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The 5th International Conference of the Russia · Eurasia Research Project

**Legacies of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union
: Nations, Territory and Ideology**

DATE

Nov 7-8, 2013

VENUE

Video Conference Room
7thFl. Graduate School Bldg.
Hanyang University, Seoul, Korea

Hosted by

Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University

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Nov. 7, 2013 (Thursday)

10:20-10:40 Opening Ceremony

Opening Address

- **Eom, Gu Ho** (Director, Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University)

Congratulatory Speech

- **Lee, Sung-Chull** (Vice President of International affairs, Hanyang University)

10:40-12:40 Session I

Theoretical Views on the Russian Empire and Its Imperial Legacies

Chair: **Lee, Sung-Chull** (Vice President of International affairs, Hanyang University)

Papers:

- **Burbank, Jane** (New York University)
"Russian Empire and Imperial Legacies in Comparative Perspective?"
- **Semenov, Aleksander** (National Research University-Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg)
"Imperial Legacy and Imperial Revolution in the Russian Empire in the Early Twentieth Century"

Discussants:

- **Song, Joonseo** (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)
- **Ki, Kye Hyeong** (Hanyang University)

12:40-14:20 Luncheon

14:20-17:00 Session II

Imperial Past and Present in Eurasia

Chair: **Eom, Gu Ho** (Director, Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University)

Papers:

- **Jung, Se-jin** (Hanyang University)
"Islamic Ideology and Resistance against Russian Empire and its legacy in 19th Century: A Case of North Caucasus"
- **Ubaidulloev, Zubaidullo** (Rudaki Institute of Language, Literature, Oriental Studies and Written Heritage; Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan)

"The Russian Empire-Soviet Legacies in Reshaping the National Territories in Central Asia: A Case of Tajikistan"

- **Kappeler, Andreas** (Vienna University)
"Russia and Ukraine: the Legacy of the Imperial Past"

Discussants:

- Bobrovnikov, Vladimir (Institute for Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences)
- Hyun, Seung Soo (Hanyang University)
- Ryzhkov, Andrii (Kyunghee University)

Nov 8, 2013 (Friday)

14:00-16:30 Session III
Imperial Legacies from Regional Perspectives and the Formation of Eurasian Union

Chair: **Ko, Jae Nam** (Professor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy)

Papers:

- **Lee, Sang Joon** (Kookmin University)
"Are the Legacies of USSR Related to the Formation of the Eurasian Union?: Implementation, Impacts, and Implications"
- **Bobrovnikov, Vladimir** (Institute for Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences)
"Making Inner Muslim Frontier in Russia's Caucasus: Hybrid Imperial Legacy from a Regional Perspective"
- **Iskandaryan, Alexander** (Director, Caucasus Institute in the Republic of Armenia)
"Nation Building From Within the Empire: A Case of Armenia"

Discussants:

- Korgun, Irina (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)
- Kappeler, Andreas (Vienna University)
- Kim, Younkyoo (Hanyang University)

16:30-17:00 Discussion

17:00-17:30 Closing Ceremony

18:00-20:00 Dinner

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Session I

Theoretical Views on the Russian Empire and Its Imperial Legacies

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Russian Empire and Imperial Legacies in Comparative Perspective

Jane Burbank

(New York University)

[TITLE SLIDE]

I. Introduction: Why analysis of empire normalizes Russia

[MAP OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION]

Empire has become in recent years a major theme of interest for historians of Russia. In this presentation, I want to discuss the significance of this “return” to empire -- for after all many pioneering studies on related themes were carried out in the 1960s and before -- for the conceptualization of Russia in world history and in political studies. (I refuse the term “political science”!) My argument is that by regarding Russia as an empire, we are contributing to the normalizing Russia, to overcoming Russian “exceptionalism” in both scholarship and, I hope, public representation.

Why is this? Our “normalization” is not the result of our decisions to use empire as topic -- as do so many historians of other areas in recent times. In Japan,

the Slavic Research Center produced a series of volumes on "Imperiology," demonstrating the ubiquitous use of the concept empire.

[IMPERIOLOGY]

And "normalization" -- as I will present it -- is not a consequence of using the vocabulary of "colonial" studies, as do historians writing about European colonialism in modern times. (Doing so would only be yet another example of historians of Russia trying to "catch up" with European/western ones.)

Rather, our scholarship can promote the normalization of Russia -- in its past and present versions -- because throughout history, empires were the normal kind of state. And perhaps even more to the point, in Russia's long 19th century, the other major powers were also empires, not nation-states. A point lost for decades in most studies of 19th century history, in which the "rise of nationalism" played a too prominent role, obscuring the actual goals of many nationalists and the imperial context in which they formed their ideas.

[MAP OF 19TH CENTURY EUROPE]

In this respect, Marc Raeff made an important point in his brilliant 1989 article, "un empire comme les autres¹". We return Russia to normalcy when we consider that Russia and its rival powers and the powers Russian leaders and elites wanted at times to emulate -- Raeff emphasizes western European civilization as a goal of Russian expansion to the west -- and even the powers that Russian subjects

¹ Marc Raeff, "Une empire comme les autres?," *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* 30,nos. 3-4 (July - December 1989): 321-328.

may have found attractive -- the Ottoman empire for some Muslims, for examples -
- all these powers were empires.

[19TH CENTURY EMPERORS]

If we can set the myth of a transition from empire to nation-state to rest, we can open up the 19th and 20th centuries to a more accurate scrutiny of political formations. We then see that Russia was not “different” because it was an empire facing nation-states; instead, Russia, like other states, existed and competed in a world of empires. A world that lasted until the middle of the twentieth century, and may continue in disguise into the 21st.

But, and this is a different point, I do not want to “normalize” Russia by saying that it was “like” other empires. Normalizing empire as a kind of state does not mean that all empires were alike. Just as putative nation-states have radically different kinds of governments -- some are dictatorships, some democracies, to take two simplistic extremes -- so too empires had their own -- varied -- ways of rule. You might say Russia was normal, in that it had its own imperial traditions and political culture. Just as had the British, the French, the Spanish, the Chinese, the Japanese, the Romans, etc.

Our task then, as I see it, in studying Russia as an empire is to understand its particular political traditions, with the understanding that all empires were “particular” or “different” from each other. Accepting the proposition that while empires face common problems, they attempt to resolve them in different ways, we can analyze, describe, and represent Russia’s own imperial tradition, free from

the normative jargon of “exceptionalism.” If each empire had its own particularities, its own “repertoire” of strategies to survive, compete and expand, then the particularities of Russian empire make it “different” but not abnormal².

[MAP OF RUSSIAN EMPIRE]

Another way of saying this is that we have to break with the convention of “comparing” Russia to western European colonial empires thought to define a “normal” kind of colonialism. Instead we should look at each empire -- the French, the German, the British, the Japanese, the Chinese, the Russian, etc. -- as having its own political and cultural habits. This means that Russia is no more exceptional than Great Britain, that had its own varied strategies of rule.

II. Why empires differ in their ways of rule

But why did empires develop different kinds of political strategies? If empires faced common problems -- ruling at a distance, governing unlike populations, managing the intermediaries that were everywhere essential to imperial power -- why did empires come up with a variety of ways to rule? I suggest two different answers:

First, since empires extended power over unlike peoples, they ordinarily, both before and after conquest or incorporation by other means, had to use different approaches to manage different groups. The imperial power’s intersection with a variety of social customs, power structures meant that

² For an analysis and definition of imperial political practices over time and in different empires, see Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), chapter one.

successful empires learned to adjust to circumstances, and to develop multiple ways to deal with different subordinated groups. Empires as Fred Cooper have written in our book, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference, governed different people differently.

This basic fact of imperial life -- the extension of power over unlike peoples, meant that empires over time produced a multiplicity of ways of ruling others. They could deploy different strategies at the same time in different places, or at different times in the same place. Empires needed to be flexible to succeed, and thus their leaders, over time, were inclined to devise different approaches. The multiplicity of intersections with different cultures, environments, and political organizations is then one source of the variety of strategies that different empires used and integrated into their own distinctive political practices.

Let's take two non-Russian examples of this dynamic: At one extreme of the "politics of difference" we have the Mongol empires.

[MONGOL EMPIRES]

After conquest, Mongol rulers adjusted to the attributes of the various populations and societies they had subordinated. They were willing to bring non-Mongol elites into the highest circles of administration, and often to move them across their empires into places where they were useful. The Mongols were successful at using the skills of religious leaders -- of different religions -- in different places. They thus created a huge imperial realm in which people continued to follow their earlier social habits, but also provided resources for the differentiated elites of the vast Mongol space.

[FRENCH EMPIRE, 20TH CENTURY]

We might expect “modern” empires to behave differently, but let’s think about the French empire in the 20th century. Regardless of the ideology of “rights of the citizen,” or “fraternity, equality, and liberty,” people living in the French empire in 1944 were governed in highly differentiated ways and had different statuses. Here are the major distinctions:

1. European France, the metropole. Everyone living there, except for foreigners, had the status of French citizen.

2. Old colonies, mainly in the Caribbean. These had been in the French empire going back as far as the 17th century, and much of their population consisted of the descendants of slaves from Africa. France had abolished slavery in 1848, and the ex-slaves in these colonies became French citizens.

3. Algeria. France had conquered Algeria from the Ottoman Empire beginning in 1830. It claimed to be continuing the Ottoman policy of allowing different peoples to use their own systems of law, and for the majority this meant Islamic law. Muslims were considered to have a distinct "status" because their personal affairs—marriage and inheritance mainly—were governed by Islamic law and not the French civil code. Muslim Algerians were French nationals, but not French citizens. They were "subjects," with only limited political voice. Many European settlers came to Algeria, and they had the rights of French citizens, including electing their own representatives to the French legislature.

4. New colonies. In the late 19th century, France conquered new territories, mostly in Africa. The indigenous people in the new colonies had a status similar to that of Muslim Algerians: they were French subjects, not citizens.

5. Protectorates. In some cases, France took over the government of

territories by treaty with their sovereign. The treaty was imposed by coercion, but it maintained the fiction that the king or prince was still sovereign and that the people kept their own nationality. Morocco, Tunisia, Laos, Cambodia, and parts of Vietnam were protectorates with their own nationalities.

6. Mandates, later called trust territories. When, after World War I, the League of Nations distributed the colonies of Germany and some of the provinces of the Ottoman empire, France acquired two mandates in Africa: Togo and Cameroon. They had a distinct status. France was a trustee for a future nation, not a sovereign. In practice, it governed Togo and Cameroon much the same way as it governed its African colonies.

So here we see a quite recent example of governing different people differently, but in a particular way. In this sense, France, too, was an empire like other empires, precisely in its capacity to create its particular ways of rule.

A second reason for variations in imperial ways of rule relates more closely to the theme of our conference: to what one might call “imperial legacies” but I would prefer to understand as imperial trajectories. That is, empires were actors in world history over time. They intersected with each other, competed with each other, emulated each other, warred with each other. These imperial intersections were dynamic: they pushed empires to emulate others’ strategies, to integrate them with their own earlier ways, and to produce new varieties of imperial power.

[WORLD OF EMPIRES, EARLY 20TH CENTURY]

Thus, rather than a “comparative perspective,” I want to look at what I call the “transformative” capacity of empires -- the ways that their power and their

ways of rule set the context for political imagination and action, both in other empires and in polities that aspired to become empires or to get away from them.

For my example, I will now turn to Russia. Rather than looking at Russia as an already formed empire, I want to look at its past: at how it became an empire and at the particular capacities and qualities that this process encouraged.

III: Russia's Imperial Pathways

My argument is that the particularity of Russian empire is an enduring capacity to absorb, select from, synthesize and transform different empires' practices. Rather than establishing a fixed "identity"³—European or otherwise—Russian empire nurtured a "way" of doing politics, a way that could be adjusted to new demands, challenges, and opportunities while sustaining state power over a very large space for now about half a millennium.

While most considerations of "imperial Russia" start in the 18th century, in its selfnamed imperial period, my argument is that in 1700, Russia already possessed an active, powerful, and self-adjusting imperial culture. I also suggest that this culture lives on past the revolutions of 1917 and 1991 and can be seen at work in today's Russian Federation and over its borders. My paper addresses the bookends of imperial Russia—Moscovy and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation in order to illuminate qualities of Russia's long-term imperial and evolving political.

³ For an analysis and definition of imperial political practices over time and in different empires, see Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), chapter one.

A. Empire before imperium

Russia was not a blank slate for empire in 1700, or 1689. Peter and his advisors worked to expand an already imperial terrain, used tools honed over centuries of struggle for secure statehood, and conceived of their possibilities from imperial perspectives. The context for imperial St. Petersburg – for an emperor who could imagine and command the forces to build the new capital – was Moscow with its achievements – its survival as town and a principedom, its expansion into a multi-ethnic polity. Before Peter’s time, Muscovy had become an irritating challenger to empires on its borders – China, Mongol and other khanates, and the Ottomans—as well as a contender with Swedes, Poles, Baltic knights, and others for imperial power in central Europe.

[EMPIRES AROUND MOSCOW]

How did Moscow become a spreading center of empire, strong enough to give birth to St. Petersburg and Peter’s Roman-style pretensions? As potential builders of empire, princes in the unpromising Moscow region – unpromising in terms of natural resources – had at their disposal three intersecting political experiences: that of the Rus’ (their progenitors in Kiev whose empire had failed after a brilliant start), that of Byzantium—the greatest power in Western Eurasia-- and that of their sovereigns for two critical centuries – the Mongols of the Kipchak Khanate. Moscow emerged as a budding empire as its princes made choices from elements of these traditions, creating new syntheses and new ideologies of rule.

[MAP KIEV]

Three elements of the Muscovite imperial way became major lanes on Russia’s imperial highway. One of these was the configuration of superior power –

the imperial dynasty – inherited from the Rus' and tweaked by the Moscovites into a long-lasting institution. The warrior princes who founded a state based on command of long-distance trade routes in Kiev, gave Russia not just its name but also imperial charisma. The stage on which later scenarios could be played out was that of rule by a dominant member of the royal–and only legitimate--dynasty.

In their capital on the Dnieper River, Rus' princes had made themselves into a Eurasian-style ruling clan, ethnically and otherwise distinct from the Slavic peasants in the surrounding area and from the artisans who flocked to their wealthy city. Their founding legend, recorded by Orthodox chroniclers centuries later, emphasized the advantages of rule by an outsider: "Riurik and his brothers were invited by the Slavic tribes to rule their land and to bring peace among them." The mystique of the ruler from distant place who is able to make and keep the peace became an enduring element of imperial imagination in the area.

[PRINCELY SAINT]

Princely brothers were part of this picture, but so, too, were the gangs of armed men (*druzhiny*) who supported each contesting Rus' prince in their fratricidal combats. If lucky, these followers made their way into the ruler's inner circle. The emperor, his family, his circle of advisors – these were the key elements of political power and authority.

Another element of state-building at the time was religion. The Rus' at first took a promising polytheistic approach, incorporating and synthesizing Norse, Finnish, Slavic, and Iranian deities. Vladimir's later turn toward monotheism and

Byzantine Christianity reminds us of Byzantium's visibility – its example of imperial power enhanced by Eastern Christianity. The Rus' choice for Eastern Christianity is a **good example of an imperial strategy that had unplanned, long-term, and transforming consequences**. This cultural acquisition remained in the imperial toolkit after Kiev's decline and defeat.⁴

KIEV CHURCHES

In the thirteenth century after the Mongols had dealt Kiev the coup de grace, surviving Rus' princes acquired a third imperial asset, possibly the most important of their imperial acquisitions – a set of administrative and military techniques for subordinating populations, taxing them, and keeping subordinates loyal. The Mongols did not deign to rule the unpromising lands west of the Volga directly, but sent out tax collectors who often drew on local authorities to assist them. Based in their small towns, the Riurikid princes competed with each other to gain the Khan's favor, to be granted the right [(iaryk)] to collect taxes and tribute, to marry into the Khan's family, and to become, as in Kievan times, the Grand Prince over the rest. In the process, they learned how to rule dispersed populations and keep a good deal for themselves.

MAP: GOLDEN HORDE

Donald Ostrowski's study, *Moscow and the Mongols* describes practices and institutions that the Muscovites learned from the Qipchak Khanate.⁵ Rus' princes who wanted to survive had to play by Mongol rules. The Moscow princes

⁴ Initially, this kind of religion was for rulers. Christianity in Byzantine style transformed the city of Kiev with churches and artistic creations; clerics brought their handy alphabet, their hopes for conversions and for attaching themselves to the prince and his power. Over time, Christianity spread a language of solace and paternal care well beyond elites, enabling spiritual connections between Slavic populations and their princely leaders.

⁵ Ostrowski, Donald. *Muscovy and the Mongols*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

[known as the Daniilovich] who eventually got the upper hand over other Riurikids and divided Mongols, used their acquired expertise to collect goods worth bringing to their Mongol overlords. For princes based in a sparsely settled and not all that productive area, acquiring sufficient largesse meant expanding from their Moscow base, bringing more land, rivers, people, and connections to the north and later down the Volga under their control. Thus, **the requirements of empire (the Mongol one) inspired imperial-style expansion by the Muscovites.** Here we have an example of how empires set the terms for political possibility, but also provided opportunities for political creativity.

MAP: MUSCOVY AND MONGOLS

Ostrowski singles out some key practices the Muscovites learned from the Mongols. A fundamental tactic was dual administration—institutionalizing two distinct administrative hierarchies, civil and military, but overlapping their areas of control, and thus enhancing the superior command of the Grand Prince.⁶ Other Mongol-style institutions including the boyar council that duplicated the Mongols' state council of high, but dependent governors; the principle that all land belonged to the ruler; the iam network of communications stations; a Eurasian variant of military land grants; and various military technologies.⁷

Another important imperial tactic, part of the Mongol repertoire, was the

⁶ Ostrowski describes an earlier imperial transfer from China to the Mongols. The key terms for the Kipchak Khanate were daruga—civilian governor, baskak—military governor. Rus' princes began in the late 13th century to take over from baskaks as tax collectors for the Kipchaks. The Mongol baskaks were dependent on Sarai for support, while the Moscow princes who could feed themselves were cheaper for their overlords. A transition took place in the late 13th and early 14th centuries, as "Rus' grand prince replaced the foreign basqaqs and along with the darugis governed Rus'." The Muscovite princes use namestniki as functional equivalent of darugis, and volosteli as the functional equivalent of baskaks. By end the 14th century, the princes could command 15 namestniki and 100 volosteli. In the 16th century, volosteli were replaced by vovody as military commanders of a district. See Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, pp. 41-45.

⁷ Ostrowski, pp. 44-61. Military tactics: short stirrups, compound bow, and campaign tactics.

incorporation of other people's leaders into the elite serving the ruler. The Daniilovichs themselves seized upon opportunities to marry "up" into the Khan's entourage. A second approach was peeling off top leaders from the other side and empowering them as subordinates. The Grand Princes of Moscow took in Tatars – the higher ranking the better – into their elite. This tactic was particularly useful as Moscow began to turn the tables on the Mongol khanates during 15th century wars.⁸

The Muscovites managed religion with the pragmatic eclecticism of their Mongol overlords (and the pre-Christian Rus'). **Learning administration from the Mongols thus gave the Daniilovichs a particular imperial toolkit, with long-lasting consequences for how both rulers and ruled regarded their possibilities, including the ways they engaged with other empires' technologies and ideas.**

Over the next two centuries, the Moscow princes expanded their control of peoples and resources in all directions, creating a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional empire. Tribes living in the core area were Finns, Slavs, and mostly pagan before their incorporation. The very top of the social hierarchy was mixed in origins, because so many Mongol and Tatar families had entered Muscovite service. Westward expansion brought elites who had served Lithuania – another empire – some of them Roman Catholics, under Moscow's rule.⁹ With the conquest of Kazan in 1552, Moscovy became an even more diverse polity. The elite of the Kazan Khanate was Tatar and Muslim, and the people of the area were Turkic

⁸ Ostrowski relates the story of Kudal Kul, captured at Kazan' in 1487. Kudal Kul eventually became one of Vasili III's advisors and the namestnik of Moscow and was buried in the Cathedral of the Archangel in Moscow, *ibid*, p. 55.

⁹ Conquest of Novgorod and its hinterlands in 1478 brought more Finnish groups under Moscow's rule. The Russians continued to contend with Livonians, Swedes, and Poles for this northern region and access to the Baltic. The death of the Grand Prince Vitovt of Lithuania in 1430, gave the Muscovites, who had earlier married into the prince's family, a chance to expand to the west.

(Chuvash),

Finno-Ugric (Mari), and Tatar. Some were Muslims, some pantheists, but few were Christians.

MAP MUSCOVY

Conquest, tribute, taxation of the agricultural population, and control of trade gave Muscovite princes the makings of an empire, but could they keep control for more than a few generations? Neither the Mongols nor the Riurikids offered a solution to the violent strife among contenders for power that usually broke up a Eurasian dynasty's domain in only three generations. Part of the solution came from a transformation of imperial strategies: the Muscovites merged elements of Mongol-style rule into an intricate marriage politics binding boyar clans to the Grand Prince.¹⁰ A council of boyars collectively advised the ruler. Royal marriage with subordinate clans—and occasionally with foreigners—allowed the Muscovite princes to solidify themselves a royal dynasty.

As the Kipchak Khans had done before them, the Grand Princes declared themselves the masters of all the land of the expanding realm, but they handed out large parts of it to their elites, both old and new, on the condition of loyalty and service. Elite servitors who received land and people on it from the Grand Prince were unlikely to form a united aristocracy. Patrimonial principles – the ruler's ultimate ownership of all resources and the conditional land grant--inherited from the Mongols and the Byzantines and recombined in Moscow's own way underlay Russia's kind of imperial government for most of its history.

¹⁰ Nancy Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics: The Making of the Muscovite Political System, 1345-1547* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987).

If marriage and land grants kept elites attached to Moscow, what did the Grand Princes offer to commoners, besides defense and exactions? Gradually Orthodox Christianity was turned into an ideology of Moscow's empire, offering connections between the court and commoners. Once Moscow princes seemed to get the upper hand among their rivals, clerics, influenced by Byzantine models, tried to make the church a power behind the Moscow throne.

But this move required another transformation—that of Moscow's imperial symbolism, based well into the 15th century on Mongol charisma. One tactic was to create a what Don Ostrowski calls a new "virtual history" for Moscow, to efface or disgrace the Tatars, and to make a connection to Byzantium. The Khans' overlordship, so critical to Moscow's success, was turned into the "Tatar yoke." Churchmen created a more glorious genealogy—claiming that the Muscovite Grand Princes received their authority from the Byzantine emperors and that they were descended from the family of Augustus Caesar—a fine example of faking the past, and of transforming the imperial image.¹¹

IVAN IV

In 1547 Ivan IV ("the Terrible") took the new title, tsar or Caesar, tying himself to the Roman past. Charlemagne had done the same in 800 CE, as did Ivan's contemporaries the Habsburg ruler Charles the V and Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent. It was Rome, not divided, quarrelsome Europe, that compelled political imagination in the 16th century. For Muscovite ideologues, the "natural" connection was made to the Eastern Roman empire. Tsars later added the

¹¹ See Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, chapter 8, "Fashioning the khan into a basileus," *op cit.*, 164-198.

appellation "autocrat" to their titles, from the Byzantine word for complete ruler. The tsar's crown was renamed the hat of Monomakh, after the Byzantine Emperor Constantine Monomachus [1042- 1055]. In fact, the crown was made in Central Asia and had nothing to do with Byzantium—except in the effective disinformation campaign carried out by Moscow clerics.

SHAPKA

Russia's rulers tweaked this simulated transfer of church authority to suit themselves. Although the Metropolitan of Moscow was elevated to the rank of Patriarch in 1589, in the same year, after convening a "Council of the Land," the tsar issued a new law code describing the right of every subject to appeal to the tsar for protection of honor and well-being. The Grand Prince thus became both Caesar and God's chosen intermediary. In the 17th century, the Romanovs took control of the church and its powers a step further, when tsar Alexei dismissed the unpopular Patriarch Nikon, whose reforms had divided (and weakened) the Orthodox church.

ALEKSEI MIKHAILOVICH

The point of this overview of several centuries of Russia's history, from the Rus' to the Romanovs, is to underline the imperial context of the Russian state's formation. The state literally "emerged" from an unpromising space because a sequence of would-be leaders learned their statecraft through a series of imperial encounters. The formative institutions of Russian empire were developed as the Moscovite Riurikids worked with, adapted, mixed, and transformed dynastic practices from the Rus', cultural achievements from Byzantium, and administrative

strategies and ruling attitudes from the Mongols. These were not direct transfers of imperial technology, but transmuted ones. Perhaps the most outstanding aspect of Muscovite political culture was the capacity to draw in ideas and resources and mobilize them in new ways. The dynamic of expansion into unlike areas, the charisma of alien rule, and an effective management regime made Muscovites good at empire. They wrote on their pretty much blank slate using tools they adapted from the repertoires of neighboring and conquering great powers, and their Grand Principedom succeeded where no one else had really bothered to try.

Well before Peter stepped onto the stage, Romanovs added "Europe" into this mix. Of course, Europe was not Europe in the 17th century, and the "West" was on no one's horizon. But Poland, Sweden, and Ukraine were very much on Moscow's mind at this time, and rulers made room for artisans, clerics, actors, and musicians whose skills and initiatives affected the arts, military organization, and administrative practices. Peter thus inherited a multi-ethnic polity, a self-critical, searching, and cosmopolitan high culture, as well as the incorporating and exploitative entitlements of Muscovite politics. There was nothing novel or "backward" or strange about an ambitious emperor's efforts to acquire the military skills of rival powers; what was new in Peter's time was that it was states to the west that offered these advantages, and attracted his attention. One lasting result of his successful educational and cultural initiatives was ideological—the setting up in the minds of Russian elites of an essentialized "West" and an essentialized "Russia." An imagined "West" became the model or the anti-model for an imagined Russia, and this binary rhetoric blocked out the complexity of Russia's pre-Petrine imperial history—for Russians themselves and for scholars studying them and their history.

