

Central Asia's Great Game and the Rise of China

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The great game in Central Asia, the rivalry among major external states and internal governments for influence, has become an integral part of world politics. Given the war in Afghanistan and its accompanying threat of terrorism, Central Asia's strategic energy importance, especially to Russia, China, and Europe, and its proximity to major actors like Russia, China, Iran, and the South Asian subcontinent, this rivalry's geopolitical importance is well established. But the competition for influence in Central Asia, the so-called new great game, has so far been depicted as between the US and Russia. Many studies have pointed to China's strategic convergence with Russia. Few analysts have correlated this competition with China's rise, one of the greatest transformation now occurring in world politics. That trend is already exercising a significant and growing influence upon the course of this rivalry but it has been unduly neglected in studies of Central Asia. While Stephen Blank, already in 1995, observed that China might eventually become Russia's most potent rival in Central Asia; only now do we see China as a real player here.¹

Arguably we can now see the first signs of this rivalry. Since 2008 China has adopted an increasingly assertive policy line on issues like international financial organization, a closed maritime zone in the South China Sea, Iran, cyber-strikes on foreign governments, etc. Thus 2009 is the year that "China showed its claws."² But it is equally, if not more arguable, that China's most lasting and tangible gains have come at Russia's expense, both in the Far East and in Central Asia.

¹ Stephen Blank, *Energy, Economics, and Security in Central Asia: Russia and Its Rivals*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1995, pp. 25-28

² David Shambaugh, "The Year China Showed Its Claws," *Financial Times*, February 16, 2010, www.ft.com

The first example of overt Chinese rivalry with Russia in Central Asia came in 2008 immediately after the war with Georgia and Russia's sponsorship of an independent Abkhazia and South Ossetia. China led the Central Asian members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in blocking recognition of those two provinces as independent states. The SCO's refusal to support the dismemberment of a sovereign Georgia and these provinces' ensuing independence contradicted Russian expectations. Perhaps more importantly, this refusal also showed the limits to Russo-Chinese partnership, which, though robust, is not an alliance. It also showed that Central Asian states aligned with China could resist Russia. The second example came when China and Turkmenistan formally opened the gas pipeline on December 14, 2009 from Turkmenistan through Central Asia to China, which, built with Chinese capital, is the first gas pipeline connecting China to Turkmenistan and to Central Asia. The new pipeline suggests a clear blow to Russia's efforts to monopolize Central Asian gas exports.

The purpose of this article is to examine the basis for China's rise in Central Asia and its implications for the "new" new great game in the region. The article begins with some recent trends in Central Asia's great game. The second section examines why Russia's recent integration projects are failing. Third section focuses on the basis for China's rise Central Asia. Central Asian countries' perspectives on the rise of China are added in the last section.

The Changing Face of Central Asia's Great Game

China's and Central Asia's opposition to Russia arose from several sources. The war coincided with an upsurge of rebellion in Tibet and Xinjiang. Chinese repression then stimulated outside pressure for reform which, in turn, generated China's habitual response to outside pressure, namely a strong assertion that its integrity is not open to question by anyone and that these provinces' issues are exclusively China's internal affair. Therefore any

forcible attempt to redraw a state's boundaries on the grounds of rescuing oppressed ethnic or religious minorities triggers a very reserved, if not negative Chinese response. Russia's unilateral recognition of Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's independence represented precedents that can then be used to pressure or even attack China to force it to yield its claims of sovereignty in Xinjiang, Tibet, or Taiwan.

Second Russia now claims in word and law that it possesses the right to use armed force to intervene on behalf of Russians -- whom it considers citizens of the Russian Federation by virtue of their ethnic origin -- who are being oppressed in Central Asian and other CIS countries.³ Central Asian governments all have minority and border issues that can be easily used to create a pretext for intervention along the lines of Russia's action since frequently those minority populations are ethnic Russians who are now being subjected to increasingly strong state pressures to assimilate or leave and surrender their social and economic positions. For example, Moscow regularly exerts or tries to exert pressure upon Kazakhstan that Moscow could threaten it on those grounds. Therefore all those states remain acutely sensitive to Moscow's claims in this crisis.

Moscow's overt claim to a sphere of influence in Central Asia and of having the concurrent and concomitant right to undertake such intervention to defend its "citizens" from discriminatory policies unilaterally under Article 51 of the UN Charter or the right to protect can only unsettle states who resist the doctrine of such intervention which they see as a landmine placed underneath their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence. While Central Asian states clearly depend on Moscow and solicit its attention and material assistance; they cannot ratify its unilateral pretensions to a right to undermine their sovereignty and integrity whenever it chooses to do so. For similar reasons China cannot

³ Moscow, *ITAR-TASS*, in English, December 16, 2009, *FBIS SOV*, December 16, 2009; Yuri E. Fedorov, *Medvedev's Amendments to the Law on Defence: The Consequences For Europe*, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Briefing Paper No. 47, November 2009

support a doctrine of intervention and unilateral rearranging of sovereign states' territories due to the mistreatment of ethnic or religious minorities.

Since then the great power rivalry in Central Asia has intensified and become even more inextricably linked to the rise of China. In 2009 the Russo-American struggle over the US base at Manas Kyrgyzstan became overt. By paying Kyrgyzstan \$2 Billion, and launching cyber-strikes against it, Russia wanted to make a point at Manas to eliminate any vestige of U.S. military presence. Russia interpreted earlier plans announced late in 2008 by the US to develop Manas further as part of the new strategy to bring more logistics from Central Asia as a threat. Moscow also clearly wanted to impose its will on Kyrgyzstan and through that demonstration upon its neighbors. Third it wanted to send a message that if anybody sought to deal with Central Asian states on military issues of importance he or she had to go through Russia first. However, Kyrgyzstan turned the tables on Russia by then turning around to then make a deal with the US. Since then US-Kyrgyz ties have improved noticeably. As Senator Robert Casey (D-PA) told a Senate hearing in late 2009

The U.S. signed a new agreement with Bishkek, in which NATO supplies and troops could be run through the Manas Transit Center. So, U.S.-Kyrgyz relations saw another boost when Under Secretary Bill Burns visited there, last July, to announce the formation of a bilateral commission on trade and investment. These are welcome developments, and we appreciate the Kyrgyz Republic's engagement on these issues. The country has its own history in contending with terrorist threats and the reports of increased religious extremism, particularly in the rural areas of the country.⁴

This “betrayal” infuriated Russia and led to a chill in its relations with Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan took the money with which Russia sought to buy its support at very generous interest rates and started lending it out at interest to increase domestic support for President Bakiyev. And when Kyrgyzstan sought new financial support it invited China to bid on

⁴ Statement by Senator Robert Casey (D-PA) , “Reevaluating U.S. Policy in Central Asia. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December 15, 2009

projects where Russia had expressed an interest.⁵ Worse yet, according to members of US non-governmental organizations, in 2009 China also told the Kyrgyz government that if the US did not offer it enough money to keep Manas open China could furnish the money, demonstrating its willingness to play a broker's role and gain leverage with Washington and Bishkek. They also quoted German diplomats who noted that China is now committed to truly big investment projects and will not invest in Central Asia for projects less than \$5Billion.⁶ Neither Moscow nor Washington can make such investments so this signifies China's regional economic capabilities.

In another blow to the Russians the Obama Administration has apparently begun to formulate and implement its Central Asian strategy to counter Russia's exclusivist approach. Deputy Assistant of State George Krol testified to the Senate that,

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, this Administration does not consider Central Asia a forgotten backwater, peripheral to U.S. interests. The region is at the fulcrum of key U.S. security, economic and political interests. It demands attention and respect and our most diligent efforts. The Obama Administration is committed to that very approach.⁷

As foreign commentators recognized, such language concerning Central Asia is unprecedented in US diplomacy.⁸ But it is clear that the US has decided to act because officials now see "an alarming fragility" in Central Asia and because they know that if they do not act Russia and China will replace the US as a major foreign presence there. Thus the US special Ambassador for Central Asian energy, Richard Morningstar, stated that Central Asian gas supplies to China subtract from gas destined for Europe and creates problems for

⁵ Venera Djumataeva, "Moscow Chills Relations With Kyrgyzstan," *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*, February 23, 2010

⁶ Conversations with NGO representatives, Washington, D.C., June 2009

⁷ Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Krol, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and, South, and Central Asian Affairs December 15, 2009, p. 6

⁸ M.K. Bhadrakumar, "China Resets Terms of Engagement in Central Asia," *Asia Times Online*, December 24, 2009, www.atimes.com

European gas supply which concerns the US.⁹ Moreover the comprehensive scope of China's investments in Central Asia also are a harbinger of its intention to be a major player there at both Moscow's and Washington's expense, even if the Chinese media seeks to downplay the negative impact of this on Russia.¹⁰ Given Russo-Chinese ambitions to oust the US from Central Asia and the region's fragility during the war in Afghanistan, Washington evidently felt impelled to strike back with an equally comprehensive strategy and policy. Thus for example, it has initiated, for the first time a regular high-level foreign policy dialogue at the ministerial level with each of the Central Asian states.¹¹

In 2009 Russia sought to exploit Kyrgyzstan's perceived dependence upon it as tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan rose by opening a base at Osh in Southern Kyrgyzstan. This angered Uzbekistan who promptly gravitated, as is its wont, back to the US. But Russia also failed to satisfy the Kyrgyz government that wanted the base at Batken, not Osh where it would be closer to Uzbekistan. Instead it is the US that now intends to build a training center at Batken. Bishkek-based political analyst Mars Sariyev suspects that once the facility is built US instructors will come in to teach Kyrgyz regular and/or Special Forces. This move clearly looks like a defeat for Moscow.¹² These are not the only reasons for souring Russo-Kyrgyz relations while Chinese and US influence grow, but they certainly suffice to show China's growing, if somewhat hidden, rivalry with Russia in Central Asia.

Batken is not the only sign of a new US strategy to check Russian influence in Central Asia. President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan recently expressed "firm allegiance on behalf of Uzbekistan" to further develop ties with Washington to bring about lasting peace and

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Deirdre Tynan, "Kyrgyzstan US Intends To Construct Military Training Center in Batken," *Eurasia Insight*, March 4, 2010

stability in Afghanistan. The US also wants to improve the bilateral relationship.¹³ Washington has good reason for acting in this way. Russian bureaucratic obstruction stalled the implementation of the US-Russian accord on aerial transport across Russia of supplies for the war effort in Afghanistan until early 2010 suggesting Russian ambivalence about a US success in Afghanistan. Alternatively Russia may be using its formal support for the program to leverage greater US concessions elsewhere.¹⁴ Some Russian analysts believe Moscow does not want NATO to win in Afghanistan or that it expects NATO to fail and does not want to be associated with that failure.¹⁵ Either way, the outcome is obstruction regarding the movement of supplies through or across Russia.

As of early 2010 it appeared that Moscow's policies have clearly diminished its position in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and antagonized both governments, giving both Beijing and Washington new profitable opportunities. Uzbekistan recently announced that its share of the gas pipeline running from Turkmenistan to China (discussed below) will be ready in August 2010, sooner than expected, allowing it to ship 10BCM annually to China, another blow to Russia's efforts to monopolize Central Asian gas and oil exports.¹⁶ Secretary of State Clinton is expected to visit Uzbekistan in late Spring as are delegations of US businessmen. The Northern Distribution Network (NDN), the landline from Riga, Latvia through Russia to Central Asia and Afghanistan, which is working successfully, is expected to create substantial economic opportunities for Uzbekistan. Meanwhile discussions about

¹³ Moscow, *Interfax*, in English, February 19, 2010, *Open Source Center: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia*, (Henceforth *FBIS SOV*), February 19, 2010

¹⁴ The pace of the flights only picked up in 2010, Peter Baker and Mark Laidler, "Delay on Arms Pact Slows Reset of U.S.-Russia Ties," *New York Times*, March 11, 2010, www.nytimes.com; Robert Coalson, "U.S.-Russian Accord on Transit of Military Cargo Fails To Get Off the Ground," *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*, January 15, 2010

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ "Uzbekistan to Sell 10BnCu.M of Gas to China Annually," Mashad, *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran External Service*, in *Uzbek*, March 7, 2010, *FBIS SOV*, March 8, 2010; "Uzbekistan: Tashkent to Export Gas to China," *Eurasia Insight*, May 15, 2009; "Uzbekistan to Deliver Natural Gas to China," *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*, November 6, 2009

military - technical cooperation with the US have taken place according to foreign observers.¹⁷

Because Uzbekistan has recently repeatedly demonstrated its rejection of the various post-Soviet political and economic groupings, the Americans decided that they could offer it as a replacement their own increased presence which not long ago (at least until the Andijon events) had been going on quite successfully. This is exactly why the United States proposed to expand cooperation with Tashkent this year in a range of areas – economic projects, political cooperation, and various ways of interaction on settling the crisis in Afghanistan. The seriousness of such plans has been underlined with increased official contacts.¹⁸

Russia's failure to satisfy Uzbek aspirations lies behind Uzbekistan's move towards the United States. Uzbekistan closely watches Russian policy and deems its relations with NATO and the US as being crucial to its well-known and repeatedly demonstrated counter-balancing strategy.

Russian attempts to secure a stake in the regional water system, as in the case of the failed or stalled negotiations over Tajikistan's Rogun and Kyrgyzstan's Kambarata-1 hydropower stations, has seriously concerned Tashkent. The latter also opposes Russia's plans to set up a new military base in southern Kyrgyzstan, fearing that it might encourage militarization and nationalistic confrontations in the region. The planned base would operate under the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Rapid Reaction Forces agreement adopted on June 14, 2009, which Tashkent chose to avoid based on its fear of Russian involvement in the region plagued by water and border conflicts, especially between Uzbekistan and its neighbors. Thus the base might help Moscow keep Tashkent within its "sphere of influence," given Uzbekistan's history of unpredictable policies toward major powers and the possibility of any US military presence in the country as well as curbing Islamic radicalism and terrorism on its southern frontiers.¹⁹

In that context, President Karimov's action plan of January 2010 to put bilateral ties on a more productive and serious and the recent tour of Central Asia by US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke demonstrate the US-Uzbekistan rapprochement. That action plan states

¹⁷ Yuri Sigov, "Pragmatism, Interest in Afghanistan Said Behind Thaw in US-Uzbek Ties," *Almaty, Delovaya Nedelya*, in Russian, February 21, 2010, Retrieved from Lexis-Nexis

¹⁸ *Ibid.* The author is referring, of course, to the Andijon uprising of 2005

¹⁹ Roman Muzalevsky, "Holbrooke's Visit Highlights US-Uzbek Regional Dilemmas and Opportunities," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, March 8, 2010

that Uzbekistan will “insist on high-level participation in the political consultations from the American side – experts from the State Department, National Security Council, and other US government agencies” though as of this writing no specific plans have been announced.²⁰ Holbrooke stressed that he regards the real security threat in Central Asia as coming from Al-Qaeda rather than the Taliban and indicated his desire to strengthen cooperation with Uzbekistan over security.²¹ Although Holbrooke did not obtain a base in Uzbekistan, he may not have sought one as the discussions with Kyrgyzstan about Batken and renewing the US lease at Manas may have sufficed for US purposes. But he also expressed US desires to improve relations with Tajikistan because of its centrality to conflict resolution in Afghanistan and discussed both water and energy issues with the Tajik government. This is the first public evidence of US interest in the contentious water issues that divide Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan from Uzbekistan. Meanwhile Kazakhstan also indicated a desire to upgrade ties with the US and has already begun the foreign minister dialogues alluded to above.²²

However, while China clearly competes with Russia for regional influence; it also does not want to see the US supplant Russia as the leading foreign influence and “gendarme” of Central Asia. Gao Fei, Vice Secretary-General of the China National Association for International Studies, said that,

Washington has a covert ambition to infiltrate the region beyond the anti-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But I don't think the US can achieve its objectives easily. Central Asian countries remain highly alert against the US export of democracy which could cause instability in those countries.²³

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ “US Warns of Increased Al-Qaeda Threat in Central Asia,” *Daily Times*, www.dailytimes.com, February 21, 2010

²² “Central Asia: Holbrooke Makes Stealth Tour on Afghan Support,” *Eurasia Insight*, February 22, 2010; “Kyrgyzstan: Holbrooke Reveals Manas Base Renewal Discussions Underway,” *Eurasia Insight*, March 3, 2010; Erkin Akhmadov, “Richard Holbrooke Visits Central Asia,” *Central Asia Caucasus Analyst*, March 3, 2010

²³ Hao Zhou, “US Efforts in Central Asia Face Challenges: Analyst,” *Global Times*, February 21, 2010, <http://world.globaltimes.cn/americas/2010-02/506586.html>

While it is unclear if the Obama Administration is actively promoting democracy as it has eschewed doing that with Russia; these remarks clearly indicate Chinese apprehensions about the geostrategic and political-ideological repercussions of the US presence in Central Asia. To counter such trends and to compete with Russia for influence China has already been deploying its most powerful political weapons, its economic power and energy needs as a market on the one hand and the support for authoritarian rule in Central Asia on the other.

In Kyrgyzstan where there is little doubt that Moscow's fingerprints were all over the coup in April, 2010. The Kyrgyz government under Kurmanbek Bakiyev infuriated Moscow by taking its money and then failing to expel the US from Manas and actually bringing it back and then giving it a second facility at Batken. It also used the Russian money for purpose other than what had been the stated purpose, namely the hydroelectric project at Kambarata. Instead it used the money to promote Bakiyev's domestic support and enrich his rapacious son, Maxim. When Putin angrily remonstrated about this with Kyrgyz Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov in late 2009, Bishkek leaked the conversations, further aggravating the situation.²⁴ Moscow then orchestrated its moves to instigate Bakiyev's downfall. Russia stopped implementing previous agreements and refused to make any commitments about new accords, e.g. the Kambarata power complex. Indeed, Moscow's priority project, the Customs Union for the CIS that Kyrgyzstan is a logical candidate to join, was also stalled with Kyrgyzstan insisting on prior agreements on military-technical cooperation, i.e. arms sales, and the issue of foreign debt, before discussing the Customs Union. Moscow also obstructed the possibility of third party cargos, e.g. from China, entering into Kyrgyzstan. Putin further turned on the pressure clearly aiming at undermining Bakiyev and bringing the opposition to power.

²⁴ Sergey Rasov, "Did the Kyrgyz 'Dump' Russia,?" Moscow, *Politkom.ru*, in Russian, December 3, 2009, *FBIS SOV*, December 3, 2009

In advance of Kyrgyzstan's upheaval Moscow reportedly established contacts with the opposition forces that succeeded Bakiyev in the wake of the April, 2010 demonstrations in Bishkek and Northern Kyrgyzstan. Although Putin professed surprise at the demonstrations, Russian papers discussed demonstrations in Kyrgyzstan several weeks before the actual demonstrations occurred. Russia also simultaneously employed its economic power by rescinding the loan to Kyrgyzstan, and revoking the preferred customs duties that Kyrgyzstan had been receiving on Russian diesel and energy imports, thus raising energy tariffs on its products. These moves forced the government to announce major price rises in electricity fees that were the catalyst for the demonstrations that unseated Bakiyev. And just weeks before those demonstrations the Russian press launched a media offensive denouncing Bakiyev as corrupt and saying that Russia could not work with him as if to signal that the time had come for an uprising. All these moves suggest a concerted plan to undermine the Bakiyev government and replace it with one more amenable to and openly dependent upon Moscow. Certainly Bakiyev's successor, Roza Otunbayeva, thanked Russia for helping oust Bakiyev, for offering humanitarian aid, and for recognizing the new government before anyone else did. And members of the new government hinted at forthcoming changes in foreign policy while asking for Russian aid and hinting that they could ask as well for Russian peacekeepers. Moscow also sent 150 (if not more) paratroopers to its base at Kant.²⁵

Indeed, President Medvedev subsequently intimated that Russia had intervened to bring about a peaceful resolution of the coup and Bakiyev's flight. Moreover he warned other Central Asian states that if they fail to govern competently they too might risk this outcome.²⁶ Here it should also be noted that the coup was also intended against China

²⁵ Stephen Blank, "Moscow's Fingerprints in Kyrgyzstan's Storm," *Central Asia Caucasus Analyst*, April 14, 2010

²⁶ M.K. Bhadrakumar, "China Plays It Cool on Kyrgyzstan," *Asia Times Online*, April 20, 2010, www.atimes.com

which was caught flatfooted (as was the US) by the coup and could do nothing more than issue anxious calls for stability.²⁷ China has important economic interests in Kyrgyzstan beyond the loan mentioned above. It is its third largest economic partner in Central Asia and more Chinese investments were announced shortly before the coup. The coup also harmed Chinese interest there at least temporarily.²⁸ Thus Beijing had no choice but to accept that the Russian led intervention there offered the only immediate way to stabilize the situation in Kyrgyzstan. But it is possible that in the long run its superior economic position there might tell in its favor.²⁹

Soon afterward Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov came to Moscow. Although Uzbek-Russian economic ties had weakened Moscow still supports its position on water issues and is trying very hard to bring Uzbekistan back into its orbit and the sign of Russian power displayed in the Kyrgyz coup, the danger of ongoing violence in Kyrgyzstan, and Russian energy and economic power in the area appear to be the cards that Moscow intends to play to bring Tashkent back into line.³⁰ But it is not clear whether Russia can lure Uzbekistan back into subservience to its policies given that decline in their economic and political ties.

Chinese Objectives and Policy Moves in Central Asia

The aim of this section is to examine China's objectives and policy outcomes regarding Central Asia. Particularly the section assesses whether China's objectives converge or diverge with Russia's. Three objectives are analyzed: economic, political, and energy. The first objective relates to China's overall economic strategy in Central Asia which aims at

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*, "Russian and Chinese Interests and the Fate of the New Kyrgyz Government," www.asianews.it, April 21, 2010

²⁹ Bhadrakumar, "China Plays It Cool on Kyrgyzstan,"

³⁰ Sergey Blagov, "Russia Moves to Strengthen Ties with Uzbekistan," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, April 28, 2010; Stephen Blank, "Is a Russian-Uzbek Rapprochement in the Offing?" *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, April 21, 2010

gaining access to key energy, economic, and infrastructural sectors through trade, investment, and aid. This strategy aims to integrate these areas into its economic network which goes beyond energy and essentially pursues a policy of comprehensive investment in Central Asian infrastructure that took off in 2009 but was well established before that.³¹ China's approach is wholly asymmetric, if not opposed, to that of Russia in that sense. The second objective stems from the U.S. export of liberal values across Central Asia. This relates to regime types, ideologies, and values.³² With the US ideological intrusion into Central Asia, China subscribes to the view that the US artificial inducement of political changes in Central Asia constitutes a threat to China. China and Russia work together to check further US advances. The third objective relates to energy. China began to display assertiveness in energy politics, and on the whole the energy interests of China and Russia differ. Although most of China's energy imports still come from the Middle East; Beijing is clearly and rapidly seeking to diversify its suppliers on a global basis: Venezuela, other Latin American countries, Africa, Russia, and Central Asia.

This does not mean that China shuns military positions in Central Asia; in fact it does seek them. China reportedly thought about using force to prevent the revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and has since then sought a base in Kyrgyzstan to forestall further such outbreaks.³³ It also definitely sought the formerly American base at Karshi Khanabad in Uzbekistan in 2005 once the Americans were expelled from there.³⁴ Neither is there any a priori reason to rule out the real possibility that the currently modest Sino-Central Asian

³¹ Bhadrakumar

³² Russell Ong, "China's Strategic Convergence with Russia," p. 320.

³³ Vladimir Radyuhin, "A Central Asian Setback," *Frontline* (New Delhi), XXII, N o. 17, August 13-26, 2005

³⁴ Vladimir Mukhin, "Poslednaya Nabrosok na Iuge," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, August 8, 2005

military relationship may rise in the future as China continues to grow stronger and the region remains unsettled.³⁵

China's Economic Objectives

China is making efforts to convert the SCO into a unified trade and economic bloc. China's overall national security strategy depends on instrumentalizing the national security benefits of its trade with its neighbors and interlocutors. The SCO's development into such a bloc would perfectly comport with China's overall strategy as laid out by Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment.

