом сыграл быстро развивавшийся теоретико-методологический раскол.

В результате демократизации общества, в ходе полной или частичной отмены цензурных ограничений, ранее существовавшие лакуны в изучении прошлого страны стали заполняться работами, написанными на основе материалов архивных фондов, часть которых прежде была практически закрыта для исследователей. Однако писались эти работы не только, а часто и не столько с академических позиций, сколько исходя из политических взглядов на историю со стороны различных социальных групп. История стала пространством политических столкновений. В силу этого доверие общества к историческим исследованиям значительно снизилось из-за конъюнктурных переоценок узловых моментов отечественной истории.

Вместе с тем, интерес к российской истории и, прежде всего, к новой истории оказался в последние годы настолько велик, что вызвал настоящий информационный взрыв, характеризующийся небывалым числом изданных монографий, статей, сборников документов, научно-популярных работ, который не имеет аналогов в истории предшествующих десятилетий. Эти работы представляют собой сложный конгломерат исследований разного научного уровня, написанных и профессиональными историками, и «любителями».

На этом фоне вопрос о современном развитии российской исторической науки в последнее двадцатилетие оказывается настолько сложным и многосторонним, что рассмотреть его целиком в небольшой работе практически невозможно. Более реальным и обоснованным кажется анализ наиболее значимых аспектов развития исторических исследований в одном из ведущих российских научных академических и университетских центров, Санкт-Петербурге, где можно детально проследить и за традициями, складывавшимися на протяжении многих предшествующих десятилетий, и за новациями, бурно прогрессирующими в последние годы.

В современной России признанным центром исторических исследований, как, впрочем, и в советское время, остается Москва, с ее крупнейшим университетом, гуманитарными вузами и академическими учреждениями. Однако, один из старейших университетов страны, Санкт-Петербургский, оказывал и оказывает весьма заметное влияние на становление и развитие различных направлений в отечественной исторической науке. Он всегда имел «собственное лицо» и упорно отстаивал собственные мнения не только в дореволюционный период, когда он являлся столичным университетом, но и в советское время, когда его влияние существенно снизилось. Значительную роль здесь играет и тот факт, что в Санкт-Петербурге располагается ряд крупнейших российских федеральных, государственных и ведомственных архивов, прежде всего, Российский государственный исторический архив, Российский государственный архив Военно-Морского Флота, Центральный государственный исторический архив Санкт-Петербурга, Центральный государственный архив историко-политических документов Санкт-Петербурга и др., которые предоставляют историкам широкие возможности для проведения исследований, основанных не на домыслах, а на фактическом архивном материале.

Исторический факультет Санкт-Петербургского государственного университета является сегодня одним из крупнейших российских научных и учебных центров в сфере истории и искусствоведения¹.

Историческая наука в Петербурге имеет давние традиции, восходящие к основанному императором Петром I в первой четверти XVIII в. Академическому университету в составе Петербургской Академии наук. В XVIII в. она была тесно связана с именами крупных европейских ученых: профессоров М.Бюргера, Г.З. Байера, Г.Ф.Миллера.

В 1804 г. в столице был открыт Педагогический институт, преобразованный в 1819 г. в Университет. Среди профессоров-историков первой половины XIX в. важную роль в развитии российской исторической науки сыграли академик Н.Г.Устрялов и член-корреспондент Петербургской академии наук М.С.Куторга. Заметный след в деятельности историко-филологического факультета оставили впоследствии Н.И.Костомаров, Н.П.Кондаков, К.Н.Бестужев-Рюмин. Последний был наиболее ярким представителем источниковедческого направления в русской исторической науке.

Уже в середине 60-х гг. XIX в. традиционным у петербургских историков становится пристальное внимание к вопросам теории и практики источниковедения. Непосредственное начало этому положил К.Н.Бестужев – Рюмин, который, отметив заслуги своих предшественников, особенно Н.М.Карамзина, в зарождении науки критики источников, сформулировал в 1865 г. обязательные, по его мнению, принципы

¹ Подробнее об исторической университетской науке в Петербурге см.: Валк С.Н. Историческая наука в Ленинградском университете за 125 лет // Валк С.Н. Избранные труды по историографии и источниковедению. СПб., 2000. С.7-106. (первое издание - Труды юбилейной сессии ЛГУ. Секция исторических наук. Л., 1948. С.3-79); Исторический факультет Санкт-Петербургского университета, 1934—2004 : Очерк истории. СПб., 2004.

работы с ними. Он считал необходимыми изучение истории происхождения источника, объяснение особенностей его формы и содержания обстоятельствами времени и намерениями его автора, выявление степени достоверности свидетельств источника, сопоставление различных документов. Эти принципы должны были определять не только методы работы историка, но и его нравственную позицию в отношении занятий историей во имя отыскания истины.

С 1888 г. на факультете начал свою деятельность один из крупнейших российских историков С.Ф.Платонов, в 1890-е гг. – начале XX в. здесь читал лекции А.С.Лаппо-Данилевский (автор двухтомной «Методологии истории»), в трудах которых идеи Бестужева-Рюмина получили дальнейшее развитие. Впоследствии эти взгляды нашли отражение в конкретных источниковедческих трудах петербургских историков А.Е.Преснякова, А.А.Шахматова, С.Ф.Платонова, С.Н.Валка.

В 1919-1934 гг. университетские историки переживали трудное время. Факультет подвергался различным трансформациям, профессорско-преподавательский состав понес тяжелые потери. Некоторые педагоги умерли, другие - эмигрировали, третьи - были вынуждены оставить преподавательскую работу. Особенно тяжело сказалось на состоянии ленинградской исторической науки сфабрикованное ОГПУ «Академическое дело», в результате которого был арестован ряд выдающихся историков – С.Ф.Платонов, Е.В.Тарле, М.Д.Приселков и др. С лета 1929 г. были уволены свыше 100 штатных сотрудников Академии наук (она до 1934 г. находилась в Ленинграде), с конца этого же года начались аресты, в основном историков-архивистов. Арестам, а затем заключению и ссылке подверглись С.Ф.Платонов и сотрудники из его ближайшего окружения², Е.В.Тарле, Н.П.Лихачев, М.К.Любавский, Ю.В.Готье и целый ряд других выдающихся российских гуманитариев. Репрессии продолжились и в 1931 г.

В мае 1934 г., появилось постановление ЦК ВКП (б) и Совнаркома СССР «О преподавании гражданской истории в школах СССР» в соответствии с этим и некоторыми другими ранее принятыми документами в столичном Московском и Ленинградском университетах были открыты исторические факультеты.

Следует отметить, что в 1935-1937 гг. на исторический факультет Ленинградского университета вновь обрушились репрессии, в результате которых были последовательно арестованы три первых декана нового факультета. Гонениями подвергся ряд ведущих профессоров факультета. Проходили «чистки» и среди студенческой молодежи. Профессия историка в эти годы была смертельно опасной. Но даже в эти годы факультет мог гордиться тем, что на его кафедрах работала целая плеяда выдающихся историков. Здесь читали лекции и писали свои научные труды Б.Д.Греков, М.Д.Приселков, В.В.Мавродин, С.Н.Валк, Б.А.Романов и многие другие крупные специалисты в области истории России.

Великая Отечественная война 1941-1945 гг. внесла свои жестокие коррективы в развитие факультета. Более трехсот преподавателей, аспирантов и студентов

² Подробнее см. например: Платонов С.Ф. Собрание сочинений: В 6 т. М., 2010. Т.1. С.9-11.

факультета сражались в действующей армии, более ста - погибли на полях сражений и в блокадном Ленинграде.

Первые послевоенные годы вновь оказались для ленинградских историков тяжелыми, поскольку начались преследования ученых по идеологическим мотивам. Преподаватели обвинялись в «низкопоклонстве перед буржуазной западной наукой», резкой критике подвергся крупнейший российский археограф С.Н.Валк, в 1949 г. в стенах факультета была организована конференция, целью которой была борьба с буржуазным космополитизмом в исторической науке. В ходе ее работы подверглись нападкам крупнейшие ученые университета академик В.В.Струве, член-корреспондент АН СССР В.И.Равдоникас, ряд профессоров факультета. В ходе «Ленинградского дела» (1949-1952 гг.), инспирированного с целью ослабить партийную организацию Ленинграда, репрессировать ряд государственных деятелей, выдвинувшихся в годы Великой Отечественной войны, факультет испытал новый удар. Был отстранен от его руководства профессор В.В.Мавродин, закрыто археологическое отделение.

Положение стабилизировалось с 1960-х гг., когда был открыт ряд новых кафедр, заметно активизировалась научная деятельность. В эти годы в университете обучались не только студенты из СССР, но и студенты из ряда стран Европы, Азии, Америки и Африки. На кафедре истории СССР под руководством профессора В.В.Мавродина создаются капитальные труды по истории средневековой Руси, коллектив под руководством профессора А.Л.Шапиро работает над написанием аграрной истории Северо-Западной Руси, плодотворно работает над изучением средневековой истории России профессор Р.Г.Скрынников.

Сегодня различные аспекты российской истории на факультете изучают на кафедрах истории России с древнейших времен до XX века, новейшей истории России, источниковедения истории России, исторического регионоведения, истории западноевропейской и русской культуры, истории менеджмента и предпринимательства, этнографии и антропологии, археографии и архивоведения, истории русского искусства, музеологии. Большинство из них было открыто в последнее двадцатилетие. Кроме того, создаются специализированные научные центры, что позволяет объединить при изучении актуальных проблем исторической науки усилия не только университетских ученых, но и представителей других вузов Петербурга и академических учреждений.

Как уже упоминалось выше, одной из проблем современной исторической науки остается проблема методологии.

Для российской исторической науки, точнее для той части ее историков, которые стремятся получить объективную картину исторического процесса, вопросы

методологии всегда играли исключительно важную роль.³ По сути дела, методологические построения создают стержень для исторического исследования, без которого оно теряет целостность. Следует отметить, что за последние два десятилетия произошло вполне очевидное включение российской историографии в мировое научное сообщество, в силу чего «российские проблемы» оказываются тесно связанными с теми методологическими исканиями, которые существуют сегодня в мировой исторической науке в целом.

Для современного состояния истории характерны широкий спектр методологических инноваций, множественность подходов к ее изучению, отсутствие универсальных критериев истинности знания.

Между тем, растет осознание того, что исторический метод должен основываться, прежде всего, на общем знаменателе ценностей, поскольку возрастает «нравственная и культурная функция истории». Одновременно ставится вопрос о необходимости привнесения в историческую науку активной позиции самого историка, который не только беспристрастно описывает, но и судит, дает происходившему моральные оценки, а также об этической ответственности историков за то знание о прошлом, которое он предлагает социуму.

Этическая сторона деятельности историка как важная методологическая составляющая с неизбежностью порождает вопрос о преемственности традиций и выработанных ранее представлений, сформулированных предшествующим поколением историков. Концепция «состоявшегося знания» (изученности какого-либо вопроса истории во всех его аспектах и в полной мере) сегодня подвергается критике, часть исследователей считает, что каждое новое поколение исследователей имеет право на свой взгляд на историю. В связи с этим, однако, встает вопрос не только о новых возможности новых подходов, но и об отношении нового поколения историков к наследию своих предшественников.

На наш взгляд, особенностью исследований университетских историков является «здоровый академический консерватизм», следование глубинным традициям отечественной исторической школы⁴, которые остаются для них классическими и «не

³ Практика показывает, что аналогичные проблемы волнуют сегодня и представителей исторической науки бывших союзных республик. Это показал, в частности International Forum on Actual Problems of Education and Science Dedicated to the 20th Anniversary of Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan «Socio-Humanitarian Science of Kazakhstan: 20 Years of Self-Understanding and Integration to the Global Cultural and Historical Context» (Almaty, April 29-30, 2011).

⁴ Свидетельством глубокого уважения к своим предшественникам может служить проект Института славяноведения Российской академии наук по подготовке полного собрания сочинений С.Ф.Платонова, осуществляемый под общим руководством С.О.Шмидта. В 2008 г. в Петербурге состоялась Всероссийская научная конференция, посвященная памяти С.Ф.Платонова. В этом проекте принимают участие и сотрудники Петербургского университета.

Традицией на факультете является проведение научных конференций - т.н. «Мавродинских чтений», посвященных памяти В.В.Мавродина, на факультете установлена памятная доска в честь ученого.

отменяются» в процессе поиска новых методов. Эти традиции, оказываются сегодня в значительной степени утраченными в некоторых других научных сообществах историков. Во главу угла на историческом факультете ставится стремление к исторической объективности, основанной на репрезентативном материале и адекватных способах его обработки. Идея заимствования модных методологических построений вызвала сначала определенную эйфорию среди части российских ученых, однако довольно скоро выяснились и проблемные стороны новых конструкций, что повлекло более скептическое отношение к ним в среде профессиональных историков.

Кроме того, длительный период «инноваций» и новых «поворотов» привел в конечном итоге к усложнению процесса исторического познания, породив, в том числе, и множество терминологических разночтений. Поэтому язык историка, проблема понимания являются сегодня весьма важными вопросами современной истории и сейчас исследуются особенно активно.

Особенностью университетской исторической науки всегда была возможность работать рядом с представителями других наук. Становится очевидным, что современная методология истории требует связи историографии с философией (философией науки, философией сознания, этикой и др. философскими направлениями).

Однако, следует отметить также, что упомянутый выше консерватизм имеет и некоторые негативные стороны, приводит к определенной замкнутости исследовательского пространства; известной конфронтации с рядом других научных школ, сужению круга международных и междисциплинарных контактов.

* * *

Какие же направления в изучении российской истории видятся сегодня приоритетными в Петербургском университете.

Одной из наиболее востребованных дисциплин остается источниковедение российской истории. Еще в 1960-1980-е гг в университете наметились новые подходы в источниковедении, как при анализе ряда традиционно используемых источников (например, т.н. «массовых»), так и в ходе изучения не доступных ранее материалов архивных фондов.

Появление современной компьютерной техники открыло не использовавшиеся ранее возможности для изучения массовых источников по истории России: средневековых писцовых книг, уставных грамот и выкупных актов второй половины XIX в., официальной и земской статистики, результатов различных обследований, описаний и переписей, часть которых ранее либо не рассматривалась вообще, либо не

Среди крупных научных конференций последних лет следует отметить и конференцию в честь столетнего юбилея А.Л.Шапира.

изучалась глубоко и системно. Применение компьютерных технологий позволило ввести в научный оборот десятки тысяч новых документов, обработка которых велась с применением математико-статистических методов. К этому времени на историческом факультете уже имелся значительный опыт проведения подобных исследований и сформировался коллектив историков, специализировавшихся в области российского источниковедения и разработки новых методов анализа источников. Под руководством профессора А.Л.Шапира был подготовлен многотомный труд «Аграрная история Северо-Запада России», при написании которого впервые в практике ленинградских ученых были применены компьютерные технологии. Значительные успехи имелись и в сфере изучения летописания, источников по истории средневековой Руси, нового прочтения документов по новейшей истории России. Эти обстоятельства, как и необходимость структурных перемен, продиктованных временем, позволили открыть в ноябре 1991 г. новую кафедру «Источниковедения истории России».

В центре внимания сотрудников этой кафедры находилось внедрение новейших исследовательских технологий, использованных при анализе документов церковного и административного учета населения, источников по аграрной истории России. Одним из центральных сюжетов, стало изучение экономических последствий крестьянской реформы 1861 г. Особый интерес к этой проблеме стал проявляться в последние годы в связи со 150-летней годовщиной освобождения крепостного крестьянства в России, широко отмечаемой в этом году.

В 2011 г. по всей Российской Федерации прошел ряд представительных научных конференций, посвященных отмене крепостного права. Хотелось бы отметить московскую конференцию «Реформа 1861 года, итоги и последствия», организованную институтом экономики и отделением общественных наук Российской Академии Наук. 3 марта 2011 г. в Мариинском дворце в Санкт-Петербурге состоялась научно-практическая конференция «Великие реформы и модернизация России», посвященная 150-летию со дня подписания Манифеста об отмене крепостного права, на которой выступили президент Российской Федерации Д.А.Медведев, глава фонда "Романовы для России" Великий князь Дмитрий Романов, Митрополит Санкт-Петербургский и Ладожский Владимир, руководители Санкт-Петербурга. Среди выступавших был и ряд университетских историков, которые дали взвешенную оценку роли крестьянской реформы 1861 г. в российской истории.

Необходимо отметить, что на многих российских конференциях часто высказывались диаметрально противоположные взгляды как на суть либеральных реформ, так и на их роль в российской истории. К сожалению, здесь достаточно часто верх брали эмоции и политические пристрастия авторов. На этом фоне работы по экономической истории, подготовленные университетскими историками, носили академический характер, базировались на репрезентативных массивах документов и изучались современными статистическими методами. Итогом этих исследований стало

изучение экономических последствий освобождения крестьян в огромном регионе – на Северо-Западе России - превосходящем по площади ряд крупных европейских стран⁵.

Историками университета была сформулирована задача изучения реформы на качественно новом уровне с применением методик, позволявших сопоставить полученные результаты с выводами, имевшимися по другим губерниям России. При этом создавались компьютерные базы данных, предназначенные для решения широкого спектра исследовательских задач.

Хотелось бы, однако, заметить, что в последние годы аграрная тематика, ранее занимавшая важное место в исследованиях российских историков, постепенно стала отходить на второй план. Хочется верить, что юбилейные торжества 2011 г. дадут новый импульс для изучения аграрных сюжетов.

Если аграрная история, как и история промышленности и рабочего класса в России в значительной степени снизили свой «удельный вес» в массе исторических исследований⁶, то такое направление как история предпринимательства в России пользуется сегодня несомненным интересом. Следствием этого стало создание в 2007 г. новой кафедры истории предпринимательства и менеджмента. Характерно, что изучение проблем истории предпринимательской и управленческой деятельности ведется здесь в контексте как отечественной, так и всемирной истории.

Еще одним направлением в изучении массовых источников на историческом факультете стало изучение первичных документов по исторической демографии России. На наш взгляд, историческая демография является сегодня одним из наиболее динамично развивающихся направлений в мировой исторической науке. Сегодня здесь можно отметить появление ряда новых тенденций, западными историками и демографами с использованием компьютерных технологий, интенсивно изучается широкий спектр первичных архивных и уже предварительно обработанных документов учета населения целого ряда европейских государств и США.

Длительное время это направление в советской исторической науке развивалось весьма медленно, что вызвало заметное отставание российских исследований от работ западных коллег. Заметный прорыв в этом направлении был сделан российскими историками, входящими в международную The Association for History and Computing⁷. С середины 1990-х гг. практически одновременно в нескольких университетских центрах России, тесно связанных с этой ассоциацией, началось интенсивное изучение

⁵ См., например: Кащенко С.Г. Освобождение крестьян на Северо-Западе России. Экономические последствия реформы 19 февраля 1861 года. М.-СПб., 2009. Результаты этих исследований опубликованы также в нескольких монографиях и десятках статей, вышедших в России, США, Германии и Финляндии.

⁶ С конца 1950-х годов на протяжении многих лет исторический факультет Ленинградского университета являлся крупнейшим научным центром по изучению истории рабочего класса СССР.

⁷ Кафедра источниковедения истории России является коллективным членом российской ветви этой организации.

документов церковного учета населения. Эта информация впоследствии стала основой для создания целого ряда компьютерных баз данных. В 1997 г. сотрудники кафедры источниковедения истории России получили грант Российского Фонда фундаментальных исследований, а в 2000-2011 гг. - гранты Российского Гуманитарного научного фонда для осуществления проектов по изучению демографических процессов на Северо-Западе России в XIX – первой трети XX вв.

Следует отметить, что в ряде случаев катализатором этих историко-демографических работ, стали труды зарубежных исследователей Steven L. Hoch (США), Pim Kooij, Geurt Collenteur (Нидерланды), которые широко применяют современные демографические методы.

Так, на протяжении ряда лет, в рамках научно-исследовательских работ ряда европейских и российских университетов успешно выполнялся совместный голландско-российский проект "Integral history at the regional level", инициаторами которого стали исследовательские группы университетов Гронингена и Утрехта.

Целью исследования голландских и российских ученых являлось комплексное изучение на локальном уровне демографических процессов (прежде всего, условий и механизма т.н. «демографического перехода»), изменений в политической, экономической, социальной, культурной и религиозных сферах. В ходе работы активно использовались компьютерных технологий и математико-статистических методы.

Ряд конференций и рабочих семинаров по проблемам исторической демографии, проведенных в это время в России, Нидерландах и США, позволил провести обсуждение актуальных источниковедческих проблем, сравнить используемую методику и полученные результаты. Среди обсуждаемых на них вопросов были принципы создания компьютерных баз данных (адаптация стандартного программного обеспечения и создание оригинального), достоверность результатов статистического анализа, выявление новых источников по исторической демографии, определение уровня их репрезентативности.

В 1990-е г. историки Санкт-Петербургского университета вместе с коллегами из Тамбова, Петрозаводска и Ярославля включились в ряд международных проектов по компаративному изучению отдельных регионов России и других стран в эпоху перехода от аграрного общества к индустриальному. Будучи направленным на интегральное (тотальное) изучение всех сторон повседневной жизни общества, работы по проектам являли собой один из вариантов социально-исторических исследований. Особенностью исследовательских подходов в данном случае было изучение процессов в обществе на микроуровне («рядовых» индивидуумов, семей, домохозяйств, населенных пунктов, волостей) и на мезоуровне (уезды, губернии), а также широкое использование компьютерных технологий для обработки массовых первичных источников.

Подводя некоторые итоги изучения массовых источников, следует отметить, что в ходе этих исследований хорошо зарекомендовала себя большая группа молодых ученых, получивших необходимый опыт и восприимчивых к новым идеям. Это создает

предпосылки для осуществления новых крупных проектов по экономической и демографической истории России и весьма важно для развития университетской науки.

Хочется отметить также, что эти исследования дали импульс для развития в Петербурге нового направления в историографии, получившего в дальнейшем название «исторической информатики». На факультете традиционно разрабатываются различных аспекты исторической информатики., рассматриваются технологии, имеющие практическое значение для будущих историков, искусствоведов и музеологов, анализируются исторические ресурсы в сети Интернет., особенности развития электронных библиотек

Развитие современной российской исторической науки в последнее двадцатилетие невозможно представить без международных контактов, которые способствуют развитию как традиционных, так и новых направлений.

Большую роль в развитии научных контактов играет ICCEES (International Council for Central and East European Studies) , который, как известно, был основан еще до «перестройки» в 1974 г. as a joint project of American, British and Canadian research associations. Участие петербургских историков в проводимых, каждые пять лет World Congress становится с каждым годом все более активным. Так, на VIII Конгрессе, проходившем в Stockholm (Sweden) в 2010 г. была организована совместная секция историков Санкт-Петербургского и Хельсинского университетов, на которой были обсуждены итоги совместных научных проектов. Интересно, что к этим докладам проявили большой интерес наши китайские коллеги. Как известно The Ninth World Congress will take place in Chiba, Japan in 2015.

Весьма ярко взаимодействие и взаимовлияние научных школ проявляется в области историографии и источниковедения. Современную петербургскую историческую школу характеризует пристальное внимание к широкому спектру проблем, затронутых западной историографией России и Советского Союза. Резко изменился и вектор отношения к работам зарубежных историков и исследованиям русских эмигрантов, в разное время покинувших Россию. Если в советской исторической науке их работы в значительной степени рассматривались со знаком «минус», а отдельные положения, содержащиеся в них часто оценивались как «буржуазная фальсификация», то сегодня многие из них публикуются в России, тщательно анализируются научные достижения наших зарубежных коллег, появляются историографические работы, содержащие взвешенные оценки их деятельности.

Появившаяся возможность работы в зарубежных архивах, содержащих документы по истории России и русского зарубежья, позволяют по-новому взглянуть на ряд историографических проблем.

Значительное место в современных российских исследованиях занимают работы, посвященные жизни и деятельности русских эмигрантов в самых различных уголках земного шара. Это и научно-популярные работы, освещающие жизнь «русской Франции», «русской Швейцарии» и т.п., и солидные академические исследования,

охватывающие глубинные проблемы российской эмиграции XIX–XXI вв. Тщательно анализируется историография российской эмиграции. Следует отметить, что историки все чаще затрагивают «болезненные» вопросы, которые ранее обходились молчанием, а если рассматривались, то с крайне политизированных позиций.

Способствуют выработке взвешенных концепций и совместные международные проекты, которые поддерживаются как российскими, так и зарубежными фондами.

В качестве примера можно привести проекты 2010 г., которые получили финансовую поддержку Российского гуманитарного научного фонда и Академии наук Финляндии «Санкт-Петербург—Хельсинки. Проблемы взаимовлияния двух европейских столиц во второй половине XII – начале XX в.» и «Народ, разделенный границей. Карелы в истории России и Финляндии в 1809–2009 гг.: эволюция идентичностей, религии и языка», в которых с российской стороны принимают участие, как маститые ученые, так и научная молодежь Санкт-петербургского и Петрозаводского университетов, а с финской стороны, сотрудники университетов Хельсинки и Йоэнсуу.

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Повышенный интерес в обществе к новейшей истории России не мог не коснуться и исторического факультета. Существовавшая на факультете кафедра истории советского общества в 1970-е годы являлась одним из ведущих центров по изучению различных аспектов истории Октябрьской революции 1917 г., гражданской войны, индустриализации. Активно изучалась Великая Отечественная война, послевоенная история страны.

С 1991 г. кафедра получила новое название - Новейшей истории России. Произошли и некоторые другие структурные изменения. В конце 2003 г. при кафедре был сформирован Центр по изучению истории политических партий и общественных движений России. Наряду с прежней тематикой исследований, большое внимание сегодня уделяется изучению органов власти и управления, историографическим проблемам российской и зарубежной историографии. Важное место в научных исследованиях занимают политическая история СССР послевоенного периода, ключевые проблем российской истории рубежа XX–XXI столетий.

Одним из актуальных направлений в современной российской науке стало изучение истории церкви. Импульс это направление получило еще в 1988 г. в связи с празднованием 1000-летия крещения Руси. Необходимо отметить, что торжества, посвященные этой исторической дате, в некоторой степени знаменовали собой и новый правительственный курс в отношении церкви.

На сегодняшний день в России сложились несколько центров по изучению истории церкви. Хотя ведущими в этом направлении являются московские ученые, однако и в Петербурге делается немало. Значительную роль в этом играет находящаяся здесь Санкт-Петербургская духовная академия. Все чаще на историческом факультете СПбГУ защищаются диссертации по истории церкви. Петербургские ученые

принимают активное участие в деятельности московского церковно-научного центра «Православная энциклопедия». Здесь создается многотомная (в настоящее время издано уже более 20 томов) энциклопедия, статьи в которой подготовлены как светскими, так и церковными историками. В Петербурге существует ряд авторитетных издательств, которые постоянно издают историко-церковную литературу. В минувшее двадцатилетие в стране переиздан целый ряд работ прошлых лет, посвященных этой проблематике, которые вряд ли могли вновь увидеть свет в СССР.

Важную роль в деле развития историко-церковных исследований играют плодотворные контакты университетских историков с видными представителями русской православной церкви. Так, в период подготовки к празднованию 300-летия Царского Села в процессе воссоздания разрушенного в 1930-х годах Екатерининского собора, при поддержке протоиерея Геннадия (Зверева) в течение нескольких лет выходил исторический альманах «Екатерининский собор», на страницах которого были опубликованы десятки статей и подборок документов, подготовленных историками Петербургского университета.

Одним из наиболее активно развивающихся сегодня направлений российской науки является военная история. Следует отметить, что здесь сегодня имеется целый ряд проблем, накопившихся в результате нескольких причин. Одна из них - продолжительная «монополизация» всего, что связано с военной историей, профессиональными военными (еще в 1966 г. был создан Институт военной истории Министерства обороны СССР). Уделом «гражданских» историков оставались, в основном, историографические вопросы.

Заметную сдерживающую роль сыграл и культивировавшийся тезис о «национальном характере русского военного искусства». Это исключало проведение параллелей с развитием европейского военного искусства и какое-либо серьезное его изучение. Говорить же о заимствовании русскими полководцами достижений европейской науки было просто невозможно. Нельзя сказать, что у этой традиции не было «историографических корней». Еще до революции существовала борьба «русской» и «академической» школ в военно-исторических исследованиях, однако в советское время ряд положений «русского направления» принял крайние формы.

Еще одним недостатком военно-исторических исследований была упрощенная схематизация процесса развития русского военного искусства, при которой основное внимание уделялось весьма ограниченному числу персонажей дореволюционной военной истории. Выделялись и изучались «приоритетные» темы: Северная война, походы А.В. Суворова, Отечественная война 1812 года. Главным направлением было изучение Великой Отечественной войны. 1941-1945 гг.

Искусственное сдерживание изучения «неудобных» сюжетов военной истории привело сегодня к заметной конфронтации между различными поколениями историков и представителями разных направлений.

В качестве примера можно привести современную историографию Отечественной войны 1812 г., двухсотлетний юбилей которой будет отмечаться в 2012 г.

Для «гражданских» историков эпоха наполеоновских войн всегда была

«любимым периодом» военной истории, еще в 1970-е – 1980-е гг., не надеясь на публикацию своих работ, они, не связанные идеологическими установками детально исследовали весь ход кампании, и, особенно его центральное событие - Бородинское сражение. Скрупулезный анализ широкого спектра источников приводил к выводам, которые не вписывались в традиционные схемы.