PETER

Empire after imperium

Now let's skip forward about two and half centuries and look at the practices of Russian empire from 1917 to the present. ¹²It is unquestionable that the creation of the first Communist state in 1917 was an event of enormous significance for world politics and history ever since. But what gave this state its structure, its institutions, and its political culture? Certainly not an effort to replace an empire with a nation-state. Rather, continuing in the Russian way of transforming political practices, the Bolsheviks did mix another set of "European" ideas – this time those of socialist theory and politics – with their own assumptions about how to rule, acquired in the last decades of the Russian empire, classically defined.

But Soviet state formation displays a not just the impact of the reformed empire that was undone in 1917, but also a configuration of power that resembles Muscovite politics in many ways, a politics created in the much earlier stage of imperial transformation I have described. At an ostensibly revolutionary moment, the Bolsheviks had something to work with: both the experience of the predecessor administrations in ruling a multi-ethnic state, but also approaches to governance forged over centuries from the mixing and recasting of various imperial inputs.

¹² In so doing I follow the footsteps of Edward Keenan's provocative article, "Muscovite Political Folkways," *Russian Review* 45 (1986): 115-181, which, maddeningly I used to think, drew connections between early Slavic practices and Soviet government, by leaping over the imperial period. But much as I used to rail about Keenan's failure to identify transmitters of culture between 1700 and 1917, I now think there can be a point to juxtaposing Muscovy with twentieth-century Russia, in its Soviet and post-Soviet variants. This tactic has also been taken by Tamara Kondrat'eva in her study of "feeding" as a political practice from the 16th century to the 20th, *Gouverner et nourir: du pouvoir en Russie, XVIe-XXe siècles* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2002).

MAP USSR

If we look at results of Communist construction, rather than expressed intentions, large parts of the picture resemble the earlier imperial blend. First, the new state was multinational – not an obvious political form for a supposedly united world proletariat and in no way a logical response to Lenin’s theories of capitalist imperialism – but definitely in the Russian state tradition, with inputs from other empires (notably, Austro-Hungarian Marxist theory), and a huge push from Russia’s social scientists. For this transformative move, we have identifiable agents, described elegantly by Francine Hirsch in her study of how academic and political figures configured the Soviet state.¹³ The federal structure and the nesting of administrative units based on the recognition of ethnic difference were 20th century variants on managing a multi-ethnic polity.

LENIN

Another aspect of the Communist configuration of power was the supreme leader and his ruling circle. Here, older traditions of one-man leadership quickly entered into practice, if not right away into ideology. Elites themselves, not just the masses, acted in accord with the imperial habitus. Lenin moved into the emperor’s place without hesitation. His successors, particularly the first one, only heightened the mystique of the all-caring, all-knowing, all-powerful emperor. The politics of Soviet leadership expressed other elements of the Moscovite tradition. The ruler was advised by an inner circle of high-ranking counselors, dependent on his good will. The politics of boyar-like counsel was enacted with ferocity and charisma by the second Soviet great leader.

¹³ Empire of Nations : Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

STALIN

In material matters, the Communist state also replayed the Mongol/Eurasian/Moscovite principle that all resources—land, people, labor, knowledge—belonged to the emperor and could be manipulated by him. Bolshevik leaders resurrected, in different versions, the conditional land grant, as well as forced and transportable labor for peasants and other workers, while resources were doled out and retracted in point-making ways to party and other managers along the multiple chains of command.

As for the critical problem of attracting and sustaining intermediaries, the new state's elites included people from the empire's diverse ethnic groups. Moving into the ranks of the rulers and out of the ruled could be facilitated by playing the national card—becoming a representative of one's "people." Earlier studies of Soviet history accented the repressive policies of Soviet power, while some more recent ones emphasize its "affirmative" qualities.¹⁴ But what may be missed is the extent to which all understood that nationalities had to be represented and that the real question was by whom. Even in the extreme case of the Roma, as Brigid O'Keeffe shows in her recent book, the language of Soviet politics—elevating and protecting its peoples—permitted ambitious and worried figures from the pre-revolutionary Gypsy elite to work their way into administrative responsibilities and resources in the "new" polity.¹⁵

¹⁴ Among the many recent works, see Hirsch, *Empire of Nations*, Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire : Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

¹⁵ Brigid O'Keeffe, *New Soviet Gypsies: Nationality, Performance, and Selfhood in the Early Soviet Union* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2103).

My point here is not that the Soviet Union was “just like” Moscovy, but first, that it was “imperial” not national, and, second, that a older politics of acquisition and transformation of other empires' tactics was at work. Over the course of 74 years, Soviet leaders and followers produced new blends of old and new ways. The “friendship of peoples” was a Soviet contribution to imperial ideology, a flexible, feel-good, and ritually rich representation of political community. The single-party state was a brilliant, world-shaking mix of European-style democracy based on contested party politics with Russian/Moscovite notions of personalized hierarchies of command.

To what extent did this transmuted imperial politics entered the political imaginary of Soviet and post-Soviet people? Of course, no member of the Russian political, managerial, professional, or artistic elite would say explicitly that her assumptions, her habitus derived from a transmuted Eurasian imperial pathway. The west/anti-west, European/Russian dichotomies still pervade the hegemonic discourse of elite politics.¹⁶ But one can reach, ethnographically, into a more popular milieu to dig out assumptions about the state and how it works. Did Soviet citizens participate in the habitus of empire, with its ethnically empowered intermediaries, its cult of the emperor, and its paternalistic power?

EVENKI SIBERIA

Nikolai Ssorin-Chaikov's study ¹⁷of the most remote “small people” he could find in the late 1980s reveals the deep penetration (from what period it's hard to tell) of ideas of the state and social organization that correspond neatly to

¹⁶ Besides, Russian intellectuals don't see themselves as objects of anthropological investigation—unlike American ones who don't seem to be able to get away from themselves.

¹⁷ Nikolai V. Ssorin-Chaikov, *The Social Life of the State in Subarctic Siberia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).

the transmuted Eurasian/Muscovite/Soviet model. The Siberian Evenki, straight through all the disasters visited upon them, including attempted collectivization, deportations, and repeated failures at provisioning, maintained a sense of connection to the state. That connection was first created centuries earlier as Russian fur-collectors latched onto Evenki hunting prowess, using the mechanism of rewarded leadership. Each strong man strove to become the empowered “prince,” but to succeed the “prince” had to convince the “elders” of the community to follow him, hand over their furs, etc. The Evenki latched easily onto the Muscovite kind of imperial rule¹⁸, and the later Soviet parallels were the party's leader and his top advisors, replicated at the lowest level by the local boss and his committee, structures that became part of 20th century Evenki lives.

The Soviet mode of production ultimately failed to provide enough for its princes, but Ssorin-Chaikov argues that the Evenkis' discussions of lapses in allocations from the authorities only reinforced the orientation of politics around the state and its campaigns. The Evenki in the 1990s still saw themselves as still subjects of a state that would continue to provide chances, in various ways, to become a “prince.” What Ssorin-Chaikov calls “governance as an everlasting construction project” alive in the Evenki idea of the state reproduces the unfixed, synthesizing, and moving on capacity of Russian political culture.

If Evenki hunters help reveal the portable, pliable frameworks of Russian imperial culture, what about settled people? Jessica Allina-Pisano’s study of land rights and their transformation in Russia and Ukraine opens another window on

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 29.

the political culture of people whose lives spanned 1991 and what was supposed to be a fundamental breakout from Soviet politics and property rights into democracy and capitalism. This eye-opening ethnography focuses on two regions that ended up on different sides of the Russian-Ukrainian border after 1991. Allina-Pisano's discovery that there were no principal differences between the situation of these villagers in two countries a decade after the breakup of the Soviet Union is itself a strong indicator of an enduring imperial culture that trumped any kind of "nationalized" outcome.¹⁹

BREAKUP OF USSR

In Allina-Pisano's ethnographic account, all actors—not just the bosses, but the villagers—display a profound acceptance of the state as a legitimate maker of rules. People may not want to call Russia a law-based state, but it is striking that at this time of uncertainty, all actors called upon or refer to the state's regulations as they tried to regulate, claim, reclaim property. Successive laws provided a field of for claim-making, reference, and, for the ambitious, a way to pursue one's interests. The formal legalism of documents and permits—from early times a component of Russia's regulatory governance—is clearly visible in the time of new troubles.

Another "vestige" of empires past: the state in both Russia and Ukraine was accessed and represented by an array of intermediary authorities, who were expected by all to be the primary actors at the local level. The Soviet state had worked through the localization of power in local officials, and after 1991 these same officials were not challenged, but rather turned to, by all parties in their struggles over resources and rights. Personal connections with officials were

¹⁹ Jessica Allina-Pisano, *The Post-Soviet Potemkin Village: Politics and Property Rights in the Black Earth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

essential and recognized by all as the way the state worked at a local level, and local authorities could safely live off this inherited power.

Third, the state, both at the highest level and the local one, functioned through the allocation of rights and resources. And this principle—that it was proper for the state, and not an impersonal mechanism (“the market”) or a social group outside the state, to decide questions about resources seemed to be accepted by all. This shared understanding that the state's proper and real function is to allocate resources put enormous power in the hands of local “princes” – the collective farm chairman, the accountant, the veterinarian, the engineer, and the agronomist – who became the managers of land and labor on the privatized former collective farms.

VOUCHER

Finally, land was at no point and by no one regarded as a commodity that could or should be freely bought and sold by an “owner.” The allocation of land according to some kind of officially sanctioned rules was a language of power shared by society and state. This vision of land as a resource manipulable by the state and supervised by it was articulated in the privatization rules, that did not allow peasants to alienate their shares of land. These rules, made by higher authorities, opened up the legal way for local authorities to transform control in their own interests.

An acceptance of the regulatory state, and of local authorities as its agents; seeing the state as an appropriate allocator of rights and resources, including land;

and thinking of reallocation and impermanence of rights in property as ordinary—all these qualities of post-Soviet civility are identifiable as components of the much earlier Muscovite synthesis, transmitted—somehow—over centuries into Soviet times and beyond. Post-Soviet land policy also offers a strong example of the transformation of an outside power's practices. Western advisors thought that Russians and Ukrainians were privatizing land according universal principles, but post-Soviet lawmakers themselves treated land from the beginning as something that did not "belong" to those who worked it or to anybody else in absolute fashion. A permanent—unmanipulable—granting of rights was unthinkable and—for many, if not all—undesirable.

The fate of the privatization program in the first years of the 21st century vividly displays characteristics of a long-lasting Russian legal culture, reliant on documentation, state hierarchy, formalized procedure, but also on the ability to transform attractive foreign institutions into something suitable, at least for a time, to Russian conditions.²⁰ The new set of boyars will continue their task of adjusting the law to new conditions—foreign and domestic—and report back to the president and the prime minister.

If the underpinnings of Muscovite legalism, with centuries of legal enhancements, have endured so strongly into new Russian times, we might ask ourselves what has gone missing from the earlier imperial ways. The obvious gap in Soviet times was religion, at least for a while. The tsars had relied on Orthodoxy

²⁰ The pliability of the law, as well as its direct links to the "emperor," is explicit in President Medvedev's ukaz, "On the perfecting [sovershenstvovanie] of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation," which directs a presidential committee (with new members) to "work up before 1 June 2009 a concept for development of civil legislation." As Viktor Zhuikov, a member of the committee, put it: "New president—new ukaz, but the sole purpose of the council—to make sure that the civil law corresponds to our international obligations and to our internal demands—remains the same." "Grazhdanskii kodeks primet mezhdunarodnye obiazatel'stva," *Kommersant*, 22 July 2008, p. 3.

as a primary ideological buttress, even as they adjusted its prerogatives and refined their control and inclusion of other religions.

KAZANSKII SOBOR

The Bolsheviks knocked out this support for their rule for a time – probably to ill effect – but later returned to a variant on the imperial strategy of bringing Church hierarchs in under official state control. After 1991, when the awkwardness of official Marxism was gone, Orthodoxy conveniently resumed its place as first among official religions, and former Communists went conspicuously back to churches, or when appropriate, mosques, synagogues, and temples.

KAZAN

The Russian Federation thus took up the tasks, tactics, and transforming capacities of Russian empire. The polity remained explicitly multi-ethnic, retaining subordinated "national" territories, some nested within each other as in Soviet times. The Russian constitution of 1993 offered all republics the right to establish their own official languages, while defining Russian as the "state language of the Russian Federation as a whole." The constitution guaranteed the rights of "national minorities" in accord with international principles of human rights, but these like all other rights are interpreted in the Russian imperial style. As Vladimir Putin revives the techniques of patrimonial power, binding magnates to the state—the prerogative of both autocrats and communists before him—tightening control over religious and other social institutions, bringing the media to heel, transforming electoral process into a "sovereign democracy" supported by a single party, compelling loyalty from the federation's governors in his "vertical of power," even

for a time resurrecting the manipulable dualism of legitimate tsar/real tsar, and wielding Russia's prime weapon—energy—effectively in the international arena, Russian empire reappears in yet another transmutation on its Eurasian space.

Conclusion: (IF TIME)

Many of us who have spent our careers studying areas of the world participated in the battle over area studies that broke out in the 1990s. It is a still on-going struggle, with echoes and variants in many countries. The questions that I raise about normalizing Russia have some implications for this time-consuming, not always productive academic war.

I don't want to go back to the details of these conflicts, but it's important to remember that the 1990s was a time of struggle, particularly on the part of social scientists, to "**normalize**" scholarship on world areas by making specialists pose the same questions and use the same theories as did "regular" scholars in a particular discipline – i.e, scholars who generally worked on the US or Europe and used professional categories and methods developed in over the course of their discipline's historical trajectory in western academia. One of the results was to undermine knowledge of the world, as the essential tools of language study and social immersion were lost; another was to go global – to imagine that there was a single global social science, a universal way to do scholarship.

The point I want to make with this glance backward on our own academic trajectory, is that the choice between particularism and universalism was yet another Euro- or Westerncentric way to pose a problem. Scholars who want to integrate their studies of Russia, China or other world areas into scholarship do not

have to accept these "normalizing" terms. Rather than seeing "exceptionalism" as some kind of abnormal way to understand society and politics and seizing instead upon the supposedly "universalistic" categories of western social science and ethics, we need to make a different scholarly transit – toward the acceptance of diversity of social arrangements in both time and space. Forsaking "exceptionalism" for "diversity" is the moral of my story and I think empire helps us get there.

Imperial Legacy and Imperial Revolution in the Russian Empire in the Early Twentieth Century

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<Abstract>

When historians ask the question about imperial legacy they usually presume that the empire in question is gone and what remains is the imprint of that polity on governance of space and society of subsequent states and on ideology or ways of self-understanding of the heirs of the bygone empire. Given the prominence of the epistemology of nationalism or “methodological nationalism” (Ulrich Beck) in much of the twentieth century, the conversation on imperial legacy is cast in terms of transition from empire to nation-state.

Historians of the twentieth century significantly complicated that presumed picture. They showed the persistent concern of states in the twentieth century with governance of difference in large and composite polities. In their opus magnum “Empires in World History: Power and Politics of Difference” Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper open up the horizon of thinking about empire beyond the temporal boundaries of modernity and colonial empires. This trend is powerfully

demonstrated in the case of Soviet Russia and then the Soviet Union which attempted to redefine the principles of governance of difference in the idiom of rooting and territorializing ethnicities and combining it with modernization and manipulation of the dyad of class and ethnicity. Historians of the Ottoman empire point to the fact that the image of radical transition to the integral nation-state of the Republic of Turkey should be complicated in view of significant delay of the proclamation of the Republic from 1918 to 1923 (Eric-Jan Zürcher) and persistence of policies of late Ottoman governance in the mandate territories and Kurdish regions of the Republic itself. Historians also unpack the persistence of governance of diversity in the “imperialism of ‘free nations’ ”(Prasenjit Duara) and in the transition from the British Empire to the British Commonwealth (Stephen Howe) well into the period of the presumed triumph of nation-state.

In the present paper I attempt to bring the question of imperial legacy to the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when the Russian Empire, which the focus of this paper, and ask the question why ideologues of that period started to talk about the imperial legacy. Taking this discourse on imperial legacy as a point of departure, I argue that the period before the collapse and remaking of the empire in 1917-1918 was far from being monolithic. This period was characterized by ruptures in imperial politics and sovereignty. These ruptures prompted new ways of thinking about composite territory and political space, including the gradual emergence of the idiom of majorities-minorities.

Session II

Imperial Past and Present in Eurasia

- Jung, Se-jin** | Islamic Ideology and Resistance against Russian Empire and its legacy in 19th Century : A Case of North Caucasus
- Ubaidulloev, Zubaidullo** | The Russian Empire-Soviet Legacies in Reshaping the National Territories in Central Asia: A Case of Tajikistan
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Islamic Ideology and Resistance against Russian Empire and its legacy in 19th Century : A Case of North Caucasus

Jung, Se-jin

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The religious heritage of the North Caucasus had a long-lasting effect that reaches to current day: it produced both the current and past contradictions which are observed on a political map of the region. Moreover, exploring the role of the Islamic factor in the past of the North Caucasus nations suggests that the Islamic ideology is considered among the major factors not only as the independence movement of mountaineers during the Caucasian war, but also as a motivation of participants in today's conflict in the North Caucasus. I will examine the role of Islamic movement, muridism in political events in Russia, specifically in the North-East Caucasus in first half of the XIX century. Muridism had an effect on the situation in the Imamate of Shamil, and Islam continues to exert an influence on the socio-political processes in the North Caucasus including those in Chechnya and Dagestan. In this region, political and ideological crises are still observed, and armed conflicts occur.

In the history of the North Caucasus nations as well as that of the Russian Empire, muridism held a very special role. Mountaineers of Dagestan and Chechnya have shown persistent resistance to tsarism. Such historical features

should be considered carefully and in depth. First of all, for the most intent study of muridism, it is necessary to investigate the Islamic factor in the lives of mountaineers and the Imamate's policy. The Islamic studies of Russia have included analysis of problems of the origin of muridism and emergence of its features in the North Caucasus. In the literature, there are many authors who considered muridism based directly or indirectly on scientific positions in the teachings of Islam. Islam has played a significant role in the historical development of the Northeast Caucasus as well as in the history of the whole world.

This article explores Islamic ideology in the North-East Caucasus during the first half of the XIX century. It also analyzes the ideology of some national and national-liberation movements that took place in the region. It should be pointed out that, in Russian historiography, the characterization of Russian literature on this subject is represented by the works of the bourgeois-landlord historiographers (an official imperial estimation, aristocratic-monarchic) that protected the interests of the tsarist regime. Of course, there were also notable differences in the interpretation of muridism, its origin and the reasons for its spread in the North-East Caucasus in the official imperial assessment.

Naqshbandi Imams Gazi-Muhammad (1828-1832) and Shamil (1834-1859) headed the national struggle of mountaineers in muridism. Mountaineers rebelled against the imperial authorities in the North Caucasus in the XIX century during the expansion of the Russian Empire. In order to understand the causes and nature of the Caucasian war, the characteristics of the muridism that was formed with it as a basis need to be carefully considered. Islam was the dominant form of religious ideology of mountaineers in the Caucasus.

The mountaineers heroically resisted the invasion, and the Dagestan people together with the khazars successfully defended Derbent and the army consisting of four thousand Arab soldiers. The troops of the Caliphate were losing forces without having achieved a decisive victory. The Arabs repeatedly attempted to occupy Derbent but were defeated each time; as a result, the control of Derbent has often been passed from country to country.¹

When taking a closer look at the Islamization process of Vainakhs (the ethnic self-name of Chechens and Ingushs), it should be noted that different points of view of the first collision of the Vainakhs with Islam exist in the literature. The multinational population of Dagestan had long-standing economic relations with their western neighbors, the Chechens and Ingushs; however, according to a number of researchers, the spread of the new religion began among these nations much later than in Dagestan. The reason was due to the absence of contact between the Arabs and Vainakhs - Caliph's troops could not penetrate into the region to affect the spread of the doctrines of the Prophet Mohammed. However, there were supporters of the 'Arab' version of the spread of Islam, insisting on the fact that, in the VII century, the Arabs introduced Islam to these people for the first time. Supporters of another 'missionary' version refer to the beginning of Islamization of the Vainakhs in the second half of the XVI century when Chechen tepes, settled in valleys of the largest rivers Sulki, Suzha, Aksay, started to voluntarily accept Islam². During this period, Muslim missionaries from Dagestan began to actively penetrate into the Chechen Republic. The Naqshbandiyya, one of the most widespread and vigorous brotherhoods, spread into Dagestan and Chechnya at the

¹ Ware, Robert Bruce, Kisiriv, Enver. *Dagestan. Russian Hegemony and Islamic resistance in the North Caucasus* (Armonk, New York, London : M.E.Sharpe, 2010) : 4-6.

² Zelkina, A. "Islam v Chechne do Rossiiskogo zavoevaniia Chechnia i Rossiia," *Obshchestvo i gosudarstvo* (Moscow, 1999) : 40.

end of the eighteenth century³. Precisely, the Naqshbandi imams Gazi-Muhammad and Shamil led the struggle of mountaineers against the Russian empire in the XIX century. The steady tenet of “murid - mentor” has key value in Sufism, giving rise to the name muridism for North Caucasian Sufism. During the period of mountaineer struggle under the leadership of Shamil, Caucasian muridism existed as the religious ideological basis of tariqa – the mystical doctrine about the way to divine truth and the approach to the God through this truth. The content of the tariqa doctrine is close to that of Sufism.

The term Sufism originated from the Arabic word “Sufi,” which means “wool,” and is based on the rough woolen clothing worn by the sufis for simplicity⁴. Robert W. Schaefer also states that Sufis tended to be lone ascetics who wore rough wool garments known as *suf*.⁵ According to Katrien Hertog, whereas Islamic law or sharia delineates a Muslim’s duties and way of life, Sufism ‘embodies the spirit of Islam,’ the ‘inner path’ that emphasizes detachment from the distractions and the deceptiveness of this world⁶. Various theories have been proposed relating to the essence and nature of Sufism, tents which are generally understood by scholars of religion to be the living spirit of the Islamic tradition⁷. The Muslim mysticism that developed during the spread of Islam was originally mainly related to asceticism. Historians are stating that the ascetic practice of

³ Katrien Hertog, “A Self-fulfilling Prophecy: The seeds of Islamic radicalisation in Chechnya,” *Religion, State & Society*, vol. 33, no. 3(Sep. 2005) : 243.

⁴ Isa Abdul-Kalyr, *Istina sufizma* (Moscow:Ansar, 2004), 11.

⁵ Schaefer W. Robert. *The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus, from Gazavat to Jihad* (Santa Barbara, Oxford : PRAEGER, 2011) : 146.

⁶ Katrien Hertog, “A Self-fulfilling Prophecy: The seeds of Islamic Radicalisation in Chechnya,” : 242.

⁷ *Ibid.*, : 242.

Arabs was observed even before the emergence of Islam. With the spread of Islam, these practices were placed under asceticism as an ideological base.⁸

Sharia is obligatory for all Sufi levels and not only regulates the external behavior of the believer, but is also the religious-ethical basis of Fiqh – the Muslim jurisprudence that defines concrete behavior rules. Walter Comins-Richmond stated that the Sharia is a body of religious precepts and guidelines developed over the first few centuries of Islamic history and housed in thousands of volumes of treaties that regulate all aspects of a Muslim’s life, both public and private.⁹ According to Andreas Kappeler, in the middle ages “the mystical teaching of Sufism had already developed into religious brotherhoods, a type of organization, which, in various parts of the world, became the catalyst of Muslim resistance.”¹⁰

In the XIV century in Central Asia, the doctrine of the Baghdad preacher and mystic of the XI century Abd-al-Qadir, who created the order of “kadirits” began to spread. Bahauddin Nakshbandi (1318-1389), after having learned the kadirits doctrine, revived it and added a number of theoretical and practical provisions borrowed from the school of Ahmad al-Iasavi, the mystical doctrine formulated by Abd al-Khaliq al-Gizhdvani. This doctrine laid the foundation for the organizational structure of a new Sufi order. According to Gary Hamburg, “Bahauddin Nakshbandi’s teaching borrowed heavily from Persian sources, particularly ‘Abd al-Khaliq al Ghujduwani, who insisted that Muslim inwardly remember God with every breath they take and that they outwardly emulate the

⁸ Stepaniants, M. T. *Islamskii mistitsizm* (Moscow: Kann-plius, 2009), 6.

⁹ Walter Comins-Richmond, “Legal Pluralism in the Northwest Caucasus: The Role of Sharia Courts,” *Religion, State & Society*, vol. 32, no. 1 (March, 2004) : 63.

¹⁰ Kappeler, Andreas. *The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History* (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2001), 182.

Prophet Muhammad".¹¹ By the end of the XIV century, there were already 12 major Sufi brotherhoods including Naqshbandiyya and Kadriyya. Naqshbandi was esteemed by the Sufis of Central Asia as the imam and the head of the largest Sufi order.

In front of the sheikh, the pupil should be as the thief in front of the sultan. The pupil cannot resist the order of the sheikh, even if he is commanded to rush into a fire, because there is no fear of lack of obedience to the order of the sheikh, and the student is convinced that his sheikh is the highest of the sheikhs and his way is the superior way. The Sufi brotherhoods were based on the disciples of each master and upon the groups of Sufis who lived in common residences¹².