The PRC's export-led economic strategy, conceived and directed consciously by a purposeful state, is centered fundamentally on creating the wherewithal to support China's rise as a traditional great power with the full panoply of political, economic, and military capabilities. Export-led growth then becomes the instrumentality that enables Beijing to keep the United States invested in strong economic links with China, thereby hopefully dissuading Washington from constraining China's rise. At the same time, however, such growth creates webs of interdependence that tightly tie the prosperity of China's regional neighbors to their relations with Beijing.³⁶

For instance, in 2009 it lent the members of the SCO \$10 Billion for large infrastructural projects, Also in 2009 China's Export-Import Bank lent the state-owned Development Bank of Kazakhstan \$5Billion, and CNPC lent Kazmunaigaz, Kazakhstan's state-run gas company, another \$5Billion. Moreover, CNPC bought a 49% minority holding in Kazakhstan's company AO MangistauMunaigaz from KazMunaiGaz National Co for \$3.3 Billion.³⁷ This deal enabled Kazakhstan to continue its robust pace of exploration for oil,

³⁵ Sebastien Peyrouse, "Military Cooperation Between China and Central Asia: Breakthrough, Limits, and Prospects," *Jamestown China Brief*, X, NO.5, March 5, 2010

³⁶ Ashley J. Tellis, "Trade, Interdependence, and Security in Asia," Ashley J. Tellis, and Michael Wills Eds., *Strategic Asia 2006-07: Trade Interdependence, and Security*, Seattle, Washington: National Bureau of Research, Asia, 2006, p. 11; Silkroad Studies Organization, www.silkroadstudies.org, "Selected News Summaries; July-October, 2004

³⁷ M.K. Bhadrakumar, "Cash-Rich China Courts the Caspian," *Asia Times Online*, April 18, 2009, www.atimes.com

which finances its overall development plan whose long-range aim is its comprehensive economic diversification and modernization. Having received an estimated \$21.1 Billion in 2008 in investment for exploration and production, it needs to keep that pace up during this crisis to prevent an even more severe economic contraction. Kazakhstan's state news agency Kazinform said the \$5 Billion loan would help pay for the MangistauMunaiGaz deal and the construction of the Beineu-Bozoi-Akbulak gas pipeline, which will serve southern Kazakhstan.³⁸ Thus Kazakhstan's need for capital and reliable export markets plays into China's strategy and China's victory was clearly facilitated by its deep pockets and cash reserves.³⁹ But China's actions do not break with past Sino-Kazakh relations. Indeed, according to Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev, at least since 2006, "economic cooperation has become the major motivation for pushing the overall development of the Kazakhstan-China relationship."⁴⁰

Nevertheless this deal exemplifies the way in which China can try to exploit the stricken condition of countries like Kazakhstan whose banking system was all but insolvent in 2009 and where foreign investment in early 2009 fell by half since 2008. Indeed this deal gives China control over about 15 percent of Kazakhstan's total oil output and other Chinese firms have already been there for some time. Furthermore Kazakhstan's national nuclear power company Kazatomprom has begun mining uranium fields in southern Kazakhstan in a joint venture with Chinese nuclear power companies.⁴¹ Terms of the deal also call for Kazakhstan to provide China with more than 24,000 tons of uranium by 2020. More recently,

³⁸ *Ibid*; "Kazakhstan: A Chinese Energy Loan," www.strafor.com Analysis, April 17, 2009; Joanna Lillis, "Kazakhstan: China's Deep Pockets Make Beijing a Potent Player in Central Asia," *Eurasia Insight*, April 20, 2009;

³⁹ *Ibid*.; Bhadrakumar, "Kazakhstan: a Chinese Loan"

⁴⁰ "Interview With President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan," Beijing, *Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese*, June 8, 2006, *FBIS SOV*, June 8, 2006

⁴¹ John C.K. Daly, "Analysis: China Increases Stake in Kazakh Energy Assets," *UPI.com*, www.upi.com, April 28, 2009

the China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group (CGNPG) and Kazakhstan's state nuclear agency, Kazatomprom, have agreed to form a joint enterprise that would build atomic energy stations in China.⁴² Even more significantly China approached Kazakhstan in late 2009 with a request to allow Chinese farmers to use one million hectares of Kazakh land to farm soya and rape seed.⁴³

In this context Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao outlined a four point proposal for enhancing bilateral partnership that emphasized first of all maintaining the growth of bilateral trade, and second, fulfilling previous agreements and giving priority to cooperation in the energy and resource sectors. Then comes cooperation in investment and finances to ensure smooth implementation of construction projects. Finally both sides should promote cooperation in infrastructure.⁴⁴ Clearly China aims to integrate Kazakhstan and all of Central Asia into its economic orbit. Thus once the loan to Kazakhstan was announced, Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan indicated that it should lead to further bilateral cooperation in business and politics while President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan indicated his support for Chinese investment in Kazakhstan and entrepreneurial activity that carried out mutually beneficial cooperation.⁴⁵ The different nuances in these remarks indicate what is at stake here, i.e. Central Asia's economic independence as well as governments' understanding of that fact. Although these are only a few of many such examples in Central Asia and elsewhere, they underscore the tactics by which China is advancing its overall strategy for Central Asia in energy and other domains.

China's strategy of gaining critical access to Central Asian energy neither occurs exclusively in Kazakhstan, or even Central Asia nor only in regard to hydrocarbons. Apart

⁴² "China, Kazakhstan: Nuclear Power Deal Agreed," www.stratfor.com, April 30, 2009

⁴³ Bhadrakumar

⁴⁴ "Chinese Premier Raises Four-Point Proposal. For china-Kazakhstan Cooperation," Beijing, *Xinhua* in English, April 17, 2009, FBIS *SOV*, April 17, 2009

⁴⁵ Beijing, *Xinhua*, in English, April 16, 2009, FBIS *SOV*, April 16, 2009

from lending Kazakhstan money China lent other members of the SCO \$10 Billion for infrastructure projects in 2009. China is also building power plants in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and pipelines in Turkmenistan that will then go on to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan so that it can buy gas from these countries at lower than normal prices. It also is mining iron ore in Kyrgyzstan from what is apparently Asia's largest source of iron. Not surprisingly Kyrgyzstan is encouraging further Chinese investment in its coal mining, non-ferrous metals, precious metals, and infrastructure sectors.⁴⁶ Kyrgyz officials also want China to import electricity from the Kambarata power station that Russia is building to prevent surplus capacity and under production. Buying hydropower makes sense for China which has increasingly been pledging infrastructure assistance and cash to Central Asian states through the SCO, e.g. helping Tajikistan build dams and roads. Moreover, China can become a handler or middleman, e.g. wiring Central Asia into Pakistan and Afghanistan and picking up huge transit and construction fees.⁴⁷ Likewise, in the past few years China has invested heavily in Afghanistan's energy and mineral resources, which have been found to be abundant, with a view to building pipelines either directly to China or possibly through the port of Gwadar and Pakistan to China.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ "China Reform Monitor," April 15, 2009 from the American Foreign Policy Council, www.afpc.org, citing Interfax, April 15, 2009

⁴⁷ Jian Yang, "Beyond Energy: China's Energy Relations With Japan and India," Paper Presented to the Annual convention of the International Studies Association, New York, 2009

⁴⁸ "Mining Boom Boosting Economics of Afghanistan," www.sananaews.com.pk, April 22, 2009; Ian McWilliam, "China Wins Major Afghan Project," *BBC News South Asia*, November 20, 2007; "Afghanistan Looking Mining Companies To Explore Iron Ore Mine," <http://paguntaka.org>, April 5, 2009; Niklas Norling, "The emerging China-Afghanistan Relationship," *Central Asia Caucasus Analyst*, May 14, 2008; Kevin Slaten, "China's Bigger role in Pakistan, Afghanistan," *South China Morning Post*, February 12, 2009, www.scmp.com; Ron Synovitz, "China: Afghan Investment Reveals Larger Strategy," *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*, May 29, 2008; Tariq Mahmud Ashraf, "Afghanistan in Chinese Strategy Toward South and Central Asia," *Jamestown China Brief*, VII, BNO 10, May 13, 2008; Jeremy Page, "Afghanistan Copper Deposits Worth \$88 Billion Attract Chinese Investors," *Timesonline*, May 15, 2008, www.timesonline.co.uk;

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These loans and investments carry with them clear political prices. China demands or has demanded support from Central Asian states for its position on Taiwan, its management of the Olympics, and for repression of the Uighurs and of all ties to their kinsmen outside China.⁴⁹ And they have had to oblige. Close examination of Central Asia shows that it too feels the impact of China's rise just like Southeast Asia does. For some time it has been apparent that China has had the power to influence at least some Central Asian states' policies, e.g. prodding Kyrgyzstan to enact an anti-extremism law in 2004 because it may have believed that Uyghur underground parties existed there and in Kazakhstan.⁵⁰ Similarly Kazakhstan may have sacrificed some of its own interests in 2005 to China to get it to make its first energy purchase there of Petrokazakhstan.⁵¹ More recently a study of Central Asian perceptions of China concluded that local governments perceive China as a uniquely powerful regime that could substantially injure their interests and therefore make fulsome statements about friendship with it.⁵² Thus they too are being forced into accommodating China.

In early 2007 China loaned Tajikistan several million dollars without interest. In return the Tajik government then signed a political or cooperation agreement with China foregoing recognition of Taiwan, tightening security linkages, and postulating an identity of interests with China on a bilateral basis outside of existing linkages between them through the

⁴⁹ Richard Weitz, *Kazakhstan and the New International Politics of Eurasia*, Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development, 2008, pp. 102-112

⁵⁰ Igor Rotar, "Kyrgyzstan Bans "Extremism" With Prodding From Beijing" September 21, 2004

⁵¹ Marat Yermukanov, "Astana May Sacrifice National Interests To Save China Oil Deal," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, September 7, 2005; Vladimir Socor, "Implications of China's Takeover of Petrokazakhstan," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, September 7, 2005

⁵² Marlene Laruelle and Sebastian Peyrouse, *China As a Neighbor: Central Asian Perspectives and Strategies*, Stockholm: Institute for Security, Development and Policy, 2009, p. 170

SCO.⁵³ Likewise, China's Ambassador to Kazakhstan, Cheng Guoping, clearly referring to Astana's position on unrest in Xinjiang, said that "China and Kazakhstan support each other in sovereignty and security issues. China thanks the Kazakh president and government for the support in sovereignty and security issues."⁵⁴ To be sure Taiwan and the Olympics are not pressing issues for Central Asian states, so they can, in a sense, trade off those issues for other negotiations on issues of more significance to them. But the Uighur issue cuts closer to home even if it is a distant second to their concerns for domestic power and stability. Nonetheless they fully know they are being squeezed.

China has made its priorities very clear. State Counselor Dai Bingguo outlined China's "core interests" and the demand that other states respect them. These core interests are the survival of China's "fundamental system" and national security, the safeguarding of China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and third the continued stable economic growth and social development of China.⁵⁵ Consequently any attempt by Central Asian governments to support their kinsmen in Xinjiang or to tolerate such action from among their Uighur citizens could lead to very quick and sharp reprisals. For example, China holds Central Asian businessmen in China as "collateral" i.e. hostages for their governments' good behavior on issues pertaining to Xinjiang.⁵⁶ So it is clear that China's motives and tactics are well understood and often resented in Central Asia.⁵⁷

⁵³ Beijing, *Xinhua*, in English, January 15, 2007, *FBIS SOV*, January 15, 2007; Dushanbe, *Asia-Plus Internet Version*, in Russian, January 16, 2007, *FBIS SOV*, January 16, 2007; Beijing, *China Daily (Hong Kong Edition) Internet Version*, in English, January 16, 2007, *FBIS SOV*, January 16, 2007

⁵⁴ Almaty, *Interfax-Kazakhstan Online*, in Russian, August 3, 2009, *FBIS SOV*, August 3, 2009

⁵⁵ Wu Zhong, "China Cut to the Core," *Asia Times Online*, August 19, 2009, www.atimes.com

⁵⁶ Farangis Najibullah, "Kyrgyzstan: China Keeps Nationals and Business' Collateral," *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*, July 21, 2004

⁵⁷ Sultan Akimbekov, "The Conflict in Afghanistan: Conditions, Problems, and Prospects," Rustan Burnashev, "Regional Security in Central Asia: Military Aspects," and Konstantin

Although China probably is well aware of Central Asia's ambivalence, it has not colored its patronizing view of the region. According to the Chinese scholar S. Zhaungzhi, "SCO members share a common border. It is unimaginable for Central Asian countries to develop their economies and maintain domestic stability without support from their neighbors."⁵⁸ More recently, even as unrest in Xinjiang was beginning, Chinese newspapers were writing that Central Asians envy China's developmental policies and their success in Xinjiang, notably the production of stability and ongoing economic growth, something they had failed to achieve in their own countries.⁵⁹ It need not be added that these are traditionally neo-colonialist and patronizing views of so called backward states and their relationship to the metropole.

The continuing unrest in Xinjiang as of September 2009 also has repercussions in Central Asian perceptions of China. This is most sharply expressed in the attitudes of Central Asia's Uighur population that numbers several hundred thousand. Local activists initially had counselled their populations not to make large demonstrations because this could lead to Beijing's backlash against vulnerable governments in their host countries or even to crackdowns by those governments against them to appease China.⁶⁰ Nonetheless demonstrations soon took place in Kazakhstan. These events could also lead to repressions against local Uighur communities so demonstrations have been rare except for this one. But that has not deterred local communities from writing letters to the UN against China or from

Syroezhkin, "Central Asia Between the Gravitational Poles of Russia and China," all in Boris Rumer, Ed., *Central Asia: A Gathering Storm?*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe & Co., Inc., 2002, pp. 69-113, 114-168, 169-207 respectively

⁵⁸ Quoted in Ramakat Dwivedi, "China's Central Asian Policy in Recent Times," *The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, IV, NO. 4, 2006, p. 155

⁵⁹ Chen Zhixin, Sun Wenbin, Zhou Rong, Huo Wen, Duan Congcong, "China Steps Up Investment and Development of Western Regions: Xinjiang Benefits Looks Down On Its periphery," Beijing, *Huanqiu Shibao Online*, in Chinese, July 8, 2009, *FBIS SOV*, July 9, 2009

⁶⁰ Peter Leonard, "Central Asian Uighurs Fear Crackdown could Spread," *Associated Press*, July 14, 2009

criticizing it on Al-Jazeera.⁶¹ Nevertheless the aforementioned support by local governments for China reflects not only their fear of domestic unrest from minorities in their own countries but a sharp awareness of what Chinese retaliation could mean to them.

Thus Laruelle and Peyrouse rightly observe that the China question has become a key issue for domestic politics and political analysis in Central Asia. This debate permits public and expert opinion to formulate anxieties about independence across a host of issues: the Chinese purchase of natural resources at bargain prices and collusion and corruption by local elites in this process; the present and future conditions of a labor market perceived to be at risk from Chinese trade and investment; the anxieties of small entrepreneurs, or of nativist forces fearing large-scale Chinese migration.⁶² In sum, "China's rise to power has clearly acted as a catalyst, exposing the dysfunctional aspects of the local economies, and compounding the anxieties and phobias connected to the last two decades of major social transformations."⁶³

China's Energy Security Objectives: The Turkmenistan-China Pipeline

On December 14, 2009 China and Turkmenistan formally opened the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Central Asia to China. This pipeline, built with Chinese capital, is the first gas pipeline connecting China to Turkmenistan and to Central Asia, but will not be the last such pipeline. Therefore it has significant consequences for both Central Asia and China, as well as Russia. This pipeline is actually two pipelines. The first pipeline, opened on December 14, travels 1833 KM from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and southern Kazakhstan to Xinjiang in China where it connects to China's domestic pipeline

⁶¹ "Uighurs in Kazakhstan Rally Against China Crackdown," *Reuters*, July 19, 2009; Chris Zambelis, "Xinjiang Crackdown and Changing Perceptions of China In the Muslim World," *China Brief*, IX, NO. 16, August 5, 2009

⁶² Laruelle and Peyrouse, p. 111

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 112

network, ultimately traversing 7000Km (4349 miles). While initially Turkmenistan will be the only supplier of gas; by 2011 Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan will open up the second line, also 1833Km long, enabling China to get gas from all three Central Asian producers, not just Turkmenistan.⁶⁴ Second, the pipeline will be sending China 40bcm by 2012 if not earlier. Thus it stands in stark contrast to the Prikaspiyskii (Caspian coastline) pipeline agreement negotiated by Russia with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in 2007. Whereas the entire Turkmenistan-China pipeline was negotiated, signed, and built in three years, there has been little progress on the Prikaspiyskii pipeline, a stark demonstration of Russian graft, inefficiency and bad faith, compared to China's progress with its Central Asian neighbors.⁶⁵

Consequently even the most cursory analysis of the new pipeline suggests a victory for Turkmenistan and the other Central Asian producers, as well as China, but also a clear defeat for Russia. The benefits to Turkmenistan from this pipeline have already been large since the agreement in 2006 and will continue to flow for some time to come. That deal gave Turkmenistan its first negotiating leverage vis-à-vis Russia, which had consistently forced it to export its gas through Russian pipelines at prices well below the market price for natural gas. Since 2006 Turkmenistan's and other Central Asian states' leverage regarding prices has increased as other options besides Russia became available to them and as Russia's continuing and growing dependence upon cheap Central Asian gas to subsidize its own inefficient and already overly subsidized domestic energy economy while meeting surging European and Asian demand grew.

Although Turkmenistan has not yet sufficiently prevailed upon Moscow to pay

⁶⁴ Open Source Center, Analysis; PRC, Central Asian Media Laud Gas Line: Russian Officials Downplay Impact," *FBIS SOV*, January 5, 2010; Moscow, *ITAR-TASS*, in English, December 14, 2009, *FBIS SOV*, December 14, 2009; Pavel Baev, "China Trumps Gazprom," *Moscow Times*, December 17, 2009 As noted above Uzbekistan will open its section by August 2010

⁶⁵ *Ibid*

European prices for the gas it ships westward, its receipts have clearly grown in size as Russian demand for its gas grew. Thus when the current economic crisis hit in 2008-09 Moscow had committed itself to paying \$300/tcm to Central Asian producers in the belief that it could charge Europe \$380-400/tcm. The crisis ended all that, forcing Moscow to buy Central Asian gas at a loss, a growing and increasingly unaffordable burden for Gazprom. Moscow sought to cut the price it paid but Turkmenistan refused to cut its prices. Then in April 2009 a mysterious explosion in the pipeline to Russia which Turkmenistan blamed on Russia led to a cessation of all shipments for the rest of the year.

As the international economic crisis gained steam and global demand for energy resources dropped dramatically, Gazprom could no longer afford to buy gas at these high prices. But it was unthinkable to raise this issue with Kazakhstan, and political relations with Uzbekistan were too delicate to back out of the deal (which meant gas through the Prikaspiiskii pipeline-author). Therefore it was Turkmenistan by default that had to take the blow alone. The explosion on the pipeline near the Turkmen-Uzbek border in April inflicted little material damage, but it was used as a pretext to put a complete stop to all Turkmen gas imports. The flow was restored in November after Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimukhammedov's visit to Moscow, but Russia bluntly refused to honor the "take-or-pay" provision in the contract.⁶⁶

Moscow also reduced the amount of Turkmen gas that it would take in 2010. Gazprom had been ready to buy over 50bcm from Turkmenistan, in 2010-2012 at a price of \$375/tcm but it scaled back its purchases for 2010-12 to 10.5bcm and wanted to pay Turkmenistan about \$220-240/tcm, the same price it seeks from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Russia believed that these forms of pressure would force Turkmenistan, which depends on gas exports, to relent on the high prices for which it had contracted with Moscow in 2008.⁶⁷ However Turkmenistan employed its new leverage with China to obtain a \$3Billion loan from Beijing for the development of Turkmenistan's South Iolotan gas field with an

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ "Turkmenistan: Gazprom To Make Cutback On Gas Purchases," *Eurasia Insight*, November 24, 2009, www.eurasianet.org; Baev

estimated 4-14 trillion cubic meters.⁶⁸ Turkmenistan raised the amount of gas it will export to China through the pipeline from 30bcm to 40 bcm and granted it the rights to South Iolatan to pay off the loan.⁶⁹ China 's readiness to assist Turkmenistan escape Russian threats has clearly paid off, not just in the rapid construction of this pipeline but also in gaining subsequent contracts and even more gas supplies. Thus in December, 2009 a consortium comprising CNPC, South Korean, and UAE companies won contracts to develop the field in South Iolatan.⁷⁰

Turkmenistan's victory is apparent. And to follow up that victory it is consolidating its diversification policy by building a new pipeline to Iran to provide it with gas. That pipeline will carry 20BCM of gas even though Turkmenistan is only shipping 8bcm annually so Turkmenistan will likely increase its ability to supply Iran, adding more diversity to its customer base.⁷¹ Meanwhile, shortly after the pipeline to China opened Gazprom and Turkmenistan negotiated an agreement to end the acrimony that had poisoned relations between them in 2009. But there is no doubt that Russia lost this round to both Turkmenistan and China and that by implication other Central Asian producers like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have won. Russian officials have tried to put a good face on this deal signalling their unconcern, touting the resumption of gas supplies from Turkmenistan, and reiterating that the new pipeline, by annually shipping 40bcm of gas to China, will make it impossible for Turkmenistan to supply the EU's rival Nabucco pipeline

⁶⁸ Moscow, *ITAR-TASS*, in English, May 29, 2009, *FBIS SOV*, May 29, 2009

⁶⁹ Chemen Durdiyeva, "China, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan Launch Turkmenistan-China Gas Pipeline," *Central Asia Caucasus Analyst*, January 20, 2010

⁷⁰ Beijing, *China Daily Online*, in English, December 31, 2009, *FBIS SOV*, December 31, 2009

⁷¹ "Russia, China, and Iran to Forge a New Energy Axis This Year," www.asianews.it, January 8, 2010

that is supposed to compete with Russian pipelines in shipping Central Asian gas to Europe.⁷² However, this Russian argument only holds water if one believes that Turkmenistan holds much less gas than it claims to possess and that the Gaffney-Cline report of 2009 suggesting vast reserves is wrong or fraudulent.⁷³

Actually Moscow's behavior shows that it understands very well who won this round. In late December 2009 it reached agreement with Ashkhabad to buy 30bcm annually of Turkmen gas starting in 2010 and to build a new pipeline to link untapped gas reserves in eastern Turkmenistan with the Prikaspiiskii pipeline.⁷⁴ Even with this agreement it is clear that by 2012 when the two pipelines connecting China with Central Asia open, China, not Russia, will be the main buyer of Central Asian gas. Even if alternatives like Nabucco have been shut off by Russia's retreat and new agreements (which is doubtful); China's primacy in the Central Asian gas market is undoubtedly a blow to Russia with long-lasting consequences.⁷⁵ As one newspaper report suggested,

Strengthening of China's economic positions will inevitably boost its political influence and eventually transform China into the leader of the whole region and the true master in the regional structures like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. With Russia's silence signifying consent, Central Asian hydrocarbons flow eastward at an ever increasing rate. The impression is that Russia accepted it. Fierce battles for the Turkmen gas with the paper Nabucco rather than with the actual gas pipeline to China plainly show the true scope of Moscow's ambitions. The Kremlin lacks either strength or willingness to put

⁷² *FBIS SOV*, December 14, 2009; Moscow, *ITAR-TASS*, in English, December 22, 2009, *FBIS SOV*, December 22, 2009

⁷³ "Energy Superpower Emerges In the Caspian," <http://www.peakoil.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=43522>, October 18, 2008;

"Turkmenistan Gas Reserves Revealed," www.kommersant.com, October 15, 2008; Regis Gente,

"TURKMENISTAN: ASHGABAT ENERGY-RESERVE CONTROVERSY CONTINUES TO FLARE,"

<http://eurodialogue.org/energy-security/Turkmenistan-Ashgabat-Energy-Reserve-Controversy-Continues-To-Flare>, Accessed on January 18, 2010

⁷⁴ Isabel Gorst, "Russia Welcomes End to Gas Dispute," *Financial Times*, December 22, 2009, www.ft.com

⁷⁵ *FBIS SOV*, December 22, 2009

up a fight for Central Asia. It finds protection of its positions in the European gas market a more rewarding occupation.⁷⁶

Even if this might be an exaggerated assessment of China's future position in Central Asia, China no longer has to approach Russia with regard to gas as a supplicant. Instead it has a superior bargaining position because it does not depend on Russia for gas no matter how much it wants that gas. Despite the Russo-Chinese agreements of 2009 to build pipelines to ship China 68bcm of gas, Russia neither has the money to build the pipelines, nor possibly the gas -- as it closed many fields due to the current crisis -- unless China lends it the money to reactivate pipelines, wells, and fields that were shut down in 2009 due to the economic crisis. Indeed China already produces 76bcm of gas a year and consumes only about 80bcm with Australian LNG making up the difference. So it really does not need Russian gas anytime soon, especially as it will now be getting 40bcm from Turkmenistan.⁷⁷ And, in any case, neither side has yet agreed on prices so their agreements are merely declarations in principle, not hard contracts, and to judge from previous negotiations, no agreement is imminent, despite Russian claims to the contrary. If anything we can expect hard bargaining on prices because China will demand below market prices and Russia will demand market prices in a classic confrontation between supplier and buyer. Russia needs this pipeline and its revenues more than China does, and therefore the Turkmen-China pipeline could ultimately contribute to expanding China's increasingly visible ascendancy over Russia, not just in Central Asia, but in East Asia as well.