Таким образом, были подготовлены предпосылки для существенных изменений в историографии этой войны. В настоящее время появившиеся возможности проведения свободных дискуссий и публикаций, привели к острому столкновению различных мнений и интересов. Причем отнюдь не академические споры велись не только между профессионалами и дилетантами, но и между историками разных поколений. Была нарушена этика внутрицеховых отношений, что, к сожалению, стало в российской историографии не столь редким явлением.

Сегодня вопрос стоит, прежде всего, в обстоятельном, всестороннем, взвешенном и спокойном изучении колоссального накопленного материала, в пересмотре сложившихся стереотипов и шаблонных оценок событий и личностей.

Сегодня, когда происходят значительные изменения в российской армии общество начинают интересоваться сюжеты, связанные с повседневной жизнью армии, воспитательной работой, снабжением, организацией досуга военнослужащих, т.е. всем, что показывало армию и флот вне войны и боя, и раньше попросту игнорировалось. Расширяется источниковая база работ по военной истории, на протяжении последних 10 лет на факультете разрабатывается комплекс вопросов, связанных с источниковедением военной истории России XVIII – начала XX в. Это направление долгие годы не привлекало внимания отечественных исследователей.

Узость источниковой базы, на наш взгляд, привела к определенному застою в военно-исторических исследованиях в конце XX в. Преодолеть его можно только в результате комплексного анализа всех типов исторических источников: письменных, вещественных, изобразительных, а также кинофотофонодокументов. Активно разрабатываются вопросы смежных с военной историей вспомогательных исторических дисциплин, таких как фалеристика и униформология.

Работы историков Ленинграда-Петербурга занимают особое место в историографии отечественного флота, что во многом связано с размещением в нашем городе двух основных военно-морских архивов – Российского государственного архива Военно-морского флота (документы до 1940 г.) и Центрального военно-морского архива (в Гатчине, документы с 1940 г.)

Исследование истории отечественного флота началось еще в XIX в. в работах Ф.Ф. Веселаго (1817-1895), Е.И. Аренса (1856-1931), К.Ф. Шацилло (1924-1998) и др.

В начале 1990-х гг. меняется тематика актуальных исследований. Если до 1990 -х в фокусе была, в основном, история революционного движения на флоте, то теперь ученые активно изучают историю техники, морских кампаний и сражений. Основное направление историографии флота в 1990-2010 гг. – реконструкция событий на основе вводимых в оборот источников.

Следует отметить, что резкое сокращение флота в последние 20 лет и некоторое расширение доступа к источникам, хранящимся в архивах, привело к почти

болезненному интересу к подробностям технического устройства кораблей и различной военно-морской техники. Исследования на эту тему пишут почти авторы с техническим образованием, не имеющие исторической подготовки. Растет интерес к биографиям отдельных военно-морских деятелей (С.К. Грейга М.П. Лазарева, З.П. Рожественского, А.В. Колчака).

Между тем, в 1990-е гг. возникла «разоблачительная» тенденция в историографии, которая проявилась в попытках полностью пересмотреть прежние оценки, зачастую без достаточных к тому оснований. Некоторые исследователи пытаются развенчать ряд признанных флотоводцев (Г.А. Спиридова, Ф.Ф. Ушакова), крайне низко оценивается деятельность отечественного Военно - морского флота во время Первой мировой и Великой Отечественной войны.

Говоря о восстановлении университетских традиций в исторической науке было бы неправильно не упомянуть о современном состоянии петербургского краеведения, понесшего и тяжелый урон в 1930-е гг.

Новым импульсом в развитии краеведения послужило создание в 2002 г. кафедры исторического регионоведения. Кафедра создавалась, исходя из традиций, заложенных еще в первой половине XX в. трудами классиков петербургского краеведения: И.М. Гревса, Н. П. Анциферова. В 2005 г. в университете была проведена научная конференция памяти профессора Гревса.

Важной вехой в развитии этого направления стал организованный в 2007 г. Первый Всероссийский съезд историков-регионоведов, на котором с докладами о путях развития этого направления выступили, представители многих федеральных округов Российской Федерации, зарубежные гости.

В заключение хотелось бы подчеркнуть, что за прошедшие двадцать лет историческая наука в Санкт-Петербургском государственном университете прошла сравнительно короткий, но интенсивный отрезок своего развития.

В разных научных центрах России последствия перестройки, а затем и распада СССР, привели к неоднозначным последствиям. Университетская наука Петербурга оказалась, на наш взгляд, готовой к переменам. Этому способствовали и классические традиции научных исследований, сложившиеся еще в дореволюционное время, и, как это не парадоксально звучит, тяжелые потрясения сталинской эпохи, которые способствовали выработке стойкости, определенного иммунитета к любым потрясениям, переданного предыдущим поколениям своим более молодым коллегам. Петербургские историки гордятся своими научными школами, способными к критическому анализу сделанного за прошедшие годы и творческому восприятию самых современных направлений науки. В то же время, эти школы, сохраненные в самые непростые времена, придадут университетской исторической науке так необходимую сегодня прочность и стабильность.

The 3rd International Conference of the HK Russia • Eurasia Research Project

**20 Years since the Disintegration of the Soviet Union: Looking Backward,
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Session II: The “Evolution of the Dissolution”:

a Balance Sheet between 1991 and 2011

**“The Present Challenges to Russia:
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The Present Challenges to Russia: Modernisation and Diversification

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A premise

Twenty years from the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation's market transformation seem a time span long enough to assess results achieved and challenges ahead. However, the two financial and economic crises that hit Russia, 1998 and 2008, each time just when the country seemed to be finally entering into a sustainable path of growth, suggest that an assessment on the viability of the Russian model of growth transformation may yet have to wait. Twenty years, however, should allow for a preliminary assessment that may be subject to change depending on the intricacies of Russia's political and economic landscape that underwent profound changes, first, in the nineties and, then in 2000s.

From today's perspective, the nineties revealed, first of all, how difficult it was to attain positive results from structural change while coping with the legacies of seventy years of communism. The output fall in a middle income economy excessively dependent on output for defence was dramatic compared to any other post-communist country. Hyperinflation in 1991-1992 destroyed people's savings. It took seven years to bring down inflation to one digit. The tenuous signs of recovery surfacing in 1997 were abruptly reversed by the effects of the 1998 financial crisis that, once again, in less than ten years, resulted in the annihilation of people's savings and the revamping of inflation.

Nonetheless, market institutions combined with large scale privatisation and better understanding of the working of the market mechanism helped Russia to recover fast from the crisis and, starting from 1999, almost a decade of robust growth ensued. Unfortunately, growth came to a halt in 2008 reversing under the effects of another crisis, this time of an international nature, to a tremendous output fall in 2009. Russia is still struggling to recover from this crisis while a) trying to understand the reasons for a very poor performance over the crisis in comparative terms and b) striving to lay down more solid foundations for growth,

This paper intends to examine the challenges posed by the global crisis to Russia since they help better to understand the pluses and minuses of her transformation path in so far as they reflect both the legacies from the past - the Soviet one and the more recent - and the weaknesses of a process of change that after twenty years seems still to be incapable of animating a sound competitive market dynamics supportive of sustainable growth.

Over almost a decade Russian economic growth has been heavily dependent on natural resources and energy: sectors by and large under direct or indirect government control. Under the crisis the role of the state in the economy has increased. The state share in the economy has grown to more than 50% and is becoming increasingly costly to the government. At the same time, the crisis helped uncover the inherent weaknesses of the Russian economy.

A debate on the Russian model of development stirred by reformers and by President Medvedev himself with his manifesto “Russia, forward” electronically published and widely disseminated in September 2009, has laid the ground for a number of reforms that should help modernise and diversify the Russian economy while at the same time calling for an innovation drive to which state and private businesses are supposed to contribute.

While strategic goals are constrained by the need to restore macroeconomic balances through post-crisis tighter budget constraints, comparatively low public debt and the on-going current account surplus from energy and commodities revenues make *prima facie* the overall macroeconomic balances sustainable. However the economy remains exposed to foreign price and reversal shocks. In this context, the government may be forced to relax its grasp on the economy and start a new wave of privatisation.

This paper focuses on changes in current Russian policy pointing to a new approach to economic development and growth that is still unfolding, where the scope for private undertakings appears to be broadening though subject to their commitment to back the government’s efforts in the pursue of national goals. Whether this could evolve in the future towards a greater emphasis on the market and free choice instead of the prevailing tendency towards government power and control remains uncertain, largely because the divide between contrasting priorities and constituencies is not always clear.

From changing constraints to changing path

Changes in Russian Government's policy on state companies, privatisation and Foreign Direct Investment deserve attention as they may effect the structure of the Russian economy in this decade (2010-2020). Much – but not all - of what is being discussed and hoped for in these areas falls under the programme of modernisation of the Russian economy – focussed on the revival of industry, technology and science that was conceived under Putin in 2006 and has been reinforced under Medvedev with somewhat more emphasis on innovation. Under the effects of the crisis, public debate on economic diversification - a policy that should help emancipate Russian growth from oil/gas dependence, has intensified. While apparently stemming out of necessity rather than virtue, policy changes such as the renewed focus on privatisation of which more below¹, are worth considering, as they could evolve beyond expediency into more radical structural changes.

During the crisis the stake of the state in the Russian economy has grown by some 15% up to 50% in 2009 according to official declarations,² and even up to 75% if state indirect control is included.³ The problem of how to manage and finance such an impressive amount of state property is acutely felt. This concerns not only inefficient state entities, but also many public utilities in dire state the privatisation of which had been postponed over the years of bonanza. The room for costly structural reforms to be domestically financed is narrow. The financial crisis has badly hit central and regional budgets owing to foregone oil, oil products and gas exports revenues. With public and private investment falling tremendously, the latter also hit by the credit crunch, 2009 GDP and industrial output fell by 7.8% and 10.8% respectively – the worst outcome within the BRICs group of large emerging market economies (Brazil, Russia, India and China).

The financial market was also badly hit. Bad loans increased from September 2008 to December 2009 by 7.2% up to about 10% of total loans according to Russian evaluation standards.⁴ Though, apparently, the banking sector started recovering in 2010, using international standards S&Ps in May 2010 estimated non -performing loans (NPLs) at c.40% of total credit.⁵ The situation may be getting worse for a number of banks, since the number of loss-making banks increased from 90 to 127 in six months from the beginning of 2011.⁶ Those data point to little room for credit expansion, while at the same time many large companies, after restructuring their foreign loans, still need to fully repay their debts. As it usually goes for Russia, effective economic growth and budget performance, however, is more dependent on oil prices than on other factors, as also noted by the

¹ An observer calls it “pragmatic privatisation”, see <http://www.rg.ru/printable/2009/10/01/privatizacia-site.html>

² <http://www.vedomosti.ru/finance/news/2009/10/06/853393>

³ See A. Shokhin in <http://www.rbcdaily.ru/print.shtml?2009/12/15/focus/447977>

⁴ See I.O. Sukhareva, “Upravlenie problemnymi dolgami v bankovskom sektore: uroki krizisa” 17.8.2011 from http://www.forecast.ru/mainframe.asp?ADDR_FROM=http://www.forecast.ru/news.asp

⁵ See <http://top.rbc.ru/economics/19/05/2010/408807.shtml#print> . On the basis of Russian evaluation standards, Sukhareva, cited above, bad loans at 8.2% of total credit on 1 April 2011

⁶ See <http://www.banki.ru/news/bankpress/?id=3184702>

OECD.⁷ In the light of still uncertain world economic recovery, the Russian Ministry of Finance (MOF) has been cautious, projecting different levels of budget deficit in 2011 according to a fork of oil prices going from 50 to 70\$pb.⁸ However, given the scale of social spending incurred in 2009 and 2010 and pensions' rise approved by the government - despite a perverse combination of rapidly ageing population and excessively low retirement age - oil prices at even \$80pb could jeopardise macroeconomic stability. A fall of \$10 in the price of oil is estimated to cause a fall of budget revenues equal to one percentage point of GDP.⁹

A moderate pace of recovery in 2011 with a 4.1-4.0% rate of growth y-o-y (some three percentage points less than the annual average from 2000 to 2007) as projected by the MED and other international agencies¹⁰ may hamper the agenda of structural changes envisaged over 2011-2020. Those range from modernisation of the arm forces estimated to cost some 20 trillion roubles (c.\$666bn) to innovation that over the same period would need some 16 trillion roubles (c.\$533bn) according to the ministry of Economic Development.¹¹ Even railways now claim that the budget will be badly hit if investments up to 400bn roubles (some \$13.5bn) are not found to finance the upgrading of the network over 2011-2015.¹² Despite Russian government's comparatively easier access to foreign lending –justified largely by Russia's good track record in honouring foreign debt - already envisaged in the 2010-2012 budgets on debt emission, financing strategic goals has become problematic in the light of an incumbent world recession looming by the third quarter of 2011.¹³

Current policies and plans on restructuring state entities, privatisation and foreign direct investment (FDI), therefore, will need to be made consistent with tighter fiscal policies that may limit scope and scale of state support. All in all post-crisis government policy seems to be driven by expediency on the one side, and opportunism, on the other. There is no firm direction of change. While reform-orientated circles call for privatisation to increase efficiency and complete the 90s

⁷ See OECD *Economic Outlook*, 2010, cit, p.215.

⁸ Versus the more optimistic 76US\$ hoped for by the Ministry of Economic Development (Minecon), see <http://www1.minfin.ru/ru/press/transcripts/index.php?id4=9676> accessed on May 14, 2010.

⁹ See M. Dmitriev in <http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2011/096/10.html?print=201101091247> on 30 August 2011. Recently (13 September 2009) Kudrin cautioned that even an oil price of \$116pb in 2012 would be barely sufficient for a balanced budget, see <http://grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.191382.html>

¹⁰ See MED's table http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/258259/bez_ambicij also projecting a 3.5% rate of growth in 2012.

¹¹ See http://www.vedomosti.ru/finance/news/1353016/dorozhe_armii and <http://www.europarussia.com/posts/2326> on an estimated military expenditure of \$650bn over 2011-2020. Note that the text bases, as a rule of thumb given the highly volatile rates, dollar estimates on a virtual exchange rate of \$30 per rouble.

¹² See http://www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/1355059/milliardy_dlya_yakunina on 2 September 2011

¹³ See Malle S., "The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Russia", *Nato Defence College Forum paper*, Research Division, Rome, December 2009, pp.11-12.

market reforms, the vast majority of the population is in favour of keeping state control of the economy.¹⁴ But recent developments as discussed below may bring about more radical reforms.

The context of post-crisis structural reforms

The nature and prospects of Russia's changes need to be put in perspective. Major plans of modernisation and diversification (M&D) were already contemplated in Putin's Strategy-2020 – a long and detailed programme – launched on 21 July 2006 and finally approved on 17 November 2008.¹⁵ The strategy envisaged the progressive emancipation of Russia from dependence on energy. The key drivers of this programme were to be innovation, investment and infrastructure with an emphasis on innovation in the financial sector capable of developing in Moscow an international financial hub.

An additional focus on institutions contributed to the shaping of Medvedev's four "i" (investment, infrastructure, innovation and institutions) electoral manifesto in March 2008. It is worth noting that the institutional driver is not irrelevant in comparing the pre- to the post-crisis approach to structural reforms as discussed below. Medvedev has pushed, and continues to push through the Parliament anti-corruption laws complying by and large with OECD best practices, including making income declarations obligatory for state officials, new provisions on state procurement, an area of widespread corruption and bribery, higher test requirements to enter police corps, interdiction to top state officials to have managerial positions in state companies; facilities for foreign direct investment; and a number of other, perhaps minor, if taken separately, but of substance altogether, reforms meant to create if not the necessary mass of provisions for a modern state, at least better grounds for implementation of the rule of law. Some laws have been passed; other provisions – notably on state procurement – encounter resistance.¹⁶ Nonetheless a process of change after many years of inaction is taking place. Even if approved, reforms will take time to deliver, and could even be reversed. But it would be wrong to dismiss efforts to change since they respond to the demands from both the more advanced sections of society and the international community.

On the other hand, a number of reforms undertaken under the new Presidential Administration retain the flavour of the ruling from above, so common to Russian history, relying on organization tools and government priorities rather than market incentives.¹⁷ An example is the Commission for Modernisation and Technological Development (CMTD), composed by influential government official, businessmen, state managers and experts that has been attached to the Presidential

¹⁴ See the results of an opinion poll in www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2009/11/10/218439

¹⁵ See on this, Malle S. cit., pp.24-26 and the *Conception of Long-Term Development of the Russian Federation to 2020* in <http://www.comission.economy.gov.ru/minrec/activity/sections/strategicPlanning/concept/concept>

¹⁶ See http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/1353993/zakupka_nevypolnima on 1 September 2011 and <http://www.ng.ru/printed/258889on> 2 September 2009 where Nabiullina, the Minister of economic Development, announces tentatively the approval of new state procurement provisions by end-2011/beginning 2012 warning that at any rate they will need at least three years to be put in force.

¹⁷ Perrie M., "Modernisation under the Tsars and the Soviets", Paper presented at the CREES Annual Conference, Cumberland Lodge, Windsor Great Park, 4-6 June 2010 presents a fascinating overview.

Administration on May 20 2009.¹⁸ This Commission meets monthly to discuss progress in priority areas specifically targeted for development and works under instructions from the President.¹⁹ Medvedev's five strategic priorities have been announced in his "*Rossia, vperyod!*" internet manifesto on September 10, 2009 – and replicated in his Address to the Nation on 12 November 2009. They focus on energy, nuclear technology, informatics, space technology, medical/pharmaceutical equipment, each considered to be an area for innovation, as by and large did Strategy-2020 under Putin, clearly a Soviet-style branch approach.²⁰

The financial crisis could help stimulate a more market-friendly approach. In 2011 21 groups of experts, under the direction of respected scholars Vladimir Mau and Iaroslav Kuz'mynov, have been charged by the government to propose appropriate changes and amendments to the Strategy.²¹ The first draft of this document has already been circulated but it will need to go through different states of comments before being validated. At this stage, it is unclear how substantive the changes will be and whether they will entail a change in priorities. What has become a main issue of contention from government bodies (the Ministry of Economic Development, in particular), however, is the presumption on the part of experts that economic diversification will take time, certainly longer than a decade, since any structural change will need to be financed out of export revenues from natural resources. This could be seen as a blow to Medvedev's calls for accelerated structural changes, as discussed below.

While Medvedev is often portrayed as a liberal compared to the former President, it is worth noting that many of Medvedev's pronouncements and sense of urgency in this area are influenced by Surkov, the energetic first deputy chief of staff in his administration and Putin's ally.²² Medvedev runs the CMTD as a decision-making and operational vehicle that should be capable of threading between companies' activities and claims, and state/regional bodies. He frequently visits regions/enterprises that carry out projects considered to be technologically advanced in the five priorities areas.²³ Companies' concerns discussed at the meetings are subsequently conveyed for solution to ministerial bodies and high government officials in charge.²⁴ But acting this way

¹⁸ See the Ukaz No. 579 in <http://graph.document.kremlin.ru/doc.asp?ID=52509>

¹⁹ See A. Dvorkovich's comments in <http://www.rian.ru/economy/20090521/171811977-print.html>

²⁰ See the Manifesto <http://news.kremlin.ru/news/5413/print> and the Address to the Nation in <http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/5979>

²¹ See <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1576907&NodesID=2>

²² See Vladimir Frolov, "Medvedev's Motor to Drive Modernisation", *The Moscow Times* November 23, 2009.

²³ For example on 31 August 2009 to Vladimir oblast where are located some pharmaceutical companies (see <http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2009/08/221352-shtml>); Gorki (Moscow Oblast)'s enterprises on 13 May 2010 developing telecommunication and IT technology, see <http://news.kremlin.ru/news/7741/print> and Khanty-Mansiisk, an oil producing district on March 23, 2010, in <http://www.rg.ru/printable/2010/03/23/prezident-anons.html>

²⁴ See the meeting in Gorki in <http://news.kremlin.ru/news/7741/print>, meeting with I. Sechin on energy savings in <http://www.kremlin.ru/news/5629> after a visit to the *Sevmash* company and Medvedev's irritation with Nabiullina (Minecom) and Kudrin (MOF) for delays in implementation in http://www.ng.ru/politics/2009-10-01/1_modernize.html

Medvedev adopts a manual management approach similar to that of Putin: both are reminiscent of Soviet practice.²⁵

Does Medvedev perform the sorcerer's apprentice?

Many of Medvedev public speeches have been openly critical of the state of the economy. Whether intended or not, Medvedev's criticism of an economy that "to a large extent ignores the needs of the people" stirred a debate on the pro and cons of his blueprint for progress that would have not been otherwise stimulated by the Strategy-2020 a dry style bureaucratic document unsurprisingly downplayed by the Russian press. After Medvedev's start, other commentators started competing on criticism. Few of those are reported below to help understand the unfolding of pressures for reform.

Maslennikov observed that the conditions for a diminished intervention of the state in the economy and an overall reconstruction of the banking and financial system were missing in the manifesto.²⁶ Others pointed to lack of constituency for modernisation and criticised the approach to modernisation from above.²⁷ Shokhin, the Chairman of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs - and at that time a candidate member of Edinaya Rossia - observed that without global competition there was no way to modernisation in a closed or semi-closed economy, comparing Medvedev's efforts to Gorbachev's inane *perestroika* and *uskorenie*.²⁸ Lack of attention to competition and private businesses in Medvedev's M&D was also noticed by financial experts.²⁹ Gontmakher, while somewhat critical of Medvedev's command approach to reform, described it a necessary but not sufficient condition for change.³⁰ Some of the best comments were formulated by Inozemtsev, currently a member of the reformed Right Cause Party, who criticised Russian foreign policy on energy and efforts to build privileged relations with Venezuela and Ecuador in alternative to Europe and other advanced economies, as conducive the M&D's programmes to a dead end,³¹ also unfavourably comparing Russian energy policy to the successful Brazilian policy owing the privatisation of the state oil company Petrobras and ensuing access to foreign technology.³² He also

²⁵ Cfr. Malle S., "Soviet Legacies in post-Soviet Russia: insights from crisis management", *Post-Communist Economies*, Vol.21, no.3, September 2009

²⁶ See <http://www.ng.ru/printed/232144>, published on October 13, 2009.

²⁷ See Leonid Radzikhovskii in <http://www.rg.ru/printable/2009/11/10/modernizacia.html> and Konstatin Limonov in <http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2009/11/10/218442> and Alexei Chesnasov in <http://www.rg.ru/printable/2009/11/27/modernizacia.html>

²⁸ Shokhin A., "Modernocracy", *Itogi* no.46, November 9, 2009 from <http://www.itogi.ru/russia/2009/46/145838.html>

²⁹ See Nikolaev and Morozov in <http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2010/01/11/222572>

³⁰ See Gontmakher A., "Politekonomia: Zadanie nachalniky", in <http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2009/11/20/219327>

³¹ See Inomentsev V., "Modernizatsya.ru: Byt' razborchivee", in <http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2009/11/30/220097>

³² See <http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2010/03/22/228682>

pointed to the contrast between excessive focus on high technology and the overall degradation of industry, a point also made by Shokhin.³³ Mau pointed to the contradiction between largely state entities – referred to as the enemies of modernisation – and the massive support sliced for them by the government during the crisis.³⁴ Finally, Piontkovskii, a long standing staunch critic of the Putin-Medvedev tandem provoked all for failing to understand that the real stumbling block for M&D in Russia is lack of democracy and freedom.³⁵

Piontkovskii's argument was directed against Surkov, first of all, who is convinced that “economic development inevitably leads to the development of democracy “-³⁶ a correlation that, albeit found in some foreign political literature³⁷, would sound insane to any liberally-minded Russian intellectual. Interestingly, however, the idea that modernisation cannot stop at the level of economics, but needs cardinal political changes is becoming more common and openly discussed among experts and even by some party members of Edinaia Rossiia trying not to lag behind in this field.³⁸

The discussion on M&D, by contributing to a better understanding of systemic weaknesses, has been both a source and a vehicle of alternative projects and initiatives in various fields preparing the ground for more comprehensive reforms that might in time be considered for implementation. On the economy, InSOR (Institute of Contemporary Development) has been particularly active contributing to highlight other areas of backwardness Russia will need to confront to modernise its economy, such as the need for long term capital lending that the Russian financial systems is still incapable of providing. Interestingly, for Alexei Vedevev, rather than striving for high rates of growth, Russia should aim at more balanced growth and lesser reliance on foreign loans to reduce her

³³ See <http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2010/01/11/222580> and Shokhin in favour of the upgrading of the industrial base versus Medvedev's focus on IT innovation, in <http://www.izvestiya.ru/comment/article3139951/>

³⁴ See <http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2010/01/20/223303>

³⁵ See Piontkovskii V., “Nichtozhnoe men'shstvo” in <http://grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.173501.html>

³⁶ See <http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2010/04/08/230776> and A. Dvorkovich agreeing that “there is a feeling the democracy cannot develop without serious economic and technological modernisation” and the role of internet in diffusing information and freedom of speech, in <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1371826&print=true>

³⁷ See, among other, Lipset S.M., “Some social requisites of democracy: economic development and political legitimacy”, *American Political Science Review*, 1959, no.53, pp.69-105 and Barro R.J., “The determinant of democracy”, *Journal of Political Economy*, 1999, no.107, S158-183. For a critical view on the cause and effect relation implicit in this view, see Acemoglu D., Johnson S. Robinson J.A., Yared P. “Revaluating the modernisation hypothesis”, *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 2009, no. 56, pp.1043-1058.

³⁸ See the discussion among the experts designed by Putin to review his Strategy to 2020 in <http://www.ng.ru/printed/252647>; the head of InSOR, Yurgens, calling for political liberalisation in <http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2011/01/00.html?print=201102021106> and a Duma deputy from ER arguing that the time of forced modernisation is over in http://www.polit.ru/news/2011/03/31/sm_print.html

exposure to exogenous financial shocks.³⁹ One should also reckon that working age population will continue to fall putting pressure on productivity growth.⁴⁰

Criticism of the state of the economy as inherited from the years of robust growth based on natural resources has developed in some occasions into open political dissent. A defiant “Putin Must Go” political manifesto blaming the Premier for kleptocracy, lack of freedom, corruption, occupation of power by the United Russia party and *nashi* movement and citing a number of terrorist attacks where hundreds of Russians died, was signed in March 2010 by 44,387 citizens, including, among other, Piontkovskii, Kasparov, Inozemtsev and a large number of the Russian *Solidarnost* movement and other opposition politicians.⁴¹ The signatories argued that modernisation can only occur if the premier quits.⁴² While this initiative has remained isolated, it provides a vivid example of the effects of the sorcerer’s apprentice’s role Medvedev may have played in spite of his effective motivations.

At the same time, efforts to capture protest and steer it into more pragmatic purposes, appeared to possibly coalesce around Medvedev when occasional dissent from Putin on both internal and foreign policy could be interpreted as to provide the ground for an alternative party.⁴³ Medvedev, indeed, cautiously linked economic to political modernisation in some occasions. While in China in mid-April 2011 he affirmed that *his own* “course is modernisation of the economy and modernisation of the political life”.⁴⁴ In March 2010 the idea of a pro-Medvedev party to be chaired by Chubais, was ascribed to Surkov.⁴⁵ Indeed, there could be an effort at political manoeuvring from above in all that. Medvedev’s occasional comments on the need to broaden party representation in the regions suggest that the *very* vertical of power might have been engineering a Russia-style democratic façade pleasing some at home and abroad.

A dual party system could, indeed, help refresh the countours of the Russian state and better fit the (hoped for) image of a country gradually moving out of the inward-looking stigma impressed upon

³⁹ See a summary of the project in <http://www.ng.ru/printed/238114>

⁴⁰ See Patrushev’s concerns for the 10 million working age people that will be missing in 2025 in <http://www.rosbalt.ru/main/2011/09/13/889235.html> accessed on 13.9.2011

⁴¹ See the Manifesto in <http://www.putinavotstavku.ru/>

⁴² See the storming action of (internet) protest all over Russia in http://www.ng.ru/politics/2010-03-12/3_internet.html?mthree=3

⁴³ See Frolov V., “A Medvedev Tea Party Could Be the Answer” *The Moscow Times*, March 22, 2010. See also <http://www.profile.ru/items/?item=31987> where Petr Orekhin argues that different political visions between Putin and Medvedev could become the foundations of a dual party system.

⁴⁴ See <http://www.rg.ru/printable/2011/04/13/medvedev.html>

⁴⁵ See Pronina L. “Medvedev May Form Political Party to Rival Putin's, Trud Says” *Bloomberg* March 10, 2010. See also Arutunyan A., “Kremlin mulls a step to the right”, *Moscow News*, March 2010, on the possibility that the right-wing of Edinaya Rossia, the so-called November 4th Club joins with Pravoye Delo, which is an instrument of Chubais to form a new party.

by Putin. Occasionally Shuvalov and Kudrin have been pinpointed as possible leaders of alternative parties.⁴⁶ But with Kudrin flatly dismissing any party membership and Shuvalov happily joining the newly created All-Russian National Front by Putin, as discussed in the last section, the electoral landscape taking shape ahead of Duma elections fixed on December 4 2011 does not seem to corroborate the vision of an alternative political grouping around Medvedev.