The appearance of Naqshbandi tariqa in Dagestan began with the religious concept of "true belief." Naqshbandi tariqa arrived in the North Caucasus in 1820s from the Ottoman Empire by way of Azerbaijan¹³, at the height of a political, military, economic, social and moral crisis caused by Russian encroachment. According to Michael Kemper, "Gradually spreading from the South to the North of the country, this brotherhood found adepts in most parts of mountainous Dagestan during the jixad period."¹⁴ It offered to return "true" Islam to the Dagestan's and Chechens by full enforcement of the Sharia and jihad against the

¹¹ Hamburg, Gary. "A commentary on the two texts in their historical context," *Russian-Muslim confrontation in the Caucasus. Alternative visions of the conflict between Imam Shamil and the Russians, 1830-1859*. Eds. Sanders, Thomas, Tucker, Ernest and Hamburg, Gary (London and New York : Taylor & Francis Group, 2004), 178.

¹² Bullent Gokay, "Russia and Chechnia: Along History of Conflict, Resistance and Oppression," *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, vol. 3, no. 2&3 (Summer & Fall 2004) : 4.

¹³ Kemper, Michael, "An Island of classical Arabic in the Caucasus: Dagestan," *Exploring the Caucasus in the 21th century. Essays on culture, history and politics in a dynamic context*. Ed. Companjen, Françoise, Maracz, Laszlo, Versteegh, Lia (Amsterdam: Pallas Publications, 2010), 71.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 71.

“infidels” and their local collaborators¹⁵. Political views and activity of the sheikhs of Naqshbandiyya-Halidiya during the period of gazawat are still not clear¹⁶. The Nakshbandi tariqa provided an ideology and social base to the jihad movement¹⁷.

In the literature, the name “muridism” refers to this movement, and there are several versions of the manner of penetration of muridism to the North Caucasus. Its history began in Central Asia, and traveled to Turkey and Azerbaijan (rather Shirvan, the feudal state which occupied the northern modern Azerbaijan). According to Moshe Gammer, “Russians describe ‘Muridism’ as a separate movement, completely different form, and even opposed to, its parent movement Sufism”.¹⁸ Russian pre-revolutionary authors insisted that muridism was directly imported to the North Caucasus on the eve of war for independence by the countries hostile to Russia and was extended among mountaineers only as a result of their fanaticism, levity and ignorance.

Next, I discuss the features and character of local Sufism generated on the basis of muridism. According to John Baddely, the mystical doctrine penetrated into the Caucasus at a very early stage and took roots there, in the Shirvan province¹⁹. Muridism is a doctrine about tariqa and is a part of Sufism. Its movement was developed on the basis of patrimonial, semi-patriarchal and semi-feudal relations. In the mountain areas of Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia, there was a transition from patrimonial patriarchal establishments to semi-feudal

¹⁵ Gammer, Moshe “The road not taken: Dagestan and Chechen independence,” *Central Asian Survey*, 24(2), (June 2005) : 102.

¹⁶ Кемпер М.К. «К вопросу о суфийской основе джихада в Дагестане Подвижники ислама ,» *Культ святых и суфизм в Средней Азии и на Кавказе*. (Москва:Восточная литература, 2003), 278.

¹⁷ Zelkina, A. *In quest for God and Freedom. The Sufi Response to the Russian Advance in the North Caucasus*. (London : C. Hurst & Co. Ltd, 2000).

¹⁸ Gammer, Moshe. *Muslim resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the conquest of Chechnia and Dagestan*(London :Frank Cass, 1994), 40.

¹⁹ John Baddeli, *Zavoevanie Kavkaza russkimi. 1720-1860* (Moscow: tsentroligraf, 2010), 178.

and to feudal systems. Preachers of muridism and gazawat established the small military-religious and feudal groups which opposed Russia. Muridism played an important role in the lives of free societies in the uplands of North Caucasus. The word 'murid' is meant the disciple of a Sufi sheikh. Murids were Muslim warriors. They were fighting monks and they lived in isolation in auls (mountain villiages).²⁰ Muridism as an ideology of the Caucasian war, generated through a progressive public process, undoubtedly had a revolutionizing influence on social forces, influencing the demolition of old ideas and establishment of new orders²¹.

Next I want to focus on the ideological differences between two trends that emerged in Caucasian muridism²². There was an immediate arise of two groups or "parties" in muridism. Like the ideology associated with the public processes of the transition period, muridism could not reflect the presence of two social forces, two societal directions, "the conservatism" defending the old way of life and "the modernism" supporting the renewal of a society. It is known that, in the concept of Shamil, the problem of two "parties" in muridism, was very important. Caucasian muridism was clearly divided into two different attitudes, as was typical for the era of the Caucasian war.

One wing of Caucasian muridism was headed by Magomed Jaragsky, the adherent of the statement that both the "higher" doctrines of Islam in general and the Sharia in particular were allowing the implementation of these tenets in real life. 'Naibian' (Наибский) muridism was related to the first tenet, the supporters of which were able to take part in (gazawat/jihad) under the leadership of Imam

²⁰ Gokay Bulent, "The longstanding Russian and Soviet debate over Sheikh Shamil: Anti-Imperialist hero or counter-revolutionary cleric?" *Russia and Chechnia: The permanent crisis. Essays on Russo-Chechen relations*. ed. Fowkers, Ben (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 27.

²¹ Блиев М.М. Дегоев В.В. Кавказская война, 199.

²² Ibid., 182-214.

Shamil.²³ Militant muridism was associated with the religious-political orientation of naqshbandiyya and was a reaction to the punitive expeditions of Russian troops against the Caucasian mountaineers²⁴.

Another wing was formed under the leadership of Dzhamal-Edin, a supporter of tariqatism and an opponent of the military-expansionist proclivities of Magomed Jaragsky and Gazi-Muhammad. According to one source, Dzhamal-Edin came to Jarag for a short time after Magomed Jaragsky had returned there from Shirvan²⁵. Communicating with Magomed Jaragsky, Dzhamal-Edin demonstrated unprecedented capabilities regarding knowledge of the higher truths of tariqa. A few months after they first met, Dzhamal-Edin became one of the most outstanding tariqaters and the most popular spiritual leader. Adherents of the other aspect of Caucasian muridism observe strict spiritual probation, indulging in personal self-improvement through faith. The aspiration for comprehension of mysteries of the faith is based on Sufi doctrine, and the purpose of Sufi practices is the instant inspiration that a person can achieve with the help of certain spiritual exercises. A Sufi evolves toward perfection and the concentrated attention of spiritual consciousness²⁶. Muridism, as any major ideology associated with internal transitive public processes, reflected the occurrence of two social forces, conservative and progressive, that were supporting the renewal of society. In Shamil's concept, the question of two parties in muridism has an important role²⁷.

²³ Cohen, Ariel. *Russian Imperialism. Development and crisis* (Westport, Connecticut, London : PRAEGER, 1996) , 57.

²⁴ Akaiev, V.Kh. "Islam v Chechne: traditsii i sovremennost'," *Chechenskaia Respublika i Chechantsty. Istoriia i sovremennost'* (Moscow: Nauka, 2006), 95.

²⁵ Руновский А.И. Дневник Руновского, Акты Кавказской археографической комиссии, Т. 12, Тифлис, 1904, С. 1494.

²⁶ Lewin, Fereshteh Ahmadi "Development Towards Wisdom and Maturity: Sufi Conception of Self," :137.

²⁷ Блиев М.М. Дегоев В.В. Кавказская война (Москва: Росет, 1994), С. 199-200.

Under the double pressure, Dzhamal-Edin finally also agreed to jihad, although he continued to resist and actively oppose gazawat for some time. After Dzhamal-Edin was beaten by the order of Aslan-khan, one of the vassals of the imperial government, and was forced to escape, he informed Magomed Jaragsky that he would no longer counteract the new imam, Gazi-Muhammad. This, according some assumptions, also freed Shamil to become the most active assistant to the imam. He was Shamil's Sufi instructor and in this regard not only held "elections" for Shamil for the post of imam in 1834, but also was Shamil's devoted adviser for the defeat of imamat in 1859. For this reason, Dzhamal-Edin is considered the main and most famous sheikh of Halidiya in the Caucasian war period, and he enjoyed extraordinary popularity among Dagestan Muslims²⁸.

In 1817, the Russian Empire had begun in bitter earnest a protracted campaign to pacify the fiercely independent Islamic tribes in the great mountain range to the north of its possessions in Transcaucasia. By 1837, the war was entering its third decade, and the hard-pressed mountain tribes, whose struggle against the Russians had become a genuinely Islamic holy war, were united under the charismatic leadership of the Imam Shamil. Although the Russian Empire began its expansion into Caucasia and Transcaucasia under Peter I, 1817 is generally accepted as the beginning of what is known as "the Caucasian War" (1817-64)-i.e., the beginning of General Aleksei Er-molov's campaign to pacify the North Caucasus.

According to the Yemelianova, gazawat began in southern Dagestan and was already accepted in most of Dagestan and Chechnya by the end of the 1830s²⁹.

²⁸ Кемпер М.К. «К вопросу о суфийской основе джихада в Дагестане,» Подвижники ислама ,Культ святых и суфизм в Средней Азии и на Кавказе. (Москва:Восточная литература, 2003), 281-2.

²⁹ Galina M. Yemelianova, *Russia and Islam. A Historical Survey* (New York: St Martin's Press, 2002) p. 50.

The slogan of gazawat was not expression of religious fanaticism, but primarily that of the practical struggle. From Sharia's point of view, the given term, gazawat refers to the struggle against infidels who initially accepted Islam but then receded from it and have declared war against it. During the period of formation of the early-feudal states, when expansion into neighboring countries was natural, the main guidelines of Islam had the form of "aggressive" ideology.

It is necessary to concentrate on the concept of gazawat. The terms jihad and war (harb) in the Arabian language do not have the same meaning. The latter refers to a battle with the enemy. From Sharia's point of view, jihad is the struggle against infidels who initially accepted Islam but then receded from it and declared war against it. During the period of formation of early-feudal states, when expansion into neighboring countries was a natural state of society, the main guidelines of Islam had the form of "aggressive" ideology. Commune-mountaineers were largely accepting of the social doctrine of Magomed Jaragsky, although they mostly did not understand the doctrine of tariqa. Jihad has often been justified as Muridism. Disciples of the Imams participated in the struggle of resistance, and they served as "organizational backbone of the jihad state and army".³⁰ In essence, muridism was seen by the Russian authorities as an anti-Russian movement because it did not recognize any worldly authorities who did not descend from the Muslim prophet³¹.

Magomed Jaragsky was the first preacher of gazawat, the "wars for the faith." Gazawat became the major feature of this struggle and the essence of the Caucasian tariqa. In general, Sheikhs Magomed Jaragsky and Dzhamal-Edin acted

³⁰ Michael Kemper, "An island of classical Arabic in the Caucasus: Dagestan," *Exploring the Caucasus in the 21th century. Essays on culture, history and politics in a dynamic context* eds. Françoise Companjen, Laszlo Maracz, Lia Versteegh (Amsterdam : Pallas Publications, 2000), p. 72.

³¹ Firouzen Mostashari, *On the Religious Frontier. Tsarist Russia and Islam in the Caucasus* (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006) p. 33.

to support the imams and spread muridism in the territory covered by the jihad. Usually the North Caucasian muridism made easy common resistance against its wide network of Sufi brothers and the Naqshbandiyya institution and justified an important unifying factor.³² This concept originated through interpretation of the Koran and in the “spirit of the social protest” which comprises Sufism. In this situation, Sufism fully approached the religious doctrine that was capable of uniting the mountaineers for “holy struggle.” Magomed Jaragsky expected to realize the doctrines of gazawat and Sharia as a dual practical goal. Finally, the ideology of muridistic tariqa concentrated on gazawat and the establishment of Sharia. The announcement of gazawat to infidels who did not convert to Islam became the main military and ideological doctrine of Caucasian muridism³³. This doctrine retained its dominating role throughout the duration of the Caucasian war. The necessity of gazawat was easily justified by the Koran as there were direct instructions on eternal and uncompromising war of the faithful against the infidels. The ideology of muridism in the Caucasian war also reflected the problems of the new social relations and needs of religious life.

It need to be researched Shamil’s Imamate as a part of the muridism process and question why the state-imamate in the concept of muridism was formed in the North Caucasus. In order to understand the features of the mountaineer movement led by Shamil, it is necessary to understand the ideology of Imamate and its political system. The term “Imamate” can be used for the Muslim independent state administering mullahs and headed by a spiritual and secular lord – the imam. Thus, the Imamate is a theocracy. The head of the state is first of all the Supreme

³² Shireen T. Hunter, *Islam in Russia. The Politics of Identity and Security* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004) p. 11.

³³ Блиев М.М. Дегоев В.В. Кавказская война, 211

spiritual leader and therefore also holds the secular power, is the head of the Muslim state, and is the commander-in-chief of all forces of the Muslim state in a Holy War. Such a united and multinational military-theocratic Islamic state existed at the junction of Dagestan and Chechnya in 1830-1859 years. Imamate was based on Sharia institutions and some changed Sufi principles, notably murid-murshid relations borrowed from Sufi practices and transformed into relations between a ruler and subjects in the jihad state.³⁴ The Russian conquest of the North Caucasus in the 18th and 19th centuries was characterized by systematic expulsion of the indigenous population³⁵. In the Imamate, the movement of mountaineers led by Shamil was evaluated more or less as national-liberation³⁶. Robert Seely states that the core of the state consisted of three factors – Shamil himself as the leader, Islam as the provider of laws and belief, and the standing army as the provider of defense³⁷.

Supported by the murids, Shamil resisted Russian power for almost three decades, built an imamate to execute a guerilla war, and relied upon the impenetrability of the forests and mountains of the Caucasus.³⁸ Like the rulers of Caliphate, the imam concentrated not only religious, but also military, executive, legislative, and judicial power, of which Shamil was the supreme judge. Shamil

³⁴ Vladimir Bobrovnikov, "Islam in the Russian Empire," *The Cambridge history of Russia. Volume II-1. Imperial Russia, 1689-1917*. Ed. Dominic Lieven (Cambridge, New York : Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 211.

³⁵ Roman Khalilov, "Moral Justifications of secession: the case of Chechnya," *Central Asian Survey*, 22(4), (December, 2003) p. 410.

³⁶ See Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, "The Spread of Islam and Russian Expansionism" in *Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide* (London: Hurst, 1985), pp. 5-12; J.F.Baddeley, *The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1999), Moshe Gammer, *Muslim Resistance to the Tsar* (London: Frank Cass, 1994), Moshe Gammer, *Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnya and Dagestan* (London: Frank Cass, 1994).

³⁷ Robert Seely, *Russo-Chechen Conflict 1800-2000. A deadly Embrace* (London, Portland: Frank Cass, 2001) p 45.

³⁸ Jacob W. Kipp, "Putin and Russia's Wars in Chechnya" (ed.) Dale R. Herspring, " *Putin's Russia past imperfect, future uncertain* (New York, Oxford: Rouman & Little field Publishers, INK, 2002) p. 182.

created a large state based on military-civil organization with religious overtones³⁹. Formation of Imamate signaled the creation of a strong centralized government, elimination of feudal dissociation, cessation of civil strife, creation of conditions for successful development of productive forces and resistance to the Russian empire. Liquidated lands of Avar Khanate became part of Imamate as did many rural societies in the Dagestan mountains and the Chechen Republic.

The Imams enforced Sharia law and saw in the Sharia a tool to unite the mountaineers in the fight against imperial expansion and the local feudal lord-collaborators. The Imams believed that adats hindered the unity of the mountaineers and existed in different forms in different places, causing fragmentation and often irreconcilability in the relationship among the North Caucasus nationalities⁴⁰. The implementation and enforcement of the Sharia was the first aim of the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya and Shamil showed great energy in moving towards the fulfilment of this aim.⁴¹

Mullahs and kadis from year to year, from century to century bore the divine words, Sharia sermons and the sacred word of Islam. They tried to establish a universal law which would make everyone equal before Allah. The adats were the norm of local political and communal formations. "Adat" is a Arabic word meaning "customs" and has three major meanings: a common law, the court of common law and a non-legal custom. Adat and other pre-Islamic local norms and

³⁹ R. Magomedov. *Bor'ba gortsev za nezavisimost' pod rukovodstvom Shamilia* (Makhachkala: Dagestanskoe gosuderstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1939) p. 90.

⁴⁰ Sh.M. Kaziev, I.V.Karpeev, *Povsednevnaia zhizn' gortsev Severnogo Kavkaza v XIX veke* (Moscow: Molodaya gvardiya, 2003) p. 165.

⁴¹ Gammer, Moshe. *Muslim resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the conquest of Chechnia and Dagestan*(London :Frank Cass, 1994), p. 232.

traditions regulated inter-clan, inter-tribe, and inter-commune relations.⁴² By the time of the mountaineers' movement, the adats in feudal possessions were adapted to the interests of feudal lords, who claimed that Sharia courts were not able to resolve local problems, that regular law was more advanced, and that corporal punishment stipulated by Sharia law was humiliating and unacceptable from the viewpoint of national customs⁴³. The passion of the Islamic warriors was countered by the determination of the adat supporters to defend the customary, centuries-old norms of everyday life. Popular tradition was always characterized by a tendency toward self-preservation, protecting society from a foreign ideological flood that was dangerous because of its aggressive nature and its spiritual or "socially contagious" potential⁴⁴.

Gazi Muhammad was a resolute distributor of Sharia during the murid movement, and he attempted to remove the adats from the lives of the mountaineers. According to Michael Reynolds, Gazi Muhammad was the warrior aimed not merely at the liberation of the North Caucasus from Russian domination, but also at the transformation of mountaineer society into a Sharia-based society⁴⁵. In Sharia establishments, all Muslims are considered to be equal. Thereby, Sharia facilitated the elimination of social interethnic contradictions in the "holy" struggle against the "infidels." To achieve such a purpose, the Imam needed a powerful idea: a man enthralled only to the will of Allah and nothing else. The Imam

⁴² Galina M. Yemelianova, "Sufism and Politics in the North Caucasus," *National Papers*, vol. 29, no. 4, 2001, p. 663.

⁴³ Yuri Y. Karpov, "Image of Violence in Modern and Recent History of the People of the North Caucasus" *Anthropology & Archeology of Eurasia* (Spring 2003) vol. 41, no. 4. P. 33.

⁴⁴ Vladimir Degoev, "The Diplomacy of the Caucasus War as a History Lesson," *Russian Social Science Review*, 45, No.3, July-August 2004, p. 30.

⁴⁵ Michael Reynolds, "Myths and Mysticism: A Longitudinal Perspectives on Islam and Conflict in the North Caucasus," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 1, January 2005, p 39.

wanted to achieve political unity of the mountaineers against the oppressors. Ruslan Kurbanov noted Gazi Muhammad's strong will of acceptance of Sharia in the Daghestan⁴⁶. Ghazi Muhammad, as the first true North Caucasus insurgency leader, organized the population and moved the entire population to a war footing.⁴⁷ He embraced a more militant interpretation of the tariqat: spreading the teachings by word alone was not enough; one must also employ the sword.⁴⁸ It is worthy to note that Imams Gazi Muhammad and Shamil called for purification and renewal of Islam (Arabic "tajdid), characteristic of all the revived movements of the Islamic World⁴⁹. Shamil's movement was great Muslim resistance against the Russian advance in the Caucasus.⁵⁰

To summarize, in the first half of the XIX century in the North-Eastern Caucasus, muridism was divided into several different factions, referred to as "tariqa muridism" and "naib muridism." The struggle between murid spiritual leaders ended with a victory of naib muridism, which then became the most authoritative religious movement with a large number of adherents. Muridism represents a mystical-ascetic form of Muslim culture in the context of social and

⁴⁶ Ruslan Kurbanov, "Globalization of Muslim Consciousness in the Caucasus: Islamic Call and Jihad," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 6(42), 2006, p. 59.

⁴⁷ Robert W. Schaefer, *The insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus from Gazavat to Jihad* (Santa Barbara, Denver, London : Praeger, 2011), p. 62.

⁴⁸ Michael Khodarkovsky, *Bitter choices. Loyalty and betrayal in the Russian conquest of the North Caucasus* (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 2011), p. 93.

⁴⁹ Ruslan Kurbanov, "Globalization of Muslim Consciousness in the Caucasus: Islamic Call and Jihad" *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 6(42), 2006, p. 60.

⁵⁰ Bulent Gokay, "The longstanding Russian and Soviet debate over Sheikh Shamil: Anti-Imperialist hero or counter-revolutionary cleric?," *Russia and Chechnia : The Permanent Crisis. Essays on Russo-Chechen relations.* ed. Ben Fowkes (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), C. 27.

anti-colonial struggle. One of the most prestigious factions was represented by naib murids.

Muridism in the context of social and anti-colonial struggle was becoming more politicized and has undergone serious changes under the influence of the tsarist colonial policy and amplified oppression of the local feudal lords. The emergence of naib muridism in historical circumstances was possible on the basis of tariqat muridism. Muridism in the Caucasus, which originally arose in tariqa treatment during the liberation movement led by Shamil mountaineers, transformed into a quite peculiar theocratic-religious system known as naib muridism. As the ideology of the anti-colonial struggle of the mountaineers, muridism became the ensign of the liberation struggle. Sharia is the Islamic law, the Muslim way of life, the foundation of faith and the path the proper living.

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The Russian-Soviet legacies in Reshaping the National Territories in Central Asia: A catastrophic case of Tajikistan

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Introduction

In every period of history many parts and territories of the world divide and get a new shape. There are lots of such examples. One clear example is the so-called 'Grate Game' and division of Central Asia by the British and Russian Empires. In general, Central Asian region is under Russian influence for more than 150 years. Today in the 21st century Central Asia once again is facing a new 'Great Game', but this time with new and non-traditional powers in the region like the US and China, which challenge the influence of region's traditional power - Russia. This paper tries to touch upon the situation and the tragic fate of Tajiks during the Russian-Soviet empires within the different political entities, administrations and territories.

Today's Republic of Tajikistan was a part of historical-geographical area called Transoxiana by the Greeks and Mawaraunnahr by the Arabs. Tajiks are the only national group of Persian (Iranian) descendants in a predominantly Turko-Mongol environment in Central Asia. Tajiks are characterized by different scholars as 'the oldest settled population of Central Asia' and 'the oldest aborigine of the

region'¹; the 'only autochthonous people' and "the most ancient and civilized people of Central Asia"²; 'the oldest inhabitants of this region'³; 'indigenous inhabitants' and 'original Iranian inhabitants of Central Asia'⁴ etc.

Tajiks had their first and last state of Tajik (Persian) origin of Samani empire during 9th-10th tenth centuries with capital city Bukhara. The Samani empire ruled much of today's Central Asia, Iran, Afghanistan and other areas. During the era of Samani empire, the process of the formation of Tajik people completed. Since then until the conquest of Russian and Soviet empires in 19th and 20th centuries Central Asia was mainly ruled by the Turko-Mongol tribes. As a result, Tajiks were assimilated by Turko-Mongol nomadic aliens in Central Asia in respect of language. This assimilation played a prominent role in the ethnogenesis of Central Asian Turko-Mongol peoples, especially Uzbeks.⁵ Tajiks until the independence of Tajikistan in 1991 from the USSR included in the following empires, dynasties, kingdoms, states etc.:

(1). Pre-Islamic period - Persia`s Achaemenid Empire (the First Persian Empire), 550-330 BCE (Capital: Pasargadae, Ecbatana, Persepolis, Susa, Babylon); Seleucid Empire (Greek-Macedonian Hellenistic state), 312 BC-250 BC (Capital: Seleucia on

¹ Масов, Рахим Масович. *Таджики: вытеснение и ассимиляция*, Национальный музей древностей Таджикистана, Душанбе, Ирфон, 2003, стр.15.

² Mamadaliev, I. "The tragedy of colonialism – Tajik phenomenon: the history of Tajiks at the second half of XIX – beginning of XX centuries". University of Washington, JSIS, The Nineteenth Annual Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies, Northwest Conference. URL:

<http://jsis.washington.edu/ellison/file/REECAS%20NW%202013/Mamadaliev.pdf> ,
http://jsis.washington.edu/ellison/reecasnw_2013/panel2c.shtml#2 (accessed October 31, 2013).

³ Abdullaev K, Akbarzadeh Sh. *Historical Dictionary of Tajikistan*. Lanham-Toronto-Plymouth, UK: The Scarecrow Press Inc., 2010, Introduction, page 1.

⁴ Peimani, Hooman. *Regional Security and the Future of Central Asia: The Competition of Iran, Turkey, and Russia*. Greenwood Publishing Group, 1998, page 44.

⁵ Кадырбаев, Александр. «Таджики: веги истории и культурное наследие», Проект Центра изучения Центральной Азии, Кавказа и Урало-Поволжья, Института востоковедения Российской академии наук. URL: <http://www.central-eurasia.com/tajikistan/?uid=269> (accessed November 1, 2013).

the Tigris (305-240 BC) & Antioch (240-64 BC); Greece-Bactrian Kingdom, 250 BC - 140 BC (Capital: Balkh, Alexandria on the Oxus. Included Bactria and Sogdiana in Central Asia); Kushan Empire, 30 BC - 410 AD (Capital: Bagram, Peshawar, Taxila, Mathura); Parthian Empire (Ashkoniyon), 247 BC – 224 AD (Capital: Asaak (IRN), Hecatompylos (IRN), Amol (IRN), Ecbatana (IRN), Ctesiphon (IRQ), Susa (IRN), Mithridatkird-Nisa (TURKM); Sasanid Empire (Sosoniyon) (the last pre-Islamic Persian Empire), 224-651 (Capital: Ctesiphon (IRQ); Hephthalite Empire (Haytoliyon), 450-567 (Capital: Kunduz (Badian), Balkh (Baktra), Sialkot (Sakala).