Neither is this deal the end of China's offensive in Central Asia, indeed it has only recently begun. This pipeline ties into China's larger strategy of global acquisitions and expansion of influence that became clear in 2009. China's strategy is clear. In conditions

⁷⁶ Alexander Gabuyev, "Cost of the Matter," Moscow, *Kommersant*, December 23, 2009, *FBIS SOV*, December 23, 2009

⁷⁷ "Warmer Ties For Russia, China With Big Gas Deals," www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/10/14/ap/asia/main5384036, October 14, 2009

where Far Eastern infrastructure is only beginning to appear; where the Middle East remains as volatile as ever; and China's Straits of Malacca dilemma remains unabated, it must define energy security as having diverse suppliers, at least some of whom cannot be interdicted in the Indian Ocean by the US, Indian or other navies or other hostile forces. Yet as the Middle East remains its largest source of energy, China's strategy is clearly both one of hedging against the future and of extending its energy and other security links abroad through economic power.

Second, China also seeks to tie Central Asian producers to it to deter them from supporting their cousins and coreligionists, Muslim rebels in Xinjiang, its own largest energy producing province. Third, to the extent that China can gain leverage over both Russia and Central Asian countries, it forestalls a Russian monopoly over Central Asia that could also be used to deprive it of energy or threaten its interests in Xinjiang as happened during the Sino-Soviet split of the period 1956-90 when Moscow sought to exploit Han-Muslim tensions there.⁷⁸ Therefore for geostrategic reasons it also seeks to avoid excessive dependence upon Middle Eastern and African producers even as it buys ever more energy from them, seeking producers as far away as Iran who can then ship gas and oil to it overland through new pipelines that China is helping to build in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan and which could ultimately connect to Iran. Beyond that China ties loans to energy because it not only gets back the loans plus interest it can now tie up energy assets in long-term contracts at reduced prices for exclusive access. Central Asia is one of the links in this chain for China clearly invests its economic resources in countries with which it has a political affinity and which enjoy a dubious reputation abroad because of their authoritarianism.

⁷⁸ Lowell Tillet, "The National Minorities Factor in the Sino-Soviet Dispute," *Orbis*, XXI, No. 2, 1978, pp. 241-260.

CNPC's future plans exemplify the trend. CNPC, in its own words, has been making non-stop acquisitions in Eurasia. In 2009 it announced a detailed plan to "strive to build five cooperation zones covering Central Asia, Africa, South America, the Middle East, and the Asia Pacific region within eight to ten years." Ultimately its overseas oil and gas business would amount to 200 million tons of oil and gas annually.⁷⁹ As this plan does not include the loans for oil plans that have already started with Russia it represents a new campaign.⁸⁰ Indeed, Central Asia is the most important zone for foreign energy cooperation, another sign of the intertwined nature of energy, strategic, and political considerations in China's energy policies.⁸¹ Apart from expanding holdings in Africa and Latin America, the efforts in the Middle East should be strengthened to make it the company's future key development zone. Meanwhile efforts should also be made in the Asia-Pacific for producing both natural gas and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG).⁸² That last point has particular relevance for China's energy ties to Myanmar, a major gas and oil supplier.

CNPC has also indicated that this is an auspicious time for such bold plans since energy demand will grow while China already imports most of its oil. Moreover, CNPC aims to become an integrated international energy company with six oil and gas business centers in Asia, America, and Europe. Meanwhile the value of investment becomes more apparent as global economic growth slows down and both energy and assets decline in price.⁸³ CNPC estimates that Central Asia has 8% of world oil and 5% of world gas and that negotiations are not that tricky since states like Turkmenistan are approaching China.⁸⁴

⁷⁹ Ming Quan, "CNPC's Expansion Blueprint: Oil and Gas Capacity To Reach 200 Million Tons in 10 Years," Guangzhou, *Shiji Jingji Baodao Online*, in Chinese, March 19, 2009, *FBIS SOV*, April 16, 2009

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

Thus in Central Asia CNPC emphasizes the need for going beyond the already estimated 40BCM of gas to be transported through pipelines from there to 50-60BCM annually and transmitting 20 million tons of oil annually through the pipeline from Kazakhstan. Apart from the oil pipeline from Russia discussed below, CNPC wants to finish a pipeline that annually transmits 30BCM of natural gas from Russia. This means a priority on finishing pipeline deals, wrapping up their financing, and their construction from Central Asia and Russia. Therefore we can expect an even greater Chinese energy drive and footprint in these areas, for example, CNPC also wants to establish a heavy oil and LNG shipping company to control those products from the wellhead to China itself.⁸⁵

CNPC also believes that with the breakthrough in Sino-Russian talks there are no longer strategic obstacles to getting oil and gas from all four of these major strategic routes (Central Asia and Russia, South America, Africa, Asia-Pacific) and also expects breakthroughs on the Sino-Burmese pipeline this year.⁸⁶ CNPC also announced its tactics, i.e. merger and acquisition efforts with closely monitored and selected targeted oil and gas companies and assets, i.e. small to medium sized independent oil companies suffering from financial difficulties but with future potential, as well as sophisticated oil and gas assets. Second, it will also target larger oil and gas firms for mergers and acquisitions to expand its overseas oil and gas business.⁸⁷

Inasmuch as the Turkmenistan-China pipeline is now functioning and Turkmenistan has expanded its pipeline capacity to Iran, it does not require much imagination to expect that China will undertake to finance a means of connecting those two pipeline systems into one so that gas as well as oil can be pumped overland from Iran to China through Central Asia. Since 2004 China has signed several major oil and gas deals with Iran which is already

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

supplying over 15% of China's energy needs. The most recent deal for \$3.2 Billion was signed on March 15 2009 where China will help develop the South Pars field, part of what is believed to be the world's largest natural gas reservoir.⁸⁸

But beyond energy considerations these deals meet China and Iran's overall foreign policy objectives. These deals are not only instrumental in ensuring China's continuing receipt of large quantities of oil and gas, they also meet Iran's desire to replace Japan with China as its main Asian energy importer. Iran has previously warned Japan that if it backed out of energy deals due to Western pressure it would turn to China.⁸⁹ Iran's foreign policy since 2001 has also been driven mainly by Tehran's "Ostpolitik", a policy placing primary emphasis on securing Russian, Chinese, and Asian support for its programs. Indeed, Iran seeks broader cooperation with Russia not only on nuclear issues but on a gas cartel and on all security issues in the CIS, or at least so it claims.⁹⁰ And it clearly seeks to be a major supplier to China to earn its political support and help break Western sanctions. Indeed, Iran points to such deals as signs that US claims that foreign energy firms are shunning Iran are baseless and that US opposition to energy deals with Iran can be overcome.⁹¹

Therefore these deals also compromise the unity of the P-5 (permanent members of the Security Council) and the negotiations between the EU and Iran that include China and Russia in forging a strong united front to arrest or reverse Iran's ever more open quest for nuclear weapons. Thanks to these deals Iran not only gains strong supporters in the East, it gains capital to develop its energy systems and evade or mitigate at least some of the impact

⁸⁸ Borzou Daragahi, "Iran Signs \$3.2 Billion Natural Gas Deal With China," *Los Angeles Times*, March 16, 2009, www.latimes.com

⁸⁹ "Iran Eyes Russia, China If Japan Stalls On oil Deal," *The Japan Times*, August 29, 2006, <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nb20060829a1.html>; F. William Engdahl, "China Lays Down Gauntlet in Energy War," *Asia Times Online*, December 21, 2005, www.atimes.com

⁹⁰ Andrei Kolesnikov, "Vladimir Putin Includes Iran in Sextet," *Moscow, Kommersant*, in Russian, June 16, 2006, *FBIS SOV*, June 16, 2006

⁹¹ Wang Ying and Dinakar Sethuraman, "China, Iran Sign \$2Billion Oil Production Agreement," *Bloomberg*, December 10, 2007

of UN and US sanctions. Indeed, according to a report from the CIA, “Chinese entities – which include private companies, individuals, and state-owned military export firms – continue to engage in WMD-related proliferation activities“ to Iran. And even though Beijing has tightened regulations on sensitive equipment exports, “enforcement continues to fall short.”⁹² China not only hamstrings the US and deflects its attention away from China’s growing power, putting it in the status of a demandeur vis-à-vis China as regards Iran. China also gets an enormous source of reliable energy supplies and by forging these deals it has already begun to create a basis for enhancing the viability of any projected pipeline linking it through Pakistan and Central Asia (either Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and/or Pakistan) directly to Iran. Here again China would thus be in a position to realize its ultimate dream of diverse supply lines that cannot be cut off by the US Navy or in this case by Russia or India, all potential rivals.

Thus China’s energy deals with Iran for oil and gas parallel its energy deals in 2009 with Russia and Kazakhstan by consolidating a community of interests binding China to its suppliers. But these deals also enable China to attack U.S. objectives, attain lasting partnerships with important energy suppliers and generally strategically important states, gain secure and reliable energy supplies, deflect Washington’s attention and energy away from it and its growth, and to do so at relatively little political cost.

Beyond that oil pipeline from Iran China is also considering a major infrastructural investment there to make it into an overall energy corridor where it sets up an oil refinery and Gwadar Port Energy zone that also accommodates other energy industries, and creates the basis for oil and gas exploration projects in Pakistan from which the latter will benefit as well.⁹³

⁹² “Iranian Nuclear Work Unhindered By Sanctions, CIA Report Says,” *Global Security Newswire*, May 8, 2009, Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org, or <http://gsn.nti.org>

⁹³ “Chinese Mulling \$13B Investment in Gwadar,” *Pakistan Real Estate Now*, May 9, 2008, www.livenreal.com/news/index.php/chinese-mulling-13b-investment-in-gwadar; Sumita

Thus much of its investment in energy and infrastructure abroad in Central Asia seems to be connected or could easily be connected with its efforts to open up the port of Gwadar. Were this port to be established as a hub it could spare China the necessity of going through the Straits of Malacca and become the hub of a network of pipelines from Iran and the Middle East, if not also South and Central Asia, to China.⁹⁴ Indeed, China's so called string of pearls strategy in the Indian Ocean that combines large infrastructural developments in and around Myanmar and Pakistan with military construction of what appears to be potential naval bases, not only is viewed as an effort to project naval power into that Ocean through available ports or bases, but also as a way of bypassing the Straits of Malacca and creating strongholds of economic and political influence tying these areas to China through energy and infrastructural investments.⁹⁵ When and if the infrastructure tying these ports to China is completed these projects could create long-lasting economic and political relationships dominated by China and that ensure that Middle Eastern and African energy supplies need not be at risk in the Straits of Malacca. Finally there are also unconfirmed reports of a renewed Chinese interest in the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline where it would replace India.⁹⁶ If that does happen these linkages could then be greatly developed in practice.

Although most of China's energy imports still come from the Middle East; Beijing is clearly and rapidly seeking to diversify its suppliers on a global basis: Venezuela, other Latin American countries, Africa, Russia, and Central Asia. Neither will China slacken the pace of

Kumar, "The China-Pakistan Relationship: Trade, Investment, Energy, and Infrastructure," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 31, NO. 5, 2007, pp. 757-790

⁹⁴ Kumar, pp. 757-790

⁹⁵ Erickson and Goldstein, pp. 43-76; Shebonti Ray Dadwal, "China's Search for Energy Security: Emerging Dilemmas," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 31, No. 6, 2007, pp. 889-914; You Ji, "Dealing with the Malacca Dilemma: China's Effort to Protect Its Energy Supply," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 31, NO. 3, 2007, pp. 467-489; Gupreet S. Khurana, "China's 'String of Pearls' In the Indian Ocean and Its Security implications," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2008, pp. 1-39

⁹⁶ Stephen Blank, "Will China Join the Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline,?" *Jamestown China Brief*, X, No. 5, March 5, 2010

acquisitions anytime soon. As noted above, CNPC's program will not stop. It recently announced its intention to invest up to \$44 Billion in oil and gas projects in 2009, especially in core projects like the ongoing Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline that will send China 15 billion tons of oil a year from 2011-2034. We can expect that other projects in Central Asia, e.g. the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan, will also be moved further to completion and that Chinese firms and the government will continue searching for distressed energy firms that they can acquire at cut-rate prices to gain global and regional leverage among suppliers and governments.

Beyond Russia, Becoming Local: Trajectories of Adaption to the Fall of the Soviet Union among Ethnic Russians in the Former Soviet Republics

Pål Kolstø

When I began teaching Russian area studies at the University of Oslo in 1990, the so-called ‘new Russian diaspora’ had suddenly become a hotly disputed topic on the political as well as on the academic agenda. Until that time hardly anyone had paid much attention to the fact that millions of ethnic Russians, 25 millions to be more exact, were living within the USSR but outside the Russian republic, the RSFSR. The Soviet Union, while formally a federation was perceived as a strongly centralized state, and most Sovietologists concentrated on political developments in Moscow, if not to say: in the Kremlin. Secondly, ethnic issues were generally not regarded as politically important, and attracted few students. Finally, to the extent that the ethnic make-up of the USSR was taken note of at all, observers found it quite natural that ethnic Russians were living all over the country. The USSR functioned as a single job market, and it was only to be expected that people moved around from one republic to another.

It is a moot issue to what extent ethnicity really was an independent source of change behind the processes that led up to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The reform policies of the Gorbachev administration were initiated from above, with little pressure from below, and primarily for *economic* reasons. The new leaders in the Kremlin had an acute sense that their country was falling ever further behind the most advanced western countries in economic development, and concluded that they had to introduce a measure of political liberalism in

order to reinvigorate Soviet society. In some republics the new scope for political initiative from below was used by local politicians to press for more republican power. Soon also activists outside the party made use of ethnicity as a means to mobilize the population against the communist system. In a country like Poland the communist regime had been challenged by a massive popular movement organized as a *labor union*, the *Solidarność*, with strong backing from the national *church*, Polish Catholicism. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the labor unions were completely docile and could not play any similar role as a vessel for opposition, and the church had no tradition of independent action. In this country, the only potential collective identity that could be activated for political purposes was ethnicity. Unlike religion, ethnicity had *not* been suppressed in the Soviet Union, on the contrary it had been *pervasively institutionalized*, on two levels: Individually, as all Soviet citizens carried with them at all times their internal passport in which their personal, ascriptive ethnicity or ‘nationality’ was marked in the so-called 5th point; and on the collective level, as the entire state was organized as a gigantic federation of ethnically defined republics (Suny 1993; Slezkine 1994). Now these two levels were politicized simultaneously and combined in a highly combustive mix: the new political entrepreneurs demanded independence for their republics with an *ethnic* justification: Ukraine was cast as the homeland of Ukrainians, Latvia as the homeland of Latvians, and so on. The correspondence between the republican structure and the ethnic map of the Soviet Union, however, was, as we all know, far from perfect. Not only millions of ethnic Russians, but also multitudes of other Soviet citizens lived outside their putative ‘homelands’. In the new ethnicized political climate these people were increasingly regarded as literally ‘out of place’.

As these developments were unfolding in the Soviet Union, similar processes took place in Yugoslavia, another communist federation that exhibited many of the same features as the USSR: also in Yugoslavia, ethnicity was the defining feature of the federation, in fact,

the Yugoslav communists had taken over the ethnofederal idea from the Soviets at the time when Tito and Stalin were still on good terms. And importantly, in Yugoslavia, just as much as in the USSR, a substantial portion of the population lived outside the republic that was named after ‘their’ ethnic group. Also in Yugoslavia the geographical dispersion of the largest ethnic group, in this case the Serbs, represented a particularly important obstacle to an amicable dismemberment of the unitary state into ethnically defined components: the Serbs lived in large numbers outside Serbia – in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro -- as well as in the two ethnic units that were formally parts of the Serb republic, Kosovo and Vojvodina. The Serb population in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo soon got caught up in a frenzy of ethnic violence: in wars that erupted in these republics in the 1990s somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000 people were killed. In these wars the status and situation of the local Serbs was one of the major bones of contention.

The Yugoslav carnage sent shockwaves throughout the world and the parallels between the internal Serbian diaspora in Yugoslavia and the internal Russian diaspora in USSR were not lost on political pundits. Alarmists feared that a blow-up of the Soviet Union could lead to a Yugoslavia scenario writ large. The famous American historian Paul Kennedy (Kennedy 1989, p 664) who published his celebrated book *The rise and fall of great powers* in 1989, wrote worriedly that ‘there is nothing in the character or tradition of the Russian state to suggest that it could ever accept imperial decline peacefully’. Another sinister parallel was the dissolution of the French colonial empire: France had certainly not accepted imperial decline peacefully, and the most protracted carnage took place precisely in the colony which contained the highest number of French settlers, Algeria.

As it happened, however, the breakup of the Soviet Union entailed remarkably little violence. It was as an ‘implosion’ rather than an explosion. To be sure, there was bloodshed and even full-sized civil wars in some republics, with Tajikistan and Azerbaijan/Armenia as

the worst cases, with tens of thousands of casualties each. We ought to recognize, however, that compared to what was taking place in Yugoslavia at the time, this was far less than what could have occurred in the Soviet Union, and we ought to be thankful for that. This outcome was far from obvious at the time and requires an explanation.

The answer clearly must be sought in several independent circumstances. On the level of national politics, there was a crucial difference in the role played by the leaders of the two largest republics, Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia and Boris Yeltsin in Russia. Milosevic pursued an actively confrontational course vis-à-vis the other Yugoslav republics while Boris Yeltsin for his part sought *alliances* with the other republican leaders in the USSR. The behavior of the Russian leader was perfectly rational under the circumstances: Yeltsin's main political foe was Gorbachev, the president of the Soviet Union, and in the power struggle between these two men it was a smart move of Yeltsin to align himself with non-Russian leaders who had an interest in eliminating Gorbachev's power base, the USSR. In Yugoslavia, on the other hand, there was no counterpart to Gorbachev whom Milosevic had to struggle against, and all the destructive energies of the Serbian president were spent on confrontations with the non-Serbs.

But what about the position of the internal diaspora of the dominant ethnic group in the two countries, the Serbs outside Serbia and the Russians outside Russia? There clearly were important structural parallels between the two cases. With a few exceptions, however, the Russian diasporians did not mobilize but remained rather passive. Indicatively, the most violent conflicts during the dissolution of the Soviet Union took place precisely in those republics where very few Russians were living, such as Tajikistan and Armenia/Azerbaijan, and the local Russians were not involved.

To be sure, some local activists among the Russians in the non-Russian republics did organize peacefully, by starting Russian centers, so-called *obshchiny* or communities, and so

on. When I and other researchers who were interested in the plight of the Russian diasporians at the time travelled to the various republics, we naturally visited these centers, talked to their leaders, read their newsletters, and so on. Sometimes these centers gave the impression of being quite vibrant and active, with articulate and energetic leaders. Very often, however, this impression was misleading. In a population of some hundred thousand Russians, or even millions, a handful of activists were not able to make much of an impact. As it turned out, these centers in many cases consisted of many chiefs and few Indians. The vast majority of the local Russians often had not heard of their self-appointed spokespersons, and if they had, they remained indifferent to their activities.

During perestroika Soviet loyalists in some republics organized so-called ‘inter-fronts’ to fight for the preservation of the Soviet unitary state. This was a countermove to the establishment of so-called ‘popular fronts’ that fought first for the cultural rights of the titular nation and gradually also for political sovereignty for the republics. While some local Russians sympathized with the popular fronts and a few titulars supported the interfronts, it is fair to say that the standoff between these two types of movements pitted Russophones and titulars against each other. This was a battle which the Russophones lost resoundingly. Their rallies were pitifully small compared to the massive gatherings which the popular fronts could muster. A remarkable feature of interfronts rallies was also the high average age among the participants (Kolstø, 1995, 113). It seems almost as if the only Soviet loyalists in the republics who were willing to take to the streets to protest against the wave of titular nationalism, were the pensioners.

This Russian tranquility is quite remarkable since there were many good reasons why we should anticipate mobilization, and I will point to some of them. The first is *the resource factor*. Many students of political mobilization point to the availability of resources as a critical factor behind collective action. (for instance (Tarrow 1994) In general terms the

Russians living in the non-Russian republics must indeed be characterized as highly resourceful. On the average they had a level of education well above the level of the local indigenous population. This was true in particular with regard to Moldova, and Central Asia, the Slavic republics, but not so much in the Baltics and Transcaucasia (see table 1.) (It should be noted that this table probably underreports Russian education somewhat since it registers only students studying in the republics. Ethnic Russians to a higher degree than non-Russians tended to go to Russia – Moscow and Leningrad – for their studies.)

**Table 1. RATIO OF INDIGENOUS AND RUSSIAN STUDENTS WITHIN UNION REPUBLICS
1959/60 AND 1969/70**

| <i>Republic</i> | <i>Nationality</i> | <i>Students per 1000 conationals in rep.</i> | |
|-----------------|--------------------|--|-----------------------|
| | | <i>1959/ 1960</i> | <i>1969/ 1970</i> |
| RSFSR | Russians | | 20.7 |
| Estonia | Estonians | 12.4 | 17.3 |
| | Russians | 8.0 | 14.5 |
| Latvia | Latvians | 10.7 | 14.3 |
| | Russians | 9.4 | 22.6 |
| Lithuania | Lithuanians | 11.0 | 19.0 |
| | Russians | 6.8 | 21.9 |
| Belarus | Belarusians | 6.1 | 12.2 |
| | Russians | 19.2 | 36.4 |
| Moldova | Moldovans | 5.1 | 10.1 |
| | Russians | 15.0 | 19.1 |
| Ukraine | Ukrainians | 8.1 | 15.1 |
| | Russians | 17.6 | 29.3 |
| Georgia | Georgians | 16.6 | 23.6 |
| | Russians | 13.2 | 14.6 |

| | | | |
|--------------|--------------|------|------|
| Azerbaijan | Azerbaijanis | 10.2 | 20.8 |
| | Russians | 10.6 | 23.7 |
| Turkmenistan | Turkmens | 7.9 | 13.4 |
| | Russians | 14.9 | 19.9 |
| Tajikistan | Tajiks | 9.0 | 13.6 |
| | Russians | 17.8 | 26.7 |
| Uzbekistan | Uzbeks | 9.5 | 17.2 |
| | Russians | 24.0 | 29.7 |
| Kyrgyzstan | Kyrgyzs | 9.8 | 17.8 |
| | Russians | 10.2 | 19.8 |
| Kazakhstan | Kazakhs | 11.2 | 18.9 |
| | Russians | 8.6 | 15.4 |

Source: Karklins 1984, p. 284.

Ethnic Russians in the republics were highly urbanized and clustered primarily in the capital and other large cities. They were more often employed in white collar jobs and in general belonged to what one might loosely call ‘the intelligentsia’, in particular the technical intelligentsia (Kaiser 1994) chapter 5). The percentage among them who worked in prestigious and influential positions was clearly higher than among Russians in the RSFSR, which suggests that geographical and social mobility often go together. This is a phenomenon often observed also among other diaspora groups as well.(Cohen 1997; Chua 2003)

One important resource which Michelle Commercio has recently drawn attention to, is access to informal networks (Commercio 2010). This factor, however, was unevenly distributed among the various Russian diaspora communities and this, Commercio believes, may explain why Russians in some republics mobilized politically during and after perestroika to a higher degree than in other republics. *In casu*, she compares Latvia and Kyrgyzstan and finds that Russians in the former republic had denser and more powerful networks to draw on than in the latter. Access to powering Central Asia was gained through

tightly knit kinship networks from which the Europeans were excluded. These traditional networks were not disrupted under the Soviet system; on the contrary, in many places they thrived and blossomed. The Brezhnev regime largely accepted that political power in the Asian republics remained concentrated in the hands of the titular nationality, as long as the local leadership did not challenge the power structures in Moscow.

I believe, however, that Commercio somewhat overestimates the level of mobilization among Russians in Latvia. While no doubt more impressive than the activities of Russians in Kyrgyzstan, it paled in comparison with the mobilization of the titulars in Latvia, and in most other republics, during perestroika.