Initial results from the M&D drive: Skolkovo

So far the drive to M&D has produced few results mainly in terms of organisation and memorandums of intent. In Russia, the major event is known as Skolkovo's silicon valley: a national project likely masterminded by Surkov to help realise Russia's IT-high tech innovation agenda within this decade.⁴⁷ Based on the existing Moscow School of Management set up in Skolkovo, whose Board of trustees, chaired by Medvedev, includes a few eminent Russians, such as Vladimir Mau, German Gref and Igor' Shuvalov plus a large number of representatives of major foreign investment companies and banks,⁴⁸ the area should develop into a technological park by attracting brains and resources from home and abroad.⁴⁹ A memorandum of intent has already been signed with the US MIT. Skolkovo, the legal status of which was discussed at length and finally approved in September 2010,⁵⁰ was earlier the venue of public relation (PR) international meetings on Strategy to 2000. The first meeting in 2008 ("Strategy to 2020. New Tactics") was organised by *Edinaia Rossia*. The second meeting ("Strategy to 2020. Social dimension of modernisation") on May 31, 2010 was organised by the Presidential Administration, with focus on diversification and drivers of modernisation.⁵¹ Viktor Vekselberg, the owner and head of the Renova group and oil tycoon, has been as the "curator" of the project.⁵² Following his appointment, a number of

⁴⁶ See as possible leaders of Right Cause Shuvalov in http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/257257/igorya_shuvalova_vedut_napravo and http://www.polit.ru/event/2011/03/25/povorot_print.html and on Kudrin in http://www.gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2011/03/16/n_1748981.shtml

⁴⁷ According to the President's sherpa A. Dvorkovich, Skolkovo will be working at full capacity in 5-7 years from 2010, see <http://www.rian.ru/economy/20100521/236891341-print.html>

⁴⁸ See <http://www.skolkovo.ru/content/blogcategory/84/811/lang,en/>

⁴⁹ Chemistry Nobel laureate David Kornberg's agreement to work in Skolkovo on biotechnology has been hailed publicly as a major achievement in April 2010, see <http://www.ng.ru/printed/240128>. Another major figure involved in management of Skolkovo is the head of Intel, Craig Barrett, see <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1363409&NodesID=4>

⁵⁰ See <http://www.rian.ru/economy/20100513/233980777.html> and Presidential Law on Skolkovo Innovation Centre signed on 28 September 2010 in <http://news.kremlin.ru/acts/9056/print>

⁵¹ See <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1372028>

⁵² See Stanovaya T., "Biznes v pomoshch'" 13 May 2010 in <http://www.politcom.ru/10095.html> and <http://lenta.ru/news/2010/07/02/skolkovo/Printed.htm>

agreements have been signed with the Russian Academy of Science and other technological institutes to promote research and speed up development.⁵³

Skolkovo enjoys preferential treatment in a number of areas. The law on federal property has been changed to accommodate for the allocation of land for residential construction to a Management Company that would be trusted with land ownership and leasing to specific purposes.⁵⁴ The special status of Skolkovo's innovation centre includes a number of material provisions (water, heating, security and medical and sanitary conditions), as well as centres to facilitate the release of licences.⁵⁵ While Skolkovo is not conceived as a closed town, it will enjoy a number of preferential conditions for the employed staff that are reminiscent of Soviet times and objected by ordinary businessmen in Russia.⁵⁶ What clearly emerges from Skolkovo's developments that by the time of this writing are mainly confined to projects, is Medvedev's effort to push ahead with his plans on innovation despite a number of obstacles enshrined in existing laws that must be modified in a short time to make the project start. His warning that every step will be under his control suggests Medvedev's strong personal commitment to push forward innovation along schemes that Russia experienced with mixed results more than once in her tsarist (Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, Alexandre II) and Soviet past.⁵⁷ Curiously, while Medvedev apparently found his inspiration mainly in Alexandre II, Putin in some occasions referred to his predecessor Stolypin stimulating commentators to draw a number of parallels.⁵⁸

"We have changed" announced Medvedev at the Saint Petersburg's international economic forum in June 2010.⁵⁹ While, according to Aslund, that was a sign that state capitalism was being replaced by a pragmatic approach to problem solving,⁶⁰ at that point in time Medvedev's statement could be at best interpreted as an intention rather than robust evidence. True, in an international context characterised by widely shared belief that more cooperation is needed to overcome the crisis, Russia

⁵³ See <http://www.itar-tass.com/level2.html?NewsID=16075014&PageNum=0>

⁵⁴ See Presidential draft laws submitted for approval to the Duma on May 31, 2010, in <http://www.kremlin.ru/news/7906>

⁵⁵ On 7 May 2010, see http://www.polit.ru/news/2010/05/07/skolkovo_print.html. On other preferential provisions see <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1363409&NodesID=4>

⁵⁶ See the summary of the debate between Surkov and the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in <http://www.rg.ru/printable/2010/05/13/biznes.html>

⁵⁷ See Perrie M., cit.

⁵⁸ See on Medvedev, *The Moscow Times* 9 March 2011 in <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/reading-medvedevs-mind/432208.html> and on Putin *The Moscow Times* 8 August 2011 in <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WTe2bTeykF4J:themoscownews.com/politics/20110808/1889101>

⁵⁹ See the announcement in <http://en.rian.ru/business/20100520/159087104.html> and <http://www.rg.ru/printable/2010/05/20/forum-spb-site.html>

⁶⁰ See Aslund Anders, "Going from State Capitalism to Pragmatism, *Moscow Times*, June 23, 2010.

may have a better chance to reform to modernity than ever before in history.⁶¹ At least on paper, things seem to be moving in Skolkovo. By the end of 2010 some 16 high tech companies had received the status of participants to Skolkovo Fund and 38 priority projects had been financed.⁶² On 24 February 2011 Vekselberg confirmed that there were 28 resident companies in Skolkovo of which only 11 had got Foundation's grants.⁶³ But Skolkovo itself is hardly the proof of a new approach to problem solving. It is very much a top-down approach with all the caveats attached to that.

What will be the cost of Skolkovo's project is yet unknown, although some estimates such US\$2bn for residential housing, had been initially provided by Vekselberg whose desiderata kept growing over time. The first stage (technical assignments, architectural plans, tenders, analysis) will cost 4.6bn roubles (about US\$150m) to be financed by the Commission on Modernisation. Most of the funds - from 50 to 60bn roubles - necessary to provide the foundation of Skolkovo will come from the federal budget.⁶⁴ In October 2010 Vekselberg complaining that venture capital had not shown interest, estimated that the cost of making Skolkovo successful would amount to 180-200bn roubles.⁶⁵ By mid-2011 Skolkovo had secured \$3 billion in government funding over three years and expected to obtain an equal sum from foreign partners.⁶⁶

Thus, the cost of the Skolkovo initiative that initially was moderate, risks becoming in time another drain on state revenues that, as discussed above, are in a dire state.⁶⁷ It is not clear, as in many public/private partnership schemes which party will bear the cost of contingent liabilities, if the project fails to materialise. The Investment Fund created in 2005 to finance infrastructure and industrial upgrading nationwide is supposed to contribute only c.US\$28m (263bn roubles) in the expectation that private partnership will provide twice as much, for a total of 1 trillion roubles already committed to 14 large scale projects.⁶⁸ It is far from certain, however, that public-private partnership (PPP) contracts can find in Russia a favourable institutional environment in the absence

⁶¹ A representation from Skolkovo in California's Silicon Valley has been approved in March 2011, see <http://www.itar-tass.com/level2.html?NewsID=16082970&PageNum=0>

⁶² See <http://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/20101214112143.shtml> and http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/251623/itog_modernizacii

⁶³ See www.i-gorod.com/en/newslst/20110224003-mat/

⁶⁴ From <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/print/business/article/vekselberg-discusses-future-skolkovo-infrastructure/404447.html>

⁶⁵ <http://top.rbc.ru/economics/11/10/2010/480047.shtml?print>

⁶⁶ See C. Weaver, "Welcome to Russia's Silicon Valley" *Financial Times*, August 22 2011

⁶⁷ It is worth noting that no matter how high oil prices will remain due to geopolitical problems, the budget, under the prudent requirements share with international organisations, keeps budget deficit estimates separated from oil revenues.

⁶⁸ See Putin's presentation at a government meeting on 19 May 2010, in <http://www.ng.ru/printed/240580>

of clear and protected property rights, shared responsibility on risk and appropriate agreements on guarantees.⁶⁹

Nonetheless one should not flatly dismiss, as many Russian commentators are inclined to do, the chance that the project may develop in time and attract a critical mass of foreign partners. On 17 November 2010, Skolkovo and Nokia signed a memorandum of understanding for the creation of a R&D centre on a number of projects including, among others, nano- and quantum technology and mobile sensors.⁷⁰ and other MoU have been signed with Intel and Cisco. On 18 June 2011, IBM and Skolkovo signed a memorandum for the creation of a scientific research centre in the field of biological medicine, IT and energy.⁷¹ Other possible partners are Ericsson,⁷² General Electric and Siemens. A number of projects have been approved and some start delivering also in the regions as one can see from some ad hoc modernisation websites.⁷³ As Dani Rodrik rightly observes industrial policy has been the lever not only of China's success, but also of Chile and other countries, also noting that interest from the US State Department of Defence were not irrelevant to the development of the Silicon Valley in California.⁷⁴ Public investment in a number of strategic sectors, from railways, to steel and energy in several European countries was crucial for recovery after the II World War.

But there are problems with industrial policy that one should not ignore. First, there is the question of how to ensure the diffusion of new high tech in the economy as a whole. This was a problem also in Soviet Union where, contrary to what normally occurs in the West speeding up the pace of technological change, sophisticated military technologies remained confined to defence. Second, the process may turn out to be simply too costly and fundamental research not properly protected under IPR legislation and enforcement, a still problematic area.⁷⁵ Third, there is a risk that money be wasted in re-inventing the wheel. Finally, rushing to show that they conform to modernisation and innovation dogmas, there could be herding and window dressing in competing for project-clusters, rather than concentrating on how to improve market institutions.

Showing not to be lagging behind, Putin has recently set up his own agency, the Agency of Strategic Initiative, engaging Ministers and banks' managers to provide support to talented young

⁶⁹ See the problems singled out by InSOR that mentions few cases of quasi -PPP in Russia based as a rule on subsidies, privileges and state bodies' contributions to private businesses, in <http://www.ng.ru/printed/240951>

⁷⁰ From the i-Gorod.com website of Skolkovo accessed on 2 September 2011.

⁷¹ See <http://www.polit.ru/news/2011/06/18/ibmskol/>

⁷² A Memorandum of Understanding was to be signed with Ericsson after the visit of Putin in Sweden on 27 April 2011, to authorise the telecom company establish a R&D centre in Skolkovo, see www.regeringen.se/sb/d/11971/a/167200

⁷³ See on energy for instance <http://www.i-russia.ru/energy/news/>

⁷⁴ See Rodrik D. , cited in. <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/rodrik42/English>. Rodrik's tenets on the role of industrial policy for development are well argued in his *One Economics. Many Recipes. Globalization, Institutions and Economic Growth*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007, pp.99.152

⁷⁵ See on the need not only for property, but for property rights, to ensure a dignified life, M. Trubolyubov in http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/1355034/zadacha_novogo_pokoleniya on 2 September 2011.

fellows wishing to set up and/or to further develop their own businesses.⁷⁶ The Agency is supposed not to cost anything to the budget and develop out of donors' funding and/or other sources of off-budget financing. The probable consequence is that the costs will be borne by state controlled financial institutions. The Sberbank that promised to invest \$800 million to build a techno park in Skolkovo is also called to help financing the ASI's projects.⁷⁷ It is unclear whether government at any level of administration will provide own guarantees and therefore bear the burden of contingent liabilities.

While the implementation of grand innovation/investment projects will take time,⁷⁸ two areas of reforms could have faster impact on economic structure and performance and help shape the contours of "modern" Russia in the near future: the privatisation of costly state entities and FDI policy. Both are under Putin's management, but Medvedev seems to have been more influential in setting the stage for the transformation of large scale state entities under special regime into joint stock companies that could be gradually privatised in the future. As discussed below, such reforms are met with resistance from powerful vested interests in the status quo.

The unfolding of the privatisation dilemma

Developments in the area of privatisation are revealing as to the mounting pressure on the Russian authorities to cut waste and increase revenues. In only one year for the hoped for ending of the crisis the government has moved from very moderate privatisation plans to large scale privatisation, perhaps the first after that of the mid-nineties. This section describes the development of the privatisation plans and the different degrees of strings attached to each. While it is clear that financial constraints have started biting, it is also becoming evident that there is, compared to only few years ago, more relaxation on divestment of potentially highly profitable assets.

The 2010 budget originally estimated at 7bn roubles the amount possibly earmarked by selling some 5,500 enterprises. A tenfold increase of this sum, 72bn roubles (c.US\$2,4bn) was later projected by Putin from the privatisation of some 250 unitary enterprises and a bulk of state shares (20-25%) in 462 state controlled joint stock companies to be offered for sale in 2010.⁷⁹ In comparison privatisation of state property carried out in 2009 had earmarked to the budget only 1,93m roubles.⁸⁰ While that was in part the effect of a depressed market, privatisation revenues in

⁷⁶ See on this a summary of the tasks and means devoted to this project in <http://www.rbcdaily.ru/2011/05/25/focus/562949980304986/print/> accessed on 25 May 2011.

⁷⁷ See <http://ru.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idRURXE76B01Z20110712> on 12 July 2011 and http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/1330856/gref_pomozhet_putinu reporting the appointment of Gref to the supervisory committee of ASI, on 2 August 2011.

⁷⁸ A. Dvorkovich optimistically projects that it will take from 5 to 7 years to Russia to become a leader in new technology, see <http://www.rg.ru/printable/2010/12/13/dvorkovich-anons.html>

⁷⁹ See <http://top.rbc.ru/economics/06/10/2009/335096.shtml?print>

⁸⁰ See <http://www.rg.ru/2010/02/24/rosimush-anons.html>

2008 had not been significant either compared to 2010 expectations: a total of 7,2bn roubles.⁸¹ When the effects of the crisis started subsiding, the Minister of the Economy, Nabiullina, stressed that national security will be a primary concern when selling stakes in strategic companies, implicitly ruling out controlling stakes by private owners. She also ruled out the privatisation of attractive companies such as the Sberbank, Aeroflot, Rosneft', VTB (Foreign Trade Bank), RZhD (railways) and Gazpromneft', until the market improves.⁸²

The privatisation plan approved on 30 November 2009⁸³ made room for more ambitious targets, though the government planned to remain in control of crucial assets while cautiously opening to private investment. Selling stakes in companies currently classified as strategic was expected to bring 54bn roubles, i.e. three-fourth of the total hoped to be earmarked from privatisation. This shows that the companies initially selected for outright sale were in a dire state, while it is not yet clear how profitable large companies, such as power generator OAO TGK-5 and insurer OAO *Rosgosstrakh* and a bunch of ports and shipping firms, whose minority stakes were set to be sold, are, or would be after restructuring.⁸⁴

Other privatisation plans unfolded rapidly in the first half of 2010: some under some pressure from below (companies); most from above (Medvedev). Gref's proposal concerning the possible privatisation of a large - but not controlling - stake of Sberbank that would earmark some US\$40-50bn circulated already in January 2010, to be publicly dismissed by the Minister of Finance.⁸⁵ A few weeks later, Medvedev stepped in ordering the government to submit proposals for increasing the number of "major strategic companies that are attractive for investment" in its privatisation plan by March 15.⁸⁶ In the same context a curious initiative attributed to Shuvalov was publicised - giving investors the opportunity to single out the assets they would be interested in - clearly disregarding their long established preference for energy/material resources not included in government's plans,⁸⁷ and possibly trying to buy time. Nonetheless, in April Medvedev approved by decree the reduction of the number of strategic joint stock companies from 211 to 41 and the number of unitary state enterprises (utilities) from 230 to 159. A total of 100bn roubles (c.US\$3,3bn) revenues from privatisation to the state budget in 2010, i.e. about US\$1bn more than envisaged some months earlier by Putin was estimated from the selling 700 joint-stock companies, 290 utilities and 18 other structures.⁸⁸ A list of 26 infrastructure objects was added by the MED subject to approval by Putin.⁸⁹

⁸¹ See <http://www.iet.ru/ru/kommentarii/privatizacionnyi-process-i-sostoyanie-imuschestvenny-otnoshenii-v-2009-g.html>

⁸² <http://www.rg.ru/printable/2009/10/07/aktivy.html>

⁸³ See the privatisation plan for 2010 and guidelines for 2011-2012 approved by the Government *Rasporazhenie N. 1805-r*

⁸⁴ According to <http://www.stratfor.com/> accessed on December 9 2009, funds to be earmarked from privatisation in 2010 would amount to 1/6 of the planned budget deficit in 2010.

⁸⁵ See <http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2010/01/29/224149>

⁸⁶ See <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/print/article/medvedev-wants-more-privatization/399603.html>

⁸⁷ See <http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2010/02/24/226410>

⁸⁸ As reported by *Interfax* April 20, 2010.

⁸⁹ <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1482726>

The privatisation saga continued to unfold since mid-2010 when mixed signs on oil/gas prices and world economic recovery had started cooling Russia's hopes for a faster and robust domestic GDP rebound. Amendments to the law on privatisation of state property were approved by the Duma in May and signed by Medvedev on 1 June 2010 contemplating the use of market mechanism in setting the initial sale price for auction, increasing the threshold for companies to be sold to an estimated value of 5m MROT (minimal amount of wages) and the inclusion in statutory capital of assets owned by the company in other OAO. Auctions and competition schemes in electronic format are also included.⁹⁰

In June, Medvedev addressing businessmen in Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum focused on the need for private business to foster modernisation. On July 26 2010, the Russian Government announced the plans to privatise non-controlling stakes in ten large scale state companies, including Rosneft, Transneft, Sberbank, VTB, Rossel'khozbank, Rosagrolizing, Rosspirtprom, RusGidro and Russian Railroads.⁹¹ Despite, perhaps excessive, prudence in limiting the stakes for sale, this was a major step in privatisation plans since 1995.

The Basic Guidelines of the Budget Policy up to 2013 published by the Ministry of Finance on 4 August 2010 reckon that over 2011-2013 privatisation should earmark to the budget a total of 883bn roubles, and specifically 298bn roubles in 2011, 276bn roubles in 2012 and 309bn roubles in 2013. Adding to those estimates the sum that was expected to be earmarked from privatisation in 2010, the total is about 1 trillion roubles (983bn exactly), c. US\$33bn.⁹² However, privatisation plans and targets rarely come true. That of 2010 was implemented by only 10% of the number of structures planned for privatisation with total revenues of 22,7bn roubles.⁹³ A large number of firms simply did not find a buyer also because in some cases the initial price was too high according to the head of the Russian Property Agency, Iu. Petrov.⁹⁴ Privatisation of large companies to come may be more successful if it raises market interest. A detailed breakdown of major companies and banks' stakes to be sold in 2011-2013 is listed in Table 1.

Table 1. Planned state companies' IPOs: companies and schedules, 2011-2013

Company	Stake/Package	Year
Sovkomflot (Joint Stock Company Sovcomflot)	25% minus 1 share	2011 (2012)*
Sberbank (Savings Bank)	7,58% minus 1 share	2011 (2012)*

⁹⁰ See details in <http://www.kommersant.ru/news.aspx?DocsID=1373268> and <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/7921>

⁹¹ See *Financial Times*, 27 July and 2 August 2010 and <http://www.finiz.ru/news/article1270655/?print>

⁹² See <http://www.rian.ru/economy/20100805/262018664.html>. The conventional exchange rate used here is 30 rouble to the US\$.

⁹³ As reported by <http://www.lenta.ru/news/2011/05/04/privat/> Printed.htm in May 2011.

⁹⁴ See <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1631232>

FSK (Federal Grid Company)	4,1%	2012
JSC RusHydro	7,97% minus 1 share	2012
Sovkomflot (Joint Stock Company Sovcomflot)	25%	2012
VTB (Vneshtorgbank, The Bank for Foreign Trade)	10%	2012
OZK* (united corn company)	100%	2012
Rosneft	25% minus 1 share (only 15% will be sold, the remaining 10% - asset swap)	2013
Rosselhozbank (Russian Agricultural Bank)	25%	2013
Rosagrolizing (Joint Stock Company "Rosagroleasing)	50% minus 1 share	2013
VTB	10% 10% Total sales: 35,5% minus 1 share	2010 (revenue \$10bn) 2011 (2012)* 2013
RZhD (Russian Railways)	25% minus 1 share	2013

*There are some controversies on schedules for privatisation. Figures for Sberbank, JSC RusHydro and VTB are reported in Rossiiskaya Gazeta 12 September 2011 downloaded from <http://www.rg.ru/printable/2011/09/12/privatizaciya.html>. The privatisation of Sovkomflot and Sberbank's shares is seemingly being postponed to 2012, see <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1772024> accessed on 13.9.2011. Minister of Finance Kudrin in his interview by Reuters on 13 September 2011 warned that privatisation of main banks will be delayed given the turmoil of the market. Thus the 10% VTB shares to be sold late in 2011 will be postponed to 2012. See several reports on Kudrin's interview in <http://www1.minfin.ru/ru/press/speech/printable.php?id4=13893>

Source of the table: Ministry for Economic Development, Ministry of Finance, National Administration, as reported in <http://www.banki.ru/news/bankpress/?id=2924543> from Vedomosti 5 May 2011.

However, it remains to be seen which privatisation scheme will be adopted and the actual privatisation schedule that is likely to be exposed to the vagaries of both world economic recovery and the Russian financial market. A number of IPOs planned for 2010 were cancelled. Only 12 ranging from metals&mining to pharmaceutical and technology&innovation were completed, of which 8 in Moscow, two in London, and two in Hong Kong (both metal& mining). Actual revenue was lower than targeted in 7 cases, whilst the only really successful IPOs were Pharmsynthez and Rusal that managed to approach the higher range of a targeted revenue fork. Of the ones planned for 2011, only 4 (in construction, manufacturing, financial services and agriculture (auctioned in London in February-April 2011) were completed according to the 2010 Chart, while 7 were cancelled of which 3 (in manufacturing, mining and metals) were postponed to February 2011. Of the latter only *Rusagro* managed to complete its IPO with a delay of one year compared to plans. Despite the London- based IPOs having raised more funds in the IQ2011 than those completed in the whole 2010 (\$2bn compared to \$1,73)⁹⁵ the economic environment remains on the whole problematic. Significantly, the deadline for 50 out of the 91 IPOs set for auction from 2011

⁹⁵ See <http://www.russianipo.com/> from the London Stock Exchange website accessed on May 12, 2011.

onwards is yet to be decided.⁹⁶ Even the London based IPO of the well-known Russian Helicopters company, planned for 11 May 2011 was cancelled due to lack of interest of the part of investors.⁹⁷

The last and more striking move forward on large scale privatisation – to be completed in 2017 - has been announced late August. That involves some 21 large scale companies including energy and diamonds, some of which to be completely divested by the state. An very preliminary estimate of the expected revenues is c.\$75bn.⁹⁸ If this plan is realised, that would be the major structural reform after mid-nineties. On the light of the above, however, one can see that the authorities are not ready to release profitable companies if market conditions are not suitable. Sharp economic slow-down projected to worsen by end-2011 may, indeed, cause delays – on the top of those certainly to be expected out of red tape - and possibly a rethinking of the whole project. Interestingly, however, the group of experts on privatisation charged with proposing amendments to Strategy-2020 met on 29 August 2011 at the Ministry of Economic Development to discuss priorities, procedures and restructuring together with means to improve state management and the institution of independent directors recently enacted.⁹⁹

Large state entities and restructuring. Not all to be privatised or disbanded.

While it remains to be seen how attractive will the privatisation package be to domestic and foreign investors, an interesting - though perhaps unyielding development *per se* - is taking place with regard to the changing status of *goskorporatsii* (GK) under the aegis of Medvedev. While not relevant for its immediate impact on the Russian economic/political structure, this development is significant for its potential of “creative destruction”. GK are state holdings set up under special regime that were put in control of a large number of production units in their specific branch under Putin’s second presidential mandate. So far GK are run by managers appointed by the government, are not responsible for economic outcomes (profit), cannot incur bankruptcy procedures and enjoy fiscal and tariff preferences.¹⁰⁰ Enjoying preferential treatment, GK were among the major borrowers abroad before the crisis and were helped to restructure their non performing loans (NPLs) during the crisis thanks to substantial government support. Working under very soft budget constraints, such entities have become a drain to the budget.

In November 2009 Medvedev announced that some GK will be transformed into joint-stock companies under 100% state control and others will be liquidated after completion of their tasks.

⁹⁶ See for a complete list of IPOs and results: http://www.pbnco.com/eng/fc/ipo_tracker.php

⁹⁷ See <http://top.rbc.ru/economics/11/05/2011/589981.shtml>

⁹⁸ <http://newtimes.ru/articles/print/42019> accessed on 27 August 2011.

⁹⁹ See <http://2020strategy.ru/g15/news/32605876.html> accessed on 29 August 2011.

¹⁰⁰ See for more details on *goskorporatsii* Malle S., “The Impact of the Financial Crisis in Russia”, *cit.*, pp.15-20.

While in principle enforcing a new legal framework should not be difficult, it has become clear that GK restructuring will take quite a while¹⁰¹ and that some will remain under state control for a quite a while. The official reason is that they perform a number of different functions that will need to be separated before undertaking radical reforms,¹⁰² but of course vested interests in the status quo also matter.

By February 2010 the time schedule for GK restructuring was agreed and published. Two GK- the Fund for Communal Housing and *Olimpstroi* (overseeing construction for the Winter Olympics planned for 2014 – were set to be liquidated in 2013 and 2015 respectively. *Rosatom* (nuclear energy) is to remain in force with legal changes eventually introduced after 2011. Decision on the legal status of VEB (*Vneshekonombank*) – to become either a joint stock company (JSC) or a public company –was postponed to end-2012. No deadline has been set for the Deposit Insurance Company to be transformed into a public agency. *Rosnano* (nanotechnology), *Rostekhnologii* (advanced technology) and *Rosavtodor* (motorways) were set to become joint stock companies in 2014 (the first) and 2015 (the other two). Actually, Rosnano, managed by Chubais, was transformed into a 100% state ownership JSC in March 2011.¹⁰³

The timetable for change allows powerful GK to increase their assets in the meantime. Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) are not always profitable to GK which are supposed to abide by government policy. But one way or the other, the sheer number of enterprises a major state holding succeeds to put under control becomes a source of large economic and political power. Particularly active is *Rostekhnologii* with special interests on military equipment, chaired by Chemezov. Out of 562 Russian enterprises under its control, more than 300 work for state defence orders and much of its earnings comes from export of weaponry through its *Rosoboroneksport* subsidiary.¹⁰⁴ Through a controlling stake in a communication company, *Rostekhnologii* is planning to build a 5000 km long network of digital telecommunications from Finland to Kazakhstan for an estimated cost of US\$550m.¹⁰⁵ Other plans concern its possible participation in a large cement holding working in Siberia and Far East, as well as increasing its stake in Kamaz (military and civilian machine-building) and establishing links abroad to help improve competitiveness.¹⁰⁶ In March 2011 *Rostekhnologii* agreed to acquire 50% minus one share of *Tekhnopromeksport*, a financially weak strategic company committing to honour its foreign debts.¹⁰⁷ Chemezov also plans to become the

¹⁰¹ See the scheme in *Izvestia* 26 February 2010 in <http://www.izvestia.ru/economic/article3138982/index.html>

¹⁰² See Minecom's programmes as reported in <http://www.rg.ru/printable/2010/02/25/korporacii.html>

¹⁰³ See <http://www.rg.ru/printable/2010/05/12/rosnano.html> and <http://top.rbc.ru/economics/11/03/2011/557582.shtml?print>

¹⁰⁴ See <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1379080&NodesID=4> for data on performance published on June 1, 2010

¹⁰⁵ See more details on this plan in <http://www.rbcdaily.ru/print.shtml?2010/03/12/media/464117>

¹⁰⁶ See <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1349954&NodesID=4> ; <http://www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/2010/04/26/1001795> and <http://arms-tass.ru/?page=article&aid=83613&cid=25>

¹⁰⁷ <http://arms-tass.ru/?page=article&aid=93399&cid=25>. This company was sold thereafter to Gazprombank.

coordinator of the several programmes envisaged to modernise mono-company towns that in theory would allow his company to survive on state funds far longer than the deadline set for restructuring: some 10bn roubles have been committed by the budget to such programmes in 2010 alone.¹⁰⁸

Rosnano, Rostekhnologii and Rosatom have been given a highly preferential treatment in the schedule for privatisation. While *Rostekhnologii* is to remain indefinitely a state holding in charge of overseeing the development of its companies and there is no mention of privatising *Rosatom* in a foreseeable future, *Rosnano* is also practically to remain under state control for a while: only 10% of JSC *Rosnano*'s shares are envisaged for sale late in 2017. Moreover, two GK, *Rosnano* and *Rosatom*, have been granted new rights: *Rosnano* to issue corporate bonds and *Rosatom* to offer guarantees to third legal persons on account of the company's assets that also include federal utilities.¹⁰⁹

It is worth noting that *Rostekhnologii*, working to a large extent for defence and arm exports, is associated in the press with Putin and government priorities in the field, while *Rosnano*, chaired by Chubais, is portrayed as a more adventurous, open-minded and trustful undertaking with more focus on civilian production. This holding plans to produce nanotechnology for some 300bn roubles a year and conquer in time an increasing share of the Russian market now dominated by foreign companies.¹¹⁰ But, from the point of view of market-based incentives compared to preferential treatment it is difficult to distinguish the two holdings. Much as Chemezov, Chubais calls for state support in innovation through tax abates on profit and personal incomes, a demand favourably considered by the government.¹¹¹ Both companies enjoy the state sovereign guarantees on debt, a condition Chubais has obtained while planning to borrow abroad some 50bn roubles (c. US\$1.5bn) and speeding up the conversion of his holding into a JSC earlier than planned. Developments in both companies are of interest to Defence.¹¹² Likewise Chemezov seeking to profit, more or less like a monopoly, from the large programme for monotowns, Chubais tries to get his share from the programme of residential building under control of the GK for communal housing set, in principle, to survive until 2013. – by becoming the major (sole?) supplier of energy saving lamps and devices.¹¹³ Chubais, a member of the CMTD, indeed, had been adamant in claiming that innovation would not develop without state support and unless government forced state companies to acquire innovative components: i.e. it helped create domestic demand for Russian innovative output.¹¹⁴ A

¹⁰⁸ <http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2010/02/05/224832>

¹⁰⁹ See Law introducing changes for Rosnano and amendments to the Law on Rosatom, approved by Medvedev on June 1, 2010 in <http://www.kremlin.ru/news/7918>

¹¹⁰ <http://www.rosbalt.ru/print/709663.html>

¹¹¹ See <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?docsID=1316097&print=true> and Putin's approval of privileged treatment for energy equipment that needs domestic outlets quantifying in 3,1 trillion roubles the sum to be spent by Russian customers in the next three years from 2011 in <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1619291>

¹¹² See <http://arms-tass.su/?page=article&aid=83620&cid=24> for Deputy Prime Minister S. Ivanov's presentation and <http://www.rg.ru/printable/2010/05/12/rosnano.html> reporting that creditors will not be allowed to claim back their loans before legal restructuring,

¹¹³ See <http://www.rg.ru/printable/2010/04/29/rosnano.html>

¹¹⁴ See ITAR-TASS January 23, 2010 and Chubais' presentation at the CMTD on 12 February 2010 in <http://chubais.ru/workplace/news/view/5246/>

novelty, if this approach is compared to the planned supply and demand economy of Soviet memory, could be the role that foreign investors are expected to play in the current Russian M&D drive.