(2). Islamic period - Ummayyad Caliphate, 671-750 (Capital: Damascus); Abbasid Caliphate, 750-875 (Capital: Kufa, Baghdad, Ar-Raqqah); Tahirid Dynasty (Persian origin), 821-873. (Capital: Marv, Nishapur); Saffarid Dynasty, 873-900 (Capital: Zaranj (Afghanistan); Samanid Empire 875-999 (Capital: Bukhara, Balkh); Ghaznavid Dynasty, 998-1186 (Capital: Ghazna, Lahore); Qarakhanid Dynasty, 1005-1212 (Capital: Balasagun, Kashgar, Samarqand (now in UZB); Great Seljuk Empire, 1040-1157 (Capital: Nishapur, Isfahan, Hamadan, Marv (Merv); Ghurid Dynasty, 1150-1206 (Capital: Firuzkuh, Herat, Ghazna, Lahore); Khwarazmian Dynasty, 1162-1221 (Capital: Gurganj (now in TRKM), Samarqand, Ghazna (now in AFG), Tabriz (now in IRN); Mongol Empire, 1221-1359; Temurid Dynasty, 1370-1507 (Capital: Samarqand, Herat (now in AFG); Shaybanids, 1501-1599. (Appanages: Balkh, Bukhara, Samarqand, Khwarasm, etc.); Ashtarkhanids, 1599-1753. (Capital: Bukhara); Manghits, 1753-1920 (Capital: Bukhara).

(3). Modern period: Turkistan Governor-Generalship of Tsarist Russia, 1867-1918 (Capital: Tashkent); Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 1918-1924 (Capital: Tashkent); Bukhara People's Soviet Republic, 1920-1924 (Capital: Bukhara); Tajikistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the Uzbek SSR,

1924-1929 (Capital: Dushanbe); Tajikistan Soviet Socialist Republic within the USSR, 1929-1991 (Capital: Dushanbe); Republic of Tajikistan, 1991~present.

There were three kingdoms in Central Asia in the 17th and 18th centuries: the Bukhara Emirate, Khiva Khanate and Kokand Khanate. Most of the today's Tajikistan was included in Bukhara Emirate and a small part in Kokand Khanate. Among these kingdoms the Bukhara Emirate was the biggest.

The Russian colonial conquest is one of the most burning issues in the history of Central Asia. The Russian Empire paid more attention to Central Asia from the mid-19th century. In the 1858 the Asian Department of the Russian foreign ministry sent three missions⁶ to Central Asia officially called "scientific expeditions" to East Iran (Khurasan) and Herat (Afghanistan) headed by N.V. Khanykov, to East Turkistan headed by Ch.Ch. Valikhanov, and a diplomatic embassy to Khiva and Bukhara headed by N.P. Ignatev⁷ with the purpose of becoming familiar with the region, facilitate its future conquest and "to help Saint Petersburg to work out the measures of future resistance to England's influence in the region..."⁸. Soon, Central Asia was conquered by the Russian Empire in the second half of the 19th century and the rule of the last Turko-Mongol dynasty – the Manghits of Bukhara Emirate ended.

In March 1863 the Emperor of Russia Alexander II signed the decree of the Special Committee on conducting military actions in Central Asia – in Kokand and

⁶ Кудрявцев, Н.А. *Государево око: тайная дипломатия и разведка на службе России*, М.:ОЛМА Медиа Групп, 2002, стр.572-574.

⁷ Akdes Nimet Kurat. 'Tsarist Russia and the Muslims of Central Asia' in Holt, Lambton and Lewis, eds., *The Cambridge History of Islam, Volume 1, The Central Islamic Lands*, pp.503-523.

⁸ Андреев, А.Р. *Последний канцлер Российской империи Александр Михайлович Горчаков: документальное жизнеописание*, М.: "Белый волк" и др., 1999.

Khiva Khanates and Bukhara Emirates⁹. In order to appease the European governments (first of all the British) the Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov wrote a historical circular^{10, 11, 12, 13} a justification for Russian advance in Central Asia, which was sent on 21 November 1864 to all Russian ambassadors in foreign countries¹⁴. The circular highlighted Russia's mission for the safety of its borders and trade relations and also to civilize the "half-savage vagrant people" of Central Asia, whose "wild and violent morals and manners make their neighbors uncomfortable"¹⁵. Russia further strengthened its dominance in the region with the capture¹⁶ of Tashkent - the biggest city in Turkistan in June 1865 by major-general Chernyayev, who became its first military governor. Consequently, the Turkistan province was established and included in the Orenburg governor-generalship and Tashkent became an administrative center of the Russian Empire in Central Asia¹⁷.

There are several explanations of the motivations behind the conquest of Central Asia by the Russian Empire: 1). Russia's 'civilized mission' in Asia; 2). Security of Russian frontiers from the threat of nomadic attacks; 3). Fear of the region's invasion by the rival power - Britain; 4). To stop Britain's activities in the region; 5). American civil war, stop of cotton import from America to Russia and

⁹ Андреев, А.Р. *Последний канцлер Российской империи Александр Михайлович Горчаков: документальное жизнеописание*, М.: "Белый волк" и др., 1999.

¹⁰ Глушенко, Евгений Александрович. *Строители империй: портреты колониальных деятелей*, Рос. акад. наук. М.: XXI век - Согласие, 2000, стр.17.

¹¹ Намазова, Алла Сергеевна. *Россия и Европа*, Т.1-4, М.: Наука, 1995, стр.119.

¹² Бокиев, О.В. *Завоевание и присоединение Северного Таджикистан, Памира и Горного Бадашхана к России*, Душанбе: Ирфон, 1994, стр.14.

¹³ Элен Каррер д'Анкосс, Е Богатыренко, Centre national du livre (France). *Николай II. Расстрелянная преемственность*, М.: ОЛМА Медиа Групп, 2006, стр.28.

¹⁴ Широкоград, Александр Борисович. *Россия - Англия: неизвестная война, 1857-1907*, М.: Изд-во "АСТ", 2003, стр.96.

¹⁵ Андреев, А.Р. *Последний канцлер Российской империи Александр Михайлович Горчаков: документальное жизнеописание*, М.: "Белый волк" и др., 1999.

¹⁶ Пчелов, Евгений Владимирович. *Монархи России, Историческая Библиотека Олма-Пресс*, М.: ОЛМА Медиа Групп, 2003, стр.505.

¹⁷ Глушенко, Евгений Александрович. *Строители империй: портреты колониальных деятелей*, Рос. акад. наук. М.: XXI век - Согласие, 2000, стр.39.

the Russia's need for a new source of raw materials, especially cotton for its industry; 6). Development of trade with Central Asia; 7). Expansion of new territories.

Turkistan Governor-Generalship of Tsarist Russia (1867-1918. Capital: Tashkent)

The Turkistan Governor-Generalship of Russia was established on July 11, 1867 by the Russian special imperial decree¹⁸. On July 17, 1867 the Tsar appointed K.P. Kaufman as the first governor-general of Turkistan¹⁹, to whom unlimited authorities were given "to solve any political, border and trade issues; to send the trusted people to neighboring dominions to conduct negotiations; and to sign the treaties, conditions or resolutions"²⁰. Although some lands in Central Asia were never invaded by Russia, Turkistan was established as a semi-independent protectorate under Russian control. The Russian invasion had important both positive and negative impacts on politics, society and culture in Central Asia.

There are different opinions expressed by the scholars about the nature of the Russian conquest of Central Asia. Khalid describes it as 'so rude in its abruptness'²¹. Some scholars like Mamadaliev think that the Russian conquest of Central Asia was 'extremely brutal' and Russians acted 'as other colonizers; they

¹⁸ Глушенко, Евгений Александрович. *Россия в Средней Азии. Завоевания и преобразования*, М.: Центрполиграф, 2010.

¹⁹ Глушенко, Евгений Александрович. *Россия в Средней Азии. Завоевания и преобразования*, М.: Центрполиграф, 2010.

²⁰ Победоносцев, Юрий. *Гибель империи. Тайные страницы большой геополитики (1830-1918 гг.)*, М.: АСТ: Астрель, 2010.

²¹ Adeeb Khalid. *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia*, University of California Press, 1998, page 44.

were ruthless, merciless killers who wiped out thousands of people, destroying their economies'. According to this author, the Russian authorities "looted thousands of Central Asian objects, of all sizes and kinds, as trophies or plunder which they then shipped to Saint Petersburg or Moscow. When General von Kaufman was governor-general of Turkestan, he plundered the movable symbols of sovereignty as well as the records of intellectual life and history of Central Asia. Among the stolen objects were numerous medieval manuscripts, ancient vessels from mosques, and other artistic objects"²². Another scholar Geiss is of opinion, that the Russian rule "rudely disregarded local customs and habits and endangered the indigenous material basis of life, at first through the uncontrolled spread of European settlement and later through the planned imperial colonization policy"²³.

Russian forces invaded the Bukhara Emirate in 1866 and took Khujand. Encouraged and supported by the Islamic clergy, the amir of Bukhara proclaimed a holy war on Russia in April 1868. But soon amir's army was defeated and Bukhara Emirate became a vassal state of Russia. Soon the Khanate of Khiva fell in 1873 and also Kokand Khanate was abolished and annexed as the Farghana region to the Turkistan Governor-Generalship of Russia. In 1884 Bukhara Emirate was included within the Russia's customs frontier and Russian troops took control of the Bukhara Emirate's borders with Afghanistan. After decade in 1895 the agreement was signed between Britain & Russia, which defined 'The Spheres of Influence of the two countries in the Region of the Pamirs'. According to this

²² Mamadaliev, I. "The tragedy of colonialism – Tajik phenomenon: the history of Tajiks at the second half of XIX – beginning of XX centuries". University of Washington, JSIS, The Nineteenth Annual Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies, Northwest Conference. URL:

<http://jsis.washington.edu/ellison/file/REECAS%20NW%202013/Mamadaliev.pdf> ,

http://jsis.washington.edu/ellison/reecasnw_2013/panel2c.shtml#2 (accessed October 31, 2013).

²³ Paul Georg Geiss. *Pre-tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia: Communal Commitment and Political Order in Change*, Routledge, 2003, page 189.

agreement Rushan, Shugnan & northern Wakhan to the east of Bukhara-Afghanistan border were to be transferred to Bukhara Emirate and South Darwaz to Afghanistan. In 2005 after more than a century Russia completely withdraws its border forces from the Tajik-Afghan border and handed it over to Tajikistan forces.

Since the conquest, Central Asia became a source of raw material for the Russian industry. As far as Tajikistan is concerned, its northern part grew more prosperous than the south. The south of the country remained under control of the amir of Bukhara, who was, however, under Russian protection. The amir regarded the eastern part of his principality as a kind of colony; thus the people of this "Eastern Bukhara" (today's Tajikistan) experienced double exploitation and they led a miserable life. The area that we now regard as Northern Tajikistan was in a more favorable situation: it was under the direct rule of the Russian governor-general in Tashkent. It became an integral part of the Russian Empire. The growth of Russia's textile industry augmented the demand for cotton; this raw material became the main agricultural product in the area.

Bukhara, Samarqand, Khwarasm of Central Asia were world-known important centers of Islamic education and thought. After being colonized by the Russian Empire, Muslims of Central Asia faced a serious problem with domination of new rulers unknown to their culture and faith. Russian empire in Central Asia also caused a destruction of traditional institutions.

The Russian colonization of Central Asia had also positive impacts. It brought modernization, progress and development. Railways were constructed,

new schools, and gymnasiums opened. It introduced the Russian culture and world civilization to Tajik and other people of the region.

The conquest and territorial expansion of Central Asia by the Russian Empire was formally ended by the bilateral notes and agreements of Russia with China in 1894 and with Britain in 1895 and 1907²⁴. But, the same legacy was continued by the Soviet Empire. The Russian Empire collapsed during the Russian Revolution of 1917, and the Bolsheviks (Communists) took control of the Russian government.

Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1918-1924. Capital: Tashkent)

Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR) formally was established in 1918.²⁵ In 1921 the northern part of present-day Tajikistan became part of the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The Turkistan ASSR also included present-day Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, a small portion of northern Turkmenistan, and southern Kazakhstan, almost whole Central Asia. There were two types of soviet governments in Central Asia before 1924: autonomous republics like the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which was part of the Russian Federation and people's republics like the People's Republic of Bukhara and the People's Republic of Khwarazm. These latter enjoyed diplomatic relations with Russia, as independent countries. During the incorporation of these republics, their pre-revolutionary boundaries were retained, although those boundaries did not correspond to the ethnic identity of the peoples that populated them. The tragedy for the Tajik population of Central Asia was again the advent of

²⁴ Победоносцев, Юрий. *Гибель империи. Тайные страницы большой геополитики (1830-1918 гг.)*, М.: АСТ: Астрель, 2010.

²⁵ Сахаров А.Н. *История России с древнейших времен до наших дней. Учебник, Т.2*, М.: Проспект, 2010.

the self-name "Turkistan" (or Turkestan) for the region. The term "Turkistan" means - the country of the Turks. By naming the region Turkistan, the oldest settled people of the region Tajiks were ignored and disregarded. According to Masov the leaders of Turkistan ASSR except Turkic-speaking nations didn't recognize any other nation. The list of all school textbooks published at that period is provided in the publications catalogue of the State Publications of Turkistan ASSR in 1922. The textbooks are published in Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Turkmen and Russian. There is no even a single textbook in Tajiki (Persian) mentioned in the list. The teaching in all schools of the Turkistan ASSR as well as the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic was conducted mainly in Turkic (Uzbek)²⁶. During this period Tajiks had no chance of creating a common territory, cultural community and national public education.

Tajiks in the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic (1920-1924. Capital: Bukhara)

In early September 1920 the amir of Bukhara was overthrown by Bolshevik forces, his emirate collapsed fully and through the Eastern Bukhara (today's Tajikistan) he escaped to Afghanistan, where he spent the rest of his life. Soon in the same month the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic was formed. Again the representatives of the Pan-Turkist movement became dominant in the newly established Bukhara republic. Of course there were Tajik leaders too, but they all were attracted and influenced by Pan-Turkism. For example, the inaugural convention of the All-Bukharan Revolutionary Committee, which officially

²⁶ Масов, Рахим Масович. *Таджики: вытеснение и ассимиляция*, Национальный музей древностей Таджикистана, Душанбе, Ирфон, 2003, стр.20-21.

declared the foundation of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic, was chaired by a Tajik – Abdulqodir Muhiddinov.²⁷

Most of the modern Tajikistan (Eastern Bukhara at that time) included in the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic. However, this inclusion was only nominal. Eastern Bukhara was a remote mountainous area and too far from both the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR) and Bukhara People's Soviet Republic (BPSR). The so-called *Basmachi* movement and resistance against the Red Army still was powerful in most parts of the Eastern Bukhara. Therefore, until the end of 1920s the Soviet government could not establish itself fully in Eastern Bukhara. It became possible only with the complete defeat of the *Basmachi* movement by the Red army and establishment of the Tajikistan Soviet Socialist Republic in 1929.

The era of the national-administrative divisions of Central Asia. Establishment of the Tajikistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the Uzbek SSR (1924-1929. Capital: Dushanbe)

In 1924 the Soviet government decided to delineate new borders in Central Asia, carving up the region among its majority ethnic groups. It was a strategy of “divide and rule”. Many mistakes were made in the process of the implementation of the national-administrative divisions, and the creation of the union republics, autonomous republics, and autonomous regions. For instance, historically established boundaries were ignored. That year on 14th October 1924 the Soviet government created the Tajikistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (or Tajik ASSR) within the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). Tajiks lost the national

²⁷ Abdullaev K, Akbarzadeh Sh. *Historical Dictionary of Tajikistan*. Lanham-Toronto-Plymouth, UK: The Scarecrow Press Inc., 2010, Introduction, pp.83-84.

statehood and independence. According to academician Masov “As a result of the ‘coarse division’²⁸ of Central Asia in 1924, Tajiks were given the mountainous areas and foothills, they lost the historical and cultural centers, economically developed regions and territories belonging to them by right, where Tajik population lived compactly”²⁹.

The Turkic leaders of Central Asia managed to participate in high level political affairs, which resulted in the consolidation of a strong Turkish national feeling and the emergence of Pan-Turkism under the guise of the already existing Pan-Islamism led by the Ottoman Turks. Pan-Turkic school was dominant during the era of national-administrative division of Central Asia. Tajiks faced continuous harassment and persecution by the Pan-Turkic officials and leaders in Soviet government in Central Asia, who openly ignored and disregarded even the very existence of such a nation Tajiks.³⁰ It was deeply traumatic for the Tajik people and they suffered great moral, spiritual and national loss.

Territorial issue has the most significance among the tragedies of the ethnic history of Tajiks in the XXth century related to historical centers of Tajik culture and civilization Samarqand and Bukhara. Bukhara and Samarqand, as the major centers of Islamic education in the eastern part of the Islamic world, were the main

²⁸ This phrase ‘coarse division’ is my English translation of the original phrase of academician R. Masov in Russian «топорное разделение» (Z.U.)

²⁹ Масов, Рахим Масович. *Таджики: вытеснение и ассимиляция*, Национальный музей древностей Таджикистана, Душанбе, Ирфон, 2003, стр.3.

³⁰ Масов, Рахим Масович. *Таджики: вытеснение и ассимиляция*, Национальный музей древностей Таджикистана, Душанбе, Ирфон, 2003, стр.19.

'civilizational reservoirs'³¹ of Tajiks and the source of their intellectual elite during the Middle Ages until the beginning of the XX century. Unfortunately, both cities (where the majority of the population were and still are Tajiks) were given to Uzbekistan as a result of the catastrophic national-administrative division carried out by Soviets in 1924 in Central Asia. Consequently, the language of Tajiks was soon withdrawn from the official circulation in both cities and replaced with the Uzbek and Russian. The new education system in these cities was largely designed in the Uzbek language. Another tragedy of the Tajik people in Bukhara and Samarqand was that hundreds of Tajiks were registered as Uzbeks.

Tajikistan Soviet Socialist Republic within the USSR (1929-1991. Capital: Dushanbe)

In 1929 after the long struggles with Pan-Turkist Soviet leaders in Central Asia, the Tajik ASSR was made a separate republic from the Uzbek SSR. During this period the Soviet government transferred the Khujand region (located in the Farghana valley), from the Uzbek SSR to the Tajik SSR. But, this move could not replace the intellectual potential of Bukhara and Samarqand. The aim of the national-administrative division of the Soviet government in Central Asia was the assignment of the ethnic groups to particular homelands. Another motivation of this policy was to destroy traditional regional entities. Moreover, centuries of interethnic cohabitation in Central Asia became a reason that, a clear-cut division was impossible. As a result of catastrophic national-administrative division of Soviets, the large proportion of Tajiks continued to reside outside the borders of the Tajik SSR (mostly in the cities of Bukhara, Samarkand, and Tashkent in the

³¹ Кадырбаев, Александр. «Таджики: вехи истории и культурное наследие», Проект Центра изучения Центральной Азии, Кавказа и Урало-Поволжья, Института востоковедения Российской академии наук. URL: <http://www.central-eurasia.com/tajikistan/?uid=269> (accessed November 1, 2013).

Uzbek SSR), while many Turko-Mongol tribes such as Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Barlas, Lakai, Kunghurat and other ethnicities found themselves in the Tajik SSR.

The capital and administrative center of Eastern Bukhara (today's Tajikistan) in the Bukhara Emirate was Hisor. But, the Soviet army during their attack destroyed most of this old city, especially amir's palace and its surrounding areas. The Soviets didn't choose Hisor as the new capital of Tajikistan. Instead, Dushanbe village was designated as the capital of the Tajik ASSR in 1924. Hundreds of people, such as a large group of intellectuals, politicians, scholars, scientists, doctors, teachers and others moved from mainly two cities Bukhara and Samarkand to Dushanbe village, to build a new capital and a new country. Also, the early period of the rule of the Soviet empire in Eastern Bukhara (today's Tajikistan) caused a large migration of religious, intellectual and ordinary people to neighboring Afghanistan and through it to other Muslim countries, like British India (today's India, Pakistan and Bangladesh), Turkey and even Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia.

It took time for the Soviet empire to establish itself in Central Asia since the defeat of Bukhara Emirate in 1920. The civil war continued until the late 1920s. Anti-Soviet struggle and activities continued until 1930. This struggle and freedom movement against the Russian and Soviet rule was called the *Basmachi* revolt. The term *Basmachi* was applied by the Soviets for their Muslim opponents in Central Asia. The *Basmachi* movement is regarded as a negative element in Soviet historiography. But in fact, it was a fight between the local population and the invader. It was a huge patriotic movement for freedom, faith and honor. Therefore,

the process of establishing the Soviet power in Tajikistan was as a long political and military struggle.

But, by the end of 1920s, the Islamic movement and freedom rebellion were suppressed. The leaders and participants of the so-called *Basmachi* movement whether were killed by Soviet Red Army and remained ones moved to Afghanistan and from there to the different Muslim countries of the world, such as India, Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia etc. This defeat and the end of the *Basmachi* movement marked the beginning of wide repression against religion. It was a process of removal of any Islamic element from the society and was manifested in all aspects of life. The past of Tajik people in literature and science was presented as something dark and something people should be ashamed of.

Negative impacts of the rule of Soviet Union in Central Asia

The Soviet empire negatively influenced Tajikistan and Tajik people in many aspects, such as language, culture, religion, names, national identity, family, rituals and traditions, national holidays and festivals, dress, etc. The following are the examples of anti-Islamic policies of the Soviet rule in Tajikistan:

- Cutting off the people of Tajikistan from the Muslim world, including Iran & Afghanistan;
- Prohibition of writing 'Allah' in literally, educational & other materials;
- Eliminating a word 'Allah' at the publication of Persian classical literature;
- Prohibition of writing 'Allah' as an ending to Arabic-Islamic names (Example: Зубайдулло/Zubaidullo not Зубайдуллоҳ/Zubaidullah, Абдулло/Abdullo not Абдуллоҳ/Abdullah etc.);

During the period of the 1930s to 1940s due to Josef Stalin's repression, thousands of clerics were killed and all religious literature was burned and eliminated. During that period many of scientific books, the rich written and cultural heritage of Tajiks were burned as the religious ones, because they were written in Persian (Arabic) script. Only a few survived, which somehow found a place in governmental libraries and museums.³²

The language of Tajiks – Farsi (Persian) was the main official, religious and cultural language in the eastern part of the Islamic world – Central Asia, Afghanistan and Iran. Even in India the language of Tajiks - Farsi was the state, religious and cultural language of many Central Asian Turko-Mongol dynasties and kingdoms in India for hundreds of years during X~XVIII centuries. It was even a state language of the last Turko-Mongol kingdom in Central Asia – the Bukhara Emirate. However, during the rule of Soviet empire in Central Asia this lingua-franca of the eastern Islamic world – Farsi (Persian) suffered a great loss. Its name artificially was changed from Farsi to Tajiki. It was a Soviet policy to divide Tajiks (Persians) from the people of Iran and Afghanistan, with whom Tajiks share the same language, culture and history. In 1929 the Soviet government changed the Persian-Arabic script of Tajikistan into Latin alphabet. And later in 1940 it was again changed from Latin to Cyrillic.

Russification – a major legacy of the Soviet Empire in Tajikistan and other Central Asian republics

³² Кадырбаев, Александр. «Таджики: вехи истории и культурное наследие», Проект Центра изучения Центральной Азии, Кавказа и Урало-Поволжья, Института востоковедения Российской академии наук. URL: <http://www.central-eurasia.com/tajikistan/?uid=269> (accessed November 1, 2013).

There were two kinds of russification in Tajikistan, compulsory and natural process. The compulsory russification of Tajikistan by the Soviets influenced wide aspects of different issues:

- Language and script (Tajiki language, not Farsi (Persian); Cyrillic alphabet, not Persian-Arabic script);
- Perception of the cultural heritage; national identity (Tajik, not Persian-Iranian);
- Family and everyday life, rituals and traditions (Example: Komsomol weddings);
- Dress (Example: the forced burning of the traditional and religious dress of women);
- Ban of national holidays and festivals, like Navruz (Persian New Year), Mehrgan (Persian Autumn Festival), Islamic holidays of Eid-al-Fitr & Eid-al-Adha;
- Forced use of Russian surname's ending ' - ov, - ovich & - ev, - evich, - eva, - evna' to local names (Рахимов/Rahimov, Саидова/Saidova instead of Рахимзода/Rahimzoda, Саидзода/Saidzoda);

Russian language served as the only language for all kinds of official and semi-official documentation. And also it had a status of the language of interethnic and international communication in Tajikistan during the Soviet era until very recently. It was even impossible to send a cablegram in Tajiki. Tajiki and other non-Russian languages were expected to function in very restricted areas, such as in countryside settlements, at homes and for the writing of fiction and poetry. Only during the Perestroika and Glasnost era of the first and last president of USSR

Mikhail Gorbachev on 22nd June 1989 it became possible to proclaim Tajiki (Farsi) the official state language of Tajikistan.

The compulsory russification certainly was a violation of the very basis of the life of Tajik people. It started even long before the Soviet occupation of Central Asia soon after the conquest of the region by the Russian empire. In the other hand, there was a natural process of russification, such as opening of the Russian and world culture to Tajik and other people of the region. So, it would be a mistake to consider everything related to the Russian culture in Tajikistan as compulsory russification. Through Tsarist and Soviet Russia people of Tajikistan adopted highly-developed forms of culture, such as the national opera & ballet, symphony orchestra, modern novels & poetry, painting, architecture and sculpture. And one cannot deny the importance of Russian science and scholarship.