Furthermore, the *grievances* which the Russian diasporians experienced would lead us to expect mobilization in defense of their rights. Many theories of ethnic conflict take as their starting point that people rebel when they are aggrieved (for instance Gurr 1993, pp. 61-88). Even if there were important differences among the various republics it is fair to say that the Russians most places have had ample ground to feel discriminated against. In Estonia and Latvia they were denied the right to obtain original citizenship such as the titular population was granted. They had to apply for citizenship on a par with recent immigrants, and fulfill relatively stringent criteria as regards residence, proficiency in the state language, etc. Moreover, also in some states where the Russians do enjoy full voting rights they are not automatically guaranteed political representation in proportion to their share of the total population. After independence the titular nationality has to an increasing degree monopolized political positions and top administrative jobs.

In many new states, particularly in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, Russians are gradually being squeezed out of their top level job in administration, technical professions and other white color jobs. The Russians seem to resent this kind of discrimination more than political marginalization, as it hits them where it hurts most--in professional opportunities,

income levels, and standards of living. Also in the Baltics the ‘locals’ are gradually monopolizing entire sectors of the labor market, particularly jobs in the state bureaucracy.(Kolstø 2008)

In their book *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics* Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff point to group discrimination as one major trigger behind ethnic mobilization. In their view, however, discrimination is not a sufficient factor; it has to be combined with *group cohesion* in order to unleash collective action. Discrimination leads to resentment and anger, but not necessarily to mobilization, they assert. If the group that is discriminated against shares a high degree of common ethnic identity, the likelihood increases that their reaction will take the form of a collective action. Conversely, if group cohesion is lacking, the likelihood that mobilization will take place is considerably reduced.(Gurr and Harff) This leads us to the crucial question of identity. There are good reasons to believe that this variable may be an important factor that may explain the low degree of collective action among Russians in the non-Russian republics.

Identity as a mobilizational factor

Russians in the Soviet Union, and in the tsarist empire before that, seem to have had a rather weak sense of ethnic identity. This is not to say that they were devoid of any collective identity altogether. Russian nationalism no doubt was a phenomenon in the past, and continues to exist today. Historically, however, this nationalism did not focus primarily on ethnicity or culture. To be sure, ethnocultural Russian nationalism did exist – Alexander Solzhenitsyn may be regarded as an important spokesperson of this tendency – but it was not dominant. Much more common was *state-oriented nationalism*. A typical attitude among Russian nationalists was pride in the huge state which had been established on the vast Eurasian continent and of which they were citizens. The fact that this was a multiethnic state did not bother them much, rather, it was seen as quite natural (Szporluk 1989; Hosking 1997).

This has several important consequences. It meant that during the perestroika it *was* possible to mobilize Russians in support of the threatened unitary Soviet state, in the interfronts, even if these moments were far more modest and torpid than the comparable movements in support of centripetal non-Russian nationalism. The flip side of this strong focus on state and territory in collective Russian identity is that Russian ethnic consciousness was generally weak. As pointed out above, ethnicity, or ‘nationality’ was institutionalized in the Soviet Union not only in the federal structure of the state, but also on the individual level through the internal passport system. Also ethnic Russians had their *natsionalnost*’ written into their ID documents in this way, but this, it seems, did not bring about the same strong ethnic attachment as in most other groups. In order to explain why this was so, Rogers Brubaker draws a parallel to the USA. Also in the USA ethnicity is an important identity marker, but not equally strong for all groups. ‘Whiteness’ is in a sense the quality of being *unmarked*, of not being ‘ethnic’ at all. The same was the case with Russianness in the USSR. ‘Russianness was a zero-value, an unthematized background condition,’ Brubaker argues (Brubaker 1996, .p. 49) There are good reasons to treat ‘Russianness’ in the Soviet Union as a *category* rather than as a *group*, if we by the term ‘group’ imply cohesion, solidarity, and a sense of common identity.

Brubaker does, however, believe that Russians who lived in the republics were more conscious of their nationality than Russians in the RSFSR. This came about as a reaction to the increased assertiveness on the part of the titular nationalities (Brubaker, 1996, p. 49). But even if many Russians in the republics did have a keen feeling of being different from the local population this does not mean that they necessarily identified with the entire Russian group as a collectivity . As I travelled around in the non-Russian republics in the 1990s, I often had the chance to discuss identity questions with Russian activists and community leaders in the non-Russian republics. When I asked if they believed that local Russians were

in any way different from Russian in the Russian Federation, I was struck both by the uniformity and the insistence of their affirmative answers. Almost without exception they would insist that ‘of course’ they were different, it could be no question about it. Their answers also revealed that they had a very positive self-perception when they compared themselves to Russians in the core group. The qualities which they ascribed to Russians in their own republic were generally better than what they associated with Russians in general: They believed that they had higher personal standards, were more conscientious and hardworking, less given to drinking, and had more stable marriages.(Kolstø 1999; Kolstø 2002) When asked to explain why this was the case, they often pointed to the wholesome influence of the local, indigenous people among whom they were living. Thus, for instance, Russians in Estonia would claim that they were highly disciplined and hardworking because they had been imbued with the Estonians’ Protestant work ethic. At the same time, Russians in Estonia did *not* claim to be particularly faithful spouses, having instead the same high divorce rates as Estonians. In Central Asia, by contrast, the local Russians were more proud of their marital fidelity and less proud of their conscientiousness at work: allegedly, the traditional values of the local Muslim communities had rubbed off on them.

We are of course talking here about stereotypes, but as the so-called Thomas theorem goes, ‘If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’. And the skeptical attitudes of the diaspora Russians towards Russians in the core group were to a large extent reciprocated by Russians in Russia. Russians from the republics who moved back to Russia frequently reported that they received a less than cordial welcome. As one leader of a local ‘Slavic Diaspora’ organization in southern Kyrgyzstan complained in 1993: ‘More often than not those who think that they have arrived in their historical homeland, find that they are regarded as aliens’ (Uleev 1993, p. 3).

We should, however, avoid any dichotomizing description of the Russian group as consisting of two parts -- a core and a periphery -- as if each of these two parts have a high degree of cohesion internally. That does not seem to be the case. In my discussions with Russian activists in the non-Russian republics I have been struck by their lack of knowledge about, and even interest in, the plight of their co-ethnics in the other republics. Their frame of reference is the country in which they are living. This is true both of those who make an effort to adapt and of activists who complain bitterly about discrimination and feel thoroughly alienated from the political regime in their country. Life in the neighboring countries seems to be quite literally foreign to them. As one leading Russian expert on the Russian diaspora, Igor Zevelev, remarks, 'a characteristic trait of the Russian diasporas is their fragmentation and weak mobilization. There are no noticeable horizontal links between them. They are distinguishable by size, life style, and level of integration into the local society. They do not have a common enemy or common dreams for the future.' (Zevelev 2008, p. 6).

An important line of division within the Russian diaspora communities runs between old-timers and recent arrivals. While some Russians have been born in the republics, as had in some cases even their parents, others came as adults, in order to study, serve there in the military or – most commonly – in search of work. The latecomers became in many ways less integrated in the local culture and society. One clear sign of this was their lack of familiarity with the local language. Few Russians knew the titular language well, but those who had lived there all or most of their life could often make themselves understood in the shops or on the bazaars. This was far less common among the recent immigrants. Those Russians who did not learn the local language were not consigned to a Russian-language ghetto, since they could always expect to be understood when they used Russian. Even so, they cut themselves off from the local culture in a way that more adaptable Russians did not.

After the break-up, new trajectories.

I believe that the blurred and diffuse group identity of ethnic Russians in the Soviet Union was one important factor behind the peaceful outcome of the processes that led to the collapse of the unitary state. In a study of *Russians beyond Russia* from 1995, Neil Melvin concludes that ‘even in the late 1980s Russians remained ethnically unconsolidated’ (Melvin 1995, p. 125). If this is a correct description of the situation prior to and during perestroika, how has the situation evolved since that time? More specifically, are the Russians adapting, mentally and socially, to the new political realities, or may we see a backlash of a new nostalgia for the good old days under the Communist regime, the time before the nationalizing policies in the new states commenced?

In an article in *Ethnic and Racial studies* in 1996 I developed a typology of possible identity trajectories of the Russians in the former soviet republics (see table 2). It could be interesting to revisit this article today and see if we now can give any more specific answers.

Table 2. Possible Russian diaspora identities.

| | CULTURAL SELFUNDERSTANDING | | |
|---|----------------------------|--|--|
| | A External homeland | B New | C Nationalizing state of residence |
| POLITICAL LOYALTY | | | |
| 1 Historical boundaries (reconstitution of the USSR) | Traditional Soviet | New Cossacks (maximum programme) | |

| | | | |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------|
| 2. External Homeland (Russia) | Irredentism | New Cossacks (minimum programme) | |
| 3. New state of its own | | The Dniester Syndrome | |
| 4 Nationalizing state of residence | Integrating national minority | Integrating new Diaspora | Assimilation |

Source: Kolstø 1996)

As you will see, in this matrix I operated with four possible political loyalties along the vertical axis and three cultural identities or self-understandings on the horizontal axis. Some boxes were empty since they represent highly unlikely or even self-contradictory outcomes. Thus, for instance, if a person assimilates culturally into the nationalizing state of reference, he or she is not likely to hang on to a political loyalty to the external homeland, Russia.

1. Continued attachment to the former Soviet Union certainly was strong among many Russians in the first years after the dissolution of the unitary state, among diasporians as well as among people in Russia. This attitude revealed itself for instance in the resolution in the Duma in March 1996 which denounced the dissolution of the Soviet Union with 250 votes against 98 (Kolstø 2000, p. 204). This attachment, however, is bound to be weakened. Over the last 20 years a whole new generation had grown up who has no personal memories of this state. Most people realize that restitution of this state is a completely lost case. In 1998 Natalia Kosmarskaia found that 25-30% of Russians in Kyrgyzstan still identified with ‘the Soviet people’ as the community of people they belonged to (Kosmarskaia 2006) (2006: 377-8) Some will regard this as much, other as little, but the important point which Kosmarskaia

makes is that Soviet nostalgia does not influence peoples actions in the way the alternative options do: it is a purely *emotional background factor*. When people have to make choices, alternatives which actually exist have a kind of ontological upper hand over hypothetical alternatives.

2. In contrast to the USSR the Russian Federation does indeed exist, and political allegiance to Russia is a real alternative. Several factors ensure that Russia continues to exert a considerable pull force on Russians in the other post-Soviet republics. First and foremost, Russian media still enjoy a strong position in most of the Soviet successor states. Popular Russian newspapers like *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* and *Argumenty i fakty* can be bought virtually all over the former Soviet space. These newspapers are edited in Moscow, but printed locally. As was the case before the breakup of the USSR they also have some locally edited pages focusing on local matters in the republics in which they are sold. In any case, they function as an important source of information about the 'external homeland'.

Even more important than the print media is television. For most people in most countries TV is their main source of information and entertainment, and the former Soviet Union is no exception in this regard. It is probably true that most Russians in the new states today are just as up-dated on Russian politics as on politics in their state of residence, if not more. By watching Russian soap operas, reality TV, and talk shows they also become in a sense part of a Russian virtual universe. As Michael Billig (Billig 1995) has strongly emphasized, our ideas about who we are, are strongly influenced by the lexicon and images used in the media. When the anchor man in the evening news says 'here' or 'we have', the viewers do not have to be told where 'here' is, or who 'we' are: it is 'in *our* country' and '*our* nation'. In that way, Russian TV viewers in the new states are in a sense subconsciously sucked into a Russia-centered universe.

However, there are clear limits to this mechanism of identification. When the meteorologist on Russian TV stands in front of a map of Russia and announces that ‘we’ will have nice weather tomorrow, the Russians in Moldova or Kazakhstan know that the city *they* live in, is *not* on that map. They are *not* included in the large ‘we’ which the meteorologist invites the viewers to participate in. Potentially, therefore, the psychological processes Billig have identified may lead to an alienation process in a diaspora situation. This is just a hypothesis which hopefully someone one day will try to test out empirically.

An important factor which weakens the Russia option for the Russians in the nationalizing non-Russian states is the diaspora policy pursued by the Russian state. This claim may seem surprising since the general view is that Russia has been rather aggressive in its defense of the rights of the Russians in the other former Soviet republics, in particular in Estonia and Latvia. This is indeed true, Russia does insist that the country has a right and a duty to pose as the protector of all Russians in the so-called ‘near abroad’. In official parlance these people are called *sootchestvenniki*, or ‘compatriots’, even if they, strictly speaking, do not share a common ‘fatherland’ with Russians in Russia, except in those cases when they have taken up Russian citizenship. The Russian law ‘On Relations with *Sootchestvenniki* Abroad’ was adopted in 1999 and, with some amendments, still remain in force. (Российская Федерация, 1999) This law loudly declares that ‘*Sootchestvenniki* who reside abroad are entitled to support from the Russian Federation in the realization of their civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights’. Specifically, the diaspora groups may expect to receive diplomatic support when their rights are violated, as well as financial support for cultural and educational institutions and facilities.

In 1995, Neil Melvin (Melvin 1995, p. 127) argued that in part through the efforts of politicians and activists in Russia ‘large sections of the Russian-speaking settler communities have, for the first time, begun to think of themselves as members of the Russian nation and of

the Russian Federation as their homeland'. Most observers, however, interpret the effect of the Russian diaspora policy differently. Russian saber rattling vis-à-vis those former Soviet republics that discriminate against the rights of the local Russians has not been followed up by militant policies of any kind. A recent analysis of Russian foreign policy concluded that 'as before, Russian diaspora policy has a most diffuse character'. (Kortunov 2009, 233). Michelle Commercio (Commercio 2010, 19) claims that 'Russia has made noise on a sporadic basis about the treatment of its compatriots in the "near abroad" but has done very little to alleviate grievances.' The means that have been set aside for diaspora support have often been miserly. In the 1990s this could perhaps be explained by the dire financial situation in Russia, but in spite of the establishment of special programs in support of the diaspora in 2006 and 2007, this situation has continued also under Putin and Medvedev. According to Igor Zevelev, this is because 'Moscow has always regarded the rights and interests of the Russian and other Russian-speaking minorities not as a goal in itself, but a means to achieve a leadership role in the territory of the former Soviet Union' (Zevelev 2008). Whenever protection of the diaspora has conflicted with other, more important objectives, the diaspora has been sacrificed on the altar of *realpolitik*.

3. We then turn to the third alternative, to create new Russian-dominated state outside Russia, comparable to the two Serb quasi-states in the former Yugoslavia, Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Republika Srpska Krajina in Croatia. In the former USSR this scenario has been realized only in one instance, the Dniester Republic in Moldova. The circumstances that led up to the establishment of this de facto state were in many respects unique and non-replicable elsewhere. The decisive factor that made it possible was the presence of the 14th Soviet Army on the Dniester left bank which intervened actively on the side of the separatists in the short civil war in Moldova in 1992. (Kolsto, Edemsky et al. 1993)

It is debatable to what degree the Dniester leaders really want to have a state of its own or whether they would prefer to be included in the Russian Federation as an exclave similar to Kaliningrad. The Dniester elite opinions seem to be divided, but in an article which I coauthored in 1998 (Kolstø and Malgin 1998) we argued that the local population in the Dniester republic indeed has a strong sense of a separate Dniestrian identity which sustains the idea of a separate state project outside Russia.

4. Finally, we reach the fourth and last of the political options open to the Russian diasporians, which is loyalty towards the state they are living in, their nationalizing state of residence. When I developed my typology in 1996 I regarded this as the most likely option, and now, 14 years later, I stick to my gun. Before I move on to a discussion about which of the three cultural self identifications this political option is most likely to be combined with I will give my reasons why I believe the trend is moving toward increasing political localization.

1. My first argument is related to the sudden near collapse of traffic communications among the former Soviet republics after perestroika. In the Soviet Union, long distance travel was remarkably cheap. The limiting factor was not so much prices as access to attractive tickets, which you could get through your work place, personal contacts (*blat*), or in other ways. In any case, most people who wanted to visit friends or relatives in another republic, could find ways to do so. And very many *did* have relatives in other republics. It was not uncommon to have been born in Kazakhstan, where the parents were still living, having moved to Estonia in search of a job, while grandparents, siblings, or uncles lived in Tajikistan, Ukraine, or Moldova. As long as the Soviet Union existed these were all places which one could be able to visit perhaps once every two or three years, but under perestroika they became all of a sudden off limits. In some cases visa acquisition and bureaucratic red tape was the problem, but more importantly, people no longer could afford these long distance flights. The prices of air tickets soared uncontrollably while salaries remained the same, and

the money had to be spent on the bare necessities of life. To a much larger degree than before the Russian diasporians were literally stuck in their place of residence.

Another important factor behind the localization of the Russian diaspora communities is outmigration. Those Russians in the former Soviet republics who did travel to Russia, now often bought a one-way ticket only. The outmigration of Russians from the republics has not been as large as some observers expected (for instance Dunlop 1994), but was nevertheless quite significant, with total figures in the range of 3 to 4 million people. Importantly, the outflow has been uneven, very high from some republics and low from others. The highest figures are registered in the Caucasian republics, where the Russian populations were rather small already in the 1980s (between 40 and 70% outmigration). In addition, approximately a quarter of the population in Central Asia, 10% to 15% in the Baltic republics, but only 1-3% in the two Slavic Republics, Ukraine and Belarus have emigrated (see table 3 and 4).

Table 3 Net migration of ethnic Russians to and from the new abroad by republic, 1990-1996 (in thousands)

| Republic | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 |
|-----------|------|-------|-------|------|-------|------|------|
| Estonia | 2.8 | 3.6 | 18.7 | 10.6 | 8.2 | 6.2 | 4.1 |
| Latvia | 3.5 | 5.2 | 19.7 | 19.4 | 19.3 | 10.7 | 5.9 |
| Lithuania | 5.1 | 4.5 | 10.2 | 13.4 | 5.4 | 2.2 | 8.4 |
| Belarus | 5.6 | - 2.0 | -4.6 | 1.2 | 13.3 | 9.2 | 3.4 |
| Moldova | 3.0 | 4.9 | 11.5 | 3.7 | 7.0 | 7.8 | 7.3 |
| Ukraine | -4.9 | -24.7 | -12.3 | 38.5 | 101.0 | 64.8 | 61.7 |
| Armenia | 3.6 | 3.3 | 5.6 | 6.4 | 4.6 | 2.4 | 1.6 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Georgia | 42.9 | 17.6 | 35.1 | 22.9 | 19.0 | 14.2 | 9.1 |
| Azerbaijan | 9.5 | 18.0 | 29.6 | 33.8 | 24.2 | 15.7 | 12.3 |
| Kazakhstan | 36.3 | 25.6 | 82.4 | 104.4 | 234.3 | 143.7 | 98.2 |
| Kyrgyzstan | 16.1 | 15.5 | 41.4 | 66.4 | 42.9 | 13.4 | 7.3 |
| Tajikistan | 31.7 | 14.4 | 47.1 | 40.9 | 25.8 | 22.3 | 15.1 |
| Turkmenistan | 4.4 | 4.7 | 10.9 | 6.7 | 13.0 | 12.2 | 14.0 |
| Uzbekistan | 40.2 | 27.9 | 65.2 | 50.7 | 93.5 | 64.2 | 23.0 |
| Total | 199.8 | 118.5 | 360.5 | 419.0 | 611.5 | 389.0 | 271.4 |

**Table 4. Net migration of ethnic Russians to and from the new abroad by republic,
1990-1996 (in thousands), continued**

| Republic | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | total. 1990-2000 | Percentage of 1989 population in republic |
|------------|-------|-------|------|------|---------------------|---|
| Estonia | 2.2 | 1.0 | .2 | .3 | 57.9 | 12.1 |
| Latvia | 4.0 | 2.4 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 92.2 | 10.1 |
| Lithuania | .5 | .5 | .2 | .4 | 50.8 | 14.8 |
| Belarus | .4 | -2.2 | -3.7 | -1.6 | 19 | 1.4 |
| Moldova | 4.2 | 3.1 | 2.5 | 4.7 | 59.7 | 10.6 |
| Ukraine | 46.7 | 35.2 | 13.9 | 20.9 | 340.8 | 3.0 |
| Armenia | 1.0 | .8 | .5 | .6 | 30.4 | 70.9 |
| Georgia | 5.5 | 4.4 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 176.8 | 51.5 |
| Azerbaijan | 7.6 | 4.4 | 2.2 | 1.8 | 159.1 | 40.6 |
| Kazakhstan | 150.5 | 130.5 | 79.2 | 76.7 | 1161.8 | 18.7 |

| | | | | | | |
|--------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|------|
| Kyrgyzstan | 4.8 | 3.2 | 4.4 | 9.8 | 225.2 | 24.6 |
| Tajikistan | 9.8 | 7.4 | 4.2 | 3.6 | 222.3 | 57.3 |
| Turkmenistan | 9.8 | 5.8 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 89.9 | 26.9 |
| Uzbekistan | 19.7 | 23.0 | 22.7 | 22.7 | 452.8 | 27.4 |
| Total | 266.7 | 219.5 | 135.0 | 147.8 | 3134.8 | |

Source: Kolstø 2005, 237

(The figures I have are only from 1990-2000 but that was the period when the largest migrations took place. As you will see from the tables, they taper off in the late 1990s.)

What I am most interested in today is not migration as such but how the outmigration has affected the situation of those who stayed behind. Two trends seem to be important here. The first is that those who arrived last tend also to be the ones who left first. They had not struck 'roots' in the local environment, and often had stronger networks of friends, family, and job connections to draw on 'back home' And for them, the expression 'back home' did in fact make sense. A result of this is that those who remained were usually those who were already best integrated in the new states and willing to accept the new cultural and political realities.

Secondly, the returnees, as a rule, were those who were able to find a job elsewhere. This was much easier for qualified people with a high level of education than for manual laborers. As a result, the social structure of the Russian diaspora population was changed, from being top-heavy, with a significant intelligentsia, to become more proletarian. Up to a point this trend runs at cross purposes with the one I discussed above mentioned since the blue collar workers among the Russians were often less able, or willing, to study the local language and learn about the local culture than were Russians with higher education.

Generally speaking, a number of circumstances force the Russian diasporians to learn the local language and acquire a basic knowledge of the country and society they live in. As their numbers shrink, they are no longer able to keep up self-contained communities outside the titular environment to the same degree as before. In several countries they will also be barred from many jobs unless they show a willingness to integrate. The younger generations who have spent most of their life -- or all of it -- in this country, will lead the way and perhaps pull their parents with them.

In 1996-8 I led a research team that studied ethnic integration in two post-Soviet states, Latvia and Kazakhstan. In that connection we conducted large-scale opinion surveys in these two countries, in which we asked inter alia, ‘Which country do you regard as your homeland?’ In both Latvia and Kazakhstan the country on residence came up on top, with ‘USSR’ as the second most popular option, and ‘Russia’ trailing far behind with only 11-13 percent support.(see table 5)

**Table 5 Which country do you regard as your homeland? –
Ethnic breakdown. Kazakhstan**

| | Kazakhs | Russians |
|------------------|---------|-------------|
| Kazakstan | 73.1 | 39.9 |
| USSR | 13.3 | 35.7 |
| Kaz SSR | 12.2 | 9.5 |
| Russia | 1.1 | 13.0 |
| Other | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| None | - | 1.5 |
| Don't know | - | 0.2 |
| Absolute figures | 376 | 409 |

**Table 6 Which country do you regard as your homeland? –
Ethnic breakdown.Latvia**


| | Latvians | Russians |
|---------------------|----------|-------------|
| Latvia | 88.7 | 41.1 |
| USSR | 0.5 | 17.8 |
| LSSR | 7.1 | 21.5 |
| Russia | 0.2 | 11.4 |
| Other | 1.1 | 1.0 |
| None | 0.4 | 2.4 |
| Don't know | 2.0 | 4.7 |
| Absolute figures | 550 | 297 |

Source: Kolstø 1999, p. 239.

If we can conclude that the local Russians will gradually move their territorial and political allegiance to their state of residence, we may then turn to a discussion of how their cultural self-understanding will develop. Will they retain a cultural identity as being ‘Russian’, and if yes, what precisely does that mean? Will they be ‘Russian’ like Russians elsewhere, or develop an identity of their own? As I have argued above, already in the Soviet period the Russians outside the Russian republic tended to see themselves as somehow different from Russians in the core group. There is no reason to believe that after the breakup of the unitary state this trend was stopped or reversed. As one of the most perceptive Russian observers of the diaspora has observed, Natalia Kosmarskaia, during the Soviet period the fact that the Russians in Central Asia and the Baltics felt different from Russians in Russia also, did not carry any consequences. ‘With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, this

situation changed radically. The sociopolitical cataclysms that followed in its wake -- radical changes in the economic situation, the mass migration, and so on -- became a potent stimulus for the Russian-speakers towards *a deeper and more conscious perception of their separateness*.' (Kosmarskaia 2006, p. 405), emphasis in the original.