Are foreign investors finally welcome?

Unlike other post-communist countries, and China, Russia has never shown much sympathy for foreign investors, in particular foreign direct investment (FDI). In the nineties the latter were practically nonexistent. The situation appeared to be changing in 2000s. FDI increased from US\$2,7bn in 2000 to US\$72,8bn (including 65,4US\$bn in the non financial sector) in 2008,¹¹⁵ despite on-going complaints against corruption and bureaucratic harassment. According to independent research, the volume of FDI accumulated in the country as of the beginning of 2011 was \$116.2 billion.¹¹⁶ Though not impressive in absolute terms, the rate of increase has been impressive. Given the volume and quality of state assets announced for privatisation in mid-2011, it is difficult to suppose that private investors would not be interested, though their actual participation in auctions will depend on a number of circumstances, including proper procedures, the general business environment and prospects for profit.

Current developments do not seem propitious to investment. Central bank data showed a net \$21bn fled Russia in the first quarter of 2011 in spite of near-record oil prices economy.¹¹⁷ Concerning FDI, one should note that competition for FDI is rising in the context of a still depressed international economic environment and investors are likely to demand favourable conditions. Unless acquisitions entail broad opportunities for restructuring, labour layoff and changing the profile of the business, investors are likely to be prudent.

Concerning the Russian programme of privatisation outlined above, any assessment of its possible success awaits details on sale procedures and constraints. In this regard government's resolve on privatisation matters. Regarding utilities, uncertainty as to the central/local policy on tariffs - an area where social concerns are likely to dominate all through economic recovery and beyond - may scare away private investors. Regarding joint stock companies, while portfolio investors may be attracted by capital gains, stakeholders' participation in decision-making is crucial to attract durable interested partners. Given the haphazard nature of corporate governance in pre-crisis Russia, the acquisition of a stake, albeit a large one, provides no assurance in this regard. In addition, proximity of presidential elections and lack of clarity on candidate(s) for presidency may induce investors to prudence.¹¹⁸

Nonetheless there are signs that the Russian Government is becoming more friendly to FDI. There have been changes to the Law on Foreign Investment in Strategic Sectors that was approved on May 7, 2008 covering 42 industries raising concerns of increased Russian protectionism. The law

¹¹⁵ Based on Russia's Central Bank as reported in http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/print.aspx?file=credit_statistics/inv_in-country.htm and <http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2010/03/01/226955>

¹¹⁶ See S. Kulikov, "Investors avoid many regions", *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 31 August 2011

¹¹⁷ As reported by *Financial Times*, 5 May 2011

¹¹⁸ As pointed by S. Guriev, *Financial Times*, 5 May 2011

prescribed strict procedures for the acquisition assets subject to preliminary approval by government authorities, possibly scaring away foreign investors as noted by Pomeranz (2010).¹¹⁹ Following the dismal performance in FDI in 2009 – that fell by 39 % y-o-y in the non financial sector –¹²⁰, amendments to the law on FDI have been approved making it possible for foreign investors in strategic companies to augment capital through emission of shares with no preliminary approval by the Russian authorities.¹²¹ New provisions that should reduce the number of strategic sectors and open the room for foreign investment also in banking have been submitted to the Duma on February 2011 that passed them in the first reading in March.¹²²

Along similar lines, changes concerning the management of special economic zones (SEZ) have been approved in the apparent aim of giving more freedom in decision-making to the provinces. On October 5, 2009 by decree of President Medvedev, the Federal agency for the establishment of special economic zones has been suppressed and its functions devolved to the Ministry of Economic Development.¹²³ According to Putin, there are at present 24 SEZ in Russia from the reported 13 in 2009 comprising two industrial production sites, four technological parks and seven tourist-recreational facilities. In 12 regions technological parks are being developed where 670 resident companies are registered operating in a large spectrum of products, from nanotechnology to medicine and construction materials. The planned volume of investment is about 300bn roubles (\$10bn circa)¹²⁴

Medvedev approved the dispatch of presidential investment ombudsmen to the regions to help foreign investors to get through the bureaucratic hurdle often encountered in dealing with elementary needs.¹²⁵ It is not sure that those figures will be able to really help.¹²⁶ But the intention is that they should.

Much alike the hesitant moves in privatisation, actual and announced changes in FDI policy may not be convincing enough to foreign companies to seriously engage in the Russian market. Economic performance ranks low with Russian productivity estimated to be 5 times lower than that

¹¹⁹ See details on, and implication from, the law in Pomeranz, W.E., “Russian Protectionism and the Strategic Sectors Law,”, unpublished paper, accessed on 1 June 2010 from <http://www.auilr.org/pdf/25/25-2-2.pdf>

¹²⁰ See <http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2010/03/01/226955>

¹²¹ See <http://www.rg.ru/2009/10/01/putin.html>

¹²² See the number 503176-5 in the website of the Duma, <http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/> accessed on 24 May 2011. An overview of the amendments to the Law on Strategic Investment can be found in http://www.pwc.ru/en/tax-consulting-services/legislation/paket-popravok-Zakon-ob-inostrannyh-investiciyah-strategicheskie-otrasli_.html

¹²³ See <http://www.rg.ru/2009/10/06/medvedev-oez.html>

¹²⁴ See Putin’s report to the Duma on 20 April 2011, <http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/14898/>

¹²⁵ See <http://news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/12173/print> for a meeting with ombudsmen on 2 August 2011

¹²⁶ See A. Yakovlev’s critical comments from regional experience with ombudsmen in <http://www.hse.ru/news/1163611/33557103.html> on 4 August 2011

of advanced countries.¹²⁷ Medvedev's appeal to foreign investors late in May 2010 was met rather coolly by companies that either had suffered from threats and corruption or learned about the problematic business climate.¹²⁸ Investing in Russia is complete insanity according to Browder, the head of Hermitage Capital investment Fund that was forced to cease its operations in Russia in 2005 and whose lawyer was jailed and died in prison in 2009 under unclear circumstances.¹²⁹ A law increasing penalties against *reiderstvo*, frequently used also by state officials to annihilate companies by fraudulent seizure of their property and assets, has been approved on July 5, 2010, hopefully paving the way to the creation of a more secure business environment.¹³⁰ But this will not be easy given the scale of the problem reflected in Medvedev's instructions to the Minister of Internal Affairs "...make sure that those who should protect from *reiderstvo* are not themselves part of the raiders' gangs".¹³¹

The FDI Confidence Index calculated on a scale from 0 (low) to 3 (high), fell to 1.24 for Russia in 2010, while it was up to 1.93 for China (at the top of the list), 1.64 for India and 1.53 for Brazil.¹³² While it is clear that this development is correlated to the economic situation and the fact that Russia suffered from the crisis much more than other emerging markets,¹³³ the distance of Russia from the other countries among the BRICs suggests that there is more than the economic downturn that matters for her comparatively worse performance in attracting FDI. In 2007 China and India ranked 2.21 and 2.09 respectively while Russia ranked 1.70 close to Brazil:¹³⁴ on the one hand, this has to do with an economic structure dominated by resources and energy and, on the other, with a rent-seeking approach on the part of the power elite discouraging FDI exactly in the areas that are Russia's driving engines for growth.

Nonetheless, the increase in FDI in the early 2000s as mentioned above suggests that the scope for foreign investment remains large. This is also what could be argued from the by and large positive sentiments of European businessmen vis-à-vis the Russian market.¹³⁵ Underlying potentially

¹²⁷ See estimates in <http://expert.ru/2011/04/1/rabotat-ne-hochetsya/>

¹²⁸ See for some reactions <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/print/business/article/medvedev-pitches-russia-as-financial-haven/406834.html> ; <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/print/business/article/new-plans-outlined-to-attract-foreign-capital/406793.html> and http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2010/05/25_a_3373164.shtml

¹²⁹ See <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/print/business/article/medvedev-pitches-russia-as-financial-haven/406834.html>

¹³⁰ See the text of the law and comments in <http://www.rg.ru/2010/07/05/zakon.html>

¹³¹ See on the meeting of Medvedev with Nurgaliev, head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as reported in <http://www.rg.ru/printable/2010/07/02/reiderstvo.html>

¹³² See the A.T.Kearny FDI Confidence data in <http://www.atkearney.com/index.php/Publications/foreign-direct-investment-confidence-index.html>

¹³³ Notably FDI in the non financial sector fell to 32,3US\$bn in 2009 see Central Bank of Russia's data in http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/print.aspx?file=credit_statistics/inv_in-country.htm

¹³⁴ See The 2007 FDI Confidence Index report in http://www.atkearney.com/images/global/pdf/FDICI_2007.pdf

¹³⁵ See the results of a survey of 127 companies belonging to the Association of European Business (AEB) carried out in 2010 in <http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2010/07/07/239766> and that of 300 (ABE) companies in 2009 in http://www.droege-group.com/fileadmin/downloads/100412_AEB-Guide_Russia-as-a-place-for-investing.pdf

favourable developments in FDI policy there are two other factors: a more relaxed international policy and economic climate stimulated by a more cooperative approach of the new US administration and the need for the upgrading of defence capacity and equipment in Russia.¹³⁶ The latter has always been decisive all through Russian history in forcing the authorities to “modernise” the country, although not the state.¹³⁷ As Putin stressed in his speech to the Duma on April 2011 on 2010 budget spending and plans for the future, the 20 trillion roubles assigned to the modernisation of the military until 2020 will have to be invested in Russia.¹³⁸ These funds could provide a strong impulse to nation-wide upgrading of the industrial structure, economic diversification and possibly innovation, but contrary to Surkov’s thesis, they will hardly help develop Russia into a modern state.

The political construct of the Russian-style modernisation

The concluding section of this paper provides a view on the political construct for the M&D drive, as conceived by the leadership and, by and large, accepted by the population.

Reading through the approach to modernisation in Russia, the contours of the Russian state organisation considered to be necessary in carrying that through become clearer. This paper takes the view that what matters in Russian politics is the power elite that emerged in the nineties and strengthened thereafter. With few exceptions, this power structure is still in place and in control of the current economic and political developments.¹³⁹ This does not rule out diverse attitude and priorities within the ruling elite. But what brings the elite together is stronger than any possible divide to the extent that power and rent-seeking coalesce against competition not only in the economy, as discussed above, but also in politics.¹⁴⁰

The major political developments that reflect this situation can be seen through the role of *Edinaia Rossia* and that of the All-Russian National Front, both Putin’s creatures. The party *Edinaia Rossia* (ER) controls the Parliament under Putin’s guidelines. This party has contributed to shape the construct of state power in Russia in two ways: first, by blind acquiescence to government policy and second, by its co-opting critical outsiders. Such are for example A. Shokhin and O.Khristyanovskaya¹⁴¹ who applied for, and obtained, ER membership, despite being unsympathetic with government policies and strategies. ER membership did not prevent

¹³⁶ See Medvedev critical of the state of the military in <http://www.rg.ru/2009/10/27/medvedev.html> ; <http://news.kremlin.ru/news/7039/print>; Putin on the same issue in <http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/9557/> and Cooper Julian, “Can Medvedev Modernise?” paper presented at the CREES Annual Conference in Windsor. Cumberland Lodge, 4-6 June 2010

¹³⁷ Perrie M., *cited*.

¹³⁸ See http://www.rian.ru/defense_safety/20110420/366419157.html

¹³⁹ It is worth reading the insights from *The Family in Power 2011* by Maria Litvinovich’s group in <http://www.election2012.ru/reports/1> to appreciate how intricate and profound are the interrelations between government officials and economic structures. I am grateful to John Lough and Andrew Monaghan for drawing my attention to this website.

¹⁴⁰ This underlying power structure may justify A. Wood’s scepticism on real achievements under Medvedev’s rule, see A. Wood, “Would the Real Medvedev Please Stand Up”, *Moscow Times*, 4 May 2011.

¹⁴¹ See information on April 16, 2009 from http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2009/04/16_a_2974828.shtml

Khristyanovskaya from carrying on with her critical views of the government, but of the President in particular, while perhaps helping her to be better informed about day to day politics. Thanks to his ER membership,¹⁴² Shokhin gained access to selected government meetings as the Head of the Union of Russian Industrialist and Entrepreneurs (URIE) that now is invited to discuss with the Premier a number of issues pertaining to government policy, including the formation of an All-Russian National Front proposed by Putin in May 2011 (as discussed below).¹⁴³

By policies designed to co-opt the business community into party politics, to which appointing billionaire Vekselberg to overview state-led innovation developments in Skolkovo also belong,¹⁴⁴ and continue support powerful state companies and their managers, such as Chemezov, Chubais and Miller, the power elite has been building a self-sustaining political organisation whose backbone is provided by the interpenetration of private business and party and state structures. By 2009 ER had organised own units in all the regions, deciding thereafter that “implementation of modernisation and innovation plans” should be the criteria by which governors were to be appointed.¹⁴⁵ Medvedev, describing representative democracy as “an obsolete idea” confirmed that there was no need to return to direct elections of governors.¹⁴⁶ The creation by Putin in May 2011 of All-Russian National Front (ARNF) designed to bring sympathetic, though formally independent, candidates into the next Duma, after inviting a broad range of heads of different associations, including major trade and businesses unions to express their desiderata through so-called primaries¹⁴⁷ – suggests that the contours of the Russian corporate state are being strengthened while the country is quietly moving further away from the playing field of democracy.

ER was ordered by Putin to grant at least 25% of posts for 4 December 2011 Duma elections to non-ER party candidates, i.e. some 150 posts selected by people and associations that have adhered to the ARNF. By this move, the government hopes to broaden the constituency for change from above¹⁴⁸ – that is change through M&D driven by central government strategies – while also

¹⁴² From November 2008, see http://www.lobbying.ru/content/sections/articleid_3842_linkid_61.html

¹⁴³ See Shokhin’s presentation of the Union’s viewpoints on post-crisis policies at a meeting with Putin on 17 May 2010 and his veiled remark that that was the first occasion for the Union’s members to meet with Putin, http://www.xn--o1aabe.xn--p1ai/Default.aspx?CatalogId=234&d_no=8257

¹⁴⁴ See <http://www.xn--o1aabe.xn--p1ai/Default.aspx?CatalogId=7971>

¹⁴⁵ See <http://www.ng.ru/printed/236507>

¹⁴⁶ See also Medvedev’s idea that new technology allows for direct democracy through voting electronically on certain issues, *Stenograficheskii otchet o vstreche s aktivom vserossiiskoi politicheskoi partii “Edinaia Rossia”* downloadable from <http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/7896>

¹⁴⁷ Both developments are discussed in the press. See <http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/15108/print/> (meeting on the National Front), <http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2011/048/39.html?print=201109051243> (Kolesnikov discussing the National Front and similarities between Putin and Mussolini); on Mironov-related developments: <http://www.rian.ru/politics/20110506/371599581.html>, <http://www.mk.ru/politics/news/2011/05/06/587128-mironov-ya-silno-meshayu-slabeyuschey-na-glazah-quotedinoy-rossiiquot-.html> and finally on arguments that ER is afraid of competition, <http://top.rbc.ru/politics/06/05/2011/587604.shtml?print.> The formation by Surkov of special commissars to be dispatched to the regions where ER is relatively weaker before December elections is discussed in http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/259722/vertikal_ne_rabotaet.

¹⁴⁸ See E. Iasin on “modernisation from above” in <http://mn.ru/economics/20110908/304749266.html> accessed on 9 September 2011.

seeking to minimise the danger of social conflicts. The values of the ARNF as enunciated by Putin are love for the Fatherland, improvement of people's welfare, strengthening of the might of the state and social justice.¹⁴⁹ A social order non hostile to change is also in the interest of businesses. Interestingly, it was Shokhin rather than Putin to propose that the ARNF structures survive the election period and be further developed in the medium-long term. It is still unclear whether, as suggested by some, the ARNF is to evolve into a party or some super-party structure. Clearly the social organisations that became members of this structure may well serve the goals of Russian corporate state and help preserve its underlying social contract as it occurred in Italy in the thirties and in Spain and Portugal over a longer time with the tripartite contract between businesses, state and workforce aimed at social peace and stability.¹⁵⁰

In Russia, Soviet legacies – in terms of a by and large docile workforce and subservient business community - make it comparatively easier the shaping of a corporate state in Russia. On the one hand, trade unions were made irrelevant under communism and never managed to grow as independent bodies afterwards. The absence of powerful trade unions in Russia is compensated by a *de facto* social contract at the factory level – a residual of Soviet practice– by which the task of keeping the social peace is left by and large up to managers' self-restraint on labour re-organisation and layoffs.¹⁵¹

On the other hand, what makes such an arrangement possible is the symbiosis of government and large scale industry at the central and local level under controlled competition.¹⁵² This arrangement finds comfortable grounds in the overlapping of government and managerial functions in large scale companies at the Federal and local level.¹⁵³ New provisions approved in April 2011 by Medvedev are meant to forbid state officials from holding company board's position and chairmanship. Medvedev's *ukaz* listed 17 state-owned companies and the powerful ministers and deputy prime ministers to be removed from board chairmanships by July 1. The President also promised a longer

¹⁴⁹ <http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/15108/print/>

¹⁵⁰ Se Royo S., "Still the Century of Corporatism?" Corporatism in Southern Europe. Spain and Portugal in Comparative Perspective", Center for European Studies, *Working Paper Series* 75 (January 2001)

¹⁵¹ Guriev and Tsyvinskii also remark that corporate social responsibility (CSR) is understood in Russia as a means to provide public goods that government fails to supply thus contributing to build (good) relations with the state, see http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/1363887/kompanii_i_filantropy. On Russian CSR see also insightful comparisons by S. Mizobata, "Business Society and Corporate Social Responsibility. Comparative Analysis in Russia and Japan", Kyoto institute of economic research, (KIER) Discussion Paper Series, *Discussion Paper*, No.774, May 2010.

¹⁵² As in a corporate state where monopolistic units and hierarchical coordination substitute for multiple units and autonomous interaction. For a comparative approach, unfortunately only in Italian, see Schmitter P.C. in: http://www.treccani.it/Portale/elements/categoriesItems.jsp?pathFile=/BancaDati/Enciclopedia_delle_Sienze_Sociali/VOL02/ENCICLOPEDIA DELLE SCIENZE SOCIALI Vol.2_107.xml

¹⁵³ The number may be very large. Only considering state companies in April 2011, 9 deputy premier officials sat in the Boards of Directors of 9 state companies, 16 federal ministers in 10 other companies and some other 205 top officials in 47 large scale state companies, see <http://www.banki.ru/news/bankpress/?id=2843766> reporting from *Vedomosti* 4 April 2011.

list by Oct. 1 2011.¹⁵⁴ The separation of government from management of state companies is meant to eliminate conflicts of interests and improve corporate governance through the appointment of *de iure* independent directors.

Whether this will help upgrade the Russian standards of corporate governance remains to be seen. A list of the possible replacements published by *Kommersant* include political/party figures whose independent judgement from government policy instructions/desiderata could be questionable.¹⁵⁵ *De facto*, so far, whether in charge of state or private companies Russian managers can hardly be defined as independent from the government. The readiness of many businessmen and billionaires to join the ARNF suggests that they look more for state protection than for independence. The results of the existing business-government relations are excessive production costs and extraordinarily high emoluments for both managers and high bureaucrats, a sort of corruption tax falling on consumers, as described by Inozemtsev.¹⁵⁶

From an economic point of view, businesses' independence can only be assured by the institutional platform of fair competition and proper business incentives. In this area, there are few signs that matters are improving. Interesting in this regard is Russia's reluctance to agree on some of the most sensitive WTO (World Trade Organisation) requirements that would allow for full membership and further integration in the world economy, such as IPR (intellectual property rights). WTO membership would bring about large gains for Russia, as estimated by Tarr and Volchkova (2010),¹⁵⁷ but also more competitive pressures for which few in the power elite seem to be ready.¹⁵⁸ While national ambitions, obsession with security and belief in the capacity of the country to perform better on its own substantiate the spirit of any corporate state, preference for cooperation (the social contract) and disdain for competition are also intrinsic to this model.¹⁵⁹ It is within this frame of mind that Russia moved in 2010 towards the formation of an integrated regional market

¹⁵⁴ See the list in http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/900 and comments by Guriev (HSE) and Tsyvinski (Yale) in <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/print/article/the-purge-of-the-kremlin-chairmen/434935.html>

¹⁵⁵ See the list and portraits in http://www.kommersant.ru/ISSUES.PHOTO/DAILY/2011/058/k09_big.jpg

¹⁵⁶ See in <http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2010/06/01/235998> Inozemtsev, V., "Modernisatsiya.ru: Prichiny sverkhkrashodov".

¹⁵⁷ Tarr D. and Volchkova N., "Russian Trade and Foreign Direct Investment Policy at the crossroads", World Bank Development Research Group. Trade and Integration Team, *Policy Research Working Paper* no.5255, March 2010 downloadable from http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2010/03/31/000158349_20100331125304/Rendered/PDF/WPS5255.pdf

¹⁵⁸ For a pessimist outlook on this issue, see Guriev Sergei, "How to reform the Russian economy", Centre for European Reform, Policy Brief in http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/pb_russian_economy_jul10.pdf

¹⁵⁹ On corporatism in its model and different materialisations one of the best sources is Philippe C. Schmitter, see Schmitter P.C. and Grote J.R., "The Corporatist Sisyphus: Past, present & Future", European University Institute, April 1997, from <http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/Publication/NDL1997/NDL1997-055.pdf> accessed on June 2, 2010. See also Schmitter P.A., "Still the Century of Corporatism?", *The Review of Politics*, 1974, 36: 85-131 Also worth seeing his table on differences between a pluralist and a corporate state in http://www.treccani.it/Portale/elements/categoriesItems.jsp?pathFile=/BancaDati/Enciclopedia_delle_Scienze_Sociali/VOL02/ENCICLOPEDIA DELLE SCIENZE SOCIALI Vol.2_107.xml (in Italian)

with two bordering countries, Belarus and Kazakhstan, as an alternative to WTO. Interestingly, despite negotiations with WTO members are still going on that could prelude to separate membership¹⁶⁰, Putin insists on the importance of the Customs union as a new geopolitical reality.¹⁶¹ There are pressures to Ukraine to join the union. Both Putin and Medvedev have resorted to threats not to cut energy prices that had been agreed before the crisis for 2009-2019 unless Ukraine join the Customs Unions.¹⁶² While Ukraine tries to resist, other relatively poor countries, such as Kirghizia, seem to be attracted by the idea of joining the Customs Union.¹⁶³

Struggling for M&D Russia will have to choose with whom it is better to cooperate. Aslund argues that there is no chance that the CIS, patchwork of trails and errors, could offer Russia a viable trade framework alternative to WTO.¹⁶⁴ He may be right, but, geopolitics may be more important to the Russian corporate state than the offer of a peer seat in any non financial international organisation, such as the WTO and the OECD.¹⁶⁵

One could argue on theoretical and practical grounds that competitive pressure from within a WTO membership framework and exposure to OECD's dialogue on best practices would provide much better support to the modernisation and innovation drive in the medium-long term. But Russian leaders seem anxious to make it on their own, allowing for some assistance from abroad that, however, should not turn into a challenge to the sovereign role the country has in part re-gained with robust growth and macroeconomic stability since early 2000s. The economic and political order is such that it would be difficult to imagine any threat to stability from opposition from within.¹⁶⁶ At the World Political Forum in Yaroslavl on September 8 2011, Medvedev warned that modernisation of the state will take time.¹⁶⁷ As it occurred in other times and with other countries, the current Russian political order may deliver on its promises of *ad hoc* improvement in priority areas. But, even under this optimistic scenario, transaction and opportunity costs may turn to be too high for society as a whole. Some Russians may find it easier to try to make it on their own abroad.

¹⁶⁰ The early steps are described in Malle S., "The Impact of the Financial Crisis in Russia", *cit.* See A. Dvorkovich on Russia's chance to join WTO in 2011 in <http://www.rg.ru/printable/2010/05/31/wto-site.html>

¹⁶¹ See as reported on May 21, 2010, by <http://www.rian.ru/politics/20100521/236891950.html>

¹⁶² See for Putin <http://www.rg.ru/printable/2011/06/08/ukr-gaz.html> on 8 June 2011 and for Medvedev <http://www.mk.ru/print/articles/617182-medvedev-predlozhit-ukraine-podumat-ob-integratsionnoy-skidke-na-gaz.html> accessed on 24.8.2011

¹⁶³ See on Kighizia <http://www.rosbalt.ru/exussr/2011/09/05/886107.html> and on Ukraine <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1766098>, both accessed on September 5, 2011

¹⁶⁴ See Aslund A., "The Post-Soviet Space: An Obituary", in Aslund, Guriev, Kuchins eds, *Russia after the Global Economic Crisis*, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Centre for Strategic and International Studies. New Economic School, Washington D.C. June 2010, pp.223-240.

¹⁶⁵ On the alleged interest for Russia and the neighbour countries to join in the effort to re-build a single economic space against economic threat from the European Union in the West and China in the East, see S. Glaz'ev, the mastermind of the tripartite Customs Union in his own website <http://www.glazev.ru/> and in <http://www.asms.ru/kompnet/2011/august/kyskova24.pdf> both accessed on 5 September 2011

¹⁶⁶ Interestingly, Prokhorov, having become the leader of Right Cause in June 2011, admits that his will not be an opposition party, since opposition has disqualified herself.

¹⁶⁷ As it should be "gradual and harmonious", See <http://www.kremlin.ru/news/12612> accessed on 8 September 2011.

Indeed, this is already happening.¹⁶⁸ There is a modern Russia, as a sharp observer points out, but is it abroad.¹⁶⁹

Concluding remarks

In the aftermath of the financial crisis Russia has embarked in an ambitious programme of modernisation and diversification with the support of innovation and institutional change. This programme is based on state projects and monitoring from above. The blueprint for change is Strategy-2020 prepared before the crisis and now being revised to take into account its effects. Among a number of specific reforms, the innovation centre Skolkovo and the Agency for Strategic Initiative have received strong government backing, though most funds are expected to be off-budget.

Reforms are carried out from a strong technocratic viewpoint widely shared within the coalition of economic and political power that constitutes the backbone of the Russian corporate state. The interpenetration of business and government interests may, indeed, help modernise parts of the economy, i.e. those selected by the government as a priority, also in the interest of security. Modernisation of the military only will cost some more than \$650bn from now to 2020. Russia has gone through a process of modernisation from above more than once in her history, prompted, as a rule, by the need to upgrade of military technology. While one can expect specific projects to succeed, the chosen path is patchy and costly. It is also unlikely to give birth to a modern economy and society, that is to a self-propelling engine for change, unless competitive pressures grow out of further integration into the international economy through membership into the WTO and the OECD. Russia remains hesitant in this field apparently judging economic cooperation with bordering former Soviet Union countries as comparatively more important.