Conclusion

Tajikistan is the only Persian-speaking nation in Central Asia and former Soviet Union. Tajik lands were invaded by many foreign powers, like Greeks, Arabs, Mongols, Turks and Russians. Therefore, the Tajiks have a long history of being included in many empires, kingdoms, dynasties, states etc. The collapse of the Soviet Union gave an opportunity to a revision of the history of Tajikistan and Tajik people. The Tajik and other Central Asian historians of the Soviet era wrote the history of their nations in accordance with the Communist methodology and instructions. The Russian and Soviet authors generally claimed that, the colonial conquest of Central Asia by the Tsarist and Soviet Russia was the free choice of Central Asian nations whose wish was to be united with the great Russia. But, this

conquest and expansion of Central Asia was an important plan and strategy of the Russian empire. Russian empire had political and economic reasons to invade, colonize and 'civilize' this important region. Moreover, it was a so-called "Great Game" and competition between Russia and Britain for occupation of this region.

Among all Central Asian nations, the Tajiks, who are the oldest settled people of the region, suffered the most from the Russian and Soviet policies and legacies. Especially, due to the destruction of the traditional and historical boundaries, political entities and national-territorial division of Central Asia by the Soviet government in 1920s, the Tajiks lost everything: their historical centers of culture and civilization, most of the territories with Tajik population and their main and fruitful lands. Only after long, painful and tragic struggles, Tajiks were given only the mountains and the hills to build their new republic. The Tajik population and community living in Uzbekistan and Afghanistan is much larger than population of whole Tajikistan.

I think it is an important task of the historians of the independent Tajikistan to uncover all details, to deeply analyze and study how Tajikistan was conquered by Russian and Soviet empires. It is not an easy task. However, to achieve this goal the archives and other sources must be accessible and open to scholars. The present and future generations of Tajik people should know the truth about the real deeds of the Russian and Soviet empires in Central Asia.

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Ukraine and Russia: The Legacy of the Imperial Past

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22 years ago Ukraine and Russia became independent states after being Soviet republics for 70 years. The separation of the Ukrainian Republic under Leonid Kravchuk and of Russia under Boris Yeltsin from the Soviet Union and their common alliance against the Soviet President Gorbachev were the decisive factors for the dissolution of the Soviet state. Moscow (the president of Russia) fought together with Kiev (the president of Ukraine) against Moscow (the president of the Soviet Union).

However, the Russian society and the Russian politicians were shocked, when they realized that the Commonwealth of Independent States did not become, as expected, the successor of the Soviet Union, headed by Russia. They were surprised by the fact that Ukraine now was an independent state in reality and not only formally (like the former Ukrainian Soviet Republic). They were not prepared and unwilling to recognize Ukraine as an equal state and a separate nation.

Russian-Ukrainian relations 1991-2013

The relations between Europe's two largest countries (by territory) were from the very beginning difficult. Among the multiple problems I mention

1. The question of Crimea, which had belonged to the Russian Soviet Republic until 1954, when Khrushchev decided that Crimea should be a part of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, though the majority of its inhabitants are ethnic Russians. This had little importance in Soviet times, but became important after 1991.

2. The question of the Russian Black Sea fleet which is closely connected with the question of Crimea. Its harbour Sevastopol' is an important symbol of the Russian nation, a hero-city of the Second World War and a national site of memory of the Crimean War.

3. The question of the approximately 8 millions ethnic Russians living in Ukraine (17% of its population) and of the about 50 % of Ukrainian citizens with Russian as their first language. They are concentrated in the cities of Eastern and Southern Ukraine. The 3 millions Ukrainians living in Russia, the second largest ethnic minority after the Tatars, are almost forgotten.

4. The question of the regional diversity of Ukraine, from Galicia in the West with its mostly Ukrainian-catholic population and its Polish-Austrian past, to Eastern and Southern Ukraine with its primarily Russian-speaking population and its Russia-oriented history.

5. The question of energy supplies (especially gas) delivered or not delivered by Russia to Ukraine and through Ukraine to Central Europe.

6. The question of the place of Ukraine between the European Union and the NATO on the one hand and Russia and its political and economic allies on the other hand. This problem is of immediate importance today: The conclusion of an Association agreement between the European Union and Ukraine is on the agenda of the Eastern Partnership Summit of November 28/29th 2013. Russia wants Ukraine to join the custom's union dominated by Russia and is exerting strong political and economic pressure on Ukraine, while the EU demands from Ukraine political and legal reforms.

7. In general there is an obvious asymmetry in the relations between the two countries and peoples. Although official Russia recognizes the independent Ukrainian state, the majority of Russians does not recognize Ukraine as an equal partner and does not consider the Ukrainians as a full and equal nation. The independent Ukrainian national state is regarded as something provisional, artificial which will hopefully reunite soon with Russia. Russia looks at Ukraine as

a part of its own strategic orbit, while Ukraine has no ambitions to dominate Russia.

8. The problem is complicated by the fact that many citizens of Ukraine do share these views at least in part. Some of them have a sort of minority complex in regard to Russia. Not only parts of Ukrainians, but also many foreigners are thinking Ukraine to be a part of Russia, the Ukrainian language being a Russian dialect. So, Ukraine and the Ukrainians don't have a firm place on the mental map of Europe.

The Russian-Ukrainian relations were especially difficult during the first years of independence until 1996, when a treaty about friendship, cooperation and partnership was concluded, and again during the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko from 2005 to 2010. Since Viktor Yanukovich was elected as the new president in 2010, the tensions were reduced, though not eliminated.

The Russian and the Soviet Empires and Ukraine

Russia has a long imperial past. The Muscovite state became an empire in the middle of the 16th century, when Ivan IV conquered the Khanate of Kazan with its polyethnic and multireligious population. In the 17th century Siberia and the

Eastern part of Ukraine were added, and in the beginning of the 18th century Peter the Great declared Russia being an Empire (Rossiiskaia Imperia), and this remained the official name of the Russian state until the Russian Revolution.

At the end of the 19th Century the huge territory of the Russian Empire extended from Poland in the West to the Korean border in the East, from the coast of the Arctic Sea to the oases and deserts of Central Asia and to Transcaucasia in the South. Its population of 140 millions was composed of 44 percent ethnic Russians, 18 percent Ukrainians, 11 percent Muslims, 7 percent Poles, 5 percent Belorussians, 4 percent Jews and 11 % other groups, among them 26'000 Koreans (0,02 %).

The Russian Empire was a centralized state, based on the concepts of dynasty and ascription to an estate. It applied widely cooperation with loyal non-Russian elites who often were coopted into the imperial elite. Although Russian was the dominant language and Orthodoxy the state religion, language and religion were not the decisive factors for the coherence of the empire. Its elite was polyethnic and multiconfessional. Non-Russian languages and non-orthodox confessions were tolerated, at least until the last third of the 19th century.

Among the more than 100 ethnic minorities the Ukrainians were a special case. They were the most numerous group after ethnic Russians with 13 percent at the beginning of the 18th and 18 percent at the end of the 19th century. Before the middle of the 17th Century almost all Ukrainians had belonged to the Kingdom of

Poland-Lithuania, by that time one of the major players in Central Europe. Since 1654, however, parts of Ukraine were under the protection of the Tsar. The Ukrainian so-called Hetmanate had a wide autonomy until the 2nd half of the 18th Century when it was abolished. Since the end of the 18th century the vast majority of Ukrainians were living in a state dominated by Russians, the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union. Only the West Ukrainians, the so-called Ruthenians, became subjects of the Austrian emperor and their history was separated from Russia until WW II.

Now, the so-called 'Little Russians' were regarded as integral parts of the Russian or all-Russian community. According to this view they consisted mainly of peasants, speaking a strange Russian dialect, and not being able to develop a high culture and statehood. Their aristocracy had been largely Russified already during the 18th century, their written language and high culture had been absorbed by the Russian culture. So, Ukrainians had a low place in the ethno-social hierarchy of the Russian Empire, much lower than the nations with their own nobility and high culture like the Poles, Finns, Baltic Germans, Georgians or Tatars. On the other hand Ukrainians were not discriminated as individuals because they were regarded as Russians. Only when a small group of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the middle of the 19th century started developing a Ukrainian national ideology, tsarist Russia reacted with repressions and prohibited schools and publishing in Ukrainian language. The Russian government reacted so harshly, because a defection of the Ukrainians was regarded as a danger for the Russian nation, which

was imagined as an all-Russian East Slavic nation, consisting of Great Russians, Little Russians and White Russians.

After the Russian Revolution and during the Civil War most peripheral regions of the Russian Empire declared themselves independent states, among them the Ukrainian peoples republic. Until 1921, the Red Army and the new Soviet state succeeded in re-establishing its rule over the majority of the former peripheral regions, among them Ukraine, Central Asia and the South Caucasus. However, only after the Second World War the Soviet Union became again a powerful empire with a size approximately reaching the size of Russia before 1914. With the annexation of Western Ukraine for the first time all Ukrainians were under the rule of a Russian-dominated state. The population of the late Soviet Union consisted of 51 % Russians, 15 % Ukrainians, almost 20 % Muslims, and 439'000 Koreans (0,12 %).

The Soviet state and the Communist party controlled the peripheral territories using extreme violence. All kinds of political movements and national emancipation were suppressed. However, the Ukrainians now were recognized as a separate nation which had its own Soviet republic. During the 1920s the Ukrainian language and culture were developed and many Ukrainians were coopted into the Soviet elite. Under Stalin this policy was reversed, russification of Ukrainians reappeared and the Ukrainians again became subaltern subjects of a Russia-dominated centre. Because of their numerical strength and the strategic and economic significance of their country the Ukrainians were controlled more tightly than most other Soviet nationalities.

Factors of the imperial legacy

1. Russia and the post-imperial space

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, all Union Republics declared their independence. The remaining centre was reduced to the territory of the former Russian Federal Soviet Republic, was deprived of most of the imperial peripheries and lost its status as a super-power. However, Russia is still an empire with its huge territory extending from the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea to the Pacific and with its polyethnic and multireligious population, non-Russians having a percentage of approximately 20 percent.

Many Russians and especially the political elites are suffering from the lost status as a great power. There is a wide-spread nostalgia concerning the tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union, even the totalitarian Stalinist regime. So one goal of Russia's policy is to keep the regions of the former empire under its hegemony. Russia had to recognize that the Baltic states were lost, but Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Belarus and Ukraine are regarded as parts of the Russian orbit.

Again Ukraine is the most important and disputed region. Russia fears a complete separation of Ukraine from Russia and its entrance into the European Union and the NATO. As already in tsarist Russia this is regarded as a threat for Russia's position as a great power and also a threat for the Russian nation,

imagined as an Orthodox all-Russian nation. So, the asymmetry of the relationship persists until today. Russia exerts considerable economic and political pressure to keep Ukraine in its imperial strategic realm and tries to prevent the integration of Ukraine to EU and NATO. As already mentioned, this problem is on today's political agenda.

2. The Orthodox Church

For the Russian Empire the close cooperation of the state and the Orthodox Church was an important factor of legitimation and stability. Today's Russia follows this policy and is using the Orthodox Church as an instrument of its politics of hegemony. In Ukraine this policy is facilitated by the fact that a majority of Ukrainian believers declare themselves as members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church headed by the Patriarch of Moscow. Strong minorities are the adherents of the rival Orthodox Ukrainian church, headed by the Patriarch of Kiev, and the Ukrainian-Catholics, concentrated on Western Ukraine.

3. The hegemony of the Russian language

In tsarist and Soviet Empires the Russian language was the dominant one, although in the Soviet Union the non-Russian languages, among them Ukrainian, were recognized as equals. Until today the Russian language remains the common lingua franca of the post-Soviet space. This is especially true for the Central Asian republics and for Belarus'. Again Ukraine is a disputed battlefield.

In independent Ukraine Ukrainian is the only state language. The government advocates the use of Ukrainian in schools and bureaucracy in order to overcome the subaltern status of the Ukrainian language. However, the Russian language keeps its strong position until today. More than half of the population of Ukraine is using Russian as its main language, although many of them are bilingual. In Eastern and Southern Ukraine Russian remains the dominant language. Only in Western Ukraine the Ukrainian language is deeply rooted.

Many Russians and numerous Europeans and Americans regard Ukrainian as a dialect of the Russian language. The Ukrainian culture is regarded as a peasant culture with beautiful folk songs, traditional costumes and Cossack dances. The Ukrainian literature and music is not taken seriously. On the whole the “backward Ukrainians” have to be “civilized” by Russia, by its language and by its developed culture.

The Russian government often has reproached the Ukrainian government with forceful Ukrainization of Russians and the Russian-speaking Ukrainians by enforcing the use of the Ukrainian language in schools and state institutions. So, under the pretext of the protection of the rights of linguistic minorities it uses the language question as an instrument of pressure and intervention into the internal affairs of Ukraine. In reality, as already mentioned, the Russian language keeps its strong position and the Ukrainian language only slowly recovers from the Russification during the imperial past.

4. The heritage of the Soviet Empire

Russia has declared itself the legal successor of the Soviet Union. This includes the nuclear weapons and this includes imperial ambitions. In the Soviet Union Ukraine and the Ukrainians had been integrated into the Soviet state, society and economy. Many Ukrainians were working in Russia, there were many personal ties and networks with Russians which are not entirely broken by the new state borders. The economies of the republics had been closely intertwined, and Ukraine and the other Soviet republics were dependent on the Soviet centre. The situation did not change fundamentally after 1991. Russia remains the main trading partner of Ukraine and Ukraine is dependent on Russian gas and oil. And Russia uses this dependency as a political instrument. Among the factors of the Soviet heritage one has to mention also a common political culture, common values and ideological traditions.

5. The legacy of the imperial historical narrative and the national Ukrainian narrative

For the national identity of Ukrainians the delimitation from the Russian historical narrative is crucial. Among the building blocks of the Ukrainian nation collective memory may be the most important one. This topic concerns my own field of work as a historian. Therefore I allow myself to go more into details.

In the Russian imperial narrative Russia and Ukraine did have not only a common history, but also a common memory. Ukraine is included into the national-imperial narrative of Russian history from medieval “Kievan Russia” until the Russian Revolution and the common victory in the Great Patriotic War.

The periods, during which Ukraine was part of other states, above all of Poland-Lithuania, are interpreted as times of national and religious oppression. They only interrupted the common history. The so-called “reunifications” of Ukraine with Russia in 1654, 1793 and 1939/44 are regarded as cornerstones of this Russian national vision. For Russian nation-building the inclusion of Ukraine and the Ukrainians was and is of crucial importance.

In the Ukrainian national narrative Ukrainian history is separated from Russian history, beginning with medieval Kievan Rus', regarded a Ukrainian state, and ending with the independent Ukrainian state, with highlights in the Cossack Hetmanate of the 17th century and the independent Ukrainian Peoples' republic of 1917 to 1920. The Ukrainian nation had to suffer under Russian rule and had to fight against Russia until the final goal of its history, the independent national state, was attained.

Ukrainian national ideologues stress the fact that the majority of the Ukrainian lands belonged during more than four centuries to Poland-Lithuania and only two centuries to Russia respectively the Soviet Union. In this period, from the 14th to the 18th Centuries, Ukraine became part of the central European space and was influenced by Western ideas, by renaissance, humanism, reformation, German municipal law and Jesuit schools. Ukrainians emphasize that the first stage of the Westernization of Russia originated in Ukraine, especially in the Kiev Academy, founded in 1632, which was the first institution of higher learning in the East-Slavic world. Graduates from the Kiev Academy became prominent

Westernizers in Russia since the middle of the 17th Century and even more during the reign of Peter the Great. So one can speak of a Ukrainization of Russia in this period. According to the Ukrainian national narrative Russian and Soviet rule separated Ukraine from the common European world, and only independent Ukraine now re-establishes the traditional ties with Central Europe. This argument is used in support of the integration of Ukraine into the European Union and against closer relations with “non-European Russia”.

Although the most important Ukrainian national myth, the Cossacks, is not exclusively Ukrainian, because there were also Russian Cossacks, only the Ukrainian Cossacks in 1648 succeeded in creating their own political body. According to Ukrainian national thinking the Cossack tradition and the central European influences during Polish rule made Ukraine and the Ukrainians more European and more democratic than Russia and the Russians.

This image is contested, of course, by Russia and the Russian national ideologues looking at the Ukrainians as uncivilized peasants or anarchic Cossacks who have to be ruled and civilized by Russia which brings European culture to Ukraine.

Thus, the different and competing historical narratives are an important element of the imperial legacy. During the last years we can speak of a war of memories between Russia and Ukraine. It was accelerated by the national politics of history of the former President Y

Yushchenko and the increasing imperial tendencies in Russian politics.

I will mention briefly four examples .

My first case is the question of the heritage of the medieval Kievan Rus'. This first political body in East-Slavic territory was among the leading powers in Europe at the beginning of the second millennium. Medieval history seems to be far away from contemporary politics. However, if we look at other countries, e.g. on the Balkans, it becomes evident that many of the political disputes concern medieval or even ancient history, the question of the heritage of medieval states and high cultures. Among numerous examples I mention the discussions concerning the heritage of ancient Macedonia between Macedonians, Greeks and Bulgarians, the controversies about Transylvania between Hungarians and Romanians or the controversies between Serbs and Albanians concerning Kosovo or between Armenians and Azeris about Nagorno-Karabakh.

So, the disputes between the Ukrainian and the Russian national narratives concerning the heritage of Kievan Rus' are by no means an exception. In the history of the construction of a Ukrainian national narrative and national consciousness, this was even one of the crucial issues. In the work of Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyj, the father of modern Ukrainian historiography and first President of Ukraine in 1917/18, the question of the Kievan heritage is the most important founding myth of the Ukrainian nation. Hrushevs'kyi and his work have been condemned in

Soviet times and are canonized in Ukraine. Today, the portrait of Hrushevs'kyi is represented on the 50 hryvni note, and the portraits of the Kievan princes Volodymyr and Yaroslav on the 1, respectively the 2 hryvni-note.

In a famous article, published in 1904, Hrushevs'kyi protested "against the usual scheme of Russian (East Slavic) history" and stated that Kievan Rus' was an exclusively Ukrainian state, while Russia and the Russians emerged only later in the forests of the North as a mixture of Finno-Ugric and Slavic elements. The heritage of Kievan Rus' according to Hrushevs'kyi was taken up by the princes of Galicia-Volynia, then the grand Princes of Lithuania and later the Ukrainian Cossacks. According to Hrushevs'kyi there were almost no traces of Kievan Rus in Russia until the end of the 17th century. This interpretation of the heritage of Kievan Rus' is contested by almost all Russian historians and politicians who claim the Kievan heritage at least partially for Russia. So, the heritage of medieval Rus' is of primary importance not only for historians, but also for politics.

In September this year the Russian President Vladimir Putin declared at the Valdai Forum:

"Ukraine, without a doubt, is an independent state. That is how history has unfolded. But let's not forget that today's Russian statehood has roots in the Dnieper; as we say, we have a common Dnieper baptistry. Kievan Rus' started out as the foundation of the enormous future Russian state. We have common traditions, a common mentality, a common history and a common culture. We

have very similar languages. In that respect, I want to repeat again, we are one people”.

<http://valdaiclub.com/politics/62880.html>.

My second example is the role of the Ukrainian Cossack Hetman Mazepa who defected from Russia in 1708 in order to join King Charles XII of Sweden.

During the last five years there were fervent discussions about the historical role of Hetman Mazepa. He may be the historical figure polarizing opinions in Russia and Ukraine more than any other. In Russia, he has the reputation of the archetype of a traitor, who broke his oath to Peter the Great and fought together with Charles XII. against Russia at Poltava where they were defeated in 1709. In Russia disloyal Ukrainians are qualified as ‘Mazepists’ until today.

In Ukraine, Mazepa is widely regarded as a national hero. You can have a look on him on the 10 hryvni banknote. According to this narrative Mazepa tried to liberate Ukraine from “the Russian yoke” in order to attain an independent Ukrainian State.

The discussion about Mazepa as many of the other discussions is not only one between Russian and Ukrainian historians, journalists and politicians but it takes place also inside Ukraine. So, there were disputes about the erection of monuments of Mazepa and Charles XII in Poltava. After long discussions the

monuments, as far as I know, have not been built. The monument of the victor Peter the Great remains the only one on the battlefield of Poltava. The discussions about Mazepa, Peter and Poltava inside Ukraine and between Ukraine and Russia are aggressive and express antagonistic, exclusive interpretations of the past. The late Viktor Chernomyrdin, then Russian Ambassador in Ukraine, posed the question: "What would you think if we would erect a monument for Hitler in Stalingrad".

My third example is Holodomor.

Holodomor is the Ukrainian name of the terrible famine of 1932/33, man-made by the politics of Stalinist Soviet Union, which caused the deaths of up to 5 millions people, among them 3 to 4 millions Ukrainians. In post-Soviet Ukraine it is officially interpreted as an anti-Ukrainian genocide directed above all against the Ukrainian nation. Today, it represents one of the crucial elements of the national conscience of Ukrainians uniting almost all parts of Ukraine and delegitimizing the Soviet past.

In Soviet times the famine was taboo and was never mentioned. Today, in Russia the famine is recognized as a terrible disaster, but Russian historians contend that as many of the victims of Holodomor were living outside of Ukraine, especially in Russia. The Russian president Medvedev in a letter to president Yushchenko harshly criticized "the nationalist interpretations of the mass famine of 1932/33 in the USSR, calling it a genocide of the Ukrainian people". This accusation sounds strange. Although Russia may consider itself as the official legal

successor of the Soviet Union, Russia is not responsible for the Stalinist crimes. Among the perpetrators and victims there were Ukrainians and Russians. The common heritage as victims of the Stalinist terror even would have the potential for common Russian-Ukrainian views on the past. However, the interpretation of Ukrainian history is not the affair of the Russian President, but of the Ukrainians themselves.

My last example is the interpretation of the Second World War. In Russia the victory in the so-called Great Patriotic War is the most important element of the collective memory and national consciousness. So, official Russia as well as Russian historians react harshly to all attempts of revisionism concerning this topic.

In Ukraine, especially in its Western part, there are activities for a re-evaluation and rehabilitation of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent army (UPA), both organizations having fought against the Soviet Union. Numerous members of these organizations collaborated with Nazi Germany, participated in the extermination of the East European Jews and committed massacres among the Polish population of Volynia. This revisionism culminated in the posthumous awarding the title of hero of Ukraine to Stepan Bandera, the leader of the OUN, and to Roman Shukhevych, the leader of the UPA, by the former President Yushchenko. In Ukraine, the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union was partially substituted by the Ukrainian national liberation war against the Soviet Union. Official Russia protested against this revisionist re-interpretation of the Great Patriotic War. In 2009, the Russian president founded a

presidential commission which has to fight against historical falsifications, above all against the Ukrainian re-interpretation of WW II. In Russia the expression “banderovtsy” together with “mazepintsy” is used for a negative designation of nationalist Ukrainians or sometimes even all Ukrainians. However, the anti-Soviet interpretation of WW II is not shared by a majority of Ukrainians. Especially in the East and the South Ukraine OUN and UPA have a bad reputation.

The divided memory over Bandera and the OUN shows that things are not so simple. Russians and Ukrainians have not only one history and one narrative and not a single memory, but many histories, narratives and memories. The historical memory is divided not only between Russians and Ukrainians, but there are different memories inside of Russia and Ukraine. This is probably more important for Ukraine, where Russian and Soviet narratives are deeply rooted in the minds of many Ukrainian citizens, than for Russia. This is obvious for Ukrainians in the Eastern and Southern parts of the country on the one hand, and Western Ukrainians on the other, whose national narrative fundamentally distinguishes itself from the Russian one. In Russia there are also distinctions and disagreements between imperial, national and liberal memories and histories, but to a lesser degree than in Ukraine. The national and imperial narrative seems to be shared by a great majority of Russians.

A short summary

The imperial legacy is one of the crucial factors for an understanding and an explanation of the post-Soviet space. This is especially true for Ukraine and for Russian-Ukrainian relations. It is undeniable that Ukraine and Russia have a special relationship. They are closer entangled than other nations by the common religion (Orthodoxy), by a partially common East-Slavic culture, by long periods of a common history and parts of a common memory. Most Ukrainians over centuries were parts of the Russian Empire and the Russia-dominated Soviet Union. So, the Russian-Ukrainian relationship was and is still characterized by an obvious asymmetry, a hegemony of Russia over Ukraine. Many Russians regard Ukraine as part of the Russian orbit and partially of the Russian nation. Independent Ukraine tries to liberate itself from the Russian hegemony, while Russia wants to keep Ukraine in its sphere of influence. Russia uses the Orthodox Church, the traditional dominance of the Russian language and the ethnic Russians and the Russia-oriented Ukrainians in Ukraine as instruments for its hegemonic policy. Ukraine uses the Ukrainian language and the Ukrainian historical narrative with its national myths of liberty and its closeness to Europe against the Russian hegemony. The on-going Russian-Ukrainian war of memories is of special interest. History is used and abused as a political weapon, and the struggles about the heritage of Kievan Rus', the interpretation of Mazepa, the Holodomor and WW II are not academic ones, but crucial elements of politics.

So history matters.

I am convinced that it is impossible to understand and to explain what is going on in Russia and the other post-Soviet states without taking into account the imperial heritage of the tsarist Empire and of the Soviet Union. The ongoing struggle over hegemony in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus between Russia on the one side and the European Union and the NATO on the other, is focused on Ukraine, the second largest country in Europe by territory which has great strategic and economic importance. So far this year Russia again has begun to exert considerable pressure on Ukraine in order to keep Ukraine in its own strategic orbit and to prevent the integration of Ukraine into the European Union. The outcome of the struggle over Ukraine will have a decisive impact on the imperial ambitions of Russia and on the future development of the post-Soviet space and of Eastern Europe.