In our 1997 survey in Latvia and Kazakhstan we also asked, 'Do Russians in [your country] differ from Russians in Russia?' Total figures for both countries are presented in figure 1 below.



As you will see, more than two thirds of those who offered an opinion, chose one of the two options 'significantly different' or 'somewhat different'. When we broke the figures down by ethnicity we got the following results:

Table 7 Do Russians in Kazakhstan differ from Russians in Russia? - Ethnic breakdown

| | Kazakhs | Russians | Ukrainians | Germans | Koreans |
|------------------|---------|-------------|------------|---------|---------|
| significantly | 31.6 | 27.9 | 22.9 | 29.3 | 33.3 |
| somewhat | 17.3 | 21.3 | 29.2 | 19.5 | 6.7 |
| no different | 26.9 | 33.0 | 25.0 | 19.5 | 20.0 |
| Don't know | 24.2 | 17.8 | 22.9 | 31.7 | 40.0 |
| Absolute figures | 376 | 409 | 48 | 41 | 15 |

Table 8 Do Russians in Latvia differ from Russians in Russia? - Ethnic breakdown.

| | Latvians | Russians | Ukrainians | Belarusians | Poles | Jews |
|------------------|----------|-------------|------------|-------------|-------|------|
| significantly | 35.2 | 41.6 | 25.0 | 24.4 | 31.7 | 28.6 |
| somewhat | 34.8 | 35.1 | 50.0 | 37.8 | 19.5 | 50.0 |
| no | 8.7 | 11.1 | 25.0 | 22.2 | 19.5 | 21.4 |
| Don't know | 21.3 | 12.2 | 0.0 | 15.6 | 29.3 | 0.0 |
| Absolute figures | 549 | 296 | 16 | 45 | 41 | 14 |

Source, Kolstø 1999, p. 260.

What exactly did the perceived peculiarities of the local Russian culture consist in?

We suggested a large number of possible answers:

1. more active and industrious
2. more cultured and better educated
3. more internationalist
4. more hard-working and diligent
5. less given to drinking
6. more individualistic
7. less drawn into conflicts
8. more open and gregarious
9. more hospitable
10. more tolerant toward the views and opinions of others
11. less attached to national traditions and customs

In Kazakhstan the responses from the titulars and the Russians were remarkably similar. The Latvian breakdown by ethnicity, however, yielded somewhat different results.

Table Perceived peculiarities of Russian culture in Kazakstan. Kazak and Russian ranking lists.
1 as 'agree completely', 4 as 'disagree completely'

| Kazaks | | Russians | |
|-----------------------------|-----|----------------------------|-----|
| more internationalist | 1.8 | more internationalist | 1.7 |
| more hardworking, diligent | 1.8 | more hospitable | 1.7 |
| more open and gregarious | 1.9 | more tolerant | 1.7 |
| more active and industrious | 2.0 | more hardworking, diligent | 1.8 |
| more cultured and educated | 2.0 | more open and gregarious | 1.8 |
| less drawn into conflicts | 2.0 | less drawn into conflicts | 2.1 |

| | | | |
|-----------------------------|-----|-----------------------------|-----|
| more hospitable | 2.0 | less given to drinking | 2.1 |
| more tolerant | 2.0 | less attached to traditions | 2.1 |
| less given to drinking | 2.2 | more active and industrious | 2.2 |
| less attached to traditions | 2.2 | more cultured and educated | 2.2 |
| more individualistic | 2.4 | more individualistic | 2.6 |

Table Perceived peculiarities of Russian culture in Latvia. Latvian and Russian ranking lists. 1 as 'agree completely', 4 as 'disagree completely'

| Latvians | | Russians | |
|-----------------------------|------|-----------------------------|------|
| more active and industrious | 2.07 | more tolerant | 1.87 |
| more internationalist | 2.32 | more hard-working, diligent | 1.96 |
| more open and gregarious | 2.39 | more cultured and educated | 1.96 |
| less attached to traditions | 2.43 | more active and industrious | 2.12 |
| more hard-working, diligent | 2.58 | less drawn into conflicts | 2.12 |
| more hospitable | 2.63 | more hospitable | 2.14 |
| more individualistic | 2.64 | more open and gregarious | 2.25 |
| more cultured and educated | 2.69 | less attached to traditions | 2.37 |
| more tolerant | 2.84 | more internationalist | 2.39 |
| less drawn into conflicts | 2.91 | more individualistic | 2.61 |
| less given to drinking | 3.06 | less given to drinking | 2.65 |

Source: Kolstø, 1999, pp. 262-3.

The Latvians tended to see fewer differences between Russians in Russia and in Latvia. They were less willing to give local Russians credit for higher diligence, hospitality, individualism, or culture compared to Russians in Russia, and they definitely did not think that 'their' Russians were more cultured, tolerant, and sober or less conflictual than other Russians. On these quality traits, they gave the Russians as low score as 2.69 to 3.06, a real slap in the face. Only on the issue of drinking habits did the Russians themselves tend to agree with these negative assessments. As regards culture, tolerance, and ability to avoid conflict they gave themselves 0.7 to 1.0 higher scores than did the Latvians! Thus, we can draw the conclusion that in both countries the local Russians saw themselves as both different from, and better than, Russians in Russia, but only in Kazakhstan did this self-image correspond to any significant degree with the image of them which the titular population held.

One important factor that has contributed to a process of dissociation of the Russians in the republics from the Russian core group is the gradual amalgamation of the various non-titular, post-Soviet diaspora groups. Not only Russians, but also other Slavs such as Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Poles live in the same new states and indeed in the same neighborhoods. These people have very much of the same educational and social profile as the local Russians, and consort and intermarry with them. Even if some of the non-Russian diasporians retain a measure of proficiency also in their own, indigenous language, their everyday language is Russian and in most places they are as a matter of course included into a category of 'Russian-speakers'. In Central Asia, where the contrast between 'Europeans' and 'Asians' is seen as strong, also ethnic Germans, and in fact also Volga Tatars are habitually included into this Russian-speaking category (Kolstø 1999, pp. 29-40). At the same time, this ethnocultural amalgamation has not been a simple one-way process in which the non-Russian Russian-speakers have been simply swamped by their Russian neighbors.

The non-Russian diasporians have added some nuances to what is becoming a new Russophone palette.

The Russian scholar Sergei Savoskul does not, as I do, believe that Russians in the non-Russian republics group in the Soviet period developed any sense of being different from Russians in the core. Savoskul argues that at that time the Russians were not prepared to become a diaspora since historically there was no need for such an identity. In the new ethnopolitical situation after the demise of the Soviet Union, however, this has changed fundamentally, he believes. In 2001 Savoskul wrote that

In the majority of the post-Soviet states the last ten years of sovereign development have somewhat hastened the process of turning the Russian populations in the countries of the new abroad into new Russian diasporas. During this period they have become convinced that they no longer have behind them the formerly mighty metropolitan state, nor will they have it in the future. The Russian population is firmly set on remaining in their respective countries of residence, and have begun to develop the habits and attitudes of a 'diasporian' orientation (Savoskul, 2001, p. 19).

Before we can finish our analysis, we must also consider the last and final of the identity options of the Russian diasporians, which is assimilation. Many Russians who moved to Western Europe and North America in the 20th century have lost their collective identity as ethnic Russians in the course of a generation or two. They have married outside the Russian community, have forgotten their native tongue and in general become not only well integrated into their host countries but been absorbed into it. They regard themselves no longer as Russians living in France or the USA, but as Frenchmen and Americans of Russian extraction. To what degree can we expect the same to happen with Russians in the 'new abroad'? This is the basic research question behind David Laitin's monumental study *Identity in Formation* (Laitin 1998). Laitin's accepts Ernest Gellner's famous description of how

minorities in multinational states assimilate through (Gellner 1983). According to Gellner, some peasant sons and daughters from a minority culture in a multiethnic state – allegorically called the ‘Ruritanians’ -- will become Ruritanians nationalists, but most will accept and adopt the dominant, ‘Megalomaniac’ culture.

But what will happen when a multinational state brakes up such as happened to the Soviet Union? Laitin asks. Can these processes be reversed? In other words, may Megalomaniacs (= Russians) be turned into Ruritanians and adopt the culture of the former minority which has now become the state-bearing nation in a new state? This intriguing question Laitin approaches from a number of theoretical and empirical angles and with field studies in four republics, Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. I cannot here go through his often very sophisticated arguments but jump right to the conclusion: in Kazakhstan he thinks the answer is no – the socio-cultural distance between the Russian-speakers and the titulars is too large. The Russian who do not emigrate will continue to live as small isolated communities. In Latvia and Estonia the answer is yes – the Baltic cultures are so prestigious and the Baltic standard of living is so high that they will exert an irresistible pull on the Russians. Finally, in Ukraine Laitin predicts consociationalism, or the continued coexistence of two high cultures (Laitin 1998, pp.353-61).

I think it is still too early to pass a verdict on Laitin’s scenarios. If he is right, it means that the adaptation processes among the Russians who suddenly and unexpectedly ended up as national minorities in nationalizing non-Russians states are going even faster than most observers would predict. But even if he is wrong, we can safely conclude that even in the unlikely situation that an irredentist party should come to power in Moscow with a programme for the restitution of the collapsed state (in one form or another) there will be scant support for such policies among those who are often regarded as the main victims of this state collapse, the beached Russian communities in the Soviet successor states.

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Eurasian Identity:

Psychology of Cultural Differences

Sergei Chaikovskii

Identity Crisis

The collapse of the Soviet Union made a deep cut in recent Russian history and led to a serious erosion of state and civilizational identity of Russia and its citizens. Citizens were left in circumstances that found them devoid of any clearly defined collective identity. The fall of a socialism, where a clearly defined collective identity was in place, has not been replaced with any distinctly outlined collective template. This resulted in the fact that no clear personal identity could be formed, and individuals were left with the option of pursuing immediate gratification. Doubling in the murder rate, alcohol and drug abuse spiraling out of control and HIV becoming endemic. The only understandable collective scheme is the one built on organized crime, and those involved are indeed motivated and goal directed. The Russian example demonstrates the consequences of a collective identity vacuum. Without a clearly defined collective identity, an individual cannot engage in normal comparative processes that would allow for the development of a personal identity and feel marginalized and lost. In this sense, collective identity is primary, and this primacy has profound implications. Former Russian dissident Natan (Anatoly) Sharansky, in his latest book *Defending Identity*, remarks that “strong identities are as valuable to a well-functioning society as they are to secure and committed well-functioning individuals”.

That period of chaos, loss of statehood and value system, which is often perceived in the country as an apocalypse, resulted in a revival of the Eurasian idea. Term “Eurasia” is

present in public discourse in Russia as far more than just a technical geographic term (Russia has a distinctive feature of having more land in Asia (75%) than in Europe, which undeniably has had a huge impact), but as a mental construct, cultural key-concept, the idea of uniqueness of Russia and her separate (from the Western civilization) identity (Hoffmann, 2010).

The idea of Eurasian identity of Russia's geopolitical position and civilization is of fundamental importance. It would help to consolidate the collective identity of peoples and would become an important motivating impulse for strengthening stability as well as for its flourishing and growing contribution to the world culture. As Lev Goumilev, a theorist of the new Eurasianism said: "Let me tell you in secret that if Russia is saved, it can be only saved as a Eurasian power and through Eurasianism".


In its thousand-year history, Russia, not unlike other nations, has seen countless identities falter. Russian intellectual Igor Chubais wrote in 1998 that "a new system of values cannot simply be thought up by someone or artificially constructed. We must search for a common Russian idea by analyzing our history and our culture." I would add, that a study of European and Eastern history and culture reveals the elements that make up their current identity and may even suggest what is missing in current Russia.

The Geography of Thought: Eastern and Western perception of the world

Psychologist Richard E. Nisbett's *The Geography of Thought* book is a study of the differences between Eastern and Western thought patterns based upon research and cultural archeology, where author examines the ways in which Eastern and Western culture and perspectives of the world differ. Even though this book focuses on difference based on geography, it presents the problem on a much broader scale.

When Nisbett showed an animated underwater scene to American students, they zeroed in on a big fish swimming among smaller fish. Japanese observers instead commented on the background environment. The different "seeings" - are a clue to profound cognitive differences between Westerners and East Asians. As Nisbett shows in *The Geography of Thought*, people think about - and even see - the world differently because of differing ecologies, social structures, philosophies, and educational systems that date back to ancient time. He contends that "human cognition is not everywhere the same"-that those brought up in Western and East Asian cultures think differently from one another in scientifically measurable ways.

Results seem to show East Asians (a term Nisbett uses as a catch-all for Chinese, Koreans, Japanese and others) measurably more holistic in their perceptions (taking in whole scenes rather than a few stand-out objects). Westerners, or those brought up in Northern European and Anglo-Saxon-descended cultures, have a "tunnel-vision perceptual style" that focuses much more on identifying what's prominent in certain scenes and remembering it. Nisbett explains the differences as "an inevitable consequence of using different tools to understand the world."



(Source: The University of Michigan Institute for Social Research:
 Westerners and East Asians describe this scene in different ways)

The author begins the book by outlining some of the major differences between ancient "Western", specifically Greek, philosophy and "Eastern", Chinese philosophy. He argues that the Greeks had a highly unusual and unusually developed "sense of personal agency". These sense of individualism coincided with an equally developed curiosity. This, in turn, led them to cultivate learning as an important social and leisure activity. This contrasts sharply with the Chinese sense of "*collective agency*", through which individuals nourished their sense of self through social relations, contributing to group goals, and "carrying out prescribed roles." Instead of personal agency the ancient Chinese focused on collective agency. It was harmony among the collective group that was most important, and self-control was promoted so as "to minimize friction with others in the family and village and to make it easier to obey the requirements of the state, administered by magistrates."

These two social tendencies were reflected in the two civilizations' main philosophies and led to two philosophical languages: Greek that emphasized linearity, objectification, and elimination through contradiction, and Chinese that emphasized circularity, holism, and an acceptance of contradiction. Studies also indicate that Western and Eastern language differ on these matters as well. Westerners have a highly developed "rhetoric of argumentation", while Asians rarely engage in this kind of dialogue. This is true in business, science, education, and law. Consequently, Asians often try to negotiate agreeable solutions in business or law where Westerners might see conflict resolved only in victory.

The author argues that the Eastern concept of "self" is quite different from the corresponding Western concept. Asians' sense of feeling good often comes from participation in a group, as can be seen by the fact that "In Chinese there is no word for 'individualism.' The closest one can come is the word 'selfishness.'" Not only are Asians less aware of the individual, they also see themselves as being more malleable, describing "themselves" in different ways according to the occasion. Indeed, individuals in Eastern culture take pleasure in being involved in a harmonious "network of supportive social relationships" and in playing "one's part in achieving collective ends." Westerners prefer choices that allow autonomy, while Asians typically prefer those that encourage group preference or guidance from an authority figure.

Nisbett brings the cognitive comparison back to the present day by contrasting modern East Asians with modern Westerners. He provides evidence that East Asians live in an interdependent world in which the self is part of a larger whole; Westerners live in a world in which the self is a unitary free agent. Easterners value success and achievement in good part because they reflect well on the groups they belong to; Westerners value these things because they are badges of personal merit. Easterners value fitting in and engage in self-

criticism to make sure that they do so; Westerners value individuality and strive to make them look good. Easterners are highly attuned to the feelings of others and strive for interpersonal harmony; Westerners are more concerned with knowing themselves and are prepared to sacrifice harmony for fairness. Easterners are accepting of hierarchy and group control; Westerners are more likely to prefer equality and scope for personal action. Asians avoid controversy and debate; Westerners have faith in the rhetoric of argumentation in areas from the law to politics and science. Westerners perceive themselves as being more in control of their environments and their destinies. Not only do they see themselves as more in control, but express a decided need to be in control, whereas Asians express comfort with the fact that many things are beyond their control.

This difference starts out in childhood, where studies prove that Western children learn nouns faster than verbs, and Asian children learn verbs faster than Western children. This may in turn be partly attributable to the languages themselves, given that “East Asian languages are highly contextual,” with meaning necessarily being extracted from context, whereas English words are intentionally decontextualized. One particularly interesting point contrasts American and Chinese children's books. The famous lines “See Dick run...” are much different than those in the equivalent Chinese primer which doesn't describe actions by an individual but instead describes information about relationships between people; “Big brother takes care of little brother...” Another example, the ways children create relationships between things, when given a series of images to pair together. An Asian child is more likely to group a cow with grass because a cow eats grass. An American child would be more likely to pair the cow with a chicken because they fit into the same “taxonomic” category.

In conclusion Nisbett sees mixing “new cognitive forms based on the blending of social systems and values.” East and West will transform each other as they create a stew in which “The individual ingredients...are recognizable but are altered as they alter the whole. It

may not be too much to hope that this stew will contain the best of each culture.”

Eurasianism as a way to rethink the direction: becoming Eurasian

As Nisbett’s findings have shown that Asians and Westerners have disposition in perception and categorization at a very basic level. I have lived in Korea for ten years, and have noticed many of these things myself. I do think people are often unaware of just how different even a simple picture might look to someone from a different culture. Between these two worlds there are relations of complementarity attributed to two millennia of cultural differences and we should know those differences which will allow us to understand people or culture other than our own.

What can these findings contribute to the Eurasian concept and Russian quest for new national identity? Much of the confrontation between East and West applies to the concept of worlds’ mono-centricity, domination of one superpower, the inevitability and naturalness of the collision of Western and Eastern value systems and civilizations. One side inspired by their policies is guided by an unshakable conviction and belief of the indisputable superiority of the comprehensive, universal perfection of the Euro-Atlantic and American civilizations, which are declared as synonyms of world civilization. And, of course, representatives of large Eastern civilizations who consider their cultural foundation which lasts for millenniums do not share these views with their Western opponents.

The concept of Eurasia as an alternative to Eurocentrism, and continuous Westernization plays their positive role in terms of inner spiritual consolidation of Russia as a unified multinational state, not tied to one or another pro-Western or pro-Eastern orientation. It is not the same concept that was established by Nikolas Riasonovsky where: “Russians are neither Europe nor Asia.” Eurasian principle of cultures relationship is based on the

harmonious interaction between them. The new Eurasian identity should be built using the principle of complementarity rather than denial of it (that can lead to nationalism and ethnic identity movements). For domestic and international well-being Russia must consistently adhere to the principle of equilibrium, the equivalency of attention of both the western and eastern azimuth.

Eurasianism recognizes polycentrism as general methodological principle of cooperation, complementarity of cultures, their relationship of mutual influence and mutual learning. According to the Eurasians, the relationship between all cultures are constructed horizontally on the basis of the principles of equality and promote the preservation of stability polycentric peace and prosperity of the world civilization as a symphony of diverse cultures. As Mikhail Titarenko wrote: “In this regard, Eurasianism coincides with the Confucian approach to the promotion of cultural variety, diversity of harmony (хэ эр бутун), and Daoist dialectic interaction of opposite phenomena in nature and culture (хэ эр эр и, и фэн вэй эр)”. Thus, Russia, led by Eurasianism, considers itself as a pivot area, heartland, which unites a unique civilization with its own identity, culture, history. Principles of the New Eurasia have to become the ideological basis of the methodological development of long-term strategy and proper arrangement of Russia and its foreign policy doctrine as symbiosis, synthesis of many cultures and historical experiences of many nations that have historically been living in the territory of Russia and adjacent to it.

Russia's centuries-old struggle for national identity mirrors similar pursuits by virtually every individual and body of people since humanity began. Our identity, whether personal or collective, is perhaps our most treasured and guarded possession. If an identity is lost, we will strain to recover and re-form it. Thus Russia's search for identity is in many ways like any other. Russia's quest sheds light on our own need to know who we are and begs a vital question: How does one form a sense of identity, whether as a nation or as an

individual? Identities are fluid, never homogeneous, and sometimes invented. Exploring where we came from and what is expected of us is crucial to forming a positive, fruitful and resilient identity for ourselves. But where does one begin? Where can one find the solid sense of place and of purpose that is foundational to a strong identity? Meaningful change is achieved only by personal active steps that arise from the self-directed will. The attempts to modernize Russia from the top were always reactive, short-term and opportunistic, aimed at superficial issues rather than on their underlying causes. Integration “from the bottom up” should make a Eurasia concept not only possible but indeed necessary.

Now it is becoming clearer and clearer that, notwithstanding the divisive power of passionate nationalism and political and economic separatism, the modern world is undoubtedly moving slowly but steadily toward a new historical community. In its place a "post-material" era is coming, along with a "post-economic" (i.e., humanitarian) culture with different intellectual and spiritual values. Which nation is most suited for the fulfillment of these tasks? Evidently, that one that possesses such features, for instance, as openness toward other cultures, tolerance, and broad spiritual values. The culture will transform into inter-culture only when it is closely associated with other cultures that are going to be assimilated, united, melted and finally translated into the planetary entity. Indeed, the time for common human civilization is yet to come. Its dynamism will be maintained in the XXI century by several geopolitical and ethno-confessional centers that are tangible right now. Each of the centers is seeking the best model of its development and is trying to define its role in the future civilization. In this sense Eurasianism is a source of new ideas, new ways of rethinking the directions in which Russia and the world is moving.

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Stalinismus Orientalis: Фольклор, Авторство и Рождение Советской Многонациональной Литературы

Stalinismus Orientalis:

Folklore, Authorship, and the Birth of Soviet Multinational Literature

Евгений Добренко

В этом выступлении я хотел бы поразмыслить о созданных в сталинскую эпоху текстах о вожде (вождях) Ленине и Сталине – сталиниане и лениниане. Без преувеличения – корпус этих текстов огромен: не было ни одного советского поэта, русского или представителя «братской литературы», который не создал бы стихов, посвященных вождю. Если к этому добавить огромный корпус «фольклорных» текстов, то станет ясно, что речь идет об исключительно экстенсивном идеологическом производстве. За неимением времени я не буду обращаться к текстуальному анализу, но постараюсь сформулировать некоторые общие положения относительно национального, а именно «восточного» измерения этих текстов, с детства окружавших советских людей. С этим связано несколько моментов: стилизация, фольклоризм, проблема авторства и ряд. Других, на которых я ниже сосредоточусь.

При множестве различий, все тоталитаризмы XX века едины в неприятии либеральной модели представительства и связанного с ним разделения власти. Все они апеллируют к прямой, непосредственной (неопосредованной никакими представительскими институтами) связи между Массами и Вождем. Масса производит вождя с той же неотвратимостью, с какой сама она является продуктом

политико-эстетического производства, для которого требуется как особого рода субъект, так и особого рода медиум. Это уже не фольклор, но еще не письменность. Тем более – не литература. «Прозрачность» нового медиума, производящего новую нацию, обеспечивалась его вознесенностью как над традиционной национальной литературой, так и над традиционным авторством.

Несколько слов о природе культа вождя в режимах, подобных советскому. Как показал Райх еще в 1933 году, в случае немецкого фашизма «на фюрера переносятся нереализованные сексуальные фантазии масс, вытеснению которых способствует структура патриархальной авторитарной семьи. В этом корень «национального нарциссизма», сублимирующего эмоциональную закабаленность отдельного лица в культ «нации». Как части великого коллектива, представители среднего класса пытаются компенсировать резкое ухудшение положения. «Чем беспомощней становится «массовый индивид» (благодаря своему воспитанию), тем отчетливей проступает его идентификация с фюрером и тем глубже его детская потребность в защите прячется в чувстве его единства с фюрером... Ужас его материального и сексуального положения настолько затмевается возвышающей идеей его принадлежности к расе господ, существования выдающегося фюрера, что со временем он полностью утрачивает понимание всей ничтожности своей слепой преданности»...»[\[1\]](#)

Вывод Райха о том, что массы бессознательно хотели фашизм, этот строй не мог быть навязан им против их воли. Агрессивный потенциал массы в кризисных ситуациях огромен, вождь не более как выявляет его, наподобие лакмусовой бумажки, и лишь *post factum* на уровне воображаемого объявляется его творцом делает понятной апелляцию сталинианы к фольклору и «Востоку», понимаемым как пре- и внепросвещенские, анти-индивидуалистические, коллективистские феномены:

подобно тому, как фашизм – это прежде всего проблема масс, а не Гитлера или национал-социалистической политики, сталинизм также должен быть понят прежде всего как проблема масс, а эстетика сталинизма – как сублимация травмы.