Nonetheless, a new and more comprehensive approach to change to modernity may be emerging. More lively criticism of existing power structures and national goals are contributing to better focus on what is needed for the country to modernise and diversify out of dependence on national resources. The need for foreign investments and support in research and development is finally openly acknowledged by the leadership. Amendments to strict provisions on investment in strategic sectors and legal changes to the status and management of major state holdings, possibly entailing more transparency and better performance, point to a certain relaxation of direct state control on production. In addition, by contributing to tighter fiscal balances, the crisis forces the authorities to consider market-orientated reforms that otherwise would have been probably postponed indefinitely. The volume of state assets slated for privatisation has increased tremendously in a short time. There are plans – still to be approved - to open some large scale companies to private investors and in some cases to divest state property completely, though the government is to retain control of the companies related to defence. It is likely that privatisation will encounter resistance from below,

¹⁶⁸ The number of Russians wishing to emigrate has remarkably increased since 1991 from 5% to 20%, see VTsIOM opinion poll reported on 10 June 2011 in <http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=459&uid=111681>

¹⁶⁹ As noted by Wayne Merry, “The crisis of Russian modernization”, www.opendemocracy.net accessed on 20 July 2011.

and possibly, like in the mid-nineties, attempts, from above, to distort conditions and procedures for sale in favour of the power elite.

The intensity of reforms will depend on constraints - available resources and oil prices – and social consensus. Political structures, such as the All-Russian National Front, that should serve this purpose by co-opting the most motivated people into politics have been put in place. It remains to be seen whether the Front will perform as hoped for, or fail, succumbing to opportunistic behaviour. One way or the other, the Russian Federal authorities are not to release control over the direction and pace of change. This leaves little room for the modernisation of the state.

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Democratic Consolidation and the Party System in the Russian Duma

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Introduction

Russian Duma elections have always revealed surprises to observers. The 1993 election ended in the triumph of Zhirinovskiy's LDPR. In 1995 election, the Communists won an overwhelming victory. In 2003, the United Russia almost gained the majority for the first time as the party of power. It further secured the two thirds of the Duma seats in 2007.

Richard Rose terms this phenomenon floating party system. In a floating party system, the parties competing for popular support change from one election to the next. Some parties disappear, new parties appear, others alter their names. Accountability is not meaningful when voters can neither reaffirm nor withdraw their support from the party for which they voted at the previous election. The floating party system impedes the formation of political institutions necessary to create an accountable democracy (Rose, 2001).

Against this perspective, Stephen Whitefield takes a relatively optimistic view of the prospects for party formation and consolidation in Russia. He agrees that governments are not formed on the basis of party allegiance, and that neither of the two presidents was elected on the basis of party identification. However he examined ideological and social divisions within Russian society and argues that the weakness of political parties is not because voters do not know how to find parties of their preferences.

Most Russians identify themselves with a set of political principles or ideology. The social divisions are created based on the different experiences of the public. The clearly different experiences particularly in the economic reform period are the main sources of the social division. The number of Russians able and willing to nominate a party with which they politically identify has grown considerably over time. Socially differentiated Russians are able to link their experiences with ideological programs and again to link each of these to their choice of parties in ways that produce clear but growing political divisions (Miller and Klobucar, 2000).

Whitefield found out a spectrum of public opinion, which at the one axis produces clusters of pro-market, pro-Western, and pro-liberal positions and at the other axis anti-market, anti-Western, and illiberal views. Supporters of the market are supporters of liberal and pro-Western position, while opponents of the market make their commitment to illiberal and anti-Western

position. He concludes that Russian parties respond to this kind of social division. (Whitefield, 2001)

The two perspectives focus on the different side of Russian party system. Richard Rose analyses the supply side of the party system and argues that Russian elites have not been forced to work accountable to the electorates, whereas Stephen Whitefield deals with the demand side of the party system and argues that due to significant social and ideological divisions to partisanship, elites have enough motive to build ties to the population.

Notwithstanding this difference, the both perspectives agree that the Russian party system is weak and stands at the initial stage of its development. They accept that political parties in post-Communist Russia are weak on many dimensions. But, not all parties might be weak. This point can connect the two positions. From this point of view, this paper tries to examine features of the Russian parties and classifies them. Research questions are “whether the Russian party system is consolidated or not? How it is on the way to the consolidation? What parties are established?” For the classification, some criteria are needed. Whereas the theory of the floating party system is supply driven and the theory of social division to party choice is that the parties respond to the ideological demand of the electorate, this paper focuses on the inside of the Russian parties and analyses their organizational strength. The organization criteria will also help classify the Russian parties into three groups, namely established, transitory and ephemeral parties.

This study has the following structure. The first section will elaborate on a conceptual framework to classify the Russian parties. The next sections examine the three types of the Russian party. The Analysis on the organizational dimensions of party weakness will help divide the parties into the three types. Many theories concerning the Russian party system deal with either demand or supply side of the party. Compared to them, this study touches the inside of the party.

Conceptual Framework of the Russian Party System

Most Russian parties are weak in terms of organization. It is mostly due to the legacy of Soviet party politics. The very concept of party has discredited after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the party was omnipresent throughout everyday lives in the Soviet era. In NRB surveys, political parties are consistently the most distrusted of all institutions in society, and the Duma comes a close second (Rose, Tikhomirov and Mishler 1997).

This legacy has negatively affected the development of party system in Russia. First, the Party is not responsible to governing. The president is not required to be a party nominee and does not need the support of a majority of members in the Duma. In Russia the link between

government and parliament is loose.

Second, the party is actually a blur concept in the Russian Parliament. The movement, which gathered a high level of support from radical critics of Communism in the last years of the Soviet Union, 'Democratic Russia', did not turn itself into a political party (Urban 1992). In 1999, the Unity party was not formally registered as a political party. It was an amalgam of seven associations. The Fatherland party combined five different associations. The Union of Right Forces brought together four associations and the Zhirinovskiy Bloc two associations.


Third, Russian parties try to claim to represent everyone. Especially, the party of power often uses this strategy of fuzzy-focus party. The party names such as Russia's Choice, Our Home Is Russia, and United Russia do not reveal any ideological direction. United Russia succeeded in gaining votes by appearing as fuzzy-focus party by campaigning in favor of political stability and pragmatism. And Putin sought nationalist support by attacking Mikhail Gorbachev for the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moreover, United Russia paraded its support for the war in Chechnya. Many of supports for the Communist drifted to Unity, an indication of the success of the latter's fuzzy-focus appeal to Russians (Rose, 2001).

The weak position of the party in the Russian politics leads to the strong representation of Independents in Duma. Independent candidates far outnumbered party standard-bearers. There were 873 independent candidates winning 45.2% of the vote in 1993 and 1055 with 31% of the votes in 1995. The independents have won between the one third and half of seats from the single-member districts of the Duma election.

If we take a close look at the political party system in Duma, we can find different groups of parties. There are some established parties. There are parties of a transitory character. These parties continually regroup themselves and change their names. There are a plentitude of ephemeral parties. They often fail to clear the threshold in Russian Duma and gain seats in the party representation system. In this respect, the Russian Duma is a house, which is built on three pillars. Established parties constitute a strong pillar while ephemeral parties build a weak pillar. Transitory parties stand in the between.

This paper chose three criteria to investigate Russian parties and classify them into the above mentioned three categories, namely established, transitory and ephemeral party. The first criterion is the persistence of parties, which concerns the time dimension. Established Parties have participated in all elections, while transitory and ephemeral parties appear in one election and disappear in another election.

<Figure 1> Conceptual Framework for Party Classification



The second criterion is party coherence. In parliament, many parties are undisciplined and Duma members easily change their parties. The pattern of faction building in Duma will explain to some extent the party discipline. The third criterion is regional representation. From geographical viewpoint, this is the means to assess how broadly parties are supported by the public.

Organizational Base of Russian parties

Persistence of Parties

The Russian electoral system has drastically changed in 2005 on the initiative of President Putin, who claimed that reducing the number of parties in Duma would strengthen the Russian party system. Until 2003 election, a hybrid system was applied. It means that half the 450 seats were distributed in single-member districts and the other half seats were competed on the basis of a party list. Under the new election law all seats in Duma are awarded exclusively from party lists and the threshold for eligibility to win seats is raised to 7% (Moraski 2007).

< Table 1> Russia's appearing and disappearing parties (Number of Seats)

<i>Party</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2003</i>	<i>2007</i>
<u>Contesting 5 elections</u>					
Communist Party	42	157	114	52	57

Liberal Democratic Party	64	51	17	36	40
<u>Contesting 4 elections</u>					
Yabloko	27	45	21	4	
<u>Contesting 3 elections</u>					
Agrarian Party	38	20		2	
<u>Contesting 2 elections</u>					
United Russia				222	315
Union of Rightist's Force			29	3	
Women's Party	23	3			
Our Home is Russia		55	8		
Russia's Choice	62	9			
Russian Unity and Harmony	22	1			
<u>Contesting 1 election</u>					
Just Russia					38
Democratic Party	15				
Homeland party(RODINA)				37	
Unity Party(Medved)			73		
Fatherland All Russia			66		
independents	135	77	113	68	
Others	16	32	9	23	
Total	444	450	450	450	450

Source: www.parties-and-elections.de/russia2.htm.

As the table 1 indicates the Communist party and the Liberal Democratic party (LDPR) have successfully contested all the five elections held after the building of Russian state. In this sense the two parties can be called the established party. However, each party accounts for around 10% of the Duma seats today. The Communist party reached the highest record of 157 seats in 1995 when Russians suffered from the radical market reform. But its seats have continually decreased from 114 in 1999 and 52 in 2003 and eventually come to 57 in 2007. Compared to the Communist party the LDPR shows a relative stability of its seats won by five elections except the 1999 election.

The Yabloko contested 4 elections and can also be characterized as the established party. It drastically lost its visibility in the 2003 election by gaining only 4 seats and eventually could not enter the 2007 Duma. The Agrarian party contested 3 elections but it contested one more election in 1999 by changing its name into Fatherland party. It also failed to come into the Duma like the Yabloko in 2007. Thus, the Yabloko and the Agrarian party are the established

party, which disappeared in the Russian party system. They are not likely to return to the Duma in this year's election due to the high threshold.

The parties that contested 1-2 elections include the transitory party and the ephemeral party. The parties that pursue the party of power can be classified into the transitory party. Russia's Choice and Our Home Is Russia and United Russia survived in two elections and Unity party contested only one election. They are the party of power in their character and are transitory in this sense. Russia's Choice was led by Gaidar, who worked for Yeltsin with the radical market reform. It showed a poor performance in the 1993 election and gave its position of power party to Our Home Is Russia under Chernomirdin that failed to win again in the 1995 election. In 1999 election, two parties that supported Yeltsin emerged. Those who sought to promote the reformist agenda of the Yeltsin era organized the Union of Right Forces which was led by Anatoly Chubais, Yegor Gaidar, Boris Nemtsov, and Vladimir Potanin. At the end of the summer, after Vladimir Putin had become prime minister, another pro-Kremlin party, Unity party (Medved) was formed (Colton and McFaul 2003).

The phenomenon that two parties were formed in favor of Yeltsin in 1999 was the reaction to the alliance of local politicians. Moscow mayor, Yuri Luzhkov organized Fatherland party and allied with a number of governors who shared the desire to decentralize power. The continuing unpopularity of Yeltsin encouraged Primakov to join the party.

After the unexpected defeat in 1999 election, Fatherland merged with Unity into United Russia. The United party is the first party of power that has consecutively gained a majority in the Duma. It secured an absolute majority in 2007 election. Thus it came from transitory party but on the way toward the established party.

The other parties disappeared only after one election and they are regarded as ephemeral. Women's party showed its visibility just by winning 23 seats in 1993 election. Russian Unity and Harmony won 22 seats and Democratic party won 15 seats in the same election. There were a number of ephemeral parties in the founding election. Just Russia emerged as a new party in the 2007 election. It advocates social democracy. The Duma election of this year will show whether it is ephemeral or not.

Coherence of Parties

There is a disjunction between electoral parties and Duma parties. Victorious candidates often change their party in whose name they stood when seeking election immediately after entering Duma. Especially, many of independents from single-member districts either join parties or build new parties, which are called convenience parties. This phenomenon was encouraged by the Duma rule that allowed faction members to enjoy greater advantages in office facilities and

committee assignments. Forming a faction in Duma needs at least 35 Duma members that means 7.8 percent of the assembly's total seats (Smith and Remington, 2001).

<Table 2> Party Alignments in December 1995 Duma

Party	Election	Duma opening	Change
Communists	157	149	-8
Our Home Is Russia	55	66	+11
Liberal Democrats	51	51	0
Yabloko	45	46	+1
Agrarians	20	35	+15
Russia's Regions	0	40	+40
People's Power	0	38	+38
Power to the people!	9	0	-9
Russia's Choice	9	0	-9
Russian Communities: Lebed	5	0	-5
Women of Russia	3	0	-3
Forward, Russia!	3	0	-3
Ivan Rybkin Bloc	3	0	-3
Minor parties	13	0	-13
Independents	77	25	-52

Source: Central Electoral Commission, <http://gd1995.cikrf.ru>.

As the table 2 shows, 105 deputies switched parties between the election of December 1995 and the opening Duma in the following month. To qualify as a Duma faction, the Agrarian Party recruited some independents and borrowed additional members from the Communist Party. Independents formed two factions, namely Russia's Regions and People's Power. Some Communist deputies also joined these new convenience parties in order to help them qualify as a Duma party. This evidence shows that established parties do not suffer from party indiscipline of their members. But many Duma members of minor parties leave their organization shortly after the election and weaken the position of the ephemeral party.

<Table 3> Party Alignments in December 2003 Duma

Seats	Election: 03. 12. 2003	Duma opening: 29. 12. 2003	Change
United Russia	222	300	78
Communists	52	52	0

Liberal Democrats	36	36	0
Motherland	37	36	-1
Minor parties	32	-	-32
Independents	68	23 ²	-45

Source: Central Electoral Commission, <http://gd2003.cikrf.ru>.

In 2003 United Russia increased its seats in Duma from 222 won by election to 300 at the opening of the parliament. It expanded 78 seats in three weeks. It attracted 13 members from the People's Party, 3 from Union of Right Forces, 2 Agrarian Party deputies, 1 from Yabloko and 1 from the Pensioners' Party. 66 independents joined United Russia. United Russia greatly succeeded in taking advantage of the position of power party and gained profits from the faction building after election than other established parties.

In 2007 election, the change of Duma seats did not take place, because Duma seats were not allocated exclusively by proportional representation. Under the new election law any members who change their party should automatically lose their seats.

Regional Representation

The single-member system applied until 2003 election encourages parties to nominate candidates to contest districts nationwide. However, no party contested as many as half the 225 single-member districts. Even large parties had weak organizational bases outside Moscow. An exception was the Communists.

In 1993, the Communist Party nominated its candidates in 98 districts, and Russia's Choice nominated only 88 candidates. In 1995 the Communist Party nominated 130 candidates, and Our Home Is Russia nominated 103 candidates. (Rose and Munro, 2001)

In the 1999 election, the Communist Party contested almost two-thirds of the single-member districts, and two other parties, Yabloko and the right-wing Spiritual Heritage group, contested half the seats. The Unity party closest to Vladimir Putin had small number of seats contested nationwide. It made every effort to gain local supports but could nominate candidates in only one-sixth of the single-member districts. Moreover it showed little presence outside Moscow and thus a great discrepancy between the two ballots: it won only nine single-member district seats while taking 64 list seats (Rose, 2001).

Conclusion

As examined above, Russian parties are weak. But, we should not exaggerate the weakness of

parties. In terms of party organization, there are weak and strong parties together in Duma. The parties can be divided into three classes, which can be called three pillars of Duma.

The Communist Party, the LDPR, Yabloko and the Agrarian party are grouped into the established party. But their organization has been weakening and Yabloko and the Agrarian party disappeared in the last election. The strong pillar of the Russian Duma is eroding.

The party of power has transitory character. Power elites in Russia organized Russia's Choice in 1993, which was changed into Our Home Is Russia in 1995. The Unity Party and the Union of Right Forces in 1999 were reorganized into United Russia in 2003. United Russia got a landslide victory in 2007 election and showed the possibility of being the established party. With this the party of power is expected to build the strong pillar of Duma.

The weakness of the Russian party system produced a number of the ephemeral party in Duma. But the electoral law passed in 2005 that included the clauses such as high threshold and proportional representation undermined the ephemeral party. The political system in the Russian Duma has been consolidated as the four party system is created today.

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The Russian Economy Twenty Years after the End of the Socialist Economic System

Julian Cooper

The Soviet economic system came to an end with the collapse of the USSR and the disappearance of communist rule in the final days of 1991. In the author's view, economic collapse was not the cause of the end of the communist order, although without doubt the economic system was in very serious crisis at the time. An already dysfunctional economy had been disorganised and weakened further by reforms undertaken in the name of *perestroika* by Mikhail Gorbachev and his government. But it was political factors above all that ended communist rule and the USSR and, as has been argued, the economic system could possibly have lived on, albeit in as an ineffective and poorly performing mixed form of economy, combining elements of 'planning'.¹ In the event, the new government of an independent Russian Federation, led by Yegor Gaidar, embarked on a difficult process of market transformation, at least in the short-term, costly in human terms.

Now, almost twenty years later, it is instructive to consider just how far this market transformation has progressed. Does Russia now possess a fully functional market economy genuinely comparable with much longer established economies of Western Europe or the United States? Has the socialist economic order that prevailed for some sixty years disappeared entirely, so that it is now receding into memory of interest only to historians? Or has it left survivals and legacies that shape and influence, at least in part, Russia's present-day economy? These issues will be explored in the present paper, which draws to some extent on the experience of one particular sector of the economy; a sector that in Soviet times could be considered by some criteria relatively successful. This is the defence industry, or the military economy more generally, which proved able in the USSR to secure nuclear parity with the United States and a conventional capability that throughout most of the post-war years presented a challenge to NATO member countries.

Through the prism of Kornai, Yaremenko and Shlykov

One of the most insightful analyses of the socialist economic system is that of the Hungarian economist János Kornai.² He demonstrated that this was an economic order exhibiting considerable coherence and, as a result, possessing resistance to reform initiatives. For

¹ See, e.g. Ellman and Kontorovich (1998). However, the present author regards this possibility with scepticism.

² See Kornai, János (1992), *The Socialist System. The Political Economy of Communism*, Oxford: Clarendon Press

Kornai, fundamental was the ideological commitment to the state ownership of the basic productive assets of a society, considered superior, economically and socially, to private ownership. Given the predominance of state ownership of enterprises and organisations, it was necessary to create an administrative framework for their management, usually taking the form of hierarchically structured ministries. Preference for state ownership was accompanied by a profound distrust of the spontaneous functioning of the market. Material resources were allocated by administrative, non-market, means. Only labour, recognising the need to permit freedom of choice of occupation and workplace, was allocated to some extent by market means in most socialist economies, labour being the sphere of a highly regulated quasi-market. In this system prices played a secondary role and were not determined by the free play of supply and demand, but were fixed by administrative means, usually according to a relatively primitive form of cost-plus pricing, including a profit element varied by branch of economic activity in an arbitrary manner, influenced to a large degree by the needs of state budgetary policy. This was a redistributive economic regime: the state reallocated resources from 'profitable' branches of the economy to other activities having higher priority for the Communist Party leadership. This was possible because of the discretion of the state in fixing prices and the very substantial role played in the economy by the state budget, which funded a large proportion of investment plus diverse subsidies to both producers and consumers.³ This redistribution took a non-transparent form, not the least those forms of redistribution relating to the military economy.⁴

Following the conceptualisation of Kornai, certain fundamental characteristics of the socialist economic system can be identified.⁵ Firstly, state property predominated; if a private sector existed then it was on a modest scale and restricted to economic activities not regarded as having priority. Secondly, the predominance of bureaucratic coordination, with 'planning' and hierarchical, vertical, relations as opposed to the horizontal relations of an economy subject to market coordination. In such a system there was a total absence of competition in the domestic economy, the creation, rise and (very rare) fall of an enterprise was entirely a matter of a government policy decision. Thirdly, the 'politicisation' of the economy in the sense that the Party and state were actively and inseparably involved in real economic activity at all levels from the ministries and other economic agencies at the apex of the system to the enterprises, mines and farms at the bottom. These relations were associated with certain interests and behaviour of the actors involved. For the leadership, output maximisation was the overriding goal, quantity valued more, on the whole, than quality. Bargaining relations were universal, whether over plan targets, investment allocations, or the volume and type of resources available for current production activity. But central to the behaviour and performance of the system were soft budget constraints at the enterprise level. While enterprises were expected to minimise costs and earn a profit, with profitability a plan

³ See Kornai (1992, pp. 134-8. In this discussion we here leave out of account the informal 'second' economy, which operated on market principles, supplementing the official economy.

⁴ The term 'military economy' is used here to cover the economic dimension of all aspects of military power, including military expenditure, the defence industry, procurement of armaments and arms exports.

⁵ See Kornai (1992), pp.360-79.

indicator influencing the scale of managerial bonuses, all understood that there were never be any question of bankruptcy, losses would be covered by intra-ministerial cross subsidisation or direct budget allocations. More generally, losses could be avoided by softening budget constraints to permit profitable operation and here multiple avenues were available for bargaining between the enterprise management and superior authorities, over plan targets, prices, taxes, subsidies, etc. In Kornai's view, many behavioural characteristics of the system stemmed directly from the existence of soft budget constraints in the production sphere, but not for households, which experienced hard budget constraints: investment 'hunger', quantity drive, neglect of quality and innovation, excess demand for resources of all kinds, including labour, and the fact that the socialist economy was one of all pervasive shortage (and, also, slack, as underutilisation of resources coexisted with scarcity). But another significant feature of the 'planned' economy was the existence and functioning of a priority system. Although never stated formally in any Party or government document, it was generally understood that certain sectors of the economy were considered more important than others and, as such, would be provided with more favourable conditions, including softer budget constraints than typical of lower priority sectors.

Kornai's understanding of the Socialist economic system in general can be supplemented by the insights of another talented economist, who advanced his own theory derived from his attempts to understand the specific features of the Soviet economic order, in particular its characteristic structural features. This was the late Yurii Yaremenko (1935-1996), perhaps the most innovative of all economists working in the USSR in its final twenty years, from 1987 director of the Institute of National Economic Forecasting of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In his major work, Yaremenko (1981), originally published in a heavily censored and abbreviated form, he analysed the Soviet economy in terms of a hierarchical, multilevel system, with each level having access to resources, human and material, differentiated by quality. The qualitative heterogeneity of resources became firmly institutionalised. An individual enterprise, or entire branch of production, could rise up the hierarchy and secure access to higher quality resources only by a policy decision of the political-economic authorities. Lower level sectors habitually deprived of high quality resources compensated by resort to larger quantities of lower quality inputs, e.g. inferior grade materials, inferior production equipment or less skilled labour. In the absence of prices determined by market forces, the authorities were able to set prices that failed to reflect this qualitative heterogeneity of resources: quality inputs consumed by the select high grade sectors were often underpriced. At the upper levels, occupied by the defence industry and some priority civil sectors, higher quality resources permitted the use and development of more advanced technologies, but innovations possible in these privileged conditions were unsuited to diffusion to lower levels of the economy, lacking an appropriate resource environment for their application. In Yaremenko's view, this structural deformation of the Soviet economy developed as central control of the economy weakened in the post war years and 'departmentalism' became ever more pronounced, the most powerful administrative interests being those of the defence industry and the sectors supplying its needs. Over time, these

priority sectors of the economy became increasingly separate from the rest of the economy and able to pursue their own interests relatively unchecked by central state power.

Yaremenko's argument was taken further by a leading Soviet authority on military matters, Vitalii Shlykov, a former military intelligence officer. It was Shlykov who coined the term 'structural militarisation' to characterise the state of the Soviet economy (Shlykov (1995)). He worked for over thirty years in the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff) as a specialist on the defence industries of the USA and other NATO member countries and was the first in the USSR to focus public attention on the extraordinarily elaborate system of mobilisation preparation that had developed in the country from the 1930s. In the USSR countless enterprises, military and civilian, were obliged to maintain substantial spare production capacities to be engaged rapidly in the manufacture of armaments or other military-related goods in the event of war or national emergency, the so-called 'special period'. In order to undertake such production, enterprises were also required to stockpile materials, components and other inputs, and to ensure that workers were properly trained to switch to military work if required. In the European part of the country, these reserves had to be sufficient for three months of wartime production; in the Asian part, six months. This extraordinarily elaborate and costly system was shrouded in almost total secrecy.⁶ As Shlykov has persuasively argued, this system had an impact on the whole economy, not just the defence industry. Mobilisation plans could involve preparation for potential increases in military output of ten times or more. In order to supply this production, the metals industry, civilian machine building and the energy sector, and other industries providing inputs, also had to maintain spare capacities and in some cases keep them in day-to-day operation in the event of need. This was an extraordinarily wasteful system, giving rise to massive spare capacity and low levels of productivity, over time deepening the structural distortions of the economy. In Shlykov's opinion this 'structural militarisation' played a significant role in the weakening and eventual failure of the Soviet economic system.⁷

The Soviet military economy

In the Soviet economy from the early 1930s the highest priority sector was the military economy and within that the defence industry, like the rest of Soviet industry entirely state owned.⁸ By 1990 it employed over 8 million people, including almost 1.5 million in research and development (R&D). This was over 19 per cent of total industrial employment. Its output represented 12 per cent of the total output of industry as a whole. But the defence industry

⁶ Significantly when a fuller version of the defence budget was eventually published in 1989, it did not include spending on mobilisation preparation of the economy. The system still exists in present-day Russia, albeit on a reduced scale, but the modest amount of funding allocated to it is now included in the budget chapter 'national defence.'

⁷ Shlykov (2002), p.149 ('...the economic collapse of the USSR was a consequence in the first instance of the system of mobilisation preparation of the economy.')

⁸ See Cooper (1991b).

also manufactured many civilian goods, in particular those of a relatively high technological level. Indeed, almost all high technology manufacturing in the USSR was undertaken within the defence sector, so much so that in 1990 half the industry's total production was of civil goods. In the same year almost 80 per cent of all industrial R&D undertaken in the country was performed by the defence industry and almost 70 per cent of this was for military purposes.⁹ Over decades the industry enjoyed top priority in resource allocation, not simply in terms of quantity, but crucially in term of quality, being the recipient of the best available material and equipment inputs and, as the favoured sector, secured with financial resources permitting the payment of relatively high salaries and wages. The attraction, training and retention of skilled personnel, from designers and engineers to machine tool operators, was vital to the industry's relative success and to make this possible the enterprises of the industry were resourced in such a way as to permit the development around them of housing, educational, medical and cultural-sporting facilities of an unusually high standard in Soviet conditions. Notably in the nuclear industry, but also in other ministries, there were special distribution networks making available to employees food products and consumer goods scarce in the normal state shops. There was also a bias to the creation of very large enterprises, sometimes employing tens of thousands of workers, often with a high degree of self-reliance, minimising the possibility of the supply breakdowns so characteristic of the Soviet economy. Some large enterprises even had their own steel works and produced their own specialised production equipment. In this respect the defence industry was not unique. A distinctive feature of the Soviet economy was the extraordinarily low level of sub-contracting. Especially in the engineering industry, enterprises made in-house many components and systems that in a typical market economy would have been supplied by independent, specialised, companies, often small in scale.¹⁰ This is a major reason why in the Soviet economy there were very few small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

Not only were many defence enterprises very large, but quite a few dominated the local economies of entire population centres and in some cases were the centres of so-called 'monotowns', with only a single or very limited number of employers, often located, for security reasons, in remote areas of the country. In the case of the nuclear weapons industry, in particular, some of these towns were 'closed', i.e. they had highly restricted access and their inhabitants had strictly regulated contact with the rest of the country, though they were usually compensated by relatively good housing and pay.

The Soviet economic system was a producer-driven order, with very weak customer power. It was a sellers' market in which even goods of inferior quality found buyers. This state of affairs was also typical of the military economy, even though the customer, the armed forces, was granted some consumer powers not available in other sectors. The defence industry was to a large extent able to determine the types of weapons supplied to the armed forces and

⁹ Data from Cooper (2006), p.132-3.

¹⁰ This phenomenon dates back to the 1930s, when the administered supply system was first adopted; for a classic analysis see Granick (1967).

their volume. However, the military were involved in establishing the specifications of new armaments and were able to exercise some influence over the quality of their manufacture through a system of so-called 'military representatives' located at enterprises and R&D organisations to monitor their work on behalf of the armed forces customer. But this system had many problems and only in the late Gorbachev years were the military able openly to voice their discontents with this one-sided arms procurement system. Unlike the rest of the economy, however, the defence sector was subject to a form of competitive pressure: for the Party and military leaderships it was considered essential to match the technological innovations of potential adversaries. To this end, efforts were made to provide the defence industry with conditions and incentives that would make this possible, including generous rewards, monetary and non-monetary, for successful scientists, designers and engineers.

The Russian economy today

Since the beginning of 1991 the Russian economy has been transformed to a very significant degree. The large-scale privatisation campaign of the early to mid-1990s ended the predominance of state ownership in industry, prices were freed to find their own market level and many market-orientated institutions were established. The military economy was not immune from these reforms; indeed, they had a major impact on the defence industry and its performance. Looking at today's Russian economy from the perspective of the theoretical insights of Kornai and Yaremenko, can it be said that market transformation has been fully achieved? Or are there survivals and legacies of the communist past that still shape the economy or exert an influence on current practice? These issues will now be explored, drawing to some extent on the current state of the military economy and its mode of functioning in the new Russia.