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Session III

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Are the Legacies of Soviet Union Related to the Formation of Eurasian Union?: Implementation, Impacts, and Implications

Lee, Sang Joon

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I. Introduction

The dissolution of the USSR added a considerable number of nations to the list of transition to democracy and market economy. From the very beginning of transition, the experiences of economic turmoil and the failure of reform have a profound influence on these countries constitute experiments in the creation of new forms of integration. In reality, the intention of integration process in the former Soviet Union countries has been observed since the beginning of the transition, and it has been the focus of attention of various interested groups, including politicians, business elites, political scientists, economists, sociologists and other professionals.

Many of regional integration was proposed such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Union State of Russia and Belarus (USRB), the Single Economic Space (SES), the Customs Union of the

EurAsEC (CU) and a number of regional unions in Central Asia. Even though some of them are currently very active, the others were not implemented because the political and business elites of the CIS countries are unable to realize their gain and to promote regional integration.

When the idea of Eurasian Union was proposed by Vladimir Putin in October 2011, unlike the early period of transition, the political willingness is very ambitious and mutual trade and investment among CIS countries is high compared to the 1990s. It is recognized not only an engine to enhance economic cooperation among the countries of CIS region but also institutional basis for strategic “vertical” power of Russia because the creation of a Eurasian Union can be seen as the result of Russian attempt to revive the strengthening of regional integration in the post-Soviet space.

The starting point for an evaluation of the possible formation of Eurasian Union, Russia’s economic influence therein, and should be an account of the legacies and economic pillars of USSR. This is important for some reasons. First and foremost, the nature and strength of economic ties established during the Soviet era explain the vulnerability to economic collapse of the CIS economies at the start of the 1990s. Second, Russia’s economic influence during the transition phase is likely to depend, at least in part, on the ability of the CIS economies to overcome inherited economic distortions which may have become embedded as a result of economic dependence during the Soviet era.

The development of relations between the CIS nations has been recurrently declared a priority of the Russian foreign policy. However, in terms of consolidation of the post-Soviet economic and political space the outcome of more than a decade of the CIS functioning could hardly be considered successful.

After the dissolution of the political center of the former Soviet Union, the new independent states failed to keep alive the integrated economic complex created in the Soviet times. This turned to be a leading factor of degradation of the technologically most advanced industries and deep economic crisis that enveloped the whole area of the former Soviet Union. In addition, given the perceived risk of the Russia's "empire ambitions" renaissance the new independent states strived for their sovereignty mostly through drifting away politically from their neighbor. Within this context both the process and outcome of transformation policy in Russia proved to be far from early expectations and as yet provide no ground to reckon it an example for the other post-Soviet nations.

Finally, one should admit indifference of the Russian public state bodies shown to the development of the CIS integration in the 1990s. This serves an evidence of at least their misunderstanding the role and significance of integration for the prospects of the national economy and political stability in this region crucially important to Russia.

In general, within the first decade followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union the Russian policy experienced self-contradiction and the shortage of consistency. This led to the implementation failure of the declared goals of the CIS nations' regional integration under the aegis of Russia. One could illustrate such a discrepancy between declarations and factual priorities using quantitative indicators of economic relations between Russia and the CIS nations. These show that the latter's share in the total external trade turnover of Russia currently amounts to less than 20% contrasted to 65% in 1990 while that share in the foreign investment flow makes up less than 1%.

II. Implementations

Trade Regime

After the dissolution of the USSR, Russia and other CIS countries have been building new legal and institutional systems which enables to take steps to liberalize and integrate their economy into the global system. Many of these countries has decreased tariff barriers and quantitative restrictions on imports and exports, progressively reduced licensing requirements. As a result, the share of foreign trade as a percentage of GDP in many countries became larger than the beginning of transition. These countries also want to diversify their foreign economic relations, it means, cut down their trade on unreliable markets and increase the number of partners willing to invest and participate in the structural transformations of their economies.

However, most countries of the former CIS countries became developing countries instead of desirable transition to the developed countries. The free trade regime was introduced to the heavily distorted economic system, which expected to set fair price structure so that products and services adjust to world market prices. And there is still deep economic interdependence between the CIS countries. Russia, as the main supplier of energy resources to post-Soviet countries, continues to play the key role in the system of relations between post-Soviet countries. In particular, the restoration of the Russian power leads to significant its involvement of its relations with other CIS countries.

Some of trade regime between Russia and other countries of CIS is attributed institutional isomorphism. Trade regime has been liberalized, but companies from outside of CIS countries face a number of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers when exporting to Russia and other CIS countries. Russia and Ukraine case have shown why the CIS trade regime is quite different from other countries. Currently, Russia joined the WTO on August 2012, that liberalizes trade with the rest of the world and create new opportunities for WTO member countries' exports and investments. However, even after becoming WTO membership, Russia and other CIS countries continue to maintain a number of barriers with respect to imports, including tariffs and tariff-rate quotas, discriminatory and prohibitive charges and fees, and discriminatory licensing, registration and certification regimes. This situation has become more complicated due to the entry into force on January 1, 2010, of the Customs Union (CU) among Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. In addition, the larger the customs union the more the collective monopoly power it has in commanding a high level of protection.

Similar problem was found in Ukraine's trade regime. Although Ukraine's MFN tariff rates are relatively low, there are many concerns about how the Ukraine State Customs Service is determining and/or calculating customs values. Customs valuation decisions are not published, reducing transparency. Importers who have sought to appeal the assigned customs valuation have been instructed by the Ukraine State Customs Service to have the government from the country of the product's origin provide verification. Importers complain that valuation and classification disputes with the Ukraine State Customs Service lead to extensive and costly delays in trade.

<Table 1> WTO Membership

	Country	Accession Date
WTO Member Countries	Republic of Kyrgyz	December 20 1998
	Georgia	June 14 2000
	Moldova	July 26 2001
	Armenia	February 5 2003
	Ukraine	May 16 2008
	Russia	August 22 2012
	Tajikistan	March 2 2013
Non-WTO Member Countries	Azerbaijan Belarus Kazakhstan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan	n.a.

Source: www.wto.org

The first reason is the legacy of USSR. Soviet power has attempted to impose by conquest or coercion, so that some elements of institutional isomorphism have observed in the form of the state of CIS which were on subject territories of USSR. There was a considerable element of path-dependency even though external forces with global standards for the quality of governance and the soundness of economic policy have pressured institutional convergence of CIS

toward Western countries. For instance, the CIS countries have to build an entirely new customs regime. In 1992 many of the CIS countries concluded several specific multilateral agreements to facilitate trade and transit, among which the agreement on Standardization, Metrology and Certification. Russia and the other CIS countries started to conclude bilateral agreements and these agreements followed the Russian format, with a free trade agreement and accompanying trade and cooperation agreements. The main reasons of institutional similarity come from responding to similar pressures of an institutional environment, the governments make similar choices to achieve legitimacy in the trade regime and reduce the uncertainty, which gives rise to isomorphism by reducing variety.

The second reason of similar trade regime is the market failure and imperfect competition in the CIS countries. Several of the CIS countries are located not only physically but also institutionally far from their major potential trading partners, and moreover many CIS countries' export commodities heavily concentrated in oil and natural gas, cotton, minerals or processed metal, in which there are imperfect competitions that are less likely to force and follow global standard rule. The landlocked countries of Central Asia have little pressures to improve export competitiveness because of the distance to markets and the lack of access to seaports. In addition, the governments of the CIS countries have restored control over raw materials and energy export, therefore trade policy does not correspond to market preferences.

State involvement in the economy is pervasive and the foreign trade and investment regimes relatively restrictive after global crisis of 2008. However, the CIS countries have quite different basic salient of political-economic system, in which a small number of elites control and narrowed interest group of business world block the market efficiency and do not allow the changes of existing trade

regime radically. Furthermore, diversifying industrial structure drives government intervention into the economy. Indeed, in response to the crisis, Russia and the other CIS countries reinforced the role of the state instead of restructuring the existing system which heavily relies heavily on the natural resources. Even though the CIS countries tried to diversify away from resource dependence, the political-economic system and the industrial structure of the CIS countries makes implementing liberalization of trade policies quite difficult. The governments of resource-abundant countries, such as Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan, have substantially expanded its role in the economy due to the industrial diversification strategy which provides the budgetary support many incumbent firms in the strategic sectors. In these circumstances, private and foreign investors may find it difficult to compete with state corporations that are subsidized and market forces alone cannot create favorable conditions for the trade reform. As a result, many CIS countries' trade regime does not follow global standards and rules but do stimulate competitiveness of non-commodity items, especially high-tech industry and/or labor-intensive industry.

The third reason of institutional convergence comes from the numerous attempts to create the economic integration within the CIS countries, which were not very successful and now considered to be practically impossible. During the early period of transition (1992-1993), Russia has concerned to improve the relations with the West, which originated from the concept of escaping "Russia's high burden" to former Soviet republics even though Russia's trade predominantly was with other CIS countries; almost 90 per cent of all trade was within the CIS. At that time of transition, the Soviet economic ties were considered as main source of inefficient redistribution. Dissolution of old economic

connections was supposed to improve economic performance of all CIS countries. However, most of all CIS countries suffered from economic recession, and the reintegration of the post-Soviet space was also considered to be seriously since the very beginning of transition. To list some of important reintegration efforts in CIS region as followings:

- 1) In 1991, the Central Asian Commonwealth with five members (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) was organized, although the organization merged with the EurAsEC in 2006.
- 2) In 1994, the CIS FTA was created covering all the CIS countries, although by 2009, only eight of its members (Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine) remained, with the other CIS countries (Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) becoming observers.
- 3) In 1996, the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) was established by Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus. In 2001, these three countries as well as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a treaty to organize a common system of water and energy use.
- 4) In 1996, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was formed among China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and further in 2001 Uzbekistan joined the group as well.
- 5) In 2010, the Eurasian Custom Union was established between Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus, which is intended to be the first step towards forming 'A Common Economic Space': a common supranational system of trade and tariffs connecting all CIS countries. However, Ukrainian trade policy has tilted more towards the EU, so whether it will eventually join remains open to question.

6) Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan joined the WTO in 1998, as did Russia in 2012.

The CIS countries have signed a large number of bilateral and regional trade agreements with each other, while the share of CIS trade in total trade gradually declined in the 1990s. An attempt to revive linkages between production networks of the Soviet Union was major motivation of the proliferation of preferential trade agreements among the CIS countries which was supposed to secure market access within the CIS as market institutions, including payments arrangements, and exchange rate convertibility, were not yet properly working, and, in this context, barter arrangements became an important component of trade among CIS countries.

The free trade regime of CIS countries was based on about 110 bilateral and multilateral preferential trade agreements that contained exemptions from the free trade regime. However, while it reduced the number of tariff and non-tariff restrictions on imports, most preferential trade agreements did not give opportunities for CIS countries because of 1) limited and unclear the coverage and exemptions and exceptions on an ad hoc basis, 2) failed to protect from various discrimination effects, 3) a mechanism to allocate rents in these arrangements provide, 4) the high costs of enforcing rules of origin, 5) absent of institutions for the regional trade agreements, 6) the lack of harmonization in levying the value-added tax (VAT).¹

¹ Russia acknowledged that about 40% of trade between CIS countries with which Russia had bilateral FTAs was in goods not subject to a free trade regime at that time.

<Table 2> Bilateral Free Trade Agreements in the CIS

	AR M	AZE	BEL	GEO	KAZ	KYR	MO L	RF	TAJ	TUR	UKR	UZB
AR M	-			1998	2001	1994	1993	1993		1996		
AZE		-		1996	1997		1995	1992		1996	1995	1996
BEL			-				1993	1996	1998		1996	1993
GEO				-	1999		1998	1994		1996	1996	1995
KAZ					-	1995	1995	1992				1997
KYR						-	1995	1993			1998	1998
MO L							-	1993		1993	1995	1995
RF								-			1993	1992
TAJ									-		1993	1992
TUR										-		1996
UKR											-	1994
UZB												-

Sources: WTO

Despite that an attempt to reintegrate CIS countries was not successful, the past experiences of numerous trade disputes and provoked suspension of the agreements on particular issues has envisaged implementation of Custom Union and, eventually, Eurasian Economic Union, implying deeper economic integration and cooperation beyond the harmonization of external tariff rates. Currently, Russia is still maintaining the position of the most important trading partner

within the CIS and its share of CIS trade. Russia has changed the trade regime and the CIS regional integration processes have been facilitated by the establishment of the Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Eight CIS countries - Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and Ukraine - which accounted for over 90 % of mutual trade within CIS, signed a new FTZ Agreement signature of the CIS FTA on October 18, 2011. Recently, in June 2012, the FTZ Agreement was signed by Uzbekistan. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan continue negotiations to join the Agreement.

Intra-Regional Trade and Energy

Since independence, the CIS countries as a regional bloc underwent a reorientation of trade partner with a high degree of variation and imbalance in its trade patterns. Most CIS countries have seen a considerable increase in the share of trade on GDP (see Table 3). Many of them started to play a more active role in international trade and establish trading relations outside the CIS. The EU is becoming the main trading partner for most CIS countries, according to WTO statistics, accounting for a major share of exports from Armenia (45%), Azerbaijan (57%), Belarus (46%), Kazakhstan (45%), Moldova (51%), Russia (59%) and Ukraine (32%). As a result, there was a steady relative decline in intra-regional trade's share of total CIS foreign trade although volumes increased. In 1990, merchandise trade between the former Soviet republics accounted for 77% of all trade, falling to 34% in 1994.

<Table 3> Trade, Tariff Rate, Logistics Performance Index

	Trade (% of GDP)		Tariff Rate (MFN, Weighted)	Logistics Performance Index
	1991	2012	2011	2012
Armenia	100.9	72.3	2.96	2.38
Azerbaijan	86.9	74.3	5.64	2.42
Belarus	70.2	158.7	4.39	2.78
Georgia	58.9	96.2	1.84	2.85
Kazakhstan	149.3	78.5	6.95	2.60
Kyrgyzstan	72.0	136.2	4.09	2.49
Moldova	66.4	128.1	3.50	2.44
Russia	26.3	51.6	6.25	5.99
Tajikistan	65.4	73.9	8.07	2.03
Turkmenistan	65.5	123.1	-	2.24
Ukraine	50.1	110.3	2.41	2.69
Uzbekistan	74.4	64.4	10.04	2.25

Source: www.worldbak.com

The share in intra-CIS trade is uneven and that of large economies is relatively small. Trade with other CIS countries accounts for only 14-15% of Russia's total foreign trade revenues, whereas in countries such as Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan the ratio may be about 40%. Moreover, the product

composition of the CIS' foreign trade is concentrated: exports are dominated by raw materials and imports by finished goods. The structure of exports, of which fuel accounts for about 56%, differs significantly from global trade structure, where both exports and imports are dominated by manufactures (70%), with fuel accounting for 15%. This indicates that, unfortunately, the CIS countries have a comparative advantage in fuel market. Intra-regional trade of CIS countries is subject to the border effect and other international barriers to trade (see Table 3).

By 2001, the geographical structure of CIS trade changed dramatically and the CIS countries have a different share of CIS trade in their overall trade. In detail, Belarus and Moldova continued to export primarily to the CIS market, which accounted for about 60 percent of their exports. At the other end, Azerbaijan and Russia had only 10 percent of their exports going to the CIS countries, while the majority of other CIS countries were in the 20–30 percent range. Therefore, the share of intra-regional trade of all trade declined around 20-25% in CIS countries.

Russia's trade linkages with CIS still exist, though they seem to have weakened since the 1998 crisis, and the trade linkages are determined by the economic growth in CIS countries. In reality, real growth of non-oil imports in Russia is strongly associated with CIS GDP growth and the effect is much more pronounced for oil importing CIS countries.

In this regards, Russia was the single most dominant trading partner for the majority of the CIS countries both in terms of exports and imports. It accounted for over 70 percent of the total imports from the CIS in the case of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Ukraine and for over 50 percent for such countries as Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Therefore, trade with the Russia becomes an important determinant of growth in some CIS countries.

Intra-regional trade without Russia is found to be insignificant for growth in the CIS region, implying that the Russia remains the main economic partner for the majority of CIS countries. This implies that both CIS countries and the Russia would benefit from further strengthening economic cooperation, especially through trade intensification.

Besides, during the Soviet period, USSR was the main sources of energy for all other European communist countries which enjoyed the semi-autarkic inward orientation with low energy cost. However, the import-substitution strategy was the main reason of under-specialization in communist economies. In addition, the enterprises tended to produce internally as large a share of intermediate inputs in the overall climate of shortage and low reliability of outside supplies, which was likely related to imports from each other country as little as possible.

**<Table 4> High Resource Intensity of Communist Economies in Comparison:
The Case of Energy and Steel**

Countries	Energy intensity in kg of coal equivalent per US \$ 1000	Steel intensity in kg of steel consumption per US \$ 1000
Austria	603	39
Finland	767	40
France	502	42
Germany	565	52
Italy	655	79
Norway	1,114	38
UK	820	38

USSR	1,490	135
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
Source: Winiiecki (1988).

Russia provides low price of oil and natural gas to CIS countries even after the dissolution of Soviet Union (see Figure 1). Until now, Russia's energy policy is critical for CIS countries because energy is a key sector with important implications for growth and macroeconomic stability in several CIS countries. Moreover, Russia is the most important buyer of gas from Caspian and Russia has strong bargaining power vis-a-vis the individual countries of Caspian region because most of the region's oil and gas pipelines pass through Russian territory which constructed in the Soviet period.

However, Russian influences have decreased as new pipelines constructed, as a result, the Chinese are building gas pipeline from Turkmenistan and oil pipeline from Kazakhstan. The Caspian and Central Asian countries, especially Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, have substantial gas reserves and could be a source of diversification of EU gas supplies. In this context, Caspian energy is also important for Russia's energy balance.

The economic and financial crisis has led to adjust the Russian energy market significantly because of the slowdown in the country's economic growth. Russian gas export prices to CIS countries were relatively low compared to European market before 2011.

<Figure 1> Export Price for Non-CIS and CIS countries



Source: CBR

<Table 5> Central Asia’s New Gas Pipeline

Section	Length	Capacity
Kazakh section: Uzbekistan-China	1,300 km	4.5 Gm3/yr for the 1st phase / reaching 40 Gm3/yr by 2013
Turkmen section: Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan	188 km	export capacity 30 Gm3/yr (2009)
Uzbek section: Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan	530 km	export capacity 30Gm3/yr (2010)
TAPI: Trans-Afghan and the CentGas pipelines	1,680 km	30 Gm3/yr (Planned)

Source: Catherine Locatelli and Sylvain Rossiaud (2013), p. 18.

Investment, Finance and Remittance

The trend of cross border financial transactions and labor-remittance flows between Russia and other CIS countries have become increasingly important compared to the traditional trade links. The largest (mostly Russian) transnational corporations are increasing investment activity in the post-Soviet space. Russian outward investment increased rapidly in the 2000s. Russian investments are concentrated primarily in the CIS countries and EU. Russian multinational corporations became dominant investors in the CIS region (see Table 6). Available empirical evidences show that Russian outward direct investment is likely to be based on the cultural and institutional familiarity, geographical proximity a high level of economic interdependence, and common language (Guiso et al., 2009).

<Table 6> The geography of accumulated direct investment of CIS countries as at late 2010

Recipient country	Accumulated direct investment from (\$ million)						% of Total in 2011
	Russia	Kazakhstan	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Armenia	Kyrgyzstan	
Armenia	1,753	10	0	0	0	0	34.9%
Azerbaijan	17	8	-	0	-	0	0.3%
Belarus	5,702	39	0	-	0	0	44.2%
Georgia	290	162	2,578	0	0	0	32.6%
Kazakhstan	2,036	-	26	1	0	0	2.2%
Kyrgyzstan	106	257	0	0	0	-	28.4%
Moldova	387	1	0	0	0	0	30.4%

Russia	-	891	44	156	6	0	0.2%
Tajikistan	264	44	0	0	0	1	31.1%
Turkmenistan	173	1	0	0	0	0	1.0%
Ukraine	4,333	166	3	29	0	0	7.0%
Uzbekistan	991	127	0	0	0	0	16.5%
CIS Total	16,052	1,706	2,661	186	6	1	-
% of Total	4.4%	10.9%	46.0%	90.7%	7.2%	50.0%	-

Source: EDB Integration 2012, p. 131, UNCTAD 2013, p. 173, author's calculation.

According to the EDB Integration Report 2012 (see Table 6), a relatively measurable Russian FDI outflow can be observed in Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Armenia in specific sectors of energy, ores and metals, and telecommunications, that is, in the CIS, resource-based economies benefited from continued natural-resource-seeking FDI from Russia. Accumulated investments in major foreign subsidiaries of a number of oil and gas and telecommunications companies in the CIS region exceeded \$1 billion. At the end of 2008, the fuel complex accounted for 29.1% of FDI, and communication and information technologies for 19.1%. Shares of non-ferrous metal complex (10%) and finance sector (8.6%) were roughly comparable. Utilities, wholesale and retail trade, transport sector and steel complex also stood out. Other sectors still play only a small part in inward FDI.

One of main motivation of FDI by Russian companies is to internalize or control the whole value chain internationally. For instance, by acquiring refineries and sales outlets abroad, Russian oil companies have achieved better control over

foreign demand, processing oil in their own refineries and selling the products via their own petroleum stations. In the oil sector, the infrastructure assets are of vital importance and Russian oil companies have gained control over several strategic infrastructure assets, including seaports and oil pipelines delivering crude oil and products to the European and the US markets. In this regards, motivation of political and foreign policy is one of main reasons of Russia outward investment for using economic and energy resources as a means to advance foreign policy goals as the Russian energy resources serve as a considerable foreign policy tool in the CIS.

It is explained that an important driver of the investment link between Russia and other CIS countries is oil prices, as sustained oil booms result in the accumulation of sizable financial surpluses and savings in and remittance outflows from Russia. Unlike investment link, financial market linkages among CIS countries are weak because of the small size of non-Russian CIS economies, along with their relatively illiquid, less-developed financial systems.

At the end of the USSR, the share of direct subsidies from Russia in the budgets of the republics was large. In Central Asia for example, the share varied between 20% in Turkmenistan and 45% in Tajikistan. Even in 1992, technical credits continued to be substantially important to the CIS countries. In Kazakhstan, Russian subsidies amounted to 25.1% of GNP, in Kyrgyzstan 22.6%, in Tajikistan 42.3%, in Turkmenistan 67.1%, and in Uzbekistan 69.2%. For the first seven months of 1993, they were worth 48.8% of GNP in Kazakhstan, 23.9% in Kyrgyzstan, 40.9% in Tajikistan, 45.7% in Turkmenistan and 52.8% in Uzbekistan.

<Table 7> External Debt of Selected Countries of CIS

Country (year)	Total External Debt	% of GDP	Total Bilateral Debt to Russia	Bilateral Debt to Russia as a % of Total External Debt	Averages Annual Debt to Russia a % of Total External Debt(1994- 2003)
Kyrgyzstan (2003)	1,518	79%	188.4	12.4%	19%
Tajikistan (2003)	1,031	66%	299.7	29.1%	29%
Armenia (2001)	905.1	43%	99.0	11.0%	14.8%
Georgia (2002)	1,858.1	55%	156.9	8.4%	11.4%
Ukraine (2003)	10,693.0	21%	1,681.0	15.7%	22.6%

Source: Carmen Amelia Gayoso Descalzi (2011), p. 99

Another important financial link among CIS countries is remittances from Russia. Remittances were supposed to an important source of growth in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Moldova. Unfortunately, empirical analysis has not strongly support the view that remittances spur investment and growth in CIS countries. This is partly because bilateral remittance flows from Russia to other CIS countries are observable only for recent years, in particular after 2006. Interestingly, Migrant remittances result in consumption booms in receiving CIS countries which may explain growth spurts.

<Table 8> CIS Countries' Trade with Other Countries and Resources & Remittances

	Trade with (share, %)			Share of Mineral Resources in Exports (%)	Money Remittances from Russia (% of GDP)
	CIS	China	EU		
Armenia	30	9	31	31	10.1%
Azerbaijan	16	3	42	95	1.5%
Belarus	55	4	25	29	0.3%
Kazakhstan	26	17	47	76	-0.3%
Kyrgyzstan	52	15	8	8	21%
Moldova	36	6	45	1	13.4%
Russia	15	9	47	66	-0.5%
Tajikistan	-	34	6	4	38%
Turkmenistan	-	21	20	71	0%
Ukraine	40	5	29	13	1.4%
Uzbekistan	-	16	16	24	6.7%

Source: EDB Integration 2012

III. Impacts & Implications

More than twenty years after independence from the Soviet Union, the CIS countries have tried to develop deeper links with western market economies. The volume of trade between Russia and the CIS countries was diminishing during the period from 1991 to 1999. Among the CIS countries, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Moldova are most tightly associated with Russia by foreign trade, while trade relations with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia are far less intense.

Although trade has been significantly reoriented away from the Soviet Union and the direction of these links has seen some change, CIS countries still trade less than predicted given their income levels and geographical location. It has been argued that the main reason for the lack of integration is the weakness of economic institutions and considerable divergence of institutional systems of CIS countries. Moreover, the lack of regional cooperation, particularly in the Caucasus and in Central Asia, greatly increases transport and transit costs to world markets and is an obstacle to international integration.