В советском случае ситуация к тому же осложняется необходимостью конструирования «нации» из разноплеменной, разноцивилизационной распавшейся и заклеянной империи. Моноэтническая модель нацизма представляется в сравнении с советским случаем куда более конвенциональной, опиравшейся на готовые матрицы, мифологию и традицию, не связанной с идеологическими препятствиями (типа марксизма, «классовой борьбы» и «пролетарского интернационализма», ведущих в прямо противоположном направлении). Закономерно, что, поскольку нацию еще только предстояло сконструировать, инвестиции в вождя в начале 1930-х годов были особенно значительными. Не следует забывать и того, что к 1933 году, когда Гитлер только пришел к власти, сталиниана, как и сталинский культ в целом были практически сформированы.

Как известно, в России представление о верховной власти с самого начала отождествлялось с понятием империи. И хотя образы империи менялись (вначале они ассоциировались с Римом и Византией, а с начиная с Петровской эпохи, с Российской империей), полная и всесторонняя власть в России всегда основывалась на некоей сверхэтнической ценности. Это то, что, несомненно, работало на сталинский проект. Но одновременно этот проект был основан на отказе если не от практики империи, то, по крайней мере, от прежних ее образов: дореволюционная Россия была осуждена как «тюрьма народов», досоветская эпоха в национальных эпосах рисовалась как эпоха юдоли и национального угнетения. В то же время, соединение прежних репрезентационных стратегий, основанных на сакральности верховной власти, традиции, религии и патриотизме, с марксистскими постулатами об отмирании

государства, классовой борьбе, пролетарском интернационализме, представляло собой огромную сложность.

Между тем, сталиниана играла ключевую роль в "идеологическом арсенале" советского искусства и формировании имперского воображаемого. С одной стороны, «тематическое единство братских литератур», заикленных на воспевании вождя, вполне отвечало задачам формирования новой "усеченной" идентичности советских народов, которым вместо суверенитета была предложена (в полном соответствии с литературоцентризмом русской культуры)... литература (в большинстве случаев созданная для этой цели *ab initio*). Сталиниана становится основой культуры сталинской "большой семьи" (со старшим братом – русским народом, матерью-Родиной и отцом-Сталиным). С другой стороны, превратившись в едва ли не основную тему советской многонациональной поэзии, поэзия воспевания вождей вступала в конфликт с основной политико-идеологической целью этой поэзии – формировать квази-национальную (усеченную) идентичность: в этой поэзии апелляция к собственной национальной истории была заменена апелляцией к этнической стилевой образности (часто сконструированной *post factum*).

Речь, таким образом, идет не только о политическом содержании, но и о поэтической форме. На этой теме мы предполагаем остановиться. Комментируя афоризм основоположника современной филологии Ульриха фон Виламовица-Мёллендорфа: «Не бывает переводов с языка на язык — а только со стиля на стиль», М. Гаспаров размышлял о «стилистической перспективе в переводе» и о том, что, в конечном счете, переводчик «выбирает» определенный стиль из депозитария существующих (поскольку создать новый не под силу практически никому)[\[2\]](#). Советская многонациональная литература была продуктом идеологической стилизации. В 1930-е годы из стилового спектра выбирались прежде всего восточные национальные

стили, что соответствовало общему сдвигу культуры на юг и восток, нашедшее свое отражение как в повседневной жизни (афористически выразил это новое климатическое мироощущение в 1935 г. Семен Кирсанов: «Приедешь в Москву — пальмолистья висят. / В наш климат пришло потепление»), так и в поэзии, где царит летнее изобилие и не прекращается весна, в архитектуре, и в своеобразном культе воды: фонтаны украшают города и заполняют киноэкраны, по всей стране строятся каналы, как будто воспроизводится «гидравлическое общество», в котором и возник деспотизм[3]. Этот поворот особенно резок по сравнению с 1920-ми годами.

В 1920-е годы, борясь с конвенциональной литературой, левовцы говорили об угрозе «красного реставраторства». «Василии Андреевич Жуковский надвигается на советскую современность как нечто глубоко закономерное, я бы сказал — неотвратимое и фатальное», - писал Виктор Перцов[4]. Перцова связывал с основоположником русского романтизма «контрреволюцию формы», с которой боролись левовцы. Однако в 1930-е годы проблема была не только в форме, но в самой модели авторского поведения. Русская литература не могла вернуться в допушкинскую эпоху, поскольку имела опыт персонализма и модернизма, прошла через эпоху Просвещения, тогда как литературы Востока, к которым прямо апеллировала сталинская поэзия 1930-х годов, не должны были испытывать комплексов подобного рода: Новое время там не наступило, самое это понятие было для «восточной традиции» (какой она конструировалась в сталинской России) просто нерелевантно. Если бы Перцов знал, что придет на смену 1920-м годам, он вспомнил бы не Жуковского, но какого-нибудь придворного поэта восточного сатрапа.

Конструируемый в советской культуре «Восток», несомненно, влиял на русскую литературу. Разумеется, это был отнюдь не аутентичный «Восток», а русской же культурой сконструированный: слагавший песни о Сталине 100-летний Джамбул

был продуктом не столько казахской, сколько русской культуры, поскольку в ней он был создан («переведен») и в ней функционировал. «Восток» *входил* в русскую литературу через стилистику, но *вводил* в нее особого рода политическую культуру. Парадокс сталинизма состоял в том, что русская революция, прошедшая под знаменем марксизма и просвещения породила глубоко ретроградную культуру, для которой «восточная стилистика» оказалась наиболее адекватным оформлением. Это была культура отката в допросвещенческую эпоху. Отсюда и апелляции именно к консервативному, патриархальному «Востоку», а не к ассоциируемому с модернизацией и просвещением «Западу».

Отсюда – и апелляция к фольклору, о значении которого для соцреализма говорил Горький: революция «открыла обильные родники народной сокровищницы, из которой народные певцы и поэты черпают полной пригоршней богатейшие образы, силу и вдохновение... Ценнейшая сокровищница художественных образов, сравнений и метафор, лежавшая до сих пор втуне и широко раскрывшаяся сейчас перед народными певцами и художниками, заиграла всеми цветами радуги, всем многообразием творческого опыта братских народов СССР»^[5]. Что же именно засияло? Редакторы роскошного подарочного издания «Сталинская Конституция в поэзии народов СССР» перечисляют: «Пышные, изысканные, изощренные иранские формы, построенные на символике и аллегориях в ряде произведений известного поэта-орденоносца Абульгасема Лахути; древнейшие поэтические формы акынов, певцов Казахстана (народного поэта-орденоносца Джамбула и др.), своеобразием своих повторов акцентирующие основную мысль; ясные и мудрые в своей простоте, идущие от тех же восточных форм, ашугские песни народного поэта-орденоносца Дагестана Сулеймана Стальского; стилизованные под ашугские «мухаммазы» песни армянского поэта Шираза; стихи и поэмы, являющиеся воплощением сегодняшних поэтических

форм, — вот неполный перечень материала, собранного в этой книге»^[6]. Обратим внимание — апелляции здесь — исключительно к Востоку. Фольклор важен еще и тем, что он позиционируется как самая непосредственность выражения народной любви к вождю, самая стихийность этой народная любви.

Лениниана знала два всплеска: после смерти Ленина, в 1924 году появился целый поток стихотворений и поэм на смерть Ленина, вызванный вполне искренним переживанием ухода вождя революции. Это были почти исключительно произведения русских поэтов, глубоко и лично причастных революционной эпохе — от лефовцев Маяковского и Асеева до пролетарских поэтов Безыменского и Суркова. Второй всплеск приходится на совсем иную эпоху: начиная с 1934 года, десятилетней годовщины смерти Ленина, появляется огромное количество стихотворений, написанных якобы на смерть Ленина в основном поэтами восточных республик либо русских народных сказителей. Многие из этих произведений (как авторских, так и фольклорных) атрибутируются 1924 годом. Ясно однако, что эти якобы «посмертные стихи» создавались они как своего рода «поэтическое задание» по прошествии его эпохи, уже в совсем иную, сталинскую эпоху. Эти ленинские и сталинские тексты станут первой темой, объединившей разнонациональных авторов появившейся и институализировавшейся в 1934 году на Первом съезде писателей «советской многонациональной литературы».

Стихи о Ленине были «плачами». Стихи о Сталине — одами. Разница здесь не только жанровая. Русские поэты выводили Ленина из «исторической закономерности» классовой борьбы, видя в нем феномен исторический. В поэме Маяковского «Владимир Ильич Ленин» (1924) «Смесью классов, / вер, / сословий / и наречий // на рублях колес / землища двигалась. // Капитал / ежом противоречий / рос во-всю / и креп, / штыками иглясь. // Коммунизма / призрак / по Европе рыскал, // уходил / и

вновь / маячил в отдалении... // По всему поэтому / в глуши Симбирска // родился // обыкновенный мальчик // Ленин».

Достаточно сравнить поэму Маяковского с поэмой азербайджанского поэта Расула Рзы «Ленин», удостоенной Сталинской премии в 1950 году. Сталинская премия означала помимо прочего жанровую канонизацию. В этой поэме Ленин рождался не от исторической закономерности, но в полном соответствии со сталинским выступлением 1924 года, где был заложен канон ленинианы (а затем и сталинианы), где Сталин называл Ленина «горных орлом». Поэма Расула Рзы начиналась с «Посвящения», немислимого в 1924 году: «Первому в семье могучей — русскому народу — слава! / Он, бесстрашный, брат наш старший, поднял знамя Октября... // Знамя дружбы, знамя братства над вселенной взвившему, / Близким солнцем коммунизма землю озарившему, / Беззакатный, вечный гений Ленина взрастившему,— / Гимн победный, стих певучий, — русскому народу — слава!».

Выстроенная биографически, эта многотысячестрочная поэма открывается узнаваемым образом. Ее первая глава называется... «Горный орел», а завершается неким эпилогом, в котором говорят уже чистые субстанции, такие как «Народ» - о сталинском солнце и о том, что «Ленин жив». И не просто жив: он одновременно Пророк и Мессия: придя в коммунизм, советские люди найдут там... Ленина, в своем сиянии ожидающего «свой народ»: «Перейдя через море / великих и малых побед, / через гордые горы / увенчанных славою лет, / мы увидим / в дорогу / впечатанный Лениным след. // Ленин / первым / в сияющий мир коммунизма войдет. // Ленин / встретит / в просторах его / свой бессмертный народ».

Эта сугубо библейская образность соседствует с эпосом. Так, практически все восточные поэты изображали Сталина эпическим персонажем. Так, эпопея Георгия Леонидзе «Сталин. Детство и отрочество» (Сталинская премия, 1939 г.) начиналась с

описаний Кавказа – высокие горы, «тенью орла накрытые», оглашаемые «сраженного барса воплями», образами «витязя, рукой слабеющей, меч зажимающего сверкающий», «Амиран закованный». Здесь «Картли вся—одни блестящий / Сад, осыпанный эмалью, / Сад, где яхонтовы ливни, / Где цветущей веет далью. / Как фазанья шея, светит, / Майским ливнем опьяненный, / Не нарядуетса саду Глаз весны светлозеленой». Далее идут картины старого Гори. Пространство сжимается: Кавказ – Грузия – Картли – Гори. То же и со временем: «То были дни столетья душного, / Ночь бесконечная, глухая. /

Нежданно шумный ветер дунул, / Сердца грозою освежая, / Тогда пронесся голос Маркса / Над баррикадами Коммуны». И только после такого эпического эпилога начинается рассказ о рождении вождя – разумеется, в «лачуге». И тут же разносится слух по округе: «В околотке нашей темном / Чудный мальчик появился». Начинается хождение в дом «Яблоки приносят гости, / Виноград, сухие сласти, / Молодая мать встречает, / Присмирившая от счастья». В библейской этой истории появляются грузинские народные мотивы: ребенок освящается на необычную жизнь: «Петуха тут в дом приносят, / Бдительным пусть мальчик будет. / Ласточку у рта проносят, / Как она, пусть быстрым будет. / Ставят соль у изголовья, — / Пусть он мудрым в жизни будет, / Сахар на сердце положен, / Пусть он добрым к людям будет. / Под луной он спит погожей, / Пусть он крепкотелым будет, / В колыбель кладут железо, / Непоколебимым будет». И вот в дом, подобно волхвам, являются крестьянин, гончар, кузнец, плотовщик, портной, музыкант, пахарь, плотник. Каждый приносит свой дар и прокликает судьбу, завещая детям борьбу с богачами.

Сталин описывается как мифический герой грузинского эпоса Амирани, который освободит свой народ от страданий. Мать рассказывает ему сказки и легенды о свободолюбивых героях, восставших против тиранов, и павших от их рук. Дистанция между ребенком и этими героями стирается. Ребенок растет необыкновенным:

«Ястребенка удалого / Гибче он, он первый в школе; / Сын единственный, такого / Пусть судьба хранит и холит. // Он растет не как другие, / Что лишь заняты игрою, — / Выше всяких книг обычных / Ставит книги о героях». От полумифологического предводителя крестьянского восстания Арсена до Великого Моурави – средневекового полководца Георгия Саакадзе. Портрет же самого ребенка выписывается в полном соответствии с романтической традицией начала XIX века: «Малыша, что сел, склонившись, / Красят сомкнутые брови, / Задумчивая улыбка. / Легких губ рисунок ровный. // Весь овал лица грузинский, / И глаза, где смех искрится, / На орлиный взор похожи... / Сам худой и бледнолицый // Но зато он крепко скроен, / Он проворный мальчик, стройный. / Непреклонный и отважный, / быстрый, резвый, беспокойный». Но и сквозь эту олеографию пробивается исходная восточная традиция: выросший ребенок, играет в горах с орлами. Он живет в эпическом мире, требуя от орла отдать ему свои крылья. Мир, в котором пребывает будущий вождь, полон очарования и тайны: «Мальчик чувствовал... / Что в алмазах встанет утро. / Встанет в яхонтах и в лалах, / Осветил все сердце голос / И — жемчужно засияло».

Впечатлительный Сосо разговаривает со своими любимыми героями, такими как Арсен, «заступник обездоленных» на языке Возвышенного: «Вот Арсен убит... И мальчик / Говорит сквозь слезы грустно: / - Кто же в смерть твою поверит, / О прекрасный, черноусый!» А в ответ слышит: «Голос я в себе услышал, / Сердца сталь мне кипела, / Не могу терпеть я эту / Боль всемирную, Сосело». В семинарии, этой «темнице души и тела», Сосело превращается в Кобу: «Пылает детское сердце, / Как жаркое сердце Коба». В финале поэмы мы видим Кобу, превращающегося в Сталина: «Впереди же поющих всех / Он, сверкая лицом, идет. / Это песня, иль боя клич? / Это ветер, иль бури взлет? // Сердце, взрывом взмятенное, / Кровью рана вскипела ль ярою, — / Небом Горн орел летел / Над горийской крепостью старою».

Профессиональная поэзия была однако уже поздней надстройкой над изначально «фольклорной» (читай: «народной») сталинианой. Ее знаковыми фигурами были дагестанский ашуг Сулейман Стальский и казахский акын Джамбул Джабаев. Разумеется, это лишь самые известные фигуры: за ними – огромный корпус пара-фольклорных и пара-профессиональных текстов. Да и сами они были фигурами переходными: одновременно и «народными», и индивидуальными сказителями.

Здесь мы имеем дело с бесписьменной *массовой* культурой, которая, оставаясь по сути *этнической*, позиционировалась как *национальная*. Массовая культура лишена автора. Ее автором является ее потребитель. Парадокс Ролана Барта, сформулированный им в известном эссе «Смерть автора», идеально описывает рассматриваемую здесь коллизию *бесписьменного письма* (заметим, что Барт говорит именно о писателе как о «пишущем», «скрипторе»): любой текст содержит в себе множество стратегий, культурных кодов и скрытых цитаций, место встречи которых – не автор, но именно читатель. Единство текста, согласно Барту, лежит не в его истоках, но в точке назначения, лишенной всякой персональности: читатель – это человек без истории, без биографии, без психологии. Его рождение знаменует собой смерть автора^[7].

Стальский и Джамбул – знаковые фигуры ранней советской многонациональной литературы. Фигуры легендарные, к созданию которых не были пригодны культуры с развитой литературной традицией типа русской, или даже литературы с начальной просветительской традицией, но именно культуры пока бесписьменные. Стальский и Джамбул – фигуры почти мифологические. Но сталиниана и не смогла бы стать продуктом обычного авторства. Автор должен был умереть, в полном соответствии с прогнозом Барта, с тем, чтобы родиться в виде

Стальского, а затем – Джамбула, и в этом почти фантастическом виде породить «образ Сталина» как еще более небывалого Автора - «великого творца советской жизни».

Литературы, утверждал Горький на Первом съезде писателей, должны были создаваться в каждой республике и в каждой автономии, *но литератур этих еще не было*. Если с литературами, имевшими традицию, дело обстояло проще – в них были «великие художники слова, [...] родившиеся в условиях капиталистического общества», а в других «братских республиках [...] писатели рождаются от пролетариата», то в республиках Советского Востока не было фактически и этого – был лишь фольклор. Обращаясь к «представителям национальностей Кавказа и Средней Азии», Горький привел в пример лезгинского ашуга Сулеймана Стальского, выступление которого на съезде «произвело потрясающее впечатление» на всех. «Я видел, - говорил Горький, - как этот старец, безграмотный, но мудрый, сидя в президиуме, шептал, создавая свои стихи, затем он, Гомер XX века, изумительно прочёл их». Горький призывал «беречь людей, способных создавать такие жемчужины поэзии, какие создаёт Сулейман» и утверждал, что «начало искусства слова — в фольклоре».

Стальский представлял на съезде от целого слоя повсюду открываемых в те годы советских «гомеров». Во всех национальных республиках «открываются» невиданные доселе таланты. Представители народной литературы и искусства, народные певцы, акыны, ашуги, бахши, шаиры, жырыши, гафизы становятся знаменитостями. Таковы Джамбул, Нурпеис и Иса в Казахстане, Пулкан, Фазыл Юлдашев, Иргаш Джуман Бульбуль, Абдулла Шаир – в Узбекистане, Хоца Намсараев и Апполон Тороев — в Бурят-Монголии, Токтогул Сатылганов, Халык и Алымкул — в Киргизии, Бобо Юнус и Атсалык — в Таджикистане, Гамзат Цадаса, Тагир Хурюгский, Абуталиб Гафуров — в Дагестане, Мирза и Асад – в Азербайджане и мн. др.

«Мастеров устно-поэтического национального творчества» принимают в члены Союза писателей СССР. Так, в Узбекистане нескольких бахши, в Казахстане – акынов и жырши приняли в республиканские союзы писателей. Пятеро ашугов стали в 1935 году членами союза писателей Азербайджана. К началу войны членами Союза писателей состояло уже более 60 представителей «народной литературы»[8].

На глазах рождалась небывалая – бесписьменная – литература. Стоявшие у ее истоков пропагандисты горьковского начинания утверждали ее продуктивность и оригинальность: «Рождается новая великая народная литература, которая есть и будет состоять из слияния фольклора и письменной литературы» - констатировал Эфпенди Капиев[9]. «Поэзия эта интересна как показатель вrastания фольклора в советскую литературу» - вторил ему Корнелий Зелинский[10]. Фольклор вступал во взаимодействие с новой медиальностью и новейшими технологиями политического манипулирования.

Если связь продукции «советских гомеров» с литературой опосредована, то проявления европоцентризма в моделировании и интерпретации «литератур советского Востока» многочисленны. Например, исходя из того, что Стальский был безграмотным, а письменность лезгины получили только после революции, критика заключала, что его поэзия связана только с фольклором и потому свободна от влияния традиций и образцов литературы Востока — Кавказа и Средней Азии, не сказавшихся на формировании творчества Стальского (то же говорилось о Джамбуле, Токтогуле, Дурды Клыче, Бекмурзе Пачеве, Ате Салихе и других «народных певцах»).

В этом усматривалось достоинство и своеобразие этой поэзии. При таком подходе не учитывалось, однако, что появление книгопечатания на исламском Востоке никак не способствовало развитию художественной литературы и отнюдь не повлекло за собой ее распространения (напротив, восточная классическая литературная

традиция была связана как раз с допечатной эпохой). Отчасти это объясняется тем, что здешние типографии находились полностью в руках духовенства; отчасти – с *тотальной* безграмотностью населения. Жизнь «народных певцов» прошла в стороне от мировой культуры. Стальский, к примеру, никогда даже не слышал о Гомере и Фирдоуси, Шекспире и Толстом. Имя Гомера он услышал впервые, когда Горький назвал его «Гомером XX века». Незадолго до того он узнал имя самого Горького, а имя Пушкина – едва ли не за год до смерти. В этом смысле Стальский был настоящим «представителем народа». Так, в чуть ли не самом промышленно развитом восточном регионе империи – Азербайджане на сто человек было безграмотны девяноста семь, почти на сотню человек в Туркмении приходился один грамотный – мулла, отвергавший светскую литературу как «греховную» и выступавший в роли едва ли не главного ее гонителя.

Поскольку тексты «народных сказителей» (Стальского, Джамбула и др.) печатались, что называется, «с колес», установить теперь, что было в неких «оригиналах», которые одним человеком заказывались, другим – доводились до сознания «автора», третьим – произносились, четвертым – записывались, пятым – переводились в подстрочник, шестым – в «художественный текст», седьмым – редактировались, восьмым – цензурировались и т.д., установить, где именно были эти «искаженные», «замененные», «убранные», «добавленные» и т.д. места, невозможно, отчасти потому, что сам автор не владел языком, на котором функционировали его тексты, а сами «оригиналы», если и существовали, утеряны. Как бы то ни было, эти тексты неаутентичны по определению. И дело не том только, что они функционировали по преимуществу не на том языке, на котором якобы создавались. Тексты акынов и ашугов связаны с целым рядом специфических проблем текстологического свойства:

Во-первых, многие произведения имеют серьезные разночтения – иногда огромная разница существует между «оригинальным» текстом, подстрочником и переводом (в работе участвовало слишком много людей – от записывающего и переводчика до редактора и цензора);

Во-вторых, значительная часть песен записывалась задним числом: слишком поздно были открыты «любимые певцы народа» (так, песни, якобы сложенные в молодости Стальским или Джамбулом, записывались спустя 30-50 лет после их «сложения» в совершенно новой ситуации);

В-третьих, будучи неграмотными, певцы не оставили аутентичного архива – дневников, рукописей, набросков, корреспонденции, каких-либо материалов, позволяющих проследить эволюцию произведения, процесс работы над ним; в-четвертых, очень многое из того, что было опубликовано, разбросано в периферийной печати, совершенно недоступной для исследования, а те материалы, которые удалось собрать при жизни певцов, были уничтожены, когда в эпоху Большого Террора погибли многие из тех, кто их окружал (как в случае Гаджибекова и Стальского).

Творчество ашугов и акынов имело свою экономику, которая определяла способы функционирования этой поэзии и, в конце концов, ее поэтику. Поэзия Стальского советской эпохи остается традиционной в том смысле, что в ее основе лежат два основных механизма производства и функционирования: заказ и айтыс.

Народные поэты как Стальский, так и Джамбул, писали по заказу. И это также должно было быть образцом «творческого поведения» для русских поэтов. Дело в том, что акыны и ашуги всегда творили по заказу, тогда как в европейской традиции Нового времени такого рода «творчество» воспринималось однозначно негативно. Хотя сложение стихов и песен не было профессией Стальского (даже после провозглашения «Гомером» он продолжал заниматься садоводством), сама традиция сочинять на заказ,

«по случаю», являлась отличительным признаком профессионализации среди «народных певцов» Кавказа и в особенности Средней Азии. За сложенные по заказу песни автор вознаграждался. Ничего зазорного в том, чтобы сочинять на заказ, не было. Это было ремесло – одно из многих. Для классической поэзии Востока «творить по заказу» (почти оксюморон для западного уха) было традицией. Так, все поэмы Низами, на родине которого, в Гяндже, Сулейман Стальский работал в молодости, были созданы именно так. Так же создавали свои песни и предшественники Стальского – лезгинские поэты Саид Кочхюрский и Етим Эмин. В этой традиции работал до революции и сам Стальский. Не удивительно, что и в советское время он видел в заказах признание своего ремесла и хорошо поставленное «дело»: «Я радуюсь, когда мне присылают заказ. Какой же я буду мастер, если у меня не будет песен для наших доблестных бойцов?»^[11] А заказы шли потоком: «С того момента, как появились стихи Сулеймана в «Правде», - вспоминал Капиев, - отовсюду, буквально со всех концов страны, поэта стали осаждать десятками телеграмм, писем, заказов, к нему начали стекаться специальные корреспонденты и репортеры. Началось паломничество к Сулейману Стальскому»^[12]. И Сулейман «откликался».