Statistics on the overall share of the private sector in the Russian economy are unsatisfactory and contradictory, making it difficult to establish the true situation at present and trends over time. However, the evidence suggests that the state share has actually increased since the late 1990s. Thus, according to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the share of the state sector in GDP increased from 30 per cent in 1997 to 35 per cent in 2010.¹¹ The 'Expert' ratings agency undertakes an annual review of Russia's largest companies. According to their analysis of the 400 largest companies in the country at the beginning of 2008, the state ownership share amounted to 40-45 per cent.¹²

¹¹ European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Transition Report*, 1997 and 2010. Note, in other ex-communist economies the state share in 2010 was much lower, e.g. only 20 per cent in Estonia, Hungary and the Slovak Republic; 25 per cent in Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania and Poland.

¹² <http://2020strategy.ru/g15/news/32589616.html>, Presentation, 19 July 2011, slide 4.

The Russian military economy

Taking the defence industry, in 2007 no less than 49 per cent of enterprises and organisations were fully state-owned, 27 per cent had state ownership participation and only 24 per cent were fully private.¹³ Given that almost all very large enterprises are fully state owned and private companies tend to be of a smaller scale, the state share of employment and output is probably larger than these figures suggest. Indeed, the available data indicate that 58 per cent of defence industry employees work in the 'state sector', undefined, but apparently meaning at fully state-owned enterprises.¹⁴ While state participation in West European defence industries can be quite substantial, the extent of state predominance in Russia is exceptional. Since about 1997 the state presence has actually increased, partly because a number of private companies have withdrawn from military work and also because there has also been a process of state consolidation, reflecting more general trends in the economy.

In another respect the defence industry retains features of the Soviet past. It remains a sector in which soft budget constraints are still very much present. This raises an issue that has been rather neglected by researchers, namely the extent to which in the Russian economy in general soft budget constraints still have prevalence. Certainly, during the years 1992 to 1998, prior to the August financial crisis of that year, Russian enterprises exhibited extraordinary ingenuity in maintaining soft budget constraints, resorting to diverse forms of non-monetary transacting, generally summarised as 'barter', which permitted unprofitable enterprises to survive without facing bankruptcy and closure.¹⁵ It is also a surprising feature of the present-day Russian economy that quite a large proportion of enterprises are reported to be loss-making, a proportion that remains high and leads to a suspicion that by various means they are allowed to remain in operation regardless of their lack of financial viability. Thus in the first half of 2011 34.7 per cent of all enterprises and organisations were loss making, including 33.7 per cent of those in manufacturing industry.¹⁶ This compares with 36.4 per cent and 36.6 per cent respectively in 2005, indicating some progress, but it is still a surprisingly large proportion.¹⁷ At first sight, the performance of the defence industry appears to be superior: in 2005, 24.4 per cent of enterprises were loss-making (excluding nuclear industry), and 20.8 per cent in 2008.¹⁸ Of loss-making enterprises in 2007, over 65 per cent had been in that state for two years or more. The largest losses were made by two well known enterprises, 'Sevmash' of Severodvinsk, the country's sole producer of nuclear submarines, and the 'MiG' corporation, producing combat aircraft.¹⁹ However, the fact that the share of loss-making enterprises in the defence industry is relatively low probably has a simple

¹³ <http://www.vpk.ru>, accessed 15 June 2009 (Information Agency Ts VPK).

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ For a good analysis of this phenomenon, in which the government was perhaps complicit in so far as it reduced the danger of outbreaks of social discontent, see OECD (2000), Section II.

¹⁶ http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b04_03/Isswww.exe/Stg/d02/187.htm, accessed 12 September 2011.

¹⁷ *Finansy Rossii – 2008 g.* (http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b08_51/Main.htm)

¹⁸ http://ia/vpk.ru/localfonds/vpk_struct_demo/2005/page_8_html, accessed 9 November 2011 and <http://www.vpk.ru>, accessed 16 February 2011..

¹⁹ <http://www.vpk.ru>, accessed 13 September 2011.

explanation: as enterprises considered ‘strategic’ by the state, they have access to means of support not available to others, i.e. they experience relatively soft budget constraints. Indeed, the defence industry has a number of channels by which support is made available.

Firstly, the defence industry is eligible for direct budget subsidies and other forms of financial support from the centre. As of 2011, there were twelve basic forms of budget support for defence industry enterprises.²⁰ They ranged from budget funds to boost the capital of enterprises fulfilling state defence orders, beneficiaries of which have included the ‘United Aviation Corporation’ and the Nizhnii Tagil’ ‘Uralvagonzavod’, the country’s sole producer of tanks. Some munitions producing enterprises are so-called ‘treasury’ enterprises, surviving on direct budget handouts. Enterprises engaged in export activity are eligible for budget subsidies to cover part of the interest charges imposed by credit organisations, as are some enterprises acting as prime contractors in fulfilling state defence orders, enterprises engaged in certain innovation and investment projects involving high-technology, and producers of aircraft and aero-engines undertaking technical re-equipment. In addition, the above mentioned ‘Sevmash’ received special subsidies in 2006-08 to reduce interest payments incurred in fulfilling state defence orders. Finally, there are now at least three different channels by which defence industry enterprises can obtain state guarantees when obtaining credits relating to their military work.²¹ The total budget funding involved is not insubstantial: excluding the substantial recapitalisation allocations associated mainly with the countering the impact of the global financial crisis, in 2008 subsidies amounted to over 5 billion roubles and in 2009 over 20 b.r.. Data for 2010 are incomplete, excluding export subsidies, in 2009 over 6.5 b.r., but amounted to over 9 b.r. In 2009 143 b.r. budget funding was used to recapitalise enterprises; in 2010 57 b.r.²² What is not clear is the extent to which there are also various forms of budget support at a sub-federal level, from republican and regional budgets.

Secondly, there is a less transparent means by which soft budget constraints can be maintained. It has been official policy for a number of years to form so-called integrated structures’ in the defence industry. The declared justification for the creation of corporations and holding companies has been the need to match the large international companies of the USA and Europe in the international armaments market. However, it is generally understood that such corporate structures have another benefit: they create a framework in which cross subsidisation of enterprises can take place, moreover in a non-transparent manner. The most striking example is the state corporation, ‘Rostekhnologii’, created at the end of 2007. This brought together into a single structure no less than 442 enterprises, approximately one third of which were bankrupt or in a dire financial state. Now the corporation has over 590 enterprises employing some 600,000 people, including 330 in the defence industry,

²⁰ <http://www.vpk.ru/cgi-bin/uis/w3.cgi/CMS/Item/2540032>, accessed 13 September 2011.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Calculated from data of Ibid.

accounting for almost a quarter of the industry's total output.²³ However, 'Rostekhnologii' also includes the highly profitable state arms export company 'Rosoboroneskport', which gives ample scope for cross subsidisation to keep the financially non-viable enterprises in operation. The combination of loss-making and profitable firms in this way also applies to other large corporate structures, including the 'United Aircraft Corporation', the 'United Shipbuilding Corporation' and 'Almaz-Antei', Russia's producer of air defence systems.²⁴ In this respect they resemble the former ministries of Soviet industry; indeed, 'Rostekhnologii' is even of a scale comparable to that of a large ministry of the Soviet era.

The discussion has focused on the defence industry but it relates to a broader issue, the extent to which soft budget constraints are a feature of the rest of the Russian economy. In the author's view they are probably quite pervasive, and not always in obvious forms. Then Russian economy is dominated by a relatively small number of very large corporations in the fuel-energy sector, metals and other resource-based activities. These companies are usually highly profitable and as a matter of course, in the name of 'corporate social responsibility' (CSR), are generous in their funding of various social and cultural projects and, it is generally believed, are willing to fund political initiatives of the government on the understanding that this will ensure a supportive stance by the state towards their corporate activities.²⁵ In the words of Guriev and Tsyvinskii, '...for companies CSR is becoming an instrument of forming relations with the state.'²⁶ For these companies budget constraints are hardly an issue; for all practical purposes they are soft. This relates to the federal level but there are grounds for suspecting that a similar situation also applies to larger, profitable, businesses at the republican and regional level. This may also permit regionally-focused cross subsidisation, whereby 'donations' from profitable firms end up being used to support less viable companies considered worthy of support at a local level on social or other grounds. To this extent the Russian economy probably still possesses a significant characteristic of its Soviet forbear, albeit on a less pronounced scale. But it is not a shortage economy as it was in Soviet times. Most households, but by no means all, still experience hard budget constraints. It is not daily shortages that are experienced but inflation, eroding real purchasing power, which has been a persistent feature of the post-1991 economy. Perhaps this is at least in part the 'price' paid for the Russian government's acceptance of the survival of soft budget constraints.²⁷

²³ <http://www.rostechn.ru/archive/3/detail.php?ID=7403> (interview with Sergei Chemezov, general director); <http://www.rostechn.ru/upload/content/strategy.pdf>, (strategy to 2020, p.5) and <http://www.rostechn.ru/company/about/>, accessed 13 September 2011.

²⁴ However, by international standards, Russia's defence industry corporations are of relatively modest scale in terms of their volume of sales. SIPRI's listing of the top 100 arms-producing companies of the world (excluding China) in 2009 by arms sales, included only six Russian companies, the largest being 'Almaz-Antei', ranked 23rd with sales just over 10 per cent those of the leader, Lockheed Martin (SIPRI (2011), pp.257-61.

²⁵ On the specific nature of corporate social responsibility in Russian, see Mizobata (2011).

²⁶ Guriev and Tsyvinskii (2011).

²⁷ The author is grateful to Silvana Malle for this insight.

In the author's view, the prevalence of soft budget constraints helps to account for other striking features of the present-day Russian economy, namely the low level of competition and the modest scale, by international standards, of innovation. For many Russian firms competitive pressure is weak, limiting the incentive to adopt new products or cost-reducing processes. According to the World Economic Forum, Russia's position in their global competitiveness ranking has remained low over the past decade and shows little sign of improving. In the latest 2011-12 ranking, Russia was placed 66th of 142 countries covered, below such comparators as China, Brazil, Turkey and Mexico, not to speak of the Republic of Korea, in 24th.²⁸ As for innovation, the interim report of the group of economists engaged in developing a revised strategy of socio-economic development of Russia to 2020, looking to the future sums up the situation as follows, 'the level of innovativeness of the economy as a whole and the innovativeness of concrete branches, in particular, will be determined by the general level of competition in the economy and concrete branches.' But the authors of this document also show a keen awareness of the problems of the high-technology sector, '....in the framework of the planned economy these sectors (armaments, space, nuclear power, aircraft building - jmc) developed in a situation of high competition (the requirement was the achievement of world leadership or parity with the USA), but - simultaneously - extremely soft budget constraints (priority financing "on demand"). With these have been linked significant difficulties of the transition of these sectors to market rails and inclusion in present-day international competition, which is competition not only of quality, but also of costs. In the 1990s these sectors suffered from a lack of financing, however the 2000s showed that the growth of financing did not lead to a proportional improvement of competitiveness.'²⁹ However, the authors fail to acknowledge that even today the budget constraints in these sectors are not always hard, i.e. one of the two identified Soviet characteristics is still to some extent present, although the other, constant pressure by the (communist) political leadership and state for new achievements, no longer functions, to the frustration, one senses, of the current political elite. The fact that the Russian economy is still not very innovative and has considerable technological backwardness in many fields will offer plenty of scope for foreign exporters and investors in the years ahead, provided the Russian government maintains an open policy towards such external acquisition of technology.

In Soviet times, as noted above, enterprises strived to minimise their dependence on outside suppliers over which they had no control. This led to a very low level of sub-contracting, few small enterprises, and much in-house provision of production inputs, or at least their supply by enterprises of the same ministry, as this raised the possibility of exerting administrative pressure to ensure reliable supply. The latter applied in particular to the defence industry, which in general exhibited a higher degree of discipline in its economic behaviour than the rest of the economy, as all understood that the sector had top priority for the country's

²⁸ http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GCR_CompetitivenessIndexRanking_2011-12.pdf, accessed 12 September 2011.

²⁹ *Strategiya -2020* (2011), pp.52-53.

leadership. In present-day Russia the situation is in many respects different but there are continuities, not always evident at first sight. The powerful administrative structures of Soviet times have gone, as has the unwavering political support which the defence industry formerly enjoyed. Now, responsibility for fulfilling the annual state defence order rests with prime contractors. They receive the budget funding for new armaments and have to manage relations with lower tier suppliers and provide payment for their deliveries of systems and components from the funding they have been allocated. But there is now a new factor leading to an aversion to external supply, price flexibility and unpredictability in market conditions. Many of the lower tier suppliers are now private companies and military-related work often forms only a small part of their activity. However, in many cases they are the sole Russian producers. According to the prime contractors, they often charge elevated prices over which they as buyers have little, if any, control. Being obliged to pay more for inputs than originally envisaged but faced with a pre-determined total contract price, the prime contractors find that their profit margins are depressed to the extent that contracts are frequently fulfilled with little or no profit, a situation that can lead to lengthy and difficult negotiations with the Ministry of Defence for additional funding. This situation leads to an outcome not dissimilar to that of Soviet times, but motivated by price, rather than supply, uncertainty. Prime contractors have an interest in maintaining in-house supply or controlling external suppliers by incorporating them into corporate structures. In present-day Russia there is another consideration that has to be taken into account. Whereas in Soviet times transport costs were extremely low, heavily subsidised by the state, now they are much higher, largely, if not entirely, determined by market forces. This is a factor pushing up costs in manufacturing and motivating interest in alternative, lower cost and less unpredictable, options.

In the defence industry other continuities with the Soviet past can be seen. The system of pricing of weapons has hardly changed. Basically, a system of cost plus pricing is employed, with a certain percentage of profit, for state defence orders limited by government decree, usually to 15 per cent. In recent years there has been much discussion of adopting new pricing principles but with to date no new methodology has been adopted. The evidence indicates that within the prices of weapons overhead costs can be extremely high, now a constant source of complaint by the MOD as customer. One of the basic reasons is that many enterprises still keep Soviet-era social infrastructure, sometimes on a substantial scale and charge its maintenance to overheads, which MOD representatives claim can reach over 1,000 per cent.³⁰ Another legacy of the past, relating to the underdevelopment of specialised subcontracting, with a tendency towards very large ‘universal’ enterprises, are very low levels, by international standards, of labour productivity. These two factors alone help to explain why the MOD is increasingly concerned that domestically produced armaments are of high cost, at times now being more expensive than foreign equivalents, usually of better quality;

³⁰ Russia’s sole builder of nuclear submarines, the federal unitary enterprise ‘PO “Sevmash”’, Severodvinsk, provides a good example. On the books of the enterprise as formal branches are a sanatorium in the Crimea, another in Sochi, a pig farm and two construction organisations, but it is likely that there is also extensive housing, sporting and other facilities (<http://www.sevmash.ru/rus/korp/ustav.html>, accessed 12 September 2011).

hence a growing interest in importing weapons. Another continuity with the past is the continued existence of mono-towns, often experiencing considerable economic difficulties in market conditions, and the 'closed' towns of the nuclear industry, now somewhat more open than hitherto, which require quite substantial budget support in order to maintain their viability. Finally, although research needs to be undertaken to establish the fact, the author's impression is that a large proportion of defence industry enterprise directors are members of the ruling 'party of power', United Russia, just as in the past they were invariably members of the Communist Party, almost all positions of responsibility in the Soviet defence industry being covered by the *nomenklatura* system.

It is perhaps not surprising that the military sector still possesses many features having their origins in the Soviet past, partly because it was the part of the administered economy that was the most successful - here 'planning' worked in the sense that the USSR was able to produce modern weaponry on a substantial scale and was able to maintain strategic parity with the US, but also because the very nature of armaments production and procurement, in any economy, does not take a directly market form. But over the past two-three years there have been serious attempts in Russia to adapt the arms procurement process more to the market reality of the economy. As noted above, the Soviet arms procurement system was producer-driven, with the MOD a relatively weak customer. Now, under civilian defence minister Anatolii Serdyukov, with his background in the tax service, the procurement process is being civilianised, with the creation of a special federal agency for arms acquisition headed and staffed by civilians (Rosoboronpostavka) alongside a separate agency, also civilian, for licensing contractors and monitoring the implementation of contracts (Rosoboronzakaz).³¹ At the same time, the MOD is adopting a much tougher stance as a customer, no longer accepting without question the prices charged by producers but negotiating lower prices when possible, obliging contractors to find means of lowering costs. The model here is clearly the acquisition system of the United States. In addition, the entire logistics system of the armed forces is being reform, with civilianisation, the development of out-sourcing and the adoption of practices normal in most developed countries. If the present momentum of reform is maintained, Russia could have a more market-orientated military economy within the next five years. To that extent, a significant Soviet inheritance will have been overcome, marking a further step in the progress of general market transition of the country.

Finally, in considering the military economy, it is worth noting that Russia is now experiencing more severe competition in another sphere, arms exports. The USSR was a large-scale supplier of weaponry to other countries, but a large proportion of these arms transfers were of a political, not a commercial, nature, taking the form of free grants or financed by extremely generous credit terms with little expectation of repayment. Since the end of the Soviet Union Russia has steadily expanded arms sales and by 2010 had reached an annual volume of over \$10 billion. However, almost all the arms exported are Soviet-era

³¹ See <http://rosoboronpostavka.ru/> and <http://www.fsoz.gov.ru/> (note, there are only Russian versions of these websites).

systems, admittedly usually modernised, and the cost advantage Russia has benefitted from is beginning to be eroded, with new competitors rapidly emerging, not the least China, but also other ex-USSR countries such as Ukraine. From now on this enhanced external competitive is likely to supplement the increased pressure being experienced on the domestic market.

Some issues of structure and time horizon

It is worth reflecting on the analysis of Yaremenko to see whether it may still capture some aspects of the Russian economy twenty years after the communist collapse. Central to his conceptualisation of the Russian economy was its structural segmentation according to the quality of resources available at each level, the higher the priority of the activity, then the better the quality of resources allocated to it by administrative means through the ‘planning’ system., with the defence industry at the top of the hierarchy and some purely consumer-orientated activities at the bottom. At the same time, prices set by administrative means did not reflect the actual scarcity or quality of the production inputs allocated. The establishment, implementation and monitoring of the priority ranking was essentially a political matter, decided by the top Communist Party leadership. Clearly, in the present-day Russian economy resource allocation and pricing are matters of market determination, suggesting that Yaremenko’s understanding no longer has relevance. However, it could be argued that this is not the case: Russia still has a relatively segmented economy in which political priorities still play a significant role. A feature of the Russian economy is the existence of a leading sector in which the state takes a very close interest and also has a sizeable ownership stake, with a marked fusion of business and political-state interests, no longer, of course, the Communist Party, but now to a large extent the ‘party of power’, United Russia and those closely associated with it. This leading sector, regarded by power as ‘strategic’, embraces some of the country’s largest companies and export earners in resource-based sectors such as energy, metals and chemicals, plus a number of leading banks. According to the annual Expert-400 ranking of the respected Expert Ratings Agency, as of 1 September 2010, the 50 largest Russian firms by market value (capitalisation) included 22 in the fuel-energy industry, 8 in metals, 4 banks, 2 in chemicals and 2 in transport (both of near state status), with a large proportion of these 38 companies having a state share holding. The remaining 12 firms were overwhelmingly privately owned, in telecoms, food, pharmaceuticals, construction and retail. In 48th and 50th places only were two machine-building companies, ‘Silovye mashiny’, the leading manufacturer of power generation equipment, and finally (with a value of 55.5 b.r. compared with the 1st, ‘Gazprom’s 3,788 b.r.) the ‘United Aircraft Corporation’, the sole representative of the defence industry, well reflecting the fact that this sector is no longer a dominant actor in the Russian economy. In fact, of the 200 largest companies by market value, only 9 were defence industry enterprises engaged in military work.³²

³² From http://www.raexpert.ru/rankingtable/?table_folder=/expert400/2010/cap/

Returning to the Yaremenko framework, other segments of the economy can be identified. There is a sector of relatively large-scale business, overwhelmingly private, in activities not regarded as 'strategic' by the state, including the food industry, most telecoms, and the retail sector and building materials. These companies, some clearly competitive both in domestic and international markets, are able to operate without much state involvement, but it is reasonable to assume that the larger such companies become the more likely they are to encounter pressures from the state, perhaps in the form of 'corporate social responsibility' obligations. Thirdly, there is a quite large sector of smaller and medium scale businesses, equivalent to the *mittelstand* companies of Germany and other West European countries, which may well have thrived precisely because the state has not hitherto shown interest in their activities. It is here that can be found such innovative and dynamic firms as those in the Russian internet business, which have succeeded in keeping the big US actors such as Google and Amazon at bay.³³ Finally, there is the sector of much smaller companies, the true SMEs and sole trader businesses, the development of which has been stunted in Russia, not so much by the actions of federal authorities, but by local governments and agencies which have subjected these business to disruptive monitoring and pressure, often motivated by bribe seeking. Thus Russia's present-day economy, like that of the USSR, is segmented, this segmentation being shaped, as before, by political-state priorities, but of a different character than before. In the post-1991 world concern about military security is not as pre-eminent as it was in the Cold War years, though still an important consideration. Now there are more general concerns about Russia's economic strength and standing in the world, accompanied by commercial and monetary motivations, including, for at least some of the ruling elite, personal access to wealth for themselves and their families. However, the very fact that the political leadership regards the economy in this way may well reflect inertia of thinking and psychology in which 'strategic' and 'security' considerations still loom large.

A further parallel between the Soviet economic system and that of Russia today is the large scope for the state in redistributing resources. In the USSR administrative control of the domestic economy, plus the ability to shape the nature and volume of foreign trade flows, gave ample possibilities for channelling resources, in non-transparent ways, from profitable, but lower priority, activities to costly, priority, activities, above all enhancing the country's military capability. In the Russian market economy these direct instruments of intervention and control are not available, or only to a limited extent, but substantial rental incomes from the export of hydrocarbons and other resource-based goods again gives large scope for non-transparent redistribution: the present day Russian state, like its Soviet predecessor, is one is one that exercises considerable command over resources and this power may well be associated with not dissimilar mentalities characteristic of political leaders in both systems. In such a situation personal rent seeking and appropriation are unlikely to be absent.

³³ See Bradshaw and Weaver (2011).

One structural determinant of the Soviet past is still present, but in a much weaker form. This concerns the ‘structural militarisation’ identified by Shlykov. The system of mobilisation preparation in the event of war or other major national emergency still exists, and is still shrouded in secrecy, but on a more modest scale. The limited evidence available suggests that mobilisation reserves are now mainly restricted to the defence industry and that the reserves maintained are on a smaller scale than in the USSR and therefore have less impact on the rest of the economy. However, while there is an annual federal budget allocation to fund the mobilisation system, it appears that many defence industry enterprises incur costs in keeping mobilisation capacities, costs which are charged to overheads.

In the Soviet economy long-term plans were considered important and much time and effort were mobilised in order to elaborate them. Not only was there a five-year plan, but also ‘perspective’ ten-year, and even twenty-year, planning documents and programmes. Yet, paradoxically, Soviet enterprises and the system of economic management in general worked in reality to very short-term time horizons. As Kornai has argued persuasively, day-to-day economic management often amounted to ‘putting out fires’, resolving one crisis after another.³⁴ The commitment to long-term perspectives clearly had ideological significance for the Communist Party, conveying a sense of control and purpose to the population and the outside world, but it may also have provided some sense of security to the ruling elite. The situation in Russia is not dissimilar. Faced with the spontaneity and unpredictability of a market economy in a globalised world, the Russian government has a considerable commitment to preparing long-term programmes and strategic documents for almost all aspects of life, from national programmes of socio-economic development, as the current one to 2020, to regional equivalents, to ten-year state programmes for armaments, energy, transport, innovation, science and technology, etc. There is also much talk of the need for ‘strategic planning’, although in practice little action.³⁵ This commitment may represent in part inertia of thought from Soviet times, perhaps even some nostalgia for the apparent certainties of the past, but may also reflect a need, in new conditions, for reassurance and security for those in power. And today, when serious problems arise, the top leadership also engages in a form of ‘fire fighting’, resort to what has become known in Russia as ‘hand control’, with personal intervention at the enterprise level and the immediate issuing of orders to relevant government agencies.

Conclusion

This paper has explored the extent to which the present-day Russian economy still possesses features inherited from the socialist economic system of the USSR, with a focus on the

³⁴ Kornai (1980), pp.217-33.

³⁵ The Ministry of Economic Development even has a section devoted to it:
<http://www.economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/strategicplanning/index>

military sector, which has remained the least changed by overall market transformation. But, as argued, in some other respects the Soviet legacy lives on in the new post-communist order. This is not surprising. The socialist ‘planned’ economy existed for over sixty years and became profoundly institutionalised and those today in leading positions of power in Russia are products of that system and to some extent bearers of mentalities associated with it. Amongst economists there has been much discussion of whether market transition has been completed in the ex-communist countries. While there is a good case that it has been in some countries of Eastern Europe, now established members of the European Union, it is more debatable with respect to Russia and other member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. For Russia, the undisputed principal actor of the military economy of the former Warsaw Treaty Organisation, the phenomenon of protracted transformation is the least unexpected. A strong case of path dependency is not being asserted, rather a matter of political-economic institutional inertia.

A final consideration arises from the fact that it is now twenty years since the collapse of Soviet communism and during that time there have been many significant changes in the wider world. The process of globalisation has gathered pace and major new actors have emerged in the world economy, challenging the dominant powers of the post Second World War settlement. More recently, there has been a severe global financial-economic crisis which, at the time of writing, has not fully run its course. These processes have led to changes in the market model itself, making more problematic the criteria by which the present-day Russian economy should be assessed. It has become evident that soft budget constraints are not a phenomenon of the Socialist economic system alone, but can exist in the most developed market economies, where companies considered ‘too big to fail’ can be subject to budget support by governments, even by those with a strong ideological commitment to free markets. Perhaps, after all, notwithstanding the reservations outlined in this paper, Russia is now much nearer to becoming a ‘normal’ market economy.

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**20 Years since the Disintegration of the Soviet Union: Looking Backward,
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Session III: From "Post-Soviet" to "What?":

Futuring the Soviet *Erfahrungsraum* and the Post-Soviet
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Постсоветская пустота (у В. Маканина и В. Пелевина)

Hans Günther

Начну прямо с цитаты из романа «Андеграунд» Владимира Маканина:

Чехов хорошо сказал, что выдавливал из себя по капле раба. Но и хорошо промолчал, чем он при этом заполнял *пустоту*, образовавшуюся на месте бывших капель. Словами? То бишь нерабской своей литературой? ... Это напрашивается. (Пишущие этим грешат. Еще и гордятся. Мифотворцы.) Но реально пострабская наша *пустота* заполняется, увы, как попало. Таков уж обмен: ты из себя выдавливаешь и выдавливаешь, но в твои *вакуумы пустоты* (пострабские) напират со стороны всякое и разное – из набора, которому ты не хозяин. Ты и обнаруживаешь в себе чужое не сразу (80; курсив мой – Х.Г.)¹.

В романе речь идет о судьбе писателя, который из андеграунда неофициального искусства после крушения коммунистической власти попал в подполье совсем другого типа, в социальные низы постсоветского общества. Потеряв опорные пункты своего прежнего, хотя и рабского, существования, он чувствует свою беспочвенность. Неожиданную свободу, внушающую ему страх, он ощущает как пустоту и не знает, чем заполнить свой внутренний вакуум. Можно было бы сравнить Петровича с заключенным, освобожденным из тюрьмы, у которого нет ни перспективы будущего, ни места жительства, ни ориентации в сильно изменившемся мире. И профессии у него никакой нет, поскольку в отличие от Чехова автор Петрович отказался и от литературного творчества.

Выбитый из колеи, он ищет спасение не в литературе, а наоборот – отказывается от литературного творчества, зарабатывая на жизнь сторожем чужих квартир. Мне представляется, что можно сравнить этот поступок с кенотической фигурой унижения Христа, которая описывается апостолом Павлом в Послании к Филиппийцам (2: 6-8):

Он, будучи образом Божиим, не почитал хищением быть равным Богу; но унижал Себя Самого, приняв образ раба, сделавшись подобным человекам и по виду став как человек; смирил Себя, быв послушным даже до смерти, и смерти крестной.

¹ Далее ссылки на «Андеграунд» даются в тексте с указанием страниц в скобках.

Греческий глагол *κενοο* значит опоражнивать, опустошать, уничтожать. Герой Маканина сознательно лишает себя атрибутов писательства и делается подобным простым людям, участвуя в пошлости и нищете их быта, в грубости и насилиии, в их бессовестности и аморальности. Отождествляясь с жителями общаги, в которой он живет, он боится потерять их близость:

Жизнь *вне их* – вот где неожиданно увиделась моя проблема. Вне этих тупых, глуповатых, травмированных и бедных людишек, любовь которых я вбирал и потреблял столь же естественно, незаметно, как вбирают и потребляют бесцветный кислород, дыша воздухом (325; курсив автора).