Notably, at the same time, it has been introduced the various forms of economic cooperation among the CIS countries and its process is going on trial and error basis. CIS countries' economic links with Russia appear to still be strong, whereby remittance and financial channels have taken on an increasingly important role. Our analysis has shown that, no matter what the lack of good bilateral trade agreement between Russia and the CIS countries, Russia's position was crucial in the developments of the other CIS countries as Russia resumed its position of good CIS partners at favorable prices and financial flow at the minimum engagement of the region. Initially, the Russian Ruble zone allowed the trade deficit countries to pass the bill to Russia, but even after the Russian Ruble

zone, it was continued to work as another form of subsidies. In detail, Russia continued to subsidize the other CIS member states as it still exported energy to its neighbor countries.

Putin suggest the idea of a deeper regional economic integration within the CIS countries. Custom Union in November 2009 has provided an important momentum for deeper regional integration. Unlike the Soviet Union, Eurasian Economic Union pursues the political disintegrated while economic integrated as Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan, which are the leading countries of integration, regarding the CU as the largest moves in market integration.

Another reason for the integration of markets in the CIS countries is related to the decline of intra CIS-trade over time throughout the CIS countries. Indeed, while the absolute volume of both imports and exports have been on the rise in the CIS, the relative importance of CIS trade to each CIS member has decreased. Obviously, energy is a key sector which enables the CIS countries more integration and an increase in trade, and many of CIS countries still relied on the output of Russia and other oil-rich countries.

In regards to other functional areas of integration, the balance of payments and budgetary revenues of Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and Baltic countries strongly depend on the volume of Russian transit through their territories. Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus receive significant foreign currency remittances from their nationals who have jobs in Russia.

In conclusion, trade regime is very similar and is tendency of institutional isomorphism which reflected the process of economic integration into world economy as path-dependent from Soviet legacies, while other trade and financial linkages are structured and motivated by economic incentives with profit

maximization. In fact, it will be failed to explain the processes in the post-Soviet space without both motivations of integration. In this regards, Eurasian Economic Union thus limit economic gains for the CIS region.

The opposite point of view emphasizes that the CIS countries have the similar political system, thus the formation of national institutions tend to be similar process. In these circumstances, although political leaders follow the rule of rationality, they are likely to strongly support the integration within the frame of political regime as much as integration depends on the political willingness. In case of deeper integration, we should consider at least three points. The first is joining of Ukraine into Union. The second is asymmetry of development and economic size of the CIS countries. The third is overcoming the drawbacks of cross-border infrastructure. It is clear that the long-term sustainability of integration processes could be ensured by lively and successful bottom up integration – the mutually beneficial flows of goods, services, labor and capital. Without this consideration, the integration will be the source of under-specialization and inevitably generated greater price distortion which was observed in the Soviet Union.

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Making Inner Muslim Frontier in Russia's Caucasus: Hybrid Imperial Legacy from a Regional Perspective

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Imagined geography of modern Caucasus in the Soviet and especially imperial time remains a highly confused and contested topic given competing historical narratives proposed by rival regional political actors. Approaching it any researcher encounters a number of influential clichés. This mountain region at the intersection between Europe, Russia and the Middle East is often considered a natural barrier on the way of Russian imperial advance towards the Muslim world (Bennigsen Broxup, 1992). Moreover, as Thomas Barrett has justly pointed out, historiographies of the colonial age and “cold war” period exaggerated the role of resistance, conflict, and religious division in the Caucasus frontier of tsarist and Soviet Russia (Barrett, 1997: 228). A lot of impressive and riveting stories were told about devastating colonial and contemporary wars for the Caucasus, movements of its Muslim mountain peoples for their religious and national liberation from the imperial oppression.

At first glance post-Soviet Caucasus seems to have almost nothing in common with the tsarist Viceroyalty. Its shape and legend of regional map mostly date back the twentieth century. Surely, modern mapping of the region took place eventually under Soviet national reforms of the second third of the twentieth century. However, the legacy of pre-Soviet (and sometimes even pre-Russian) regional geography is still explicitly felt as it concerns borders of nation-states, republics of the Russian Federation and their administrative units, identities, settlement and population movement. The chief argument I attempt to verify in this paper is that modern Caucasus as such was constructed under the Russian imperial and Soviet rule.

This paper examines a distinct case of such imperial construction. It is about the emergence of inner Muslim frontier in Russia's North Caucasus from the mid-eighteenth to the first quarter of the twentieth century. I want to examine this case from a regional and to some extent micro-historical perspective to understand how the Russian/Soviet conquests, military indirect rule, exile, colonization, and Orientalist ideology jointly resulted in mapping foothill and mountain territories that form at the moment the core of North Caucasus and South Federal Districts of the post-socialist Russian Federation. The study is based mostly on primary textual and cartographic data gathered in state and private archives (mostly in Dagestan, Georgia, Moscow, St. Petersburg and abroad Russia) during the last twenty years as well as on existing literature (see: Tsutsiev, 2006).

This research was guided by the following set of questions:

What did the imperial inner frontier mean in the imperial context of Russia's Caucasus? How far is it felt in the region after the empire and its Soviet successors has gone away?

Where, how, wherefore, and by whom was this frontier made? What can be said of "vertical" mountain character of regional territories, power and society in the imperial framework?

What was the influence of forced displacement of Muslim mountaineers known as muhajir movement, and Russian colonization on the emergence of this regional inner frontier?

What imperial identities appeared in the area under study during the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries? What can be said of their hybrid character?

What was the role of fears and hopes on territories and peoples Russia acquired in the Caucasus? How did they influence on shaping the area and its relationship with the rest of imperial and early Soviet Russia?

What can be said of interregional parallels as it concerns Caucasus and regions of Russia and other European empires at the colonial age, such as nineteenth-century France's in Algeria?

A secondary, but important remark. One should not exaggerate continuity as it concerns the Russian imperial rule over Caucasus during the last two centuries. Such an exaggeration is possible given claims of contemporary political elite in post-Soviet Russia to present themselves legal successors of tsarist and

Soviet empires. Moreover, after the tsarist empire was rehabilitated in the 1990s, Russian presidents and regional authorities used to imitate imperial institutions of governance and colonial visions of anti-Russian Muslim resistance in the Caucasus (cf. Jersild, 2002: ix). This witnesses the importance of imperial political and ideological legacy that might be discovered in the background of contemporary political projects and actions. However despite all nostalgia for the tsarist/Soviet past, empire is gone away and no politician is able to restore imperial rule so in its former political centers as in the Caucasus borderlands.

•MOUNTAIN FRONTIER ON-THE-MOVE

Initially Russian tsars and emperor had been entitled sovereigns of different Caucasus lands quite nominally, much earlier than real colonial conquests began. In 1587 tsar Feodor Ivanovich became ruler of Kakheti, in 1589 “sovereign of Circassian and Mountain princes’s lands in [Greater] Kabarda”, his successor Boris Feodorovich Godunov was entitled in 1605 “sovereign of Iberian lands in hands of Kartali and Georgia’s kings” (see: Filiushkin, 2006). These titles meant but temporary protection of such or such local princedoms by the tsars. Later, to protect communications with Russia’s territories conquered in Transcaucasia in the 1780s-1820s, the tsars started political annexation of the North Caucasus. The region was already recognized under the Russian control by international treaties of Kuchuk Kainarji (1774), Turkmenchay (1828), and Adrianople/Edirne (1829) concluded between the Russian empire, Ottoman Turkey and Iran defeated by the Russian in a series of wars in Transcaucasia and the Balkans. By that time most Transcaucasian vassal princedoms dependent on Iran and Turkey were gradually

absorbed by the empire. The way from Southern Russia to the Georgian kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti passed through Daryal valley where the so-called Georgian Military Road was constructed by the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Until the end of the Russian conquest in the 1860s relationship of mountaineers' tribes (and even Cossack communities like Grebentsy) to the Russian empire oscillated from loyalty to Russian fortress governors (komendant), pristav (from 1769) officers and other imperial military authorities commissioned by the tsars to open hostility. It is noteworthy that before the mid-eighteenth century many mountaineers' tribes, village leagues and Muslims khanates resorted to empire's protection entering into federal agreements with the tsar's military commissioners. For instance, such a treaty with Muslim khanates and village leagues of the East Caucasus and Dagestan was set up in the fortress of Georgievsk in December 1802. Having promised not to attack Russian or Georgian territory or to give support to Russia's enemies, the mountaineers were given the right to farm and herd animals on Russian landholdings and to trade in Russian cities and outposts. They paid yearly tribute to Russian military authorities (there were three offices of the General Quartermaster of the Caucasus Army with responsibility for the mountaineers), but otherwise they were left to deal with their own internal affairs through either their customary laws ('adat) or shari'a. This state of early imperial order in the region was aptly called by Sean Pollock "empire by invitation" (Pollock, 2006).

However already by the 1770s-80s building of the fortified state border known as the Caucasus Line made empire to exile mountaineers (as well as Nogay nomads in the North-West Caucasus) from territories occupied by fortresses and walls, what often turned former allies into open enemies of the empire (*nemirnye gortsy*) who fled to Circassian, Chechen and Dagestani mountain valleys outside of the Line still free from the Russian control. From behind the Line “not pacified (*nemirnye*)” mountaineers conducted raids to the Russian subjects and imperial settlements. From their part, the Russians made punitive forays to the mountains destroying whole villages and evicting rebelled population from its native lands. In 1817-64 these hostilities took the form of protracted Caucasus wars what in turn led to the spread of the Caucasus Line through the whole region. In 1792-1803 solid border Line stretched from Taman to the Russian fortress of Kizliar. Nineteenth-century Caucasus wars lasted about half a century. Even longer the region was constructed in the framework of imperial fortified boundary known as the Caucasus Line (*kavkazskaia liniia*) whose building had begun in the 1760s and went on till the end of Caucasus wars in the 1850s. Piedmont lands of the area were gradually freed from their pre-imperial population and included in the Line.

Trying to restrict political mobility of mountaineers and Cossacks living on both sides of newly established border, imperial military authorities introduced the so-called *billet* (internal-passport) system. From the end of the 18th century, any person passing through the Caucasian fortified line had to carry passport this *billet* issued by Russian officers and local Caucasian rulers under the Russian command. In the first half of the 19th century, the passport regime, attaching

mountaineers to the land of their village communities, was reinforced. Highlanders were prohibited to provide with lodging any guest having no billet. They were also to inform the Russian governors about unauthorized guests of their neighbors. As Yermolov's recommendations to the Kabarda Temporary Court put it: "If any Kabardian is found guilty for receiving a guest who arrived from the lands on the other side of the rivers Kuban and Terek as well as from the [territory] of the Nazranis [Ingush] and wasn't registered by the Russian governor, or if this guest had no billet, [the host] will be penalized; in the case the host provides unlawful people or abrek bandits with lodging the former will be severely persecuted in accordance with the Russian laws" (TsGA KBR, f. 23, op. 1, d. 48, vol. 1, ll. 11, 11 rev.). Later a similar billet system was imposed over Chechnya and Dagestan. The hard inner-passport regime remained in force for the Caucasian mountaineers till the end of the 19th century.

Conducting wars and building fortified border the empire constructed a very flexible if not nomadic inner frontier between governorates (gubernii) of South Russia and its new lands in Transcaucasia. Its borders, territory and even capitals traveled from one place to another almost permanently. Political center of Russia's Caucasus migrated accordingly to successes or defeats of the Russian troops. For the most of the eighteenth century it was in the town of Astrakhan in the Lower Volga region, then moved to a Cossack village (stanitsa) named Ekaterinograd after Empress Catherine II (1785-90, from 1822 again the village of Ekaterinogradskaia), then back to Astrakhan and again to the North Caucasus Steppe where it was located at first in a small fortress of Georgievsk (1803-22) and later to that of Stavropol (1822-44). Eventually the capital of Russia's Caucasus was

transferred further to the south to the town of Tiflis annexed by the empire already in 1801. It remained the regional centre till the fall of the imperial rule in 1917 (Bobrovnikov, Babich, 2007: 84-85). Accordingly the territory of Caucasus borderlands (Kavkazskii krai) at first included mostly Steppes to the south-west from Astrakhan and gradually moved to the Greater Caucasus mountain range and to Transcaucasia. In the 1840s Stavropol lands became of a separate governorate and left administrative borders of Russia's Caucasus. Initially the Caucasus frontier was constructed in the framework of the Caucasus line. Cossacks were attached to the Line it while in its Right (Western) flank "pacified mountaineers" were often resettled in enlarged mixed villages between Cossack stanitsas.

It is noteworthy that most today republican centers and other Russian towns in the area such as Krasnodar (imperial Ekaterinodar), Vladikavkaz, Mozdok, Grozny, Buynaksk (imperial Temir-Khan-Shura) emerged from former Russian fortresses built in the Caucasus Line between the 1760s and the 1850s. Some of their names, as Thomas Barrett rightfully noted, were given either in honor of the tsars like Ekaterinodar named after Empress Catherine II or in order to threaten antagonist mountaineers during the Caucasus wars. For instance, Grozny literally means in Russian fortress "terrible" for empire's enemies, and Vladikavkaz has an imperative meaning "Let us take possession of the Caucasus!" Before the Russian conquest there were no towns in the North Caucasus with the exception of Derbent at the margins of East Transcaucasia. In the second half of the nineteenth century fortresses gradually lost their military meaning acquiring status

of Russian towns. The urbanization of the region happened later, under the Soviet rule in the second half of the twentieth century.

Under the tsarist rule Russia's Caucasus was gradually constructed in the framework of Viceroyalties (*namestnichestvo*), the first of which was established by Catherine II in 1785 from Astrakhan governorate with addition of lands inhabited by the Black-Sea Cossacks (*Chernomortsy*) and previously related to the Tavrida Province centered in the Crimea. Thus the Empress broke interregional connections of governance inherited from the Crimean Khanate whose vassals lived along the Kuban valley in North-West Caucasus, and attempted to introduce a new imperial one. After Catherine's death Paul I, who hated all his mother did, abolished the first Viceroyalty in 1796. The second institution under the same name appeared during the Caucasus wars in 1844 and this time was centered in Tiflis. Viceroyalty as the Caucasus Line was not regional particularity. Such forms of fortified border and autonomous order were wide spread in the imperial borderlands so Western as Eastern where the other fortified border Lines as well as Viceroyalties were established in the same periods.

At the top of both Viceroyalties were put representatives of the Russian higher military elite from St Petersburg. Viceroy reported directly to the tsarina/tsar and thus concentrated an enormous power in his hand. The first Viceroy was Prince Pavel Sergeevich Potyomkin (1743-96), a relative of the empress's favorite Prince Potyomkin-Tavrichesky. Count Mikhail Semenovich Vorontsov (1782-1856) was appointed head of the second Viceroyalty. In 1856-62

this office was held by Prince Alexander Ivanovich Bariatinsky, the victor over the famous Imam Shamil and personal friend of Alexander II. His successor Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich (1862-81) was the emperor's younger brother who had even more influence among the highest imperial elite in St. Petersburg. Following the murder of Alexander II in 1881 Mikhail Nikolaevich left Tiflis for St. Petersburg where he chaired the State Council, and Viceroyalty was abolished. In 1881-1905 Caucasus was ruled by High Commissioners (Glavnonachalstvuiushchie grazhdanskoi chast'iu). However with the beginning of the first Russian Revolution Viceroyalty was restored in 1905 and dissolved together with the empire in February 1917.

Military patterns of governance dominated the North Caucasus until the late 1920s. Despite of a well known negative attitude of the Soviet authorities to the Russian imperial legacy they maintained status quo of the late imperial order in which civil and judicious power in provinces was commissioned to military officers originated from the hereditary Muslim military elite. Transcaucasia passed to general civil rules of the empire already in the 1830s-60s with the establishment of governorates (gubernii) which substituted former Christian and Muslim princedoms under the Russian protectorate. But the North Caucasus was still governed by military officers. Remote mountain lands in Dagestan, Chechnya, and Circassia were subjugated only in the end of the Caucasus wars, in 1859-64. There were still "not-pacified" mountaineers expelled from their piedmont lands where Russian frontier fortresses were built in these alpine areas in the end of the second third of the nineteenth century. They conducted against the Russian troops guerilla

warfare under Islamic slogans of jihad. While “pacifying” mountaineers’ tribes the empire had to keep in the region a numerous Caucasus army including auxiliary local militia of allied mountaineers’ tribes and principalities. Its commanders-in-chief were also charged with civil administration of local indigenous peoples. Such a difference between the administration modes of governance characterizes a very mosaic and hybrid character of Russian imperial and early Soviet order in the Caucasus.

•ORIENTALIST FEARS OF AND APPROACHES TO MUSLIM MOUNTAINEERS

The end of wars and conquest in 1859-64 did not free Russian society and especially high imperial officials serving in the Caucasus from fears of mountaineers’ wildness and ferocity they considered romantic but dangerous for the Russian order and society introduced in the region. The idiom of “predatory mountaineers” (*gorskie khishchnichestva*) was common in accounts of nineteenth-century travelers, traders and missionaries who passed this region and frequently have been taken it for the den of robbers. In this respect Russia did not present somewhat unusual. This distinct Orientalist cliché, as Suzan Layton has shown in her brilliant study of Russian Orientalism in classical fiction and Caucasus politics (Layton, 2005; see also: Bobrovnikov, 2005), was shared by all the European colonizers of that period. Moreover, Russian classical fiction created a new symbolic story of a good Russian prisoner who was said to compassion to savage mountaineers subjugated by empire but to have been kidnapped by them, martyred in prison and eventually freed and return to the civilized world. From the first appearance in Pushkin’s work (1822), and development of its plot by

Lermontov and Tolstoy, the Caucasus prisoner cycle has moved across different literary genres and survived to post-Soviet time in a number of fiction movies (Grant, 2009: 94-102).

To “pacify mountaineers”, the tsarist military administration applied during the Caucasus wars the so-called “siege policy (politiku stesneniia)” attempting at establishing a barrier between submissive (mirnye) and independent (nemirnye) mountaineers (Gammer, 1994: 45-49). At the same time, military authorities tried to eradicate blood feud as an illegal criminal practice which was against the law of the Russian empire. Believing that the independent (nemirnye) mountaineers’ elite were a natural antagonist of the Russian citizenship, General-Protector Alexei Petrovich Yermolov attempted to deprive them of the former legal privileges. A bill prohibiting resolving blood revenge cases according to the local customary law passed in Kabarda in 1793. From this time onwards, the cases that previously caused ‘blood revenge’ were now settled according to the Russian Penal Code first in the Highest Frontier Court in Mozdok and later in the Kabarda Temporary Court established by Yermolov in 1822 (Butkov, 1869: pt. 2, 263-265, 267).

After the wars a number of attempts were made to demilitarize mountaineers. Till the 1930s mountaineers were not subjected to military conscription, although they could serve in the Russian army on a voluntary basis (“Kopiiia prikaza nachal’nika shtaba Kavkazskogo okruga, f. 545, op. 1, d. 1755). Irregular militia troops of village communities and noblemen were partly abolished first in Kabarda, and later in Chechnya and Dagestan. Deprived of all

usual sources of income, these princes and nobleman had to choose between the Russian military service and outlawed activities. On the one hand, the above mentioned administrative measures allowed imperial Russia to submit all the Caucasus, and unify its administration. As a result, by the end of the 19th century, a social and criminal situation in the area became much more stable than in a turbulent period of the great Caucasian war. Turned into Russian subjects, the mountaineers had to adapt to the Russian imperial context. On the other hand, the foundation of social banditry has been formed. It is not without coincidence that many famous 19th century abrek-bandits like the Kabardian prince Tau-Sultan Atazhukin originated from this social class (Bobrovnikov, 2007: 256). At the same time a serious disarmament of mountaineers appeared to be impossible. Imperial authorities had no means to implement it. Moreover, rumors of possible disarmament might cause new possible uprising in the mountains what made tsarist officials to abandon this plan. This project was carried out only in the early Soviet time, namely in 1925-26 when the Soviet power disarmed mountain settlements in Chechnya and Dagestan having terrorized civil population with the help of modern heavy artillery and aviation. This operation facilitated implementation of collectivization and other socialist reforms in the former inner mountain frontier of the empire.

Following the Caucasus wars in imperial Russia there appeared another Orientalist phobia whose roots also date back to the colonial conquest of the region. There occurred a gradual re-evaluation of Islam. The earlier confessional policy reflected government's indifference to knowledge of Islam. The imperial vision of Islam shifted once more. There appeared fears of an Islamic threat. Encountering

Muslim resistance in the borderlands, the government became especially anxious about Sufism. The Russians mistakenly took the jihad state set up by imams of Mountain Dagestan and Chechnya for a militant Sufi network. They regarded different Sufi orders and their lodges as branches of a “single anti-Russian movement”. The Muslim resistance of the North Caucasian mountaineers against Russia became famous under the name of Muridism (Bobrovnikov, Kemper, 2012: 98-99). Fears of Sufism provoked a number of anti-Sufi decrees and persecutions. Despite the pacifist character of his teaching, the Qadiri Sufi sheikh Kunta-hajji was arrested in Chechnya in 1863 and exiled to Nizhnii Novgorod province, where he died in 1867. His followers were dispersed by Russian troops in the village of Shali. Kunta-hajji’s movement was labelled “Zikrism” after the Sufi practice of loud prayer (dhikr) performed by his followers in contrast to ‘silent dhikr’ adopted in the North-Caucasian branch of the Naqshbandiyya brotherhood.

Fearing Muslim resistance, Viceroy Prince Bariatinsky proposed to undermine the influence of Muridism in the North Caucasus by strengthening customary law at the expense of shari’a. Since Islam and the Islamic legal tradition played central roles in sustaining resistance to the empire during the war, tsarist officials had also to decide on an approach to dealing with the religion and its jurisprudence and with Muslim spiritual elites in the region. The tsarist government itself was not of a single mind about how best to approach Islam in the Caucasus mountain frontier. Imperial officials were split into two factions. The first insisted on the cooption of Muslim religious elites into the state body as it had been made under the reign of Catherine II with the establishment of official

Muslim hierarchy in the framework of Orenburg Muhammedan Spiritual Assembly (OMDS, 1788-89). They argued for and creating new muftiates in annexed Muslim regions. The opposite faction discouraged the creation of muftiates, pointing out the danger of concentrating power in the hands of 'anti-Russian fanatically minded mullahs', as, the influential War Minister (1861-81) Dmitry Alexeevich Miliutin put it once (Arapov, 2003: 227). The adherents of the second faction supported the hands-off policy requesting "disregard of the local Muslim clergy". The first approach was backed up by the powerful Ministry of Internal Affairs that attempted to spread its network through the Department of Spiritual affairs for Foreign Faiths over all the Muslims of the empire. The second approach was more popular in the War Ministry, which supervised Muslims in the borderlands. The situation actually was even more complicated. Both factions existed in each ministry and among different functionaries in provinces.

Officials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs launched an ambitious program aiming to turn different groups of the Muslim religious elites ('ulama') into a unified imperial estate (soslovie). Given the absence of Church and Clergy as such in Islam, imperial lawmakers 'invented' them in the framework of previously established muftiates. Mosque congregations were turned into "parishes" (prikhod) modelled in the Orthodox fashion. Like Orthodox priests in a bureaucratized hierarchy of the Holy Synod, loyal Muslim 'ulama' were coopted into the imperial administration at village, district and provincial levels, which granted them the privileged status of 'Muslim clergy' (musul'manskoe dukhovenstvo). They were exempted from corporal punishment and military draft. Muslim religious titles were included in the Table of ranks and divided into two

separate groups (for more details see: Bobrovnikov, 2006: 213-214). The number of regional Muslim hierarchies in the empire multiplied. Two more muftiates were created in Tiflis on 5 April 1872.

These were two Transcaucasian Muhammedan Spiritual Boards of the Shi'i and Sunni Creed (*Zakavkazskie magometanskije dukhovnye pravleniia shiitskogo i sunnitskogo uchenii* or ZMDP). Like the other muftiates they were charged with religious, legal and educational affairs of Muslims. Contrary to the Orenburg Assembly, the ZMDP had a more hierarchically fashioned collegial organisation that established a clear chain of command running from the Russian viceroy to a local mosque. At the top of the hierarchy was a Spiritual Board, headed by a mufti for the Sunnis or a sheikh-ul-Islam among the Shi'is. They ruled over provincial majlises, which in their turn supervised district (*uezd*) qadis, teachers and students. The lowest level of religious administration was a Sunni mullah (and a Shi'i *pish-namaz*) administering a Friday mosque, teaching in a Muslim school, if any, and composing communal registers (*metricheskie knigi*) of parishioners (Arapov, 2001: 165-169, 210-247. See also "*Instruktsiia*", 1873: 28-32). Religious personnel of the Sunni and Shi'i muftiates shared certain privileges and institutions. "Muslim clerics" and their children were exempted from corporal punishment, the military draft and tax payments. The senior clerics were paid by the Russian administration, while the lower ones were subsidised by their congregations. Only Sufi leaders and their adherents, who were supposed to share an anti-Russian position, didn't receive privileged legal status and were ascribed to the "lower classes".

In the North Caucasus “disregard of the Muslim clergy” prevailed like in governorates of Russian Turkestan conquered by the Russian Caucasus Army in the 1870s-80s. Mullahs and other members of the Muslim religious elites were not recognised. Fearing possible Muslim uprisings, the authorities put pious waqf endowments, holy places and Sufis under the state control. Wandering dervishes were prohibited to preach and recite prayers (dhikr) in the towns. All practising Sufi masters, holy graves and mosque schools were registered and became the subject of police supervision. They had no legally defined status or privileges. Tsarist officials feared that an institutionalized Islamic system in the North Caucasus would be dangerous for Russian control, especially in the wake of Shamil’s success in constructing state structures based on Islamic law and using them as a basis for resistance to Russian rule over such a long period. Therefore in the North Caucasus, after extensive deliberation and internal debate, the Russian government ultimately did not allow the extension of an official Islamic hierarchical organization (Blauvelt, 2010: 221).