Любой ашуг знал, кого прежде всего ему надлежит благодарить в песнях: заказчика. Тем более, когда таким заказчиком оказывалась сама власть. Пиетет перед силой и властью, характерный для политической культуры Востока, отчетлив в досоветской поэзии Стальского. Он воспекает счастье родины, дружбу народов СССР, рабочих, колхозников, стахановцев, чабанов, пограничников, Москву, Красную армию, девушек Северного Кавказа, дороги, прорезавшие горы Дагестана, он поет о Конституции, о съезде комсомола... Нет, кажется, даже малого общественно-политического события, на которое не откликнулся бы ашуг радостной песней или письмом в стихах, торжественным гимном или приветствием, поздравлением или

частушкой, плачем или одой – будь то «злодейское убийство» Кирова или конный пробег вокруг Кавказского хребта, смерть Орджоникидзе, гибель самолета «Максим Горький» или открытие консервного завода в родном ауле. Как писала советская критика, «величие Стальского в сравнении с его предшественниками в том, что он расширил рамки народности. В противовес им, содержание его творчества уже не узкоплеменное, а межплеменное, общедагестанское – в первый период его поэтической деятельности, и всенародное, общесоюзное – в последний»^[13]. Сам Стальский справедливо называл себя в разговоре с Капиевым «общим поэтом»: «Я поэт – не лезгинский и не кавказский, я – советский поэт, хотя и пою я только на своем языке. Потому что я пою о Красной армии, а Красная армия и в Москве, и в Самарканде – одна, и в горах, и на равнине – едина. Я пою о комсомоле – комсомол и грузинский и лакский – все тот же. И родина у нас одна. Вот и получается, что я общий поэт, а не только лезгинский»^[14].

Вся поэзия Стальского, как и поэзия Джамбула и других восточных «народных певцов» – о цветущих садах и чудесах социалистических преобразований. В гимнах Стальского сад олицетворяет власть: «Наша власть советская – пышный сад, знаю я» («Нашей власти»), «В саду страны, ты видишь сам, плодов не сосчитать глазам» («Наша власть»), «Советов власть – прекрасный сад, - она в цвету, в плодах, родная» («Советов власть»), «Обильным урожаем богат сад трудовой власти» («Социализм»), «Страна труда, в твоих садах – полдневный мир, весенний свет» («Размышление о том, что происходит в мире»).

Все в этом волшебном саду «родной власти» чудесным образом цветет и плодоносит. Выступая на Всесоюзном совещании передовиков животноводства с руководителями партии и правительства 15 февраля 1936 года Стальский в присутствии Сталина развивал именно эту метафору: «Я буду петь большевиков, / Мы

победили строй веков. / И миллиардами пудов / Поля рожают хлеб у нас. // И горы целые угля / Дают стахановцы у нас, / И трубы в ряд, как тополя, / Поют на фабриках у нас. // Быстрее, чем облаков гряда, / Растут у нас овец стада, / И табуны, как никогда, / Бессчетны на степях у нас» (Пер. Э. Капиев). Этот гиперболизм связан не только с мотивом двух миров, сквозном в творчестве всех «гомеров XX века», увидевших на своем веку оба мира («Нужда шагала с бедняком, / Рот обжигала чесноком... / Сады цветут теперь кругом, / Улыбка на устах – социализм»). К этому приему прибегали Сатылганов – в Киргизии, Джамбул – в Казахстане, Намсараев – в Бурятии, Магомедов и Хурюгский – в Дагестане.

Гиперболизм связан с самим механизмом функционирования этой поэзии. Ашуги демонстрировали свое мастерство публике в ходе соревнований-айтысов, либо импровизируя песни на любую заданную тему, либо на лучшее исполнение давно известной песни, либо задавая друг другу поэтические и философские вопросы и отвечая на них стихами-экспромтами. В ходе этих состязаний ашуги и акыны, изошряясь в славословиях, должны были перещеголять один другого в посрамлении соперника и восхвалении заказчика. Поэтика этих одических стихов строилась на постоянной «накрутке» все более превосходных степеней, пока они не застывали в устойчивых формулах. Вот Стальский восторгается Москвой: «Ты – колыбель земли / Отчизны стольный град, Москва! / Полмира заняты тобой – / Громада из громад – Москва!» Но и этого оказывается Стальскому мало: «С пером когда б я был знаком, / Когда бы русским языком / Владел, - воспел бы я стихом / Тебя смелей стократ, Москва!» (Гордимся мы тобой, Москва!, 1936. Пер. Н. Ушаков).

Сама большевистская идеология «привнесения передового сознания извне» и сталинская «революция сверху» к началу 1930-х годов подвели черту под борьбой двух противоборствовавших в 1920-е годы проектов культурного строительства в

республиках: выстраивание национальной литературы снизу или сверху. Подобно тому, как осуждены были пролекткультовские фантазии РАППа, свернут «призыв ударников в литературу» и развитие литкружков, в национальных литературах была сделана ставка на писателя-профессионала. Но пока этого писателя не существовало, пока шли его подготовка и продвижение, опираться оставалось на фольклор.

Так к середине 1930-х годов на авансцене оказались казахские акыны, узбекские шаиры, киргизские жирши, северо-кавказские ашуги, туркменские бахши, олонхосуты Якутии, бандуристы Украины, гусаны Армении... Фольклор из признака отсталости, каким он виделся в 1920-е годы, стал синонимом «социалистической народности», которая, в условиях отказа от прежней интернационалистской доктрины, все более ассоциировалась с «национальными корнями».

«Советский фольклор» мог функционировать *исключительно* как письменная литература, поскольку в силу языковой ограниченности в устной форме он был дисфункционален. Он мог функционировать только в переводе и только в условиях новой устной (через радио) и письменной (через центральную и местную печать) медиальности. Этот фольклор не был, разумеется, неким «органичным продолжением» устного народного творчества.

Акыны идеально подходили для демонстрации скачка из феодально-родовых отношений, минуя капитализм, в социализм. Фактически, скачка через письменную литературу к олитературенной мифологии. Одни критики восторгались тем, что «на примере деятельности Джамбула можно проследить одно из характерных явлений современного литературного движения — уничтожение вековой противоположности между письменной литературой и устно-поэтическим искусством»[\[15\]](#). Другие шли еще дальше, утверждая, что певцы, подобные Джамбулу, «непосредственно на основе народной поэзии создавали национальные формы социалистической поэзии»[\[16\]](#).

Эпическое время фольклора в Европе завершилось с рождением авторской литературы. С появлением автора путь в эпос был закрыт навсегда. Искусство стало индивидуальным. В Средней Азии этого еще не произошло. Советская власть застала фольклор еще живым и заставила работать на себя. Эта ситуация во многих отношениях уникальна: здесь произошло не обычное использование литературы и не простая симуляция фольклора (как это имело место в русской литературе), но использование живого, здесь и сейчас производимого фольклора.

Важный аспект мифологии творчества в сталинском «восточном фольклоре» состоит в том, что в отличие от поэта, акын практически лишен верифицируемого прошлого: подобно тому, как нефиксировано его творчество, в свободном полете находится его биография. Биографию поэта можно сфальсифицировать, а творчество идеологически перформативировать, но сама материя, продукция его неотменима, поскольку зафиксирована и (часто) опубликована. Иное дело акын – его биография и творчество могут быть придуманы от начала до конца. Что и было сделано с Джамбулом.

Песни Джамбула были сугубо перформативным актом, лишенным какой бы то ни было содержательности. Если верно, что, как заметил Барт, стиль – это медиум содержания^[17], то поэзия Джамбула может быть определена как *медиальная*. Основная ее функция – организация социального медиума, его заражение состоянием ликования, его трансформация в медиум террора – при полной нерелевантности содержания. Главное в этих экстатических текстах – стилизация и метафоризация террора. Они могли появиться и функционировать только в условиях прямого террора. От них исходит насилие. Они сами – инструмент и орудие террора: заражая читателя страхом, они сублимируют его ненависть к врагу в любовь к вождю.

Рецензент провинциальной газеты обратил внимание на медиальный аспект этих стихов, когда выразил свое впечатление от чтения Джамбула в таком бесхитроном пассаже: «Книга «Песни и поэмы» - замечательная книга! Каждая строчка в ней – это крупинка золота, украшающая счастливую нашу жизнь. Ее хочется не читать, как читаются обычные книги, а хочется взять в руки домбру и петь каждое слово так, как поет их этот звонкий казахский соловей»^[18]. Рецензент обратил внимание на ораторскую установку, или, в терминах формалистов, «доминанту»: именно о ней писал Тынянов, анализируя оду как ораторский жанр. Ода была единственным, хотя и ушедшим за столетие до того, жанром, к которому могла апеллировать русская поэзия, столкнувшись с феноменами, типа Стальского или Джамбула. «Память жанра» проснулась в переводе.

Образность Джамбула встраивалась в жанр европейской героической оды. Сюжет ее так же имел прежде всего «государственное» измерение (победы над внешними и внутренними врагами, возрождение страны и т. п.). Чувство, ее вдохновляющее, - восторг. Тон, ее окрашивающий, - восхваление вождей. Торжественная приподнятость риторического стиля, грандиозность образов и «высокость» языка, обильно сдобренного метафорами и олицетворениями, дополнялись величественными картинками, призванными потрясти читателя и слушателя. Подчиненность стиля оды ее функции – вызвать в читателе/слушателе восторг и одновременно преклонение перед величием и мощью государства и власть предержащих – определялась политической природой этого жанра.

Обладавший великой родословной жанр европейской торжественной оды расцвел на русской почве в эпоху классицизма, когда к нему обратились лучшие русские поэты XVIII века и окончательно иссяк тогда же, когда и в других европейских литературах, - к концу первой трети XIX века. Этот упадок жанра

сопровождался его переходом к поэтам-одописцам третьего ряда (в русской литературе – к эпигонам типа Хвостова, Шишкова и поэтов «Беседы любителей русского слова»), которые, как заметил Дмитриев, создают свои бездарные хвалебные вирши ради «награды перстеньком, ста рублей иль дружества с князьком». Новому времени претил присущий оде неистребимый сервизм. В восточной традиции, напротив, «награда перстеньком» была не только не зазорна, но почетна, поскольку поэзия была не средством чуждого коллективистскому духу мусульманского Востока индивидуалистического самовыражения, но – заработка: это было искусство в изначальном смысле – ремесло.

Падение оды, как показал Тынянов, было связано со сменой установок поэтического слова: с резким усилением индивидуального начала иерархия жанров в романтизме радикально меняется. Поскольку восточная поэзия существовала в иной истории, она была свободна от дилемм Нового времени. Эстетика Джамбула сформировалась в айтысах с их бесконечным воспеванием могущества различных кланов и легендарных генеалогий разных жузов (трех основных родовых союзов, возникших на территории современного Казахстана после распада Золотой Орды), восходящих к неким мифическим «праматерям». Стиль этих песнопений, казалось бы, совершенно непригоден для воспевания социалистической модернизации страны, но несоответствие между формой и содержанием в сталинском искусстве мнимое: функция этой «восточной поэзии» в том и состоит, чтобы возродить к жизни умерший в европейской литературе жанр. Именно при анализе оды Тынянов пришел к выводу, что «*сознание ценности жанра является решающим в литературе*»[\[19\]](#). Сталинской литературе нужна была ода. Возродить ее способна была только «восточная поэзия». Так появились Стальский и Джамбул.

Момент стиля здесь определяющий. Действие этого стиля заразительно. Вс. Рождественский, поэт, в молодости близкий Блоку и акмеизму, пишет к юбилею стихотворение «Привет Джамбулу», читая которое, можно предположить, что так выглядело бы приветствие Джамбула, напиши он его самому себе: «Из города северных вьюг и туманов / Привез я привет соловью Казахстана. // Акыну, чьи струны светлей серебра, / Чье мудрое сердце звенит, как домбра. // Степные просторы, моря и пустыни / Доносят нам вести о славном акыне, // Чье слово прозрачнее синих озер, / Чья мысль, словно беркут, пронзает простор. // Он песней шумящей, как горные воды, / На пиршество дружбы скликает народы, // Он Сталина, радости нашей творца, / Прославил домброю и сердцем певца. /.../ Мы славим тебя, о гафиз Казахстана, / Века не знавали такого баяна. // Ты словно потоков грохочущий гул, / Ты слава, ты счастье народа – Джамбул».

Рождественскому было несложно сочинить подобные стихи: их сходство с текстами Джамбула объясняется тем, что сам Джамбул в переводах русских поэтов (включая и самого Рождественского) – чистая стилизация: он явлен в них таким, каким, в представлении русского поэта, должен выглядеть восточный поэт. Стереотип оказывается универсальным «поэтическим приемом»: он и есть стилевой оригинал. Сходство приведенного текста Рождественского с переводами Джамбула таково, что можно утверждать: для подобных «переводов» избыточен даже подстрочник.

Эпоха Большого Террора был эпохой ликования. В этом смысле ликующий перформанс Джамбула – сугубо террористическая практика: как и положено, «в пространствах утопии совершается театрализация ее травм, и чем у нее больше внутренних причин для недовольства..., тем более безупречным кажется даваемый в Утопии спектакль»^[20]. Одновременно, это и текстуальный спектакль, поскольку «в случае реализации утопия неизбежно обросла бы репрессивными механизмами,

наложившимися на первоначальное ядро», остается предположить, что «нескомпрометированная утопия – это неосуществимая утопия, которую логично отождествить с чистой текстуальностью»[\[21\]](#). Текстуальные стратегии ликования – чистый образчик эстетизированной политики, и в этом качестве представляют несомненный интерес.

Прежде всего, обращает на себя внимание формульность, создающая своего рода стилевую раму. Эти тексты ничего не изображают, что особенно заметно в «описаниях»: «Глаза у моих молодых дочерей / Сверкают рубинами звездных огней. / Они не устанут и дальше сверкать. / На крыльях моих дочерей не догнать. / И смех дочерей моих – солнца ответ. / Их лица румяны, как яблочный цвет, / Ресницы из золота, месяцем брови, / И родину любят священной любовью / Кремлевские звезды глядят из очей. / Все ярче сверкают глаза дочерей» (Девушкам моей страны, 1938). Между тем, даже делая поправку на то, что «по характеру импровизаторского метода Джамбул не мог давать углубленных социально-психологических характеристик нового человека, как это делали выдающиеся поэты Маяковский или Багрицкий»[\[22\]](#), критика утверждала, что в его произведениях «нет повторения приемов изображения, прибегающих к фантастическим небылицам, в них главное место занимают реалистический показ и идейно-художественные принципы, присущие советской поэзии»[\[23\]](#).

Проблема «реализма» здесь особенно интересна, поскольку тексты Джамбула не просто нереалистичны – они бросают вызов реальности. Пространство свершившейся утопии в них, подобно опухоли, агрессивно поглощает любые анклавы того, что могло бы быть названо незараженной территорией реальности, стирая всякую грань между собой и жизнью: «Страна моя лучше и краше всех стран, / И что перед нею мираж-Гюлистан... // Забудь миражи, моя песня, и славь, / Не сон, а чудесную явь»

(Песня о большом караване, 1937), «Растут города, и луга утопают в цветах. / В просторных степях зашумели колосья литые. / Исполнилось все, что веками таилось в мечтах, / Сбылись наяву человечества сны золотые» (Сталинские батыры, 1937), «Ну, как не запеть, если сердце поет, / Ну, как не запеть, мой любимый народ! / Встает над землею ликующий день, / Страна моя, яркое платье надень» (Закон счастья, 1940). Уместно напомнить, что во время воспеваемой Джамбулом коллективизации из трех с половиной миллионов казахов свыше миллиона вымерли от голода, а из выживших около 600 тысяч человек ушло в Китай. «Цветущий Казахстан» потерял половину населения.

Отмена реальности ведет к расцвету различных форм гиперболизации. Отмененная жизнь утверждается через резкое усиление черт как на спатиальном уровне («В Москве сады, как сплошной изумруд, / В Москве дворцы, как в сказке, растут. / Столица – солнечной радости клад, / Столица – сталинской мудрости клад, / Столица – труда и счастья клад. / Там звезды Кремля горят» (Песня народу, 1936), так и на темпоральном («И текут медовою рекою / Все двенадцать месяцев, как май» (Славься в песнях, СССР!, 1937), «Мы за тебя вели бои, чудесный синий край, / Двенадцать месяцев твои – сплошной медовый май!» (Песня ликования, 1937).

Утопия симулирует реальность через различные метафоры аккумуляции: «Перед хозяевами сполна / Все богатства открыла страна. / Кара-тау дает свинец, / Кокче-тау гонит овец, / Тянет с золотом руки Алтай, / Медь обильно дает Карсакпай, / Белый хлопок дарит Чимкент, / Шерсть овечью дает Джаркент, / Золотые, как в сказке, хлеба / Для народа растит Актюба. / Меж озер и меж каменных глыб – / Вороной с дымной гривой Турксиб. / Дни и ночи грузит поезда / Черным золотом Караганда. / В Эмбе гордые вышки стоят, / И кипит нефтяной водопад. / В Кармакчинской степи зреет рис, / В Ала-тау сады поднялись. / И в садах слаще сна и мечты, / Спят яблоки Алма-

Аты». Здесь представлен Казахстан, но может быть представлена вся советская страна.

В принципе, подобные перечисления являют пример дурной бесконечности: достаточно поменять масштаб карты, чтобы точки на ней мультиплицировались. Характерен при этом настойчивый интерес Джамбула к собственно материальной стороне перечисляемых объектов: реки нефти, горы угля, слитки золота и серебра, несметные залежи руд, переполненные плодами сады, бескрайние моря пшеницы, безграничная цветущая степь, бесконечные линии железных дорог и т. п. Это словесное половодье иногда окончательно вымывает «реализм», порождая образы, вполне авангардные: «Корову колхозная холит рука, / Корова колхозная высока. / Рогами заденет она облака, / А вымя, касающееся земли, / Клокочет фонтанами молока...» (Мастерам животноводства, 1938).

Этот интерес к материальности, к вещам, сохраняется даже тогда, когда он, как кажется, совершенно неуместен, вступая в конфликт с самим пафосом случая. Так, в едва ли не самом знаменитом стихотворении Джамбула «Ленинградцы, дети мои» (1941), обращенном к жителям блокадного города, неожиданно вновь всплывают перечисления материальных богатств, видимо, особенно дорогих Джамбулу: «Из глубин казахской земли / Реки нефти к вам потекли. / Черный уголь, красная медь / И свинец, что в срок и впопад / Песню смерти готов пропеть / Бандам, рвущимся в Ленинград. / Хлеб в тяжелом, как дробь, зерне / Со свинцом идет наравне, / Наших лучших коней приплод, / Груды яблок, сладких как мед. / Это все должно вам помочь / Душегубов откинуть прочь. / Не бывать им в нашем жилье! / Не жиреть на нашем сырье!» Джамбул ценил материальные ценности как может ценить их только неожиданно разбогатевший бедняк: ему нравились богатые подарки, он с явным удовольствием одевал роскошные халаты и упивался чудесным образом свалившимся на него богатством — домом, автомобилем, деньгами.

И все же, главное в этих песнях ликования – их политическая функция, которая сводилась к формированию масс через их репрезентацию. Сталинизм – это прежде всего проблема масс, проецирующих себя в вожде. Массы однако нуждаются в собственном образе – чуждом дескриптивности, антимиметичном и прежде всего экспрессивном. Поэтому его основная характеристика не «реализм», но *жизнь*. Об этом говорил сам Джембул: «Советский Союз, где мы с вами живем, / Джембул представляет живым существом. / В нем слышны дыхание и сердцебиенье, / Горение чувства и мысли кипенье». В «Поэме о наркоме Ежове» (1937) мы имеем дело с уже готовым тропом – олицетворением Советского Союза: «Он вырос на зависть всех стран великаном. / В румянце знамен он могуч и здоров. / Пульсирует в нем большевистская кровь. / Он дышит свободой. В нем кости из стали, / А мозг его – мудрый и солнечный Сталин. / В живом организме советской страны / Ежову вождем полномочья даны / Следить, чтобы сердце – всей жизни начало – / Спокойно и без перебоев стучало, / Следить, чтобы кровь, согревать не устав, / По жилам текла – горяча и чиста» (Пер. К. Алтайский). Эту черту отмечали как критики («Он любит свою страну, как живое существо, бесконечно близкое и дорогое»^[24]), так и коллеги по цеху. Вл. Луговской писал: «Почти столетняя мудрость придала стихам Джембула какую-то совершенно особую силу и прозрачность, но в них никогда не чувствуешь старости, так слит он с вечно старой и вечно юной природой, с древней и молодой силой народа. Все события и явления мира видит он совокупно, и наша страна кажется ему великим и единым живым существом»^[25].

Масса, как показал Элиас Канетти, обладает теми же биологическими свойствами, что и «живое существо»: она жаждет роста, равенства, нуждается в направлении и обладает плотностью^[26]. Все эти качества приобретают в текстах Джембула поэтико-идеологические свойства неких *биологем*. Так, рост проявляет себя

через фигуры аггравации («Чтобы джайляу советской страны / Были повсюду гуртами полны, / Партия к новым победам зовет, / Партия к новым победам ведет. / Партии мы свою клятву дадим, / Партии силы свои отдадим, / Чтобы росла наша мощь неустанно / В неисчислимых стадах Казахстана!»); равенство – через метафорику уподобления («Цветущая степь! Ты волшебней мечты, / Огнем самоцветов сверкают цветы. / Одиннадцать стран в окруженье врагов / Цветут, как одиннадцать пышных садов» (Песня о весне народов, 1937)); плотность – через аккумулятивные тропы («Обильна родина моя! Тучнеют сытые стада, / Всесветна слава табунов, не счесть отар, что степью бродят. / В полях зерно, в садах плоды, в земле чудесная руда. / Богатства юрт и городов невольно мне на ум приходят /.../ Я вижу груды серебра и слитки золота горой, / Фонтаны нефти и зерно, и уголь, до сиянья черный. / И самолеты над землей, и поезд, мчащийся стрелой, / И караваны мудрых книг, и труд, веселый и упорный. / Я вижу зданья светлых школ и блеск театров средь ночей...» (Советский Союз, 1937)); направление задается практически во всех текстах выходом на образ вождя («Ликуйте, народы! Цветите и пойте! / Дворцы из гранита и мрамора стройте! // Растите хлеба! Разводите сады! / В пустыни вторгайтесь разливом воды, // Чтоб нежные яблони там расцветали, / Мы с именем Сталина все побеждали, - // Мы с именем Сталина все победим. / Клокочет заветная песня в груди – // В ней Сталину слава, любовь, уваженье, / Без края восторг, без границ восхищенье» (Песня о весне народов, 1937).

Аршалуис Аршаруни, один из главных советских авторитетов 1920-30-х годов по литературам советского Востока писал в дни празднования юбилея Джамбула: «В древней Греции из-за Гомера спорили семь городов. [...] Народы великого Советского Союза с большей страстью боролись бы из-за Джамбула, оспаривая свое преимущество перед другими, если бы не два обстоятельства: Джамбул принадлежит единому и могучему советскому народу, Джамбул и его задушевные песни через русский язык

стали родными и близкими всему советскому народу»^[27]. Как можно видеть, обстоятельство фактически одно: советскому народу не нужно «бороться из-за Джамбула» потому, что Джамбул, будучи переведенным на русский язык, стал принадлежать *всему* советскому народу, а не каким-то его частям («нациям»). Советский народ, *наряду* с «народами великого Советского Союза», является отдельным субъектом. По сути, эта субъектность стала продуктом литературы: не будь русских переводов, не оказалось бы у советского народа единого объекта для «борьбы».

Вопрос о переводах Джамбула не является ни специальным, ни, тем более, техническим. Он является ключевым для понимания феномена Джамбула и всей стоящей за ним «советской многонациональной литературы», которая имела *своего* (отличного от национального!) читателя и требовала писателя *особого типа*, фактически дисфункционального на родном языке. Это была «национальная литература» даже не по языку (поскольку ее функции лежали за пределами своего языка и своего этноса), но именно национально-советская литература, призванная обслуживать «единый и могучий советский народ» и каждая давала от своих традиций то, что требовалось для формирования этой новой «исторической общности людей».