Новая кенотическая ипостась героя выражается переменной имени. Когда его называют по имени-отчеству, он смеется и говорит, «что теперь просто Петрович» (475). Перед нами писатель без фамилии, к которому обращаются непринужденно лишь по отчеству. Очень характерна судьба его старой пишущей машинки марки «Ундервуд». Несмотря на то, что он бросил писать, он крепит ее металлической цепочкой к койке своей комнаты в общаге. Но потом он продает ее, чтобы купить еды, а в конце концов все-таки решает выкупить «ненужную» ему машинку.

Важной приметой кенотической экзистенции Петровича является его бездомность. В советском обществе у каждого писателя было свое место – комфортабельное место на высших этажах на службе государства или менее комфортабельное место в подполье независимых художников андеграунда. Петрович в буквальном смысле лишен постоянного места жительства и обитает на дне общества, работая сторожем то в общаге, то в частных квартирах, то в каком-то складе. В конце концов его вытесняют из приватизированной квартиры, и он переселяется в бомжатник у Савёловского вокзала. Пространство, в котором движется Петрович, является моделью общества (Schuchart 2004, 50-59). Лабиринт длинных коридоров напоминает бесконечные коридоры «гигантской российской общаги» (217), а психушка, в которой с советских времен влачит жалкое существование художник и брат Петровича Веня (явный намек на Венедикта Ерофеева, автора известного романа «Мосвка – Петушки»), прямо обозначается как «кусочек государства» (370).

В то время как Веня продолжает жить в психушке, потому что тридцать лет назад, залечивая его, «забрали себе его 'я'» (603), у Петровича нет убежища, и он живет в новом обществе как сторож то в общаге, то в частных квартирах. Особое переживание представляет для него работа на складе где-то в дальнем Подмосковье:

Перелески, опушки. И какая *пустота*! И в то же время какая жизнь *пустоты* – жизнь чистого пространства как простора, то есть в качестве простора. Да и сам этот бесконечный зеленый простор был как заимствование у вечности. Простор как *цитата из вечности*. Мне давалось в те дни ощутить незанятость мира: тем самым подсказывалось будущее (111-112; курсив автора).

А если глаза, в глубоком гипнозе, от горизонта все-таки отрывались, они тотчас утыкались в *пустоту* и в гипноз иного измерения: в нем не занятый (так и не зарисованный абстракциями) торец склада. И удивительно, как обессиливает нас общение с ничьим пространством (112; курсив мой – Х.Г.).

В виду глубокого переживания пустоты пространства и склада с пустым торцом Петрович тем более тоскует по вечной тесноте людей бывшей общаги. Примечательно, что для него «*эстетика склада*» (111; курсив автора) проявляет черты абстрактного искусства. Значение склада и окружающего его пустого простора становится более понятным на фоне особенного вида пустоты, который связан в романе с именем Малевича и его Черного квадрата. Поэтому я считаю уместным включить короткое отступление об этой картине и некоторых ее толкованиях в связи с нашей темой пустоты.

В своих соображениях о квадрате Малевича герой Маканина исходит из мысли, что человеку для жизни нужна перспектива, «свет в конце туннеля» (76). Весь «гениальный» эффект квадрата он видит именно в отсутствии света. Он осознает, что где-то за кадром чувствуется луна, однако в картине ее не видно. «В этом и сила, и страсть ночи, столь выпукло выпирающий к нам из квадратного черного полотна» (76). Намекая на свет, но одновременно затемняя его, Черный квадрат означает «стоп», «удар и грандиозное торможение» (76) и этим самым закрывает будущее. В этом смысле он выражает эстетику длинной советской очереди:

Отсутствие будущего во имя приостановившегося настоящего – это и есть очередь, ее идея, это и есть нирвана одной-единственной (можно черной) краски (76).

С этого момента картина Малевича как символ закрытой перспективы будущего преследует Петровича. Он видит квадрат окна перед сном (90), а когда в ожидании поезда в метро он смотрит в «туннельный зев», квадрат принимает для него космические измерения: «Смотришь – а там ничего. Кусок тьмы. Черная дыра. И осторожный (нешизоидный) контакт с космосом» (229). Интерпретацию произведения Малевича как гениальное предвосхищение бесперспективности и дурной вечности XX века мы находим и у других авторов. По поводу показа Черного квадрата русской публике в 1981 году художник Эдуард Штейнберг² пишет, что картина Малевича – «это предельная Богооставленность, высказанная средствами искусства» (Штейнберг 1992, 67): «В нем снова ночь и смерть... И снова вопрос – будет ли воскресение?» (там же, 68). Еще в 1970-е годы сокрушительной критике исторический авангард подвергся со стороны соцартиста Александра Косолапова в виде репродукций картин Малевича, воспроизведенных на пачках сигарет, или замены названия «Марлборо» на «Малевич» на изображении сигаретной пачки (Липовецкий 2008, 269).

² В связи с абстрактной эстетикой склада в романе упоминается художник Игорь Штейн, в чем можно увидеть намек на Эдуарда Штейнберга, который в своем творчестве обязан супрематизмом Малевича.

Татьяна Толстая связывает Черный квадрат Малевича с известным «арзамасским ужасом» Льва Толстого, т. е. с той мрачной квадратной комнатой из «Записок сумасшедшего», в которой писатель пережил страшный припадок боязни смерти. Согласно Татьяне Толстой, Черный квадрат возник в результате сделки с дьяволом, который сам «подсказал художнику простую формулу небытия» (Толстая 2007, 77). В ее глазах Черный квадрат – «одно из самых страшных событий в искусстве за всю историю его существования» (там же, 76). Она обвиняет Малевича в том, что он сознательно вывесил свою картину в сакральном красном углу:

Свою работу он назвал «иконой нашего времени». Вместо «красного» – черное (ноль цвета), вместо лица – провал (ноль линий), вместо иконы, то есть окна вверх, в свет, в вечную жизнь – мрак, подвал, люк в преисподнюю, вечная тьма (там же, 77).

Фигура пустого центра во многих литературных произведениях еще в 1920-е – 30-е годы становится «манифестацией разрушенной трансцендентальности», воплощая трагическое осознание «невозможности выхода за пределы катастрофической истории» (Липовецкий 2008, 222).

В этой связи можно упоминать эстетику *Ничто* обэриутов и «ритуалы пустого центра» (там же, 243) концептуализма 1970-х – 1980-х годов (Хансен-Лёве 1994). Примером может служить инсталляция «Муха с крыльями» Ильи Кабакова, для которой художник написал статью под названием «О пустоте». Пустота Кабакова (Эпштейн 2000, 190-199) связана с пространством советской государственности, которое изображается как

дыра в пространстве, в мире, в ткани бытия, реально имеющая свое местонахождение, противопосталения миру как резервуар пустоты, выполняющая страшное свое пустотное дело по отношению ко всему остальному миру, – втянуть его в себя, вынуть из него бытие, его витальность и в пределе – ввергнуть его в свою безбытийность (Кабаков 2002, 212).

В конце моего отступления хочу заметить следующее. Соображения о Черном квадрате и о представлениях обэриутов и концептуалистов говорят о том, что в русской культуре XX века существует известная непрерывность в осмыслении феномена пустоты и ее многочисленных образных аналогов. Эти формы пустоты чаще всего связываются с советским периодом русской истории, с ее бесперспективной вечностью или, с религиозной точки зрения, с ощущением богоставленности XX века. Пустота героя Маканина, напротив, отражает в первую очередь его постсоветский опыт. Этим она отличается от вышеупомянутых интерпретаций, но тем не менее кажется, что и его мировосприятие нельзя отрывать от этого общего фона.

Но вернемся к проблеме литературы и литератора Петровича. Она связана с мотивом пустоты по линии кеносиса, поскольку герой Маканина отказывается от

литературы, усугубляя таким образом свое чувство пустоты в новом обществе. Как многие постсоветские авторы и герой Маканина стремится к освобождению *гиперморализма* (Виктор Ерофеев) классической русской литературы. В своей деконструкции литературного мифа, однако, он не так легко прощается с литературной традицией, как другие постмодернисты. Становится ясно, что мишенью его критики является именно *канонизированный* облик классиков. Так, он жалуется на то, что многие авторы в описании психушки вторичны по сравнению с Чеховым, что его превратили в «сладенький леденец, который предают изо рта в рот», отчего получается «мятный запах» (150). Петрович признается в том, что очень долго и для него самого нравственный авторитет представляла «Русская [с большой буквы] литература, не сами даже тексты, не их породистость, а их именно высокий отзвук» (190).

Особенно напряженный диалог Петрович ведет с Достоевским. Он бросает Достоевскому вызов тем, что безнаказанно – в отличие от Раскольников – убивает двух людей, одного кавказца и одного стукача, без того, чтоб его совесть заставила признаваться в своем убийстве. Он указывает на то, что с времен Достоевского измерения нравственности изменились. Упоминаются массовые репрессии сталинского периода, когда убийство было не личностным поступком, а в «их компетенции» (197). По его мнению, сегодняшний человек переходит черту преступления легче, чем герой «Преступления и наказания»: «Он ходит через черту и назад напроsto – как в гости. Как на службу, а потом домой» (156). Ему кажется, что мысль Достоевского о саморазрушении убийством осталась жива лишь как «художественная абстракция» (198). Литература как «классика» и «канон» действует в его глазах в России лишь как «огромное самовнушение», как «великий вирус» (198). Но, несмотря на критику классического канона, герой Маканина не просто прощается с авторитетным «Словом» (334, 512) с большой буквы, как доказывает его бред «про *ночную бессловесную совесть*» (409; курсив автора). Он задается вопросом: «Но что, если в наши дни человек впрямь учится жить без литературы?» (334).

Кенотический писатель не только меняет свое имя и бросает писать, но принимает и новую профессию. Он превращается в бездомного сторожа, опекающего чужие квартиры. Но Петрович осознает, что этот сторож занимает особенный «статус» (197) и представляет собой «образ мысли», поскольку он сторожит «для людей и одновременно *от* людей» (562; курсив автора). Он «сторож и этажный исповедник» (194), к которому жители общаги приходят с бутылкой водки исповедываться. Ходя по бесконечным темным коридорам общаги, он знает, что происходит в комнатах, и участвует в бедной жизни жителей:

Мое «я» уже рвалось жить само по себе, вне литературы, да, да будь благодарен, говорил я себе, да, да, пойд и возьми припасенную бутылку водки, распей с ними, они (мать их!) здорово тебе помогли сегодня своим случайным и хамским кто ты такой! (194)

Происходит странное смещение:

С той самой поры, как только я назвался и сказал, что я сторож, люди на этажах стали считать меня *писателем*. Трудно понять. Что-то в них (в их мозгах) сместилось. Я выглядел для них Писателем, жил Писателем. Ведь знали и видели, что я не писал ни строки. Оказывается, это необязательно (197; курсив автора).

Упоминание факта, что «литбоссы» взяли Андрея Платонова «сторожем и подметателем улицы» (40) на Тверском бульваре, бросает дополнительный свет на роль писателя-сторожа, который воскрес как Феникс из пепла старой литературы. На фоне кенотического отрицания литературы старого типа тот факт, что сторож зажигает вечерами свет в квартирах (194), принимает качество символического проблеска надежды.

Подобным образом можно понимать соображения Петровича о мотиве ловца, который всплывает довольно неожиданно в этой связи в романе. Поначалу он возникает в эпизоде с незнакомой плачущей женщиной в метро, которую Петрович хочет утешить по вполне бескорыстным причинам. Перед нами, без сомнения, аллюзия на Евангелие, где апостолы обозначаются «ловцами человеков» (Евангелие от Марка 1:17). У Маканина, однако, семантический объем этого мотива еще расширяется. Ловец женщин превращается в ловца будущего:

Конечно, если бы не противовес нашего прошлого (которым мы себя себе объясняем), мы бы попросту не удержали в себе ни одного сильного чувства. Мы бы просто распались. Нас бы разорвало.

Но почему бы не уравновесить прошлое будущим? Почему бы не считать, что часть чувств (закодированных в образе) надвигается на нас как раз из будущего. [...]

И в этом приеме предчувствий будущего наше прошлое, я думаю, ни при чем, мы свободны от прошлого. Мы чистый лист. Мы ловцы (60).

Эти слова бросают свет на кризисное положение человека, который пытается дать себе отчет о своем колебании между прошлым и будущим.

Замена писателя «сторожем» и «ловцом» обозначает разрыв с литературной традицией, но одновременно и непрерывность. В этом переопределении выражается кенотическое снижение профессии литератора и статуса литературы в обществе. Как раз об этом и идет речь в беседах с богатым бизнесменом Ловянниковым, спекулирующим приватизированными квартирами. Для вида он переписывает квартиру Петровичу, но на самом деле обманывает его. Таким образом писатель опять остается без квартиры, что, конечно, имеет символическое значение. То, что фамилия Ловянникова содержит намек на «ловца», можно понимать в том смысле, что он ловкий «ловец будущего», который осознал знамение времени. Он предостерегает Петровича: «А главное, Петрович, будьте осторожнее. Теперь ведь все по-иному: прекрасное, но смутное время» (520). Его поколение он называет поколением «литературным», а свое «поколением политиков и бизнесменов» (512). По наблюдению Петровича,

литературное поколение уже вымирает. В то время как художники андеграунда ходили «в простеньких свитерах», у героев современности совсем другой «пророческий» (513) вид:

Идут в костюмах, при галстуке, с попискивающими в карманах радиотелефонами, и рассказывают о своем сокровенном – о бизнесе, о черном нале (наличности), о биржевом курсе и сдавивших горло налогах (513).

Подзаголовок романа Маканина иронически ссылается на произведение Лермонтова «Герой нашего времени». Но, по словам Ловяникова, «лишний человек» Петрович – герой ушедшего времени, а Петрович со своей стороны считает бизнесмена Ловяникова героем «Вашего времени», поскольку он претендует на новый век.

Герой романа В. Пелевина «Generation 'П'» (1999), бывший литератор Вавилен Татарский, учился в Литинституте, но, в отличие от Петровича из «Андеграунда», он после конца советской власти становится – в соответствии с карнавальным релятивизмом постмодерной поэтики – бескрайним циником. Он меняет литературу на рекламный бизнес и видит задачу «копирайтера» и «криэтора» в том, чтобы «приспосабливать западные рекламные концепции под ментальность российского потребителя» (33)³. Его имя Вавилен, составленное из составных «Василий (Аксенов)» и «Владимир Ильич Ленин», он объясняет задним числом увлечением его отца мифом древнего города Вавилона, а впоследствии вообще переходит на «Вова» или «Владимир». Таким образом, изменения имени героя наглядно отражают переход от советской к постсоветской эпохе.

Подобно Петровичу, и Татарский находит в себе не до конца подавленного раба. Однако, в отличие от Петровича, он приходит к пессимистическому выводу,

что раб в душе советского человека не сконцентрирован в какой-то одной ее области, а, скорее, окрашивает все происходящее на ее мглистых просторах в цвета вялотекущего психического перитонита, отчего не существует никакой возможности выдавить этого раба по каплям, не повредив ценных душевных свойств (52-52).

С именем Чехова связана и идея рекламного плаката для сети магазинов «Gap», на котором изображены худые голые ноги Чехова в виде песочных часов. Английский слоган такой:

RUSSIA WAS ALWAYS NOTORIOUS FOR THE GAP BETWEEN CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION: NOW THERE IS NO MORE CULTURE: NO MORE CIVILIZATION: THE ONLY THING THAT REMAINS IS THE GAP: THE WAY THEY SEE YOU (85).

³ Далее ссылки на «Generation 'П'» даются в тексте с указанием страниц в скобках.

В этом слогане можно видеть каламбурную аллюзию на вечную русскую дискуссию о России как «пробеле» в развитии европейской культуры, начатой еще Чаадаевым. О том же говорит употребление известного высказывания Тютчева, которая цитируется Татарским в остранинном виде в качестве рекламного слогана:

UMOM ROSSIJU NE PONYAT,
V ROSSIJU MOJNO TOLKO VYERIT.
«SMIRNOFF» (77).

Мотив разрыва и пустоты разворачивается в романе в связи с постсоветскими масс-медиа. Пустая бутылка напоминает Татарского «об идеологической исчерпанности коммунизма, бессмысленности исторических кровопролитий и общем кризисе русской идеи» (100). Но за пустотой советской «вечности» следует пустота постсоветской реальности, которая рассматривается в романе в виде трактата о телевидении.

Телевидение создает симулякр реальности, состояние «коллективного небытия», «воздушный замок, фундаментом которого служит пропасть» (105-106). Вследствие этого человеческий субъект исчезает. Homo sapiens превращается в Homo Zapiens-а (от английского слова *to zap*):

Положение современного человека не просто плачевно – оно, можно сказать, отсутствует, потому что человека почти нет. Не существует ничего, на что можно было бы указать, сказав: «Вот, это и есть Homo Zapiens». ХЗ – это просто остаточное свечение люминофора уснувшей души; это фильм про съемки другого фильма, показанный по телевизору в пустом доме (107).

Тип примитивного современного потребителя, Oranus (по-русски – «ротожопа»), существо без эмоций и намерений, «глотает и выбрасывает пустоту» (111). Подобным образом в романе «Чапаев и пустота» телевизор определяется как «маленькое прозрачное окошко в трубе духовного мусоропровода» (Пелевин 1999, 188). Магия рекламы на экране производит у Орануса фальшивую идентичность, иллюзорную структуру, «у которой нет центра» (114). Рекламный мусор, который глотает и выбрасывает Оранус, пожалуй, напоминает опасение героя «Андеграунда» о том, что его пострабская пустота заполняется «как попало» и что в «вакуумы пустоты (пострабские) напират со стороны всякое и разное – из набора, которому ты не хозяин» (80).

Когда Татарский находится под воздействием наркотиков, ему кажется, что экран телевизора превращается «в подобие огромной вагины, в черный центр которой со звенящим свистом полетел всасываемый ветер» (257). Для лучшего понимания существа телевидения рекомендуются «три буддийских способа смотреть телевизор» (269). Сначала надо смотреть телевизор с выключенным звуком, потом с включенным звуком, но отключенным изображением, а наконец выключенный телевизор. «Если так смотреть телевизор десять лет подряд хоть бы по часу в день, можно понять природу

телевидения» (270). Получается пародия на известный слоган Мак-Лухана: «The medium is the message». Герой Пелевина попадает в постсоветский мир, в котором происходит полная дереализация действительности посредством рекламы и масс-медия. Опустошенному человеку, потерявшему идентичность, остается лишь галлюцинаторный выход в мираж месопотамского и вавилонского мифов.

В романе Пелевина «Чапаев и пустота» (1996) описываются психопатологические симптомы героя, страдающего галлюцинациями, состояниями деперсонализации и дереализации. Психоз, конечно, не только личный, а социальный. В центре романа находится миф о Чапаеве, включая всевозможные его шуточные варианты устного фольклора. Бывший петербургский авангардист Петр Пустота назначается политкомиссаром легендарного советского героя. Ночные встречи и беседы Пустоты с Чапаевым происходят в психиатрической клинике постсоветского времени. В романе принципиально размывается разница между настоящим и прошлым, реальностью и сном. Не случайно указывается на родство слов «мир» и «мираж». Довольно навязчиво в романе муссируется тема крайнего «кантовского» идеализма в восприятии реальности. Мир предстает в виде сна, иллюзии, кошмара, «коллективной визуализации»: «Все, что мы видим, находится в нашем сознании» (156)⁴. Не удивительно, что слово *пустота* является ключевым понятием романа, что выясняется уже из фамилии главного героя.

Утверждается, что «русский народ давно понял, что жизнь – это сон» (134). Примечательно, что и в романе Пелевина появляется аналог Черного квадрата из «Андеграунда» – русская «концептуальная икона начала века» (178) в виде слова «Бог», напечатанного на шероховатой бумаге черными буквами через трафарет. Картина, приписанная авангардному художнику Давиду Бурлюку, ставится выше «Троицы» Андрея Рублева именно из-за полосок пустоты, оставших от трафарета:

Человек начинает глядеть на это слово, от видимости смысла переходит к видимой форме и вдруг замечает пустоты, которые не заполнены ничем, – и там-то, в этом «нигде», единственно и можно встретить то, на что тщатся указать эти огромные уродливые буквы, потому что слово «Бог» указывает на то, на что указать нельзя (179).

Подобно буквам Бурлюка, любое слово можно понимать как сосуд, ценность которого зависит от того, «сколько пустоты оно может вместить» (179). Черные авангардистские иконы XX века Бурлюка и Малевича, правда, отличаются – Черному

⁴ Далее ссылки на роман «Чапаев и Пустота» даются в тексте с указанием страниц в скобках.

квадрату в «Андеграунде» приписывается отрицательное значение, как символу зачеркнутого будущего, в то время как черные буквы Бурлюка у Пелевина намекают в более нейтральном смысле на апофатическое понимание Бога. Намек на умозрительное Нигде и Ничто нередко встречается в рамках своеобразного «буддизма» Пелевина. Поэтому не удивляет, что японский собеседник Пустоты указывает на то, что такой пустоты нет в европейском искусстве и что «в глубине российской души зияет та же пустота, что в глубине японской» (180). На фоне этого сходства японец предлагает – в противовес влиянию западной культуры – алхимический брак России с Востоком.

Беседы Пустоты с «Учителем» Чапаевым в психушке большей частью касаются темы иллюзорности реального мира. Жизнь, по мнению Чапаева, – сплошной сон. Когда человек просыпается от одного кошмара, то он просто переходит из одного сна в другой. Кошмар Пустоты о мифическом герое советской прошлости и кошмар о его современном существовании в сумасшедшем доме постоянно пересекаются. Поэтому роман можно читать как мучительную – не удавшуюся – попытку освободиться из советских кошмаров. Раз выхода из круговорота сновидений нет, что можно сделать? Чапаев советует Пустоте «записывать свои кошмары» (250). Но и выход в литературу ставится под сомнение, потому что смысл букв и слов стирается со временем и оказывается крайне непрочным:

Литература, искусство – все это были суетливые мошки, летавшие над последней вселенной охапкой сена. Кто, подумал я, прочтет описание моих снов? [...] Ручка, блокнот и все те, кто мог читать оставленные на бумаге знаки, были сейчас просто разноцветными искрами и огнями, которые появлялись, исчезали и появлялись вновь” (322).

Как у Маканина, так и у Пелевина образ *пустоты* не однозначен. Он обладает довольно широким спектром значений. Было высказано мнение, что *пустота* в романах Пелевина снимает ограничения времени и пространства и таким образом образует эфир, предоставляющий автору максимальную свободу в воплощении своих героев (Богданова 2008, 128). Но это определение учитывает лишь формально-конструктивную сторону приема. Существуют более важные содержательные функции *пустоты*. Во-первых, она является характеристикой постсоветского мира рекламы и масс-медиа, превращающего человека в пустую оболочку без идентичности. Во-вторых,

пустота обозначает крайний идеализм в восприятии реальности, который – по иронической интенции автора – проповедуется именно советским героем Чапаевым. В-третьих, *пустота* предстает как «вечная» проблема «пробела» русской культуры (Эпштейн 2000, 91-95), сближающая ее с мыслью Востока. В романах Маканина и Пелевина *пустота* отражает прежде всего опыт и мироощущение героев в постсоветском обществе 1990-х годов. Несмотря на это оказывается, что в обоих случаях этот мотив тесно связан с русской культурной традицией и является ее продолжением.

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**20 Years since the Disintegration of the Soviet Union: Looking Backward,
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Session III: From "Post-Soviet" to "What?":

Futuring the Soviet *Erfahrungsraum* and the Post-Soviet
Erwartungshorizont

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Словесность и русский культурный код в начале XXI века.

Михаил Голубков

Культурный вакуум как фактор современности

Одной из доминант современного общественного сознания (и подсознания) становится ощущение некой идейной и даже культурной пустоты. Возникнув давно, около полутора десятилетий назад, оно не ослабевает, напротив, усиливается. Его чувствует и отдельный человек, жизненные цели которого в большинстве случаев носят сугубо личностный характер и ограничены семьей, частными отношениями или, в лучшем случае, карьерными амбициями в некой кампании, фирме, конторе, офисе. Согласимся, что этого явно мало: перспектива жизни «офисного планктона» устраивает далеко не каждого, кто умеет думать. Эта пустота ощущается и политическим классом, который на протяжении последних десяти лет время от времени взыскует «русской идеи», которая разделялась бы обществом и ориентировала его в историческом пространстве. Иными словами, налицо вакуум идей, представлений о том, что есть наша национальная идентичность и что ее формирует, разделяемых во всех социальных стратах общества. Кроме того, налицо вакуум идеологии, которая могла бы определить характер пройденного исторического пути, наше сегодняшнее место в национально-историческом пространстве, а так же перспективы, дальние и ближние, которые открываются перед современным человеком и обществом в целом.

Мы сейчас очень боимся самого понятия идеологии – страх перед «единственно верной» марксистско-ленинской идеологией грозит стать генетическим и передаться по наследству следующим поколениям. А между тем отсутствие идеи (или оторефлексированного комплекса идей, т.е. идеологии) есть отсутствие осознанной исторической перспективы. Если рухнула одна идеология, значит ли это, что не может быть некой общей идеи, которая объединит людей и организует общество для решения исторических перспектив? Похоже, сама по себе мысль о ее формировании не возникает в коридорах власти.

Да и может ли нынешняя политическая элита, мыслящая преимущественно экономическими категориями, предложить обществу и человеку? Некие инновации, которые сводятся к тотальной компьютеризации школ? (Да и всегда ли и везде ли они нужны? Не обернется ли погоня за инновациями любой ценой в традиционно консервативных областях, таких, как, например, образование, бездумным разрушение накопленного за три века существования русской школы?) Развитие нанотехнологий? При всей вероятной важности этих задач они никак не могут стать общественно значимыми.

Эту, если угодно, ментальную пустоту усугубляет и телевидение, воздействие которого на сознание нашего современника стало воистину безграничным. Его катастрофически низкий уровень, оглуляющий человека, тотальное отсутствие политических и аналитических программ, усугубляют картину культурного и идеологического вакуума. Перед российскими (как, возможно, и мировыми) масс-медиа даже не стоит задача формирования и артикуляции неких общественно и национально значимых идей.

Литературный герой в онтологическом провале.

Есть ли в современной литературе, в писательской среде, осознание той идеологической, грозящей перейти в онтологическую, пустоты, о которой мы говорим? Артикулирует ли ее критика?

Строго говоря, намного труднее осознать отсутствие, чем констатировать наличие. Думается, что отсутствие общенациональной исторической и идеологической перспективы стало каким-то привычным явлением, не нуждающимся в осмыслении. Но его если не осознала, то отразила современная литература. Проблематика романа Ю.Полякова «Грибной царь» во многом обусловлена той бытийной пустотой, которую переживает современный человек, способный хоть немного мыслить, будь он владелец своего небольшого бизнеса, бывший военный, студент...

Сюжетом романа становится своеобразная игра. Директор фирмы «Сантехуют», торгующей санитарно-техническим оборудованием, в первую очередь, модными унитазами (такая вот ироничная деталь), будучи человеком по нынешним временам вполне добропорядочным (разведен с женой, живет один, заводит себе молоденькую любовницу, заботится о непутевой дочке-студентке и охотно продлевает ее пребывание в институте, покрывая академическую неуспеваемость солидными спонсорскими взносами), проснувшись поутру в обществе двух проституток, пытается осознать последствия для своего здоровья ночных приключений. Человек солидный, преуспевающий, не злодей и не ханжа, такой персонаж может быть воспринять весьма позитивно, но лишь по нынешним временам (представим себе, какую реакцию он вызвал бы у критика — шестидесятника Игоря Дедкова, прочитай он роман первого десятилетия XXI века!).

Сюжет романа составляет все увеличивающийся зазор между внешним благополучием жизни главного героя, Михаила Дмитриевича Свирельникова (прочный бизнес, отсутствие частных и иных долгов, полная материальная независимость) и томительным ощущением мертвенной пустоты, наполняющей его бытие. Герой способен признать, что отношения с дочерью прерваны, что нет у него любви, но лишь «отношения», настоящего дела тоже нет — унитаза разве что. Зато деньги есть, которые и становятся воплощением пустоты: они покупают суррогаты любви, дружбы, общения. Какие уж тут сверхличностные идеи, включенность в национальную жизнь или хоть некая причастность к ней!

Завязкой романа становится едва ли не кафкианский сон, в котором герой собирает грибы, замечательные и красивые, но разломив один, обнаруживает гниль,

притом вместо обыкновенных желтых личинок внутри копошились, извиваясь, крошечный черные гадючки. Пробуждение связано с еще большим кошмаром: задыхаясь от отвращения и боли, герой рванул на себе свитер и увидел, что множество гадючек, неведомым образом перебравшихся на его тело, уже успели прорыть серые, извилистые ходы под левым соском» - после этого герой и обнаруживает себя в компании двух проституток, ожидающих расчета. Метафора мертвечины и гнили реализуется и на уровне детективного сюжета романа: обнаружив за собой слежку, герой поручает своей службе безопасности расследование, подозревает в готовящемся покушении жену и ее любовника, бывшего своего сослуживца и товарища, и готовит ответные действия соответствующего характера. Поляков показывает незаметное, но катастрофическое выветривание неких исконных нравственных основ человеческого бытия: спасая себя и свой бизнес, герой заказывает убийство брошенной жены, и лишь добросовестность службы безопасности предотвращает преступление – выясняется, что жена не готовит никакого криминала в отношении Свирельникова, лишь хочет прибрать к рукам половину бизнеса бросившего ее мужа – всего по-честному!