The reaction of Muslim populations towards the new conceptions and methods of the imperial government was mixed. Their attitudes varied from open hostility to collaboration and to adaptation to imperial rule. The majority of Muslim native population accepted new imperial order and took part in the creation of inner frontier society in Russia’s Caucasus. At the same time persecutions of Sufis provoked a number of local uprisings. In 1877 spontaneous revolts broke out throughout Dagestan and Chechnia. Jihad was declared and an Avar Mohammed-Hajji, a son of the popular Naqshbandi sheikh ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Sughuri (1792-1882), was elected to the office of imam. Similar revolt was led in

1898 at Andijan in Russia's Turkestan by a Naqshbandi sheikh Mohammed Ali known as Dukchi Ishan. These rebellions were defeated by Russian troops, while their leaders were sentenced to death or exile in Inner Russia. Though crushed, they strengthened Russian anxieties about Islam and especially Sufism.

•ALIENS' MILITARY TERRITORIES UNDER INDIRECT RULE

A much more unified and fixed system of imperial governance was established throughout the North Caucasus after the end of wars in 1859-64. Mountainous frontier retained its military character but at the same time the conquest as such successfully completed. Different native and resettled populations eventually became imperial subjects. The major change was connected with the abolishment of the Caucasus Line in 1860. There was no more need to keep fortified state border in the region that was turning into inner provinces of the empire. To control mountaineers Russian fortresses remained in the mountains and the foothills as well as military garrisons. Military units of the border Line were turned into provinces (oblasti) under military rule. Left flank became the Dagestan province while the Right flank and Center were divided into Terek and Kuban provinces. In the 1920s the last one served the basis of Soviet Krasnodar while the Terek province was first turned into federative Mountaineers' Republic but soon divided into a number of bi-national Soviet autonomies. In addition, the Terek and Black-Sea (Chernomorsky) troops of the Caucasus Line Cossacks were transformed into the Terek and Kuban Cossack Hosts. They were granted lands in the Terek and Kuban provinces where Russian colonization was restricted as to the lands of native Muslim mountaineers. While imperial and early Soviet authorities believed

that they maintain local native traditions in the Caucasus mountains they in fact constructed a more mosaic and hybrid territorial and social order.

In mountain districts the so-called "military native administration" (voenno-narodnoe upravlenie) was planned by Bariatinsky and carried out by Mikhail Nikolaevich in the 1860s-70s under the authority of the Caucasus Mountain Administration, which was later renamed the Caucasus Military-Native Administration (Kavkazskoe voenno-narodnoe upravlenie). Muslim mountaineers were granted legal and administrative autonomy under the supervision of Russian military officers. They were allowed to preserve their customs ('adat), in particular village community and customary law courts. The Bariatinsky's project to substitute Islamic law by local customary law appeared to be quite impossible and even harmful for stability of the Russian rule. By this reason, mixed oral and mountain courts (mahkama) were created that followed principles of 'adat, shari'a and partly imperial laws. Without abolishing 'old' Muslim religious elites, the authorities turned village imams into functionaries known as mullah or efendi and reduced their number to one per 200 people. This administration was distinct from the system of civil administration (grazhdanskoe upravlenie) that was implemented in more settled parts of the region, such as the bigger towns and cities of the North Caucasus and most of the Transcaucasia, and it had the ultimate aim of eventually bringing the areas currently under military administration into a unified civil administration. One main goal of this military-civil administration was to create a unified and centralized administrative organization in the conquered territories. Another goal was to weaken the authority of the Muslim spiritual leaders of the village communities and to create a secular administration

that had authority among Muslims while fulfilling the decisions of the central authorities. The long-term intention was to “civilize” the mountaineers and reduce their “fanaticism” and aggressiveness, thus making them passive and peaceful citizens of the empire (Bobrovnikov, 2002: 147-175).

A number of reasons, chiefly the massive exodus of Muslims to the Ottoman Empire, prevented the government from introducing this model all over the Caucasus. It was established only in Dagestan, as well as Zakataly, Sukhum, Batum districts and Kars province in Transcaucasia. Elements of the military peoples’ administration model were used in the north-western Caucasus and the Transcaspian Province (present Turkmenistan) conquered by the Russian Caucasus Army and belonged to Caucasus Viceroyalty till 1899. From the 1860s till the mid-1920s the whole area remained under military administration. In the late imperial period the Terek and Kuban provinces included districts (okrug) inhabited by native mountaineers under military rule and divisions (otdely) of the Terek and Kuban Cossack Hosts. In Dagestan and partly in the Terek province new administrative division was sometimes based on hierarchies existed in the imamate of Shamil. The sections (naibstva, Arab. nahiyat) of districts maintained names and borders of imamate wilayas. In some cases local headmen (na’ib) from Shamil’s administration remained in place. The mountain administration also undertook fundamental changes in the organization of territorial units in order to break up and control previously existing clan and kinship structures, and it restricted local forms of self-government by supporting new local elites and placing them under the oversight of the Russian military.

Tenets of military-native and pure military administration had parallels in the colonial administrations of other imperial powers of the period, particularly in French Algeria and in the British colonies in India and the Middle East; policies in all three places may themselves have been inspired by Ottoman policies of indirect rule in the 16th–18th centuries. Files of imperial archival collection witness that Russian officials carefully studied the French and British experience during their preparations for the reforms of the 1860s (Bobrovnikov, 2002: 100-101). In Algeria in particular, as in Dagestan, the coastal areas were declared “civil territory” and governed under the laws of the metropole, while the mountainous areas populated by Muslims were governed by the military officers of the so-called *Bureaux arabes*. There too, French military administrators attempted to undermine shari’a law by supporting customary law, which as in the Caucasus “was codified by the regime in order to compel the mountaineers to follow their own ‘custom.’” (Jersild, 2002: 95). Moreover, the French broke “pacified” Arab and Berber tribes into small territorial units of districts and village communities. However, the Russian approach was not simply copied from these forms, as in many cases the Russian approaches predated those of the British and French. The latter also closely followed and studied events in the Caucasus, and in some cases they took the methods of compiling and using traditional law from the Russian experience in the Caucasus: obviously, it is more correct to speak of a shared experience of colonial administration among the three main colonial powers of the 19th century (Bobrovnikov, 2010).

In the context of late tsarist Dagestan military native administration meant the emergence of a hybrid network of judicial institutions based on principles of

legal pluralism. Although the military communal administration claimed to apply only customary law, in reality village verbal courts set up in 1860 practiced both 'adat and shari'a rules together with elements of the Russian civil code. The use of Islamic law was legalized in the field of personal status and family laws. The movement for judicial reform using shari'a courts as its backbone played an important role in the first decade following the Revolution of 1917. As soon as the tsarist rule fell, there appeared numerous projects pursuing the political rebuilding of the North Caucasus on the Islamic legal foundations. The shari'a justice took an important place in all of them. It was expected to grant the "rule of law" and democratic freedoms proclaimed at the first phase of the Revolution in 1917-18. In Civil war in the North Caucasus all adversary parties actively played the shari'a card. Blaming their political opponents as violators of the basic Islamic rules they tried to seize power in the region. It was with the help of local Islamic leaders, that Bolsheviks at last came to power. (Bobrovnikov, 2009).

The colonial conquest and following state reforms formed legal status of native mountaineers in the Caucasus. It is noteworthy that they were not only inferior to the populations of the imperial core but also exempt from some general rules of empire. Till the 1930s mountaineers were not subjected to military conscription, although they could serve in the Russian army on a voluntary basis ("Kopiii prikaza nachal'nika shtaba Kavkazskogo okruga, f. 545, op. 1, d. 1755). Mountaineers related to the military native administration had a special local jurisdiction. In Dagestan and Zakataly in Eastern Caucasus they could have legal proceedings and be summoned before a judge only on the territory of their native

province or district, even the crime was committed in another district or province where this system acted. In some degree their position within the Russian imperial polity was close to the Russian peasants after the peasant reform. There was a special legal term denoting such new imperial subjects in the borderlands, that of "aliens (inorodtsy)", though this very term was substituted in Russia's Caucasus by that of natives (tuzemtsy). Caucasus mountaineers of different faiths (so Muslims, as Christian, and even so-called Mountain Jews of Dagestan and Georgia) belonged to this specific group of Russian imperial subjects from the conquest till 1917 (for more details see: Bobrovnikov, 2012). With the fall of the tsarist rule their legal status also changed. Together with other Orientalised aliens they were turning into early Soviet ethnic minorities. But this topic belongs to another period and requires a special examination. As such North Caucasus inner frontier emerged in the Russian imperial context and disappeared with remains of imperial framework in the 1920s.

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Nation Building From Within the Empire: A Case of Armenia

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Armenia offers the scholar a rather interesting case of nationbuilding that unfolded within the Russian imperialist project. Of course, every case of nationbuilding is unique. Armenia's case is special in that it differs in many ways from the situation in neighboring countries and other post-Soviet and post-Communist states.

It is a known fact that many future political nations evolved and matured within an empire. Specifically, within the Russian Empire and the USSR, we find numerous examples of national symbols, myths and ideologies being formed, and national intellectual elites emerging from amongst farming or even nomadic communities. A multitude of nations did not just mature but originated in the USSR, each getting all the attributes of a future political entity – from a name to an alphabet of its own.

Nationbuilding in the Russian was common but extremely uneven. By virtue of history and geography, Russia incorporated a great variety of communities. Arguably, Russia was the most diverse continental empire. The

Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire were far more homogenous. As for maritime empires, such as France and Great Britain, they did not need to establish one political entity that would embrace their entire territory. For this very reason, Britain and France could afford to introduce some forms and elements of democracy “at home” – that is, in the metropolitan states. There was no need to spread democracy to the colonies. As a result, both Great Britain and France pulled out of their colonies with relative ease. At least, the identity of the French and the British did not suffer very much in the process. Contrastingly, in Russia, the most primitive hunters and gatherers, nomadic tribes roaming in steppes and deserts, ancient agricultural nations and booming urban communities all coexisted within the same territorial empire.

Within this range, the Armenians stand out in the sense that this ethnic group had existed long before the Russian Empire extended over the lands that the Armenians populated. Back in the Middle Ages, the Armenians already had high culture, established religious practices, religious and secular literature in their own language (Grabar, or Classical Armenian), historiography and complex historical narratives.

Armenians had had various forms of statehood since antiquity. However, most of them were lost or disappeared very early in history, at least in the territory, known as Eastern Armenia, which became part of the Russian Empire in the 19th century, in which the 20th century Armenian states were established and in which the modern Republic of Armenia is situated. Some forms of statehood survived in some parts of Armenia. Specifically in Eastern Armenia, the longest-surviving forms of statehood existed in Nagorno-Karabakh in the form of semi-independent

princedom. However, an independent Armenian state had not existed for centuries. Armenian aristocracy was very scarce, numbering just a few families. Consequently, the role of the elite was played by the business elite (businessmen) and by the intellectuals, artists and similar.

By the 19th century, when it became a constituent of the Russian Empire, Armenia had lost any tradition of independent statehood that it had ever had. However, Armenians had a very keen perception of their ethnic identity. A key reason was the Armenian heritage, preserved through the ages. The heritage included historical narratives, various mythologems, a very specific linguistic and religious identity that set Armenians apart from all their neighbors, most of whom were Muslims, and a very large body of religious literature and philosophy. This heritage enabled the Armenians to preserve their ethnic and cultural identity and survive as an ethnocultural group through the ages, despite very unfavorable and sometimes even extreme external circumstances.

Thus, in the 17th century, Shah Abbas invaded Armenia, exterminating some of its population and deporting thousands of Armenians to the center of the Persian Empire of the time. As a result, by the 19th century, when Eastern Armenia was annexed by the Russian Empire, its Armenian population was tiny, numbering just tens of thousands. Most of these Armenians farmers engaged in very basic agriculture. The Armenian cultural centers of that time were either located or forming outside Armenia. This fact led to yet another very special feature of the Armenian ethnic group: the existence of a strong Diaspora, in which Armenian culture and even political discourses developed more actively than in the homeland. The reasons for this situation logically follow from what I just described: Armenia did not have independent statehood and the Armenians lived

as a Christian minority in Islamic states. Besides, Armenia was a poor highland territory without any significant cities. For centuries, the population of Armenia consisted mostly of farmers, whose out-migration fed and replenished the growing Armenian Diaspora communities across the world.

Against this background, what happened within the Russian Empire was an amazing achievement. In a matter of decades, the predominantly agricultural Armenian population of Eastern Armenia consolidated as an ethnic group and established secular education formats. This was soon followed by the emergence of secular intellectual elites and modern forms of high culture. Consequently, religious historical narratives transformed into secular ones. The next logical step was the creation of political groups and clubs. By the end of the 19th century, Armenian political parties, news media and political discourses were in place. It all happened inside the Empire and quite amazingly fast.

Many of the developments in Armenian culture and politics of the time continued to unfold in the urban centers of the Diaspora. However, they were directed at the transformation of Eastern Armenia, causing the emergence of modern forms of nationbuilding. For example, the first draft Constitution of Armenia was written in India. It was also in India, then a colony of the British Empire, that the first Armenian newspaper saw light. The first Armenian political party was established in France, in Marseille. The lyrics of Armenia's national anthem were written in Moscow. Even the independence of the First Republic of Armenia was proclaimed in Tiflis – now Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia.

The new ideological space that emerged as a result was largely based on examples existing around the world, in various European countries and Russia.

New discourses and narratives reached Armenia and changed it, especially as Armenia developed its economy and gradually entered the common market of the Russian Empire. New ties were established, people and texts moved about, ideas and symbols circulated. As economic wellbeing of Armenia in the Russian Empire grew, its population grew also. Towns were established in Eastern Armenia. They were not large, but they were urban centers. The density of the population increased. State-of-the-art educational institutions opened in Armenia. Soon, a secular intellectual elite began to form. Ideologems, including political ones, were generated in the Diaspora and found supporters in the homeland. Gradually, political clubs and organizations of various colors were created in Armenia.

In May 1918, following the disintegration of the short-lived Transcaucasian Seim, the Republic of Armenia, later to become known as the First Republic of Armenia, was established on the territory of Eastern Armenia. The First Republic only survived two and a half years. Its tragic and heroic history was, all in all, a history of failed efforts to survive, as its last Prime Minister Simor Vratsyan put it in the title of his book, "between the Bolshevik hammer and the Turkish anvil."

In those same years, in Western Armenia, also known as Turkish Armenia, the Young Turk government organized the Genocide of Armenians. Consequently, the history of the First Republic of Armenia was a series of wars with Turkey, hopes vested in the Entente, and efforts to support a huge influx of refugees from Western Armenia at a time of economic collapse and impaired communication to the rest of the world. All hopes were in vain. Western Armenia lost its Armenian population. In Eastern Armenia, the First Republic was soon dissolved, cut up and divided between the emergent Kemalist Turkey and Bolshevik Russia.

This brief and tragic historical episode had crucial symbolic impact on Armenia and the Armenians. The symbols of the First Republic became the symbols of renewed Armenian statehood. The contemporary Republic of Armenia has the same national anthem, flag and coat of arms as the First Republic. The city of Yerevan, chosen as the capital of the First Republic more or less at random, continued to be the capital of Armenia during the Soviet rule, and evolved into a major city. Political figures of the First Republic have become very important symbols. In the Soviet years, they formed the pantheon of Armenian counterculture, opposed to the Soviet pantheon of Bolshevik leaders. In modern Armenia, following the disintegration of the USSR, the military, cultural and political leaders of the First Republic have played the roles of official symbols of national independence.

Once the First Republic of Armenia was annexed and dissolved, the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic was established as one of the republics forming the USSR. Inside this new political entity, the processes that unfolded were quite typical for the USSR. Since Soviet Armenia was a highland territory with scarce arable land, it was not feasible to lay agriculture at the foundation of the new republic's economy, the way it was done in the "cotton republics" of Central Asia. Instead, Soviet Armenia developed mining and processing industries, and based on them, gradually, a military industry based on science and technology. Eventually, Armenia became an integral part of the Soviet military-industrial machine.

Similarly to other territories on the Soviet periphery, Armenia was subject to rapid urbanization. Education and healthcare systems soon covered its entire

territory. This required the mass production of educated professionals: teachers, doctors, and skilled industrial workers. Similarly to many other Soviet republics with agricultural populations, the educated professionals were brought in from more modernized and developed parts of the USSR. The difference in the case of Armenia was that there was no need to bring in Russians, or Slavs in general. Modernized, developed, urbanized Armenians lived in great numbers outside Armenia but inside the USSR. A call was made for them to come to Armenia, and it worked. Poets, writers, artists, engineers, teachers, architects and even communist party officials willingly moved into Armenia from Tiflis in Georgia, Rostov in Southern Russia, Moscow and St. Petersburg. These people laid the foundation for an urban culture in the newly established capital. They established Yerevan State University, the Opera, and scientific research institutions.

In many other capital cities around the USSR, the same trends were in place. Very often, the result was that major cities became Russian-speaking and dominated by Russian culture. This was only natural in the case of ethnic groups that lacked an educated class. Indeed, it is very difficult and perhaps impossible to transform cattle framers, used to transhumance, into city dwellers, industrial laborers and intellectuals within one generation. In the case of the Armenians, the human resources were readily available and had the advantage of speaking the same language and identifying with the same culture. All the Soviets had to do was to make the call; there was no need to organize the mass migration of Russians to Armenia. This led to a rather unique situation. In the entire USSR, Yerevan was probably the only city of its size and status that expanded and developed inside the USSR but remained monoethnic and did not become dominated by Russian language and culture.

As a result, in Armenia, the Soviet urbanization project transformed into a nationalist one. This just happened on its own, quite spontaneously. No organized political entity-building project was under way, unlike, for example, the Jewish Autonomous Oblast. Events simply took their natural course.

In the framework of this project, it was crucial that Armenia's capital, Yerevan, evolved into a modern city and a cultural center. Indeed, for the first time in over a thousand years, the center of Armenian cultural and intellectual life was now located on the territory of Armenia. Universal schooling in Armenian was already in place. Urbanization led to social changes. Newly emerging national symbols often incorporated old ones, following the almost classical patterns of political nationbuilding typical for European modernity.

Prior to the Soviet invasion, Yerevan was a remote provincial town with a population numbering around 30 thousand. In the Soviets, the Chief Architect of Yerevan, St. Petersburg – born Alexander Tamanian, built a new modern city based on an integral plan and containing allusions to ancient Urartu architecture. The city was planned to become the capital and the heart of Armenia – not just Soviet Armenia but Armenia in general, a country with a valiant past that was being re-born in the USSR. At least, this was the official mythology reflected in the numerous and varied art of the day.

Quite naturally, these developments led to the emergence of national elites and the birth of national self-determination ideologies. These trends were manifest in many Soviet republics. By the 1960ies, following the death of Joseph Stalin and the general weakening of the regime, various Soviet republics began to create nationalisms – both in the form of underground dissident movements and in

milder intellectual forms. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, political nationalism found its way into the thinking of official 'priviligentsia', or 'privileged intelligentsia' – a Soviet nickname of the artistic and academic elites that were recognized by the Soviet authorities. To some extent, nationalism affected even the official communist elites of Armenia and other republics.

With the new stability that they obtained following Stalin's death, the political elites of the emergent Soviet nations moved on toward greater autonomy from the Moscow elite. I believe the disintegration of the USSR began back in the 1960ies and 1970ies. The 'title nations' of Soviet republics were by that time gradually becoming proto-nation-states. The logic of the developments up to that point prepared the jump to a new stage: that of creating political entities.

Another important development helped. After World War Two, Armenians from the Diaspora outside the USSR were allowed into Soviet Armenia. They came to Armenia from many countries of the world, from Europe to the Near East. Most of them were survivors of the Genocide of Armenians in Western Armenia, or the descendants of the survivors. In many cases, especially in the case of repatriates from richer countries such as France or the United States, their primary or sole motivation for the move to Armenia were their national feelings. Most of these people had had long-term experience of living in a society that was very different from the USSR in cultural terms. Specifically, many had had experience of community activism, political engagement and self-organization. The culture they brought to Armenian was quite new and foreign, in strong contrast to official Soviet standards. This played a crucial part in Armenia's future. Many dissidents and future leaders of the independent Republic of Armenia that would come to be after the disintegration of the USSR were either repatriates themselves or grew up

in the families of repatriates. These include Armenia's first president Levon Ter-Petrossian who was born in Aleppo, Syria, and its first Foreign Minister who was born in the United States.

In the 1960ies, Armenia already had a dissident movement, which was national by its character, and even defined itself as a 'national liberation movement.' In one of his interviews, a famous Armenian dissident said that he would not even mind a communist joining his group provided the communist was ready to fight for the independence of Armenia. According to their vision, the liberation of Armenia from the Empire was the goal, and the governance system that would be established in the future independent Armenia would be chosen by the people and could be anything, including even communism.

What was perhaps even more important, a semi-dissident social stratum was formed, mostly from academics and students. All over Armenia, informal and semi-formal clubs and groups were established; they all had some legitimate purpose, such as study and preservation of architectural monuments. The people in these groups did not necessarily share the same views about politics. More often, those were young people wanting to learn more about the culture of Armenia and the Armenians. A similar trend was manifest in Russia and other republics. Still, this trend can be considered proto-political, because the paradigm of ethnic nationalism is closely followed by the politicization of ethno-cultural aspirations. This represents a classical project of European modernity, and indeed, by the time that the USSR began falling apart in the late 1980s, the epoch of European modernity was already in full bloom in Armenia.

In fact, politicization of ethnicity in Armenia began rather early by Soviet standards, back in the 1960ies, when the first mass rallies in the USSR took place in Yerevan. The protesters in those rallies were demanding official permission to commemorate the symbolic anniversary of the early twentieth century Genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. The demand was met. Moreover, a monument to the victims of the Genocide was erected in Yerevan after the mass protests. In fact, this was the birth of the culture of mass rallies and protests, which are so common in modern Armenia but were so unusual and abnormal in the 1960ies USSR. April 24 – the day when the Armenian intellectual elite of Constantinople was arrested in 1915 and exterminated shortly afterwards – was established as the symbolic date of mourning. It was commemorated as such, not just in Yerevan, but also throughout Armenia and amongst Armenians worldwide, including in other Soviet republics. Back in the 1960ies, books were published about the Genocide and films were made, making the Genocide a key historical narrative for Armenians.

By the late 1980ies, the first mass rallies with political demands took place in Soviet Armenia. The reason for the rallies was formally external for Armenia but internal with respect to the Armenian society. In February 1988, in Nagorno-Karabakh, a predominantly Armenian-populated autonomous region of neighboring Azerbaijan, a mass movement demanded that the region should be moved to the jurisdiction of Soviet Armenia. This was the launch of an ethnopolitical project, very similar to numerous Western European 19th century projects and Eastern European early 20th century projects.

By the time the Karabakh movement began, Armenia was the most ethnically homogenous republic of the USSR, with a rather urbanized and

educated population capable of appreciating political ideology. Armenia also had a sufficient presence of intellectuals capable of generating political ideology and organizing its dissemination. A general anti-Soviet attitude was also rather common, especially amongst the educated classes. Finally, the motive was significant and legitimate. It concerned fellow Armenians who lived in a different republic and wanted to use democratic methods to unite with their compatriots in Armenia.

Moscow's reaction was predictable. The expression of the free will by an ethnic group with regard to the administrative territorial structure of the USSR was a clear threat to the foundations of the Soviet state. The moment the territorial structure of the USSR is no longer the prerogative of the Moscow center, the USSR is no longer the same country. Besides, the Moscow authorities were aware of dozens of locations all across the USSR in which the administrative territorial structure did not correspond to the ethnic layout. This was causing problems and could easily become an avalanche should the Armenian's demands be met. Moscow was thus siding with Azerbaijan in the emerging conflict, since Azerbaijan wanted the status-quo to remain unchanged and Armenia was demanding change.

Meanwhile, in Armenia the politicization of ethnicity – and the ethnization of politics – had reached a climatic stage. Social protests engulfed the entire Armenian population of the republic. Since it was ethnically rather homogenous, this meant the vast majority of about 4 million people. The goal of the movement was territorial irredentism, that is, the unification of two parts of the Armenian nation in the borders of one republic. The tools were mass protests: strikes, rallies, marches and hunger strikes.

Very soon, the chosen method of achieving this goal was political independence. Already by 1989, when Armenia was formally still a Soviet socialist republic, its new revolutionary leadership took the course for political independence from the USSR. The new leaders sent the communist nomenclature of Armenia packing. Moscow, meanwhile, lacked the power, incentive and resources to exercise the degree of violence that would be sufficient to put an end to Armenia's movement for independence. Armenia went the whole way and the nation-state building project was under way.

Of course, the process is still ongoing, within the independent Republic of Armenia. The polity of Armenia is facing major challenges. They include establishing political institutions and mechanisms, creating checks and balances, and last but not least, enabling a nation that had lived in empires for centuries to build the mentality of a political nation. This is going to take years and decades. There are and will be crises and failures. The outcome is not known. Many states have failed. However, Armenia has existed for over twenty years now: ten times longer than the First Republic did a hundred years ago. A Generation of Independence has grown up in Armenia: young people who do not remember the empire and have lived in an independent country for as long as they can remember. Armenia has created mechanisms for the production and reproduction of the elites and state bureaucracy. These mechanisms have often been the target of criticism. Indeed, they need improvement. What matters in the context of this topic is that they exist and function.

None of this would have been possible in the mid-19th century. Armenia needed the time it spent in the Russian Empire in order to transform from a set of Christian communities in Islamic empires into a proto-political nation.