Роман имеет кольцевую композицию: страшный сон о собирании грибов повторяется в конце, но уже наяву. По звонку мобильного телефона Михаил Дмитриевич узнает, что убийство не состоялось – и получает огромное облегчение, сродни опьянению, «ту внезапную добрую слабость, какая нисходит, если на голодный желудок выпить стакан водки». У читателя возникает надежда, что именно в этот момент герой сможет ощутить возрождение подлинного в себе – но нет, Поляков безжалостно реализует метафору мертвечины и тлена, с которой начинается роман. Герой благодарит Грибного царя, огромный и красивый гриб, который, как ему кажется, спас его от преступления: «Михаил Дмитриевич с трудом повернул голову и, благодарно посмотрев на своего спасителя, нежно погладил его холодную и влажную, словно кожа морского животного, шляпку:

- Спасибо!

От этого легкого прикосновения Лесной царь дрогнул, накренился и распался, привратившись в отвратительную кучу слизи, кишашую большими желтыми червями...».

Увы, жизнь героя, человека очень современного, погруженного в социально-историческую, психологическую, ментальную среду середины двухтысячных годов, не имеет никакой опоры, кроме денег, которую приносят импортные унитазы. В сущности, имея по нынешнему стандарту весь большой «джентlemenский набор» (хороший автомобиль, полную свободу в средствах, пылкую любовницу, связи в средней и высшей чиновной иерархии, без чего и бизнес – не бизнес), герой не имеет ничего, кроме денег (да и их собирается уполонинить бывшая жена с любовником). Он покупает деньгами и подхалимажем и чиновные связи, и молодую любовницу, и дочь, не задумываясь одаривая ее, а та еще и фыркает... Пустота, которая накатывает на героя романа, может разрешиться чем-то подлинным, например, встречей с Грибным царем, легенда о котором принесена из детства, но, и он, как мы уже знаем, оказывается гнилым...

Схожую ситуацию отражает и роман Е.Гришковца «Асфальт». Вообще это писатель, который в своем творчестве последних лет сумел показать (возможно, и не желая этого) воистину бытийную пустоту поколения сегодняшних тридцати-сорокалетних. Поколения, вовлеченного в погоню за некими фантомами (успех, карьера, обязательное переселение в Москву, если не довелось здесь родиться, поездки в Париж, вечера в суши-барах, многочасовое толчение в московских пробках), которые на самом деле являются ширмой, драпировкой пустоты, драпировкой «Ничто» в экзистенциальном его смысле. Погоня за фетишами поглощает все их жизненные силы, миражи близки и, кажется, достигаемы, но как только они растворяются в воздухе, мы видим героя Гришковца человеком несчастным и уничтоженным. В такие минуты он имеет одно желание, в сущности, вполне понятное: качественно напиться, кое и реализует.

Герой «Асфальта», преуспевающий бизнесмен, в жизни, в общем-то, тоже не имеет ничего настоящего, кроме своего бизнеса, впрочем, более респектабельного, чем у персонажа Полякова: он не торгует иностранными унитазами, а делает по заказу автоинспекции дорожные знаки, и эта деятельность дает ему удовлетворение не только финансовое: он находит в ней социальные смыслы, воспринимает их как художник, творческая личность, обнаруживает вполне убедительные поводы философствовать о дорожных знаках. В остальном же жизнь героя выглядит сколь респектабельно, столь и случайно. Случайны друзья, с которыми два раза в неделю нужно ходить в спортзал, а после пить какой-то прозрачный, безвкусный и очень полезный чай, хотя всем троим хочется курить. С друзьями (в общем, случайными знакомыми) связывает лишь равное отсутствие жизненных целей и интересов, суррогатом которых выступают спортзал, совместные посещения ресторанов, суши-баров и тому подобных заведений.

Гришковец мастерски закручивает сюжет романа, в основе которого является столкновения героя с подлинным, настоящим, но это не создает никакого событийного развития, кроме реализованного желания качественно напиться. И первым таким событием является смерть некогда очень важного человека, сестры московского друга, покровительствовавшей Мише в его первых московских шагах. Герой потерял, пытается как-то объяснить ее нелепое самоубийство, мечется от следователя к другу, от друга к жене, пытается найти завязки... и не находит ничего. Так Гришковец ставит первую ловушку читательскому ожиданию. Читатель ждет развития детективного сюжета, но он до середины романа так и не трогается с места, а затем как-то теряет остроту, забывается... Но ближе к концу внезапно завязывается еще один детективный сюжет, притом опасность от неких криминальных личностей грозит уже самому Мише – но и этот сюжет как-то просто заканчивается, так и не развернувшись. Отношения в семье могли бы стать опорой сюжета, вспыхивает даже немотивированная ревность со стороны жены, но и тут довольно скоро все уляжется. А что делать с детьми и о чем с ними говорить по воскресным дням, Миша тоже не очень знает.

Сюжет этого романа пытался начаться несколько раз – но так и не начался: не на чем. Не на спортзале же и не на бане его строить... Пустота...

В рассказе Гришковца «Лечебная сила сна» миражность современного бытия обретает анекдотический эффект: его герой, погруженный в цейтнотную жизнь офисного планктона, страдает хроническим недосыпанием. Он спит в московской пробке, хотя бы минуту, пока не тронулась впереди стоящая машина, на совещании у начальства... Получив командировку в Париж, он составляет себе план ночной экскурсии по городу (другого времени нет), вызывает такси... и засыпает! Париж дает ему самое важное, чего никак не давала алчная и суетливая Москва: сон! Радость и успех приходят к герою после счастливой парижской ночи, когда он сладко спал – и больше ничего... Сон как подлинность? В сущности, явление, действительно, очень важное, необходимое, но достаточное ли? Идеи, ради которой поехал герой в Париж, увы, нет. Как нет ее и у подавляющего числа наших современников, которые отправляются кто в Москву, кто в разнообразные заграницы погостить, отдохнуть, поработать.

Историческая память и национальная идентичность

А между тем такая идея необходима. Ее можно называть как угодно – русской идеей, национальной идеей, государственной идеологией. Ее задачей будет формирование единства людей, принадлежащих одной нации и государству, на основе надличностных целей и интересов – ведь это единственное, что можно противопоставить атомизации общества и превращение наиболее молодой и перспективной его части в бессмысленный офисный планктон, в бесконечных «менеджеров», заполнивших крупные города, в первую очередь, Москву, и лишенных и настоящего дела, и перспективы его получить.

На основе чего возможно формирование общезначимой национальной идеи? Во-первых, на возрождении исторической памяти как актуальной составляющей каждодневного бытия человека. Современный русский (российский) человек может и должен в своей каждодневной жизни ощущать себя наследником тысячелетней культурно-исторической традиции.

Во-вторых, для современного человека точно так же, как и во все времена, необходимо понимание исторической цели существования русской цивилизации и личной причастности к этой цели. Только тогда человек ощутит себя и частью общества, и членом государства.

В самом деле, что объединяет русских людей первого десятилетия XXI века, – пусть разобщенных, дезориентированных в культурно-историческом, социальном, бытийно-онтологическом пространстве, часто не способных выйти за рамки ближайшей социально-бытовой среды? В сущности, две вещи: язык и общая тысячелетняя история. Но если родным языком человек овладевает без усилий, впитывая его с молоком матери, то для овладения историей и культурой требуются весьма значительные труды – и от личности, как в процессе становления, так и на протяжении всей жизни, и от ближайшей социальной среды, в которой созревает человек, от школы, с которой связаны первые десять (теперь – одиннадцать) сознательных лет его жизни. Но если школа и дает некие представления об истории и

русской культуре и литературе, то они существуют (какое-то время) в сознании выпускника сами по себе, а его офисно-менеджерская жизнь (а еще лучше – чиновничье-управленческая) – вне всякой связи со школьными или университетскими (вузовскими) знаниями гуманитарного профиля. Таким образом, человек, вступая во взрослую жизнь, к тридцати годам ощущает себя не гражданином своего отечества, а менеджером, клерком, обслуживающим (если удастся хорошо устроиться) интересы транснациональных монополий. Увы, так устроена современная экономика, ей подчинены социальные структуры, ею определяются социальные процессы. Смеем предположить, что это устройство не является единственно верным. Скорее, наоборот: оно не только не учитывает исторические перспективы российской цивилизации и государственности, но противоречит им.

Начать с того, что попираются глубинные, выработанные веками национальной жизни и быта принципы отношений, когда культ личного успеха просто не мог доминировать в общинном (коллективистском, соборном) сознании, когда слово и честность априори были значительно важнее финансовой состоятельности и определяли ценность личности, когда чистоплотность превалировала над нечистоплотностью и существовало понятие нерукопожатности, нерукопожатного человека, когда честь ценилась значительно выше собственной жизни.

Возникает лишь вопрос: если эти черты, некогда укорененные в национальной ментальности, безвозвратно канули, откуда мы можем знать об их отдаленном во времени существовании и как мы можем судить о них? Что за мифология прежней прекрасной жизни, противопоставленная нынешним обстоятельствам?

Литература как форма исторической социализации

Вот здесь-то и начинается самое важное, ради чего, собственно, и написаны эти строки. Мы можем судить об этом по литературе. Именно литература доносит до нас через десятилетия и века представления о нормах национальной жизни, систему ценностей, принятых в обществе, жизненных и нравственных ориентирах лучших его представителей, показывает идеал и антиидеал человека, формирует в общественном сознании представления о должном и недолжном, о той самой нерукопожатности (слово, давно ставшее историзмом). Литература формирует наши представления об исторических событиях и о людях, участвовавших в них, – как они мыслили себя, как ощущали в пространстве русской истории, что двигало ими, заставляя вершить историю, совершать поступки, действовать вопреки интересам личного преуспевания.. Именно от Льва Толстого мы знаем о войне 1812 года, от Грибоедова – о мироощущении декабриста накануне выхода на Сенатскую площадь, от Алексея Толстого – о Петровских преобразованиях, от Достоевского – о том, как чувствует себя человек в период ускоренного развития капитализма. В этом смысле герои «Преступления и наказания» выглядят едва ли не нашими современниками, особенно если вспомнить «теорию целых кафтанов» Лужина и мысль героя о том, «что все в мире на личном интересе основано», – под нее подводится целая научная концепция.

Достоевский показывает, к чему приводит подобная идеология и человека, и общество, ступившее на сей путь. Вот только наши современники далеко не всегда могут прочесть и понять роман, написанный без малого полтора века назад.

Литература является носителем своеобразного генетического кода, без которого человек и общество теряют преемственные связи по вертикали времени. Через литературу человек получает накопленный столетиями опыт национальной жизни, частного поведения, манеры чувствовать и думать. И считать, что этот опыт архаичен и неприменим в современных условиях (можно сослаться на глобализацию), значит, отказаться от принадлежности к собственной национальной культуре. В самом деле, почему неприменим? Потому что не нужен для работы в нефтяной кампании? В какой-либо транснациональной монополии, где вполне достаточно беглого английского языка? Да, там, вероятно, более востребован культ личного успеха любой ценой, и американское кино оказывается, конечно, более привлекательным носителем социальной информации, чем русская литература XIX века.

А в самом деле, чему учила русская литература двух последних столетий? В двух словах можно сказать: ответственному отношению к собственной жизни и к национальной судьбе, настаивая на том, что сложится она так или иначе при личном и непосредственном участии каждого человека. Безответственное отношение к собственной жизни и непонимание национальной судьбы трактовалось как болезнь, о чем прямо сказал в предисловии к своему роману «Герой нашего времени» М.Ю.Лермонтов, указав обществу на симптомы и настаивая на необходимости «горьких лекарств». Культ личного успеха с презрением отверг Чацкий («Горе от ума» А.С.Грибоедова), утверждая свое право служить и гневно отказываясь прислуживаться.

Конечно, чтобы «вычитать» это все, нужно научиться читать – тому и должны служить школьные уроки по литературе. Увы, они далеко не всегда достигают своих целей. Современный выпускник зачастую выносит из них мысль о некоем абстрактном гуманизме, утверждаемом словесностью, а так же абстрактные размышления о том, что «человеческая жизнь есть высшая ценность». Но если именно ради этой мысли созданы тома русской классики, то как понять размышления Петруши Гринёва под виселицей, когда Савельич просит его, сплюнув, «поцеловать злодею ручку»: «Я предпочел бы самую лютую казнь такому подлому унижению». Значит, для Петруши есть какие-то более значимые ценности, чем его жизнь: он готов не раздумывая повторить ответ великодушных товарищей своих самозванцу и расстаться с жизнью, как только что сделали капитан Миронов и другие его товарищи по обороне крепости, – но не расстаться с честью, которая важнее для героя...

Историческая вина русской литературы?

Оглядываясь на опыт XX века, многие писатели и в Советской России, и в эмиграции возложили на русскую литературу вину за исторические потрясения, выпавшие на нашу долю. На Западе эта точка зрения аргументировалась следующим образом: именно литературный образ русского человека, то разломанного и лишенного

цельности, как Онегин или Печорин, то бездейтельно-созерцательного, как Обломов на своем диване, то необразованного и ленивого, как Митрофанушка, прячущийся за матушкиной юбкой, унизил русских в глазах Европы и представил легкой добычей перед Вермахтом, когда разрабатывался план «Барбаросса». Немцы рассчитывали встретить здесь сплошных Обломовых... Русская литература обманула их, внушив ложные представления о русском человеке, и этот обман слишком дорого стоил нам.

Для писателей иного исторического опыта, для познавших репрессии и поднявших лагерную тему, именно гуманистический пафос русской литературы обнаружил полную несостоятельность. «Мне кажется, - писал Варлам Шаламов, - что человек второй половины двадцатого столетия, человек, переживший войны, революции, пожары Хиросимы, атомную бомбу, предательство и самое главное, венчающее все, - позор Колымы и печей Освенцима, человек... просто не может не подойти иначе к вопросам искусства, чем раньше»¹. По мысли писателя, сама гуманистическая литература скомпрометирована, ибо действительность вовсе не оказалась соотносима с ее идеалами: "Крах ее гуманистических идей, историческое преступление, приведшее к сталинским лагерям, к печам Освенцима, доказали, что искусство и литература - нуль. При столкновении с реальной жизнью это - главный мотив, главный вопрос времени"². Этот же мотив недоверия классической литературе слышится и у А.И.Солженицына - от полемики с Достоевским, с его "Записками из мертвого дома" ("Когда читаешь описание мнимых ужасов каторжной жизни у Достоевского, - поражаешься: как покойно им было отбывать срок! ведь за десять лет у них не бывало ни одного этапа!" - "В круге первом") до полемики с Чеховым ("Если бы Чеховским интеллигентам, все гадавшим, что будет через двадцать-тридцать-сорок лет, ответили бы, что через сорок лет на Руси будет пыточное следствие <...> - ни одна бы чеховская пьеса не дошла до конца, все герои пошли бы в сумасшедший дом" - "Архипелаг ГУЛАГ").

Речь у Шаламова и Солженицына идет о наивном гуманизме, трактующем человека венцом Вселенной и самым смыслом ее существования. При столкновении с реальными противоречиями жизни, тем более с историческими катаклизмами, подобная позиция обнаруживает свою полную несостоятельность, а «та жалкая идеология "человек создан для счастья"», внушенная литературой, выбивается «первым ударом нарядникова дыря» («Архипелаг ГУЛАГ»).

Думается, что и в том, и в другом случае речь идет о ложной и некорректной интерпретации глубинного идейного пафоса литературы XIX – XX веков. В ней содержались не только идеи о счастье, для которого создан человек, как птица для полета, высказанные наивным (по авторской же оценке) героем Короленко, писателя очень глубокого и сложного, но утверждалась, повторимся, мысль об ответственном отношении человека к миру. Об ответственности личности за собственную честь, которая воистину дороже счастья и жизни, и национальную судьбу, за которую и

¹ Варлам Шаламов "Новая проза". // Новый мир. 1989. № 12. С. 60.

² Там же. С.61.

жизнь положить не жалко. И мы можем припомнить не только бездеятельных Обломова с Онегиным, но и героев совсем другого склада: Чацкого, Петрушу Гринёва, Татьяну Ларину, князя Андрея, Николая Ростова, лесковских Левшу и атамана Платова... Целую галерею образов праведников, созданных этим писателем в одноименном цикле.

Функцией литературы в условиях литературоцентризма русской культуры было формирование национально значимых образов культурных героев, с которыми и по сей день самоидентифицируется любой грамотный человек. Они «обживают» историю, делают ее понятной, близкой и «домашней», создают алгоритмы поведения в разнообразных жизненных ситуациях, формируют систему бытовых и онтологических ценностей. Образы литературных героев, перешедших с книжных страниц в национальное сознательное и бессознательное, ставших национально значимыми архетипами, категориями национального сознания, которыми мыслит русский человек еще совсем недавно, сформированы литературой предшествующих столетий.

Схожую роль играла литература советского периода, в том числе социалистического реализма, ориентируя человека, лишенного революцией важнейших бытийных, онтологических опор (религиозных, культурных, социальных, правовых), в историческом пространстве советской эпохи, создавая мифологию нового мира, новых культурных героев (Павел Корчагин, Алексей Турбин, Петр Первый, герой Алексея Толстого, Вихров и Грацианский, герои «Русского леса» Л.Леонова, Воланд и Мастер, генерал Самсонов и полковник Воротынцев, герои «Красного Колеса» А.Солженицына), объясняя бытийный смысл свершившихся исторических катаклизмов. Литература создавала образ советского космоса и укореняла там человека, открывая перед ним смысл его исторического бытия. Можно говорить о том, что этот космос оказался непрочным, исторические цели, поставленные им, недостижимы, но именно литература создала столь притягательный образ советского мира, что он стал национальной идеей огромной страны, мировой державы на протяжении нескольких десятилетий. Образ мира, созданного советской литературой, формировал идеал жизни, приближение к которому обусловило исторические цели нескольких советских поколений. И хотя этот идеал так и не был достигнут, он обладает несомненной ценностью, и можно ли от него с пренебрежением отвернуться нынешнему поколению, которое не смогло (пока не смогло?) выработать для себя и своих детей не то чтобы идеал, но хоть сколько-нибудь внятную историческую перспективу, которая не была бы связана с курсом иностранной валюты и ценой на нефть?

Конечно, русской литературе XX века история неизбежно предъявит и свой счет. Слишком уж многие важнейшие аспекты национальной жизни оказались не запечатлены отечественными художниками слова – ни в метрополии, ни в эмиграции, ни в потаенной литературе. А стало быть, следуя русской традиции, остались (хочется надеяться, до времени) не осмыслены национально-историческим сознанием людей, живущих уже в начале XXI века. Не преломленные художественно, они будто не отражены в национальной памяти. Таковы Кронштадтское восстание гарнизона города и экипажей некоторых кораблей Балтийского флота против власти большевиков,

восстание крестьянской армии атамана Антонова на Тамбовщине и его подавление Красной армией под командованием Тухачевского (лишь два рассказа Солженицына 1990-х годов), голод на Юге России в начале 1930-х годов (лишь рассказы Тендрякова), гонение на Церковь и уничтожение священства. Да и участие России в Первой мировой войне не нашла бы отражение в литературе, если бы не «Август Четырнадцатого» А.И.Солженицына.

Так уж сложилось в последние две-три сотни лет, что всякий русский постигал исторические судьбы своей страны, обретал национальную принадлежность, впитывал культурные гены своей нации – из литературы. Через литературу приобщался к образу мыслей и ощущению бытия давно ушедших поколений, обретал с ними кровную и глубоко личную связь. В этом и состояло то, что мы привычно называем литературоцентризмом русской культуры. И это качество мы утратили.

Утрата литературоцентризма

Всего два десятилетия назад мы были свидетелями последней на сей момент вспышки воистину всеобщего интереса к литературе. То был конец 1980-х – начало 1990-х, когда тиражи «толстых» журналов взлетели на невероятную высоту, а публикация любого задержанного произведения, будь то «Собачье сердце» М.Булгакова или же «Новое назначение» А.Бека вызывало всеобщий и самый искренний интерес. Литература восстанавливала народную историческую память, будто вклеивала вырванные и растерзанные страницы в книгу национального исторического бытия. Тогда и представить было невозможно, что миллионные тиражи года через два упадут так, что не будут набирать и тысячи...

Литература на глазах современного поколения перестает быть сферой национального самосознания, национальной саморефлексии. Сейчас литература утратила важнейшую свою функцию – ориентировать человека в историческом пространстве, определять его бытийные ориентиры. Она превратилась в форму занимательного и необязательного досуга, чтение перестало быть престижным занятием. В результате книжный рынок заполнился продуктами совершенно иного рода, предлагающие в качестве культурных героев современности Дашу Васильеву, доморощенного детектива из сериала Донцовой, или же Фандорина из псевдоисторического романного проекта Акунина.

В результате утраты литературой присущего ей на протяжении трех последних столетий высокого статуса в русской культуре, традиционно литературоцентричной, возник ощутимый вакуум, заполнить который пока нечем.

Можно ли связывать подобную ситуацию бытийного вакуума с утратой культурного литературоцентризма? Думается, что да. Механизмы культуры пока еще не во всем изучены, но утрата литературой своего традиционного статуса и потеря прежних функций не могла оказаться безболезненной. И здесь мы с неизбежностью говорим о роли государства в поддержании (или же в полном небрежении) художественного слова и его воздействия на современника.

Литература и власть

Оглянемся на времена советские. Прошло время бранить соцреализм, советскую власть, искоренение инакомыслия в литературе. Негативные воздействия на словесность того процесса, который в современном литературоведении получил название «огосударствление» литературы, хорошо известны. Его жертвой пали и отдельные писатели, и целые литературные направления (новокрестьянская литература, представленная именами С.Есенина, П.Васильева, С.Клюева, А.Ганина, или же абсурдизм ОБЭРИУтов Д.Хармса, К.Вагинова, А.Введенского). Но не только лишь к уничтожению писателей и литературных направлений сводилось внимание государства к литературе. Первый съезд советских писателей (1934) ознаменовал принципиально новый характер отношений литературы и власти, когда словесность становится государственным делом, а писательский труд – востребованным и общественно значимым. Создается Союз писателей, формируется (впервые в мировой истории) Литературный институт, готовящий профессиональных литераторов, организован академический Институт мировой литературы им. М.Горького. И все эти события становятся объектом колоссального общественного внимания, воспринимаются людьми тридцатых годов так же остро и с той же гордостью, как перелет в США через Северный полюс и эпопея спасения челюскинцев.

Иногда, правда, приходится слышать следующее: массовое открытие литературных изданий, поддержка Литинститута, Союза писателей и др. не могло осуществляться вне гонений на писателей и литературные течения, которые не соответствовали официальной идеологии. Мы полагаем, что это не так. В данном случае речь идет о разнонаправленных и даже противоречивых векторах советской системы и советской политики, которая несла в себе как глубочайший гуманизм и любовь к человеку (примеры известны, среди них – ликвидация беспризорности, сплошная грамотность, отсутствие бездомных, поголовное среднее образование, всеобщий доступ к медицинскому обслуживанию и многое другое), так и людоедство ГУЛАГА и всего, что с ним было связано. Один вектор почти не пересекался с другим, они будто существовали в разных измерениях, поэтому об одной эпохе написан и «Василий Теркин» А.Твардовского, и пронзительная повесть К.Воробьева «Это мы, Господи!». А позитивная роль литературы, какую она играла в советские годы, была обусловлена именно государственным вниманием и поддержкой.

Именно в результате государственного влияния и поддержки возникло явление, которое получило название социалистического реализма. Не понятое в советское время (из-за неизбежной идеологизации любого его филологического исследования), осмеянное в постсоветское, сейчас оно все более привлекает внимание исследователей. Постепенно становится ясным, что социалистический реализм удовлетворял очень важной общественной потребности. Когда революцией были уничтожены прежние социальные институты, общественные связи нарушены, мораль, основанная на

общечеловеческих принципах, объявлялась буржуазной, религия трактовалась как опиум для народа, а Церковь подвергалась невиданным гонениям, - общество нуждалось в слове, способном организовать распадающийся мир, лишившийся прежних связей и структур и не обретший новых. Литература могла сказать такое слово и говорила его. Именно социалистический реализм стал тем литературным направлением, которое сумело показать человеку, выбитому из прежних социальных ячеек, его место в становящемся мире. Литература объясняла читателю новый мир, творящийся на его глазах, структурировала его, указывала личности место в новых социальных структурах, формировала представления о частных, социальных, исторических задачах, указывала место в мироздании. Это было органичное, идущее изнутри литературы стремление. Литература брала на себя функцию организации общества, лишённого бытийных, онтологических, религиозных ориентиров и исконных нравственных ценностей. Иными словами, литература структурировала пореволюционный *хаос*, превращала его в новый послереволюционный *космос*, придавала ему черты гармонии и высшей разумности, вписывая в него читателя, объясняя ему, в чем состоят результаты грандиозной исторической ломки, пережитой в прошлом десятилетии.

Соцреализм как мифогенная эстетика

Утратив прежнюю мифологию, общество нуждалось в новых мифах, способных представить революцию как эпоху первотворения, результатом которой является современное мироздание. И литература ответила на эту общественную потребность, создала художественную мифологию, которая формировала у читателя картину мира, светлого и преображенного, устремленного к несомненным и очевидным историческим перспективам. Советская мифология, созданная литературой социалистического реализма, конструировала категории мышления строителя прекрасного коммунистического завтра.

Литература рождала миф о Революции как о грандиозном историческом преображении космических масштабов, приведшем к сотворению Нового Мира. Основные константы этого мифа оформились в исторической эпопее А.Толстого «Петр Первый», в романе Н.Островского «Как закалялась сталь», в колхозном эпосе М.Шолохова «Поднятая целина».

Рядом с этим мифом и одновременно с ним творился миф о Новом Человеке, герое-демиурге. Его воплощением стал Левинсон («Разгром» А.Фадеева), Павел Корчагин («Как закалялась сталь» Н.Островского), Курилов («Дорога на Океан» Л.Леонова). Чертами такого героя становятся аскетизм, отсутствие личной жизни (любовь сознательно принесена в жертву Революции), железная воля, способность к строгому рациональному мышлению, сильный дух, властвующий над физически слабым и изможденным телом. С названными чертами нового человека ассоциируется христианский мотив укрощения плоти (потерянное в борьбе здоровье), жертвенность и восхождение.

В той мифологической модели нового мира, которая создавалась литературой социалистического реализма, даже пространство и время обретали особые константы. Время, история могли выступать как косное начало, требующее ускорения ценой невероятных волевых усилий героя-демиурга и его сподвижников, способных схватить Фортуны за волосы и повернуть к себе лицом, рвануть колесо истории и заставить его крутиться быстрее («Петр Первый» А.Толстого). Миф о победе над временем создает В.Катаев («Время, вперед!»).

Советская мифология преобразовывала и переосмысляла христианские и языческие образы, мотивы, сюжеты, перетолковывая их в соответствии со своими нуждами. Наиболее очевидно подобное переосмысление в романе «Молодая гвардия» А.Фадеева. Он буквально впитывает в себя канонические христианские представления (и этот аспект художественного мира романа не был затронут в ходе переработки). Молодогвардейцы ощущают себя почти так же, как первые христиане, их конспиративные встречи выглядят как катакомбные собрания, свою миссию они видят в проповеди Правды, в донесении Благой Вести до сограждан через листовки, переписанные от руки, размноженные сводки совинформбюро; радиоречи Сталина передают друг другу и ближним как слова апостольской проповеди; флаги, вывешенные на 7 ноября, напоминают церковные хоругви. Конфликт и его разрешение вписываются в рамки той же традиции: участвуя в битве с силами тьмы и inferнального зла, молодогвардейцы одерживают безусловную нравственную победу и обретают вечную жизнь через жертвенную смерть.

Задача формирования советской идеомифологической системы ставилась перед новой литературой: она должна была «воспитать нового человека». В определении, данном социалистическому реализму в 1934 году, говорилось о важнейшей «задаче идейной переделки и воспитания трудящихся людей в духе социализма». Именно эта литература, создавая новую мифологию, ориентировала человека в историческом пространстве XX века, воспитывала его, формировала высокие духовные идеалы и противостояла все усиливающемуся карьеризму и стяжательству сталинской бюрократии, ее беззакониям, нарастающим репрессиям, ГУЛАГУ

Что впереди?

Обращаясь к сегодняшнему дню, мы можем констатировать неестественность и неорганичность для русского сознания утраты культурного литературоцентризма. Если общество хочет что-то противопоставить культурному и идеологическому вакууму современности, то необходимо вспомнить о единственном и уникальном в своем роде носителе социально-исторической и культурной информации – о художественной литературе. Ее уникальность состоит в личном и даже интимном обращении к каждому, кто берет в руки книгу, в возможности, открытой для каждого, ощутить себя современником Петра Первого, Кутузова, Пугачева, и почувствовать, как ощущали себя в те времена Гринев, князь Андрей, Алексашка Меньшиков. Только для того, чтобы это произошло, нужно воспитать *читателей*, способных и желающих

размышлять, - одних *писателей* мало. Только тогда русская литература сможет оправдать перед современным и будущим поколением факт своего исторического существования.

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**20 Years since the Disintegration of the Soviet Union: Looking Backward,
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Session III: From "Post-Soviet" to "What?":

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**“Ob odnom postsovetskom literaturnom spore:
v sviazi s ‘bol’shoi teoriei’”**

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