Соцреализм в национальных культурах начал формироваться в условиях, когда большинство из них не имели не то, что литературной традиции, но даже письменности. Неизбежным поэтому оказался своего рода *откат в эпос*. Этот *эпический провал* в домодернистскую эпоху в ходе моденизации прошли в XX веке многие национальные культуры, в начале века – восточно-европейские, после Второй мировой войны – многие культуры в Азии, Африки и Латинской Америке. В переходный период, когда в культурах советских национальных меньшинств формировалась письменность и только началось создание институтов литературы,

письменная культура сосуществовала с первобытно-оральной, формируя уникальный симбиоз.

Эта нео-оральная культура уже не была органичной. В ходе модернизации она теряла свои основные признаки. Однако лишь формально завершилась она со смертью своих «чудесных стариков» - Стальского и Джамбула. Оральная родовая травма, хотя и была кратковременной, осталась в советской культуре навсегда. Как замечает Юрий Мурашов, «для тоталитарных культур модернизма свойственна противодействующая, апоретичная динамика, которая состоит, с одной стороны, во взаимно усиливающемся стремлении к технологическому прогрессу, а с другой, к развитию и в установке на устно-архаические формы социальности и культурное самоопределение»[\[28\]](#).

Советское архаически-оральное общество формирует культуру, которая, с одной стороны, апеллирует к развитой западной литературной модели (создавая письменность для национальных меньшинств восточных окраин, латинизируя алфавиты, создавая и модернизируя институты пропаганды, письма, образования, медиальное пространство), а с другой, опирается на многовековую оральную традицию, черпая в ней свою «народность». Последнее – не просто дань советской интерпретации марксистской доктрины.

Как показал Вальтер Онг, оральность является продуктом и одновременно источником определенных ментальных конструкций, глубоко социальных и лишь проявляющихся в языке. Так, в оральной традиции сочинительные связи доминируют над подчинительными, поскольку последние усложняют информационный поток, делая его трудным для запоминания. Сочинительная связь связана с однородностью, коммулятивностью и повтором, позволяющими следовать за устным высказыванием, не опасаясь потерять мысль. В результате возникают избыточность, риторичность, плеоназмы и тавтологии. Отсутствие письма стимулирует воспроизводство

устоявшихся конструкций и языковых клише, опять же необходимых для запоминания, а потому устные тексты стереотипны и невосприимчивы к каким бы то ни было аналитическим «вызовам», способным разрушить кристаллизованные формулировки. В этом смысле «солнцеликий вождь» Стальского или Джамбула – всего лишь современные версии «славных батыров». Поскольку знание в оральной культуре невозможно записать, оно сохраняется лишь благодаря повтору и накапливается с годами, что создает культ мудрой старости, традиции и, в конечном счете, способствует утверждению социального консерватизма. Своеобразный миметизм и конкретность порождаются необходимостью следовать ходу рассуждений и особенностями оральной концептуализации, избегающей слишком сильного абстрагирования. Поскольку оральные тексты ориентированы на запоминание, они продуцируют разные формы симуляции диалога и часто выстраиваются в виде некоей интеллектуальной и вербальной «битвы», «вызова» (так вызывают на «бой» в айтысах). Поэтому в оральных культурах сильно развит элемент антагонизма. Не случайно, их любимым сюжетом являются битвы. Важной стороной орального типа культуры является ее своеобразный синтетизм: повествование в отличие от письма, создающего дистанцию и «объективность» и отделяющего знание от пишущего и потребляющего, основано на том, что повествователь, содержание его повествования, его персонажи и слушатели объединяются в коммунальной идентификации, где «субъективное» и «объективное» неразличимы. Как неразличимы, впрочем, миф и реальность из-за слабости концептуализации, неразвитости понятийного аппарата и слабости объяснительных механизмов. Это создает богатый иллюзорный мир, обязанный своим богатством еще и тому, что значение понятий в оральной культуре, замкнутое на конкретной группе, лишает их обобщающего кодифицирующего начала, нормы, так что словарь этих культур необычайно динамичен. С другой стороны, отсутствие

письменности не позволяет фиксировать прошлое, опыт, лишает их «фактичности», позволяя постоянно «выдумывать» историю: «пересказывать» даже легче, чем «переписывать»^[29].

Здесь – пуповина, соединяющая современность с прошлым, реальность с эпосом не разорвана, так что «батыры» здесь живут в настоящем. Эти культуры лишены памяти. В них эпос заменяет историю, а то, что должно быть ею, всякий раз оборачивается чистым листом, который – в отсутствие письма – не может быть заполнен. Временной протяженности и связанности здесь нет. Историческое сознание поэтому дискретно и заменено современностью. Стальский говорил Капиеву: «Как грязная река, как мутная вода, ушло все прошлое. Не до него теперь! Жизнь человека правильно устроена, сын мой! Я доволен! Прошлое никогда не возвращается обратно, и не надо! Пусть моя молодость будет там, а я здесь... Мы разные люди, рожденные разными матерями... Мы друг друга не поймем!»^[30]. Это идеальная почва для мифологии.

Пересечения основных параметров оральных культур со сталинской бросаются в глаза. И все же – центральной здесь является не проблема технологии (письма), но сама фигура автора, субъекта. И в самом деле, в какой мере эта ликующая поэзия принадлежит ничего не понимавшему древнему старику, который с трудом передвигался? Как сказать, что именно сочинял Джамбул, а что сочиняли за него, когда неясно, насколько он понимал даже то, что с ним лично происходило (например, вручение орденов, премий, встреча с Ежовым и т. д.)? Насколько релевантны в разговоре о Джамбуле язык его песен, их «оригиналы», наконец, сами приписываемые ему произведения? Ведь, по сути, «Джамбул» был не личностью, но коллективным предприятием, на котором работали десятки лучших поэтов и переводчиков Казахстана.

Вот почему впору повторить вслед за Мишелем Фуко сказанные им в статье «Что такое автор?» слова об «очевидной недостаточности повторения пустых лозунгов: автор исчез, Бог и человек умерли общей смертью. Вместо этого следует подвергнуть пересмотру оставленное исчезнувшим автором пустое место, внимательно присмотреться к произведенным этой пустотой провалам и разрывам связей, новым размежеваниям и перераспределениям, к изменчивым функциям, порожденным этим исчезновением»^[31]. Фуко ввел понятие автора-функции дискурса, инициатора дискурсивных практик. В нашем случае ситуация осложняется изначальной двойственностью «автора»: наделяемый индивидуальной биографией субъект, производящий якобы «фольклорный» (по определению, без-авторский) текст.

Фуко призывал заменить традиционные вопросы типа: «Кто является реальным автором?» или: «Есть ли у нас доказательства его аутентичности и оригинальности?», куда более существенными: «Каковы модусы существования этого дискурса?», «Откуда он идет, как циркулирует, кто его контролирует?», «Чем определяются позиции возможных субъектов?», «Кто может исполнять различные функции субъекта?»^[32] Если эти вопросы поставить в отношении персонажей типа Стальского, Джамбула или любого другого «народного певца» сталинизма – лезгинского, казахского или русского, ответы придется искать не в полувывмысленных биографиях этих случайно оказавшихся под рукой персонажей, производших некий корпус заведомо неаутентичных, разными субъектами заказанных, записанных, переписанных, переведенных, отредактированных и цензурированных текстов, но в самом дискурсе сталинизма. Анализ *авторства текстов* уступает, таким образом, место анализу *самого института авторства*, а следовательно, вопросу о производстве и функционировании этого дискурса в сталинизме.

То обстоятельство, что эти тексты «национальны по форме», играет решающую роль, поскольку смещают ключевой для текстуального анализа вопрос о языке на периферию: Стальского или Джамбула превращает в событие культуры вовсе не то, как и что они пели, когда (и если) пели на своих языках, но то, что, в конечном счете, остается на бумаге по-русски, т.е. нечто, в принципе не подлежащее атрибутивным процедурам. На лезгинском языке Стальский существует лишь как локальный эпизод истории периферийной и экзотической словесности, как литература, созданная «в отдельно взятом ауле», как курьез, но не как культурный феномен, поскольку произведенное им (или атрибутированное ему) вне русского языка – с точки зрения задач самого этого производства! – дисфункционально, т.е. попросту не может выполнять политико-эстетических функций по наполнению и заражению «нелезгинского» медиального пространства риторикой, образностью и метафорикой террора и ликования, придавая этому пространству национальное измерение.

Верно и обратное: это поэзия примордиальных рефлексов. Если освободить ее от риторической шелухи восточных метафор, проступит ее ценностный каркас: род, вождь, кровная месть, трайбализм, милитаризм, героизация убийства и т.д. Эта поэзия не может апеллировать к развитым культурным и социальным формам, а потому для того, чтобы эффективно выполнять функции социальной мобилизации, она ищет адекватных культурных форм в родо-племенном обществе, сохранившем первичные формы оральности. Поскольку же эта поэзия встраивается в уже готовую культуру, последняя проходит через то, что можно назвать романтическим редукционизмом, исходящим из концепций нации Фихте и особенно Гердера, для которого нация была языковой группой, язык – синонимом мысли, а потому нация наделялась некими «природными» качествами, становящимися едва ли не генетическими. Парадоксальным образом, советское национально-культурное строительство

соединяло просвещенческий пафос и интернационализм с обскурантизмом, с расистской, антимодернистской романтической национальной идеологией.

Рассматриваемый здесь случай интересен еще и тем, что перед нами – один из первых примеров той манипулятивной политическо-идеологической стратегии, что станет в XX веке определяющей. Речь идет о том, что просветительские идеи, ставшие продуктом социальной, культурной и интеллектуальной истории Запада, направляются на продвижение разного рода проектов классовой и/или национальной политической мобилизации и/или религиозного экстремизма и порождающей их примордиальной политической культуры, которые вполне успешно (само)защищаются через апелляцию к тем самым просветительским ценностям (социальный прогресс, модернизация, права человека, национальное освобождение, интернационализм), неприятие и разрушение которых составляет самую их суть.

Шкловский шутил по поводу «вазаимодействия и взаимообогащения» русской и европейских культур, что русский лен по старому обычаю возвращается в Россию голландским полотном. В связи с рассматриваемым нами сюжетом, можно сказать, что в годы террора возродился куда более старый «обычай»: русским полотном возвращался среднеазиатский хлопок. Как бы то ни было, на примере одной из ключевых для советской многонациональной литературы функций – создания образа вождя и окружающего его «пространства ликования» – можно увидеть, что прокламируемое советской идеологией «взаимодействие и взаимообогащение литератур народов СССР» отнюдь не было однонаправленным, предполагавшим влияние русской литературы на все остальные. Оказалось, что европейские литературы, на каком бы уровне развития они ни стояли, просто не располагали требуемой традицией в том, что касается риторики, образности и метафоричности репрезентации вождя (вождей) и глорификации террора и наступившего «золотого века», и вынужденно

следовали в этом за восточным фольклором. Если для политической «ориентализации» русского государства потребовалось 300 лет «татаро-монгольского ига», то для ориентализации эстетической достаточно оказалось всего нескольких лет террора.

Как мы видели, то, что только намечалось у Стальского, у Джамбула приобрело почти гротескные формы: его тексты настолько избыточны и тавтологичны, роль сугубо языкового установки в них настолько велика, стилевая аффектация искусственна, а формальное задание доминирует над идеологическим содержанием, что можно определенно говорить о полной *нерелевантности* этого содержания. Тексты эти можно было «переводить» с какой угодно степенью отклонения от «оригинала», заменяя одни метафоры и конструкции другими, их можно было менять местами, перекомпоновывать, сокращать, увеличивать.

Можно сказать, что *тексты эти вообще не нуждались в оригинале*. В принципе не важно, с чем и кем на этот раз сравнивает Джамбул Сталина (Ворошилова, Ежова, Кагановича или Калинина) – все это легко заменимо. Не важно к какой годовщине или очередному «первомаю» создана та или иная песня. Итак, неважны: имена исторических персонажей, атрибуция тех или иных событий и фактов, конкретные идеологические задания (кроме славословий или проклятий по тому или иному поводу и/или адресу), оригинальный язык этих текстов, но лишь метафорика, риторика и стиль. И, следовательно, *неважен и сам их автор*. Он – сама функция.

Что же тогда производил человек по имени Стальский или Джамбул? В сущности, весь свой Мусафаилов век акын слагал песни прославляющие носителей власти – ханов, баев, а в конце жизни Сталина и его «батыров», мало что меняя, кроме имен. Он проклинал «век скорби» и воспевал «золотой век». Но в отсутствие исторической перспективы, любой век мог быть объявлен «веком скорби» или, напротив, «золотым» - последний мог существовать в качестве фольклорной утопии, а

мог быть объявлен наступившей реальностью. Акын рифмовал, что угодно – он пел о снегах на вершинах гор, которые видел в окно, о рельсах, по которым мчался поезд, об окружавшей его природе, лошадях, девушках. В этом и состояло мастерство импровизации, которым Джамбул владел, по-видимому, в совершенстве, используя выработанные десятилетиями сложные приемы стихосложения. Ведь песня на айтысе должна была быть сложена так, чтобы ее смысл сохранился при пении с конца, т.е. в обратном порядке слов, чтобы ее можно было спеть спереди назад и сзади наперед. Шкловский утверждал, что в русской литературе такую песню мог бы сложить только Хлебников^[33]. Читая эти тексты, отчетливо понимаешь, что задача Джамбула была сугубо формальной. Именно в этом, сугубо формалистическом смысле, Джамбул и был художником.

Иное дело – функции этих песен, которые представляют собой текстуализацию ликования. Их настроение и стиль были настолько заразительны, что индоктринировали все вокруг – и прежде всего литературы, не имевшие традиций восточного славословия. Функция эта вообще не предполагает персонального измерения. Характерно не только то, что эти тексты создавались в квази-фольклорной традиции, но и то, что даже созданные в системе индивидуального поэтического творчества, они лишались авторской индивидуальности (не могли ею обладать!). Так, что если, к примеру, стихи о войне Симонова и Твардовского, Суркова и Исаковского, Маркиша или Тычины, а тем более Ахматовой и Инбер различить несложно, то их же стихи о Сталине трудноразличимы. Дело тут не в «мастерстве», но в природе и функции этих текстов.

Фольклор не нуждается в авторе. Он есть то, что авторства лишено. Сама оксюморонная ситуация советского *авторского фольклора* указывает на факультативность фигуры автора. Чем больше текстов о вожде производит Джамбул,

тем более нерелевантной становится его фигура как автора. Она тает, ее жизнь, цвет и голос перетекают в создаваемую в этих текстах фигуру единственного Художника и Автора – самого Сталина. Тексты о вожде не могут быть авторскими по определению: в «стеклянном доме» тоталитарного государства связь между персонажем (Вождем) и читателем (Массами) прямая, и не предполагает посредника-автора. Превращаясь в медиум вождя, Автор теряет все те качества, которыми не располагает, согласно Барту, и читатель: он лишается истории, биографии, психологии и, таким образом, сам превращается в читателя. Между Вождем и Массой третий – лишний. Гомеры сталинизма самой курьезностью своего открытия, откровенной фиктивностью биографий, явной творческой несамостоятельностью и дисфункциональностью напоминают о том, что любой Автор в сталинизме становился таким лишним.

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Historical Transformations and Regionalism in Central Eurasia

Mirzokhid Rakhimov

Creation of Central Asian republics

It is difficult to understand contemporary Central Asia without understanding its historical heritage and cultural diversity. During many centuries the region was at the very center of trade, commerce and the exchange of ideas between Europe and Asia. Historically, Central Asia has had a variety of names: Turan (“land of Turks”), Transoxiana (“across the Oxus (Amu-Dar’ya)”), Maverannahr (Arabic for “beyond the river”), and Turkestan.

The geopolitical location of Central Asia made the region an attractive trade route and, consequently, there were frequent struggles for power. In the second half of the 19th century Tsarist Russia gradually conquered Central Asia, bringing the regional powers—the Emirates of Bukhara and Kokand and the Khanate of Kokand—into the Russian sphere of influence. In the early 20th century Soviet rule was established in Central Asia until the 1991s.

The contemporary Central Asian republics, as a political entities with their boundaries and organizational structures, were created by the Soviets during the 1924–25 “national delimitation” that divided Central Asia into several new ethno linguistically-based units. The national delimitation is one of the most contentious issues in Central Asian history¹.

¹ For more details see, Ata-Mirzaev, V.L.Gentshke, R.Murtazaeva, 1990 *Uzbekistan mnogonatsionalnyi: istoriko-demograficheskiy aspekt*. Tashkent: Medesinskaya literatura Press; Bolshay Sovetskaya Ensekoplediya. 1976 Moscow: Ensiklopediya Press; Gordienko A. 1959 *Sozdanie sovetской nasional'noy gosudarstvennosti v Sredney Azii*. Tashkent: Central Asian University Press; Giinsburg, G. 1992 ‘Recent History of the Territorial Question in

The problem of the national and territorial state delimitation of Central Asia nations was resolved in Moscow by the Party and Bolsheviks leadership of RSFSR in the mid-1920s, guided by the motto “national self-determination” for the indigenous peoples of the region, and in obvious contradiction to the volition and opinion of their best representatives. However, according to the archives, these two major provisions: 1. The ethnic composition of the majority of the population residing on the territory under consideration; 2. The territorial indivisibility of territories of new state formations. They should not be similar to strip-farming or open-field system were not kept. In fact, they were superseded by special directives from higher administering bodies to suit political ambitions. The historical documents reveals that the accomplishment of delimitation according to nationality was impeded by the fact that the people of Central Asia lived in alternating strips, where land fit for cultivation and tillage alternated with steppe and semi-desert land plots suitable only for grazing.²

The Bolshevik delimitation resulted in such a situation that significant numbers of persons belonging to one or another nationality found themselves outside the boundaries of their titular state. For example, 433,000 Uzbeks found themselves outside the boundaries of Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan included about 82% of all Uzbeks residing at that moment in the former USSR, and Tajikistan included 75.% of all Tajiks.³

Central Asia’ Central Asia Monitor. 3:21-29; Masov Rakhim, 1995 Tadjiki: istoriya s grifom “Sovershenno sekretno”. Dushanber: Heritage Press; Rahimov Mirzohid, Urazaeva Galina, 2005 *Central Asia Nations and Border issues* // Conflict Studies Research Center, Central Asia Series. UK. 05/10. <http://www.da.mod.uk/csarc>; Olivier Roy, 2000 *The New Central Asia. The Creation of Nations*. (I.B. Tauris Publishers); Tursunov H. 1957 *Obrazovanie Uzbekskoy Sovetskoy Socialisticheskoy Respubliki*. Tashkent: Academy of Sciences Press and others.

² Rahimov Mirzohid, Urazaeva Galina, 2005 *Central Asia Nations and Border issues* // UK Defence Academy Conflict Studies Research Center, Central Asia Series. UK. 05/10. <http://www.da.mod.uk/csarc> P. 9

³ Ibid

In the territory of the Turkestan, Bukharian and Khorezmian Soviet Republics the following structures were formed: Uzbek SSR (including the Tajik ASSR), Turkmen SSR, Kara-Kirghiz (Kirghiz) Autonomous oblast affiliated to the RSFSR, and Kara-Kalpak Autonomous oblast affiliated to Kazakh ASSR. The Kazakh districts of Turkestan were affiliated to the Kazakh SSR.

However, the national-and-territorial state delimitation had not been completed. In May 1929 the Tajik ASSR was transformed into the Tajik SSR. In 1926 the Kirghiz Autonomous oblast was transformed into the Kirghiz ASSR, and in 1936 it was transformed into a Soviet Republic and was included directly in the USSR. In 1936 in accordance with the new USSR Constitution (adopted in 1936), the Kazakh ASSR and Kirghiz ASSR were transformed into independent Soviet Socialist republics and directly entered the USSR. Regarding the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous oblast, in 1930 it was included directly in the RSFSR, in 1932 it was transformed into an ASSR, and since the late 1936 it has remained within Uzbekistan.⁴

Later on in 1939, 1956 and in other years the similar practice of turning over the lands continued.

Thus, during the accomplishment of national-and-territorial delimitation and formation of new states mistakes were made which influenced the further development of each republic. The delimitation was an administrative decision imposed on the region from the center – part, some would say, of a “divide and rule policy”.⁵

Administrative bodies did not adhere to regulations, which they themselves adopted as fundamentals, which resulted in infringement of human rights. Taking all these matters into

⁴ Ata-Mirzaev, O. et al 1998 *Uzbekistan mnogonatsionalnyi: istoriko-demograficheskiy aspect*. Medicine literature Press. Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Pp.:55

⁵ Akiner, Sh. 1990 “Uzbeks” pp.215-222 in Smith G. (ed.), *The Nationalities question in the Soviet Union*. London and New York: Longman. Pp.168-82

account historians should continue studying newly released research materials relating to the national-and-territorial state delimitation in Central Asia. But the most important matter is to be very careful with evaluations, and state boundaries of post-Soviet Central Asia nations should be solved only through diplomatic means.

Complex Soviet experience

From 1920s till 1991 Central Asian republics is faced considerable experiences of Soviet political, social, economic and cultural transformation with positive and negative aspects. In period from the 1920s to the mid-1930s saw the establishment in the Central Asian republics of the totalitarian administrative model of the Soviet social and state structure based on command-control economy and strict centralization. Adopted 1936 the USSR Constitution considerably restricted many former constitutional provisions relating to the sovereign rights of the Soviet republics, in particular their right to suspend or appeal against the resolutions or instructions of any All-Union body. The decisions of All-Union executive bodies were thus given legal precedence over the republics' laws. In all respects the Central Asia republics remained strictly subordinate to the central authorities of the USSR.

Among very complicated issues if that time could be mentioned Stalin's collectivization. The *dehqons* (peasants in Uzbekistan) were forced into collective farms (*kolkhoz*), often under threat of confiscation of land, water and food supplies. Those who resisted were subjected to 'dekulakization' (victimized as *kulaks*, rich peasants), all their property was confiscated and they were sent into exile. Besides farm buildings, all livestock and poultry was subject to collectivization. The process of collectivization was tragic especially for the Kazakhs, who practiced the nomadic traditions and way of life. From several hundred thousands to even as many as 1.5 million Kazakhs perished due to starvation during the

1930s.⁶ The Soviet leadership stimulated the development of the sectors in which the 'USSR's independence of the world market' was sensed most strongly and which were required to provide the central regions with the necessary industrial raw materials. As a result, like other republics, the Central Asian republics were making a weighty contribution to the USSR's industrialization and the strengthening of its economic independence, but remained a raw materials exporter.⁷

In the mid-1950s the USSR's new leadership under Nikita Khrushchev initiated the policy of de-Stalinization. Mass repression was condemned officially, but on the whole the regime's ethos remained unchanged. Despite, the development of limited trends at the time of 'Khrushchev's thaw' during the late 1950s and early 1960s the existing state structure fundamentally remained the same.

Among the positive aspects of the Soviet policy in Central Asia industrialization should be mentioned. From the 1960s to the beginning of the 1980s dozens of large industrial plants were built in Central Asian republics and the branch structure of industrial production was expanded. For instance in Uzbekistan, more than 1,500 industrial enterprises, engineering, chemical, construction, light industry and agro-industrial complexes were in operation in 1985. However, during the period from the 1960s to the 1980s, Uzbekistan specialization as a raw materials supplier increased.⁸ The Soviet Government's consumerist attitude towards Central Asia, the predatory exploitation of its natural and human resources and the one-sided nature of the national economy as a supplier of raw materials created conditions impeding the republics' socio-economic development.

⁶ Svanberg, I. 1990 "Kazakhs" pp.200-206 in Smith G. (ed.) *The Nationalities question in the Soviet Union*. London and New York: Longman. Pp. 202

⁷ Rumer, B. 1989 *Soviet Central Asia: a Tragic Experience*. Unwin Hyman, Boston. Pp. 43

⁸ Mirzohid Rahimov, *From Soviet republics to independent states: Challenges of transitions in Central Asia* // in *The Greater Middle East in Global Politics: Social Science Perspectives on the Changing Geography of the World politics*. by Mehdi Parvizi Amineh (ed.). Brill Academic Publishers (Leiden & Boston). 2007. Pp.279-300.

The policy of artificially increasing the multinational mix of the union republics, including those in Central Asian one, had a special place in the Soviet model of ‘socialist internationalization’. There was forced migration into the republics as well as uncontrolled voluntary migration. It should be noted that migration from Russia to Central Asia started from the 19th century. This process intensified during the Soviet period. A tidal wave of compulsory resettlement emerged in the second half of the 1930s, when at the time of mass repression the deportation of whole nations began.⁹ During WWII (‘Great Patriotic War’) Central Asian nations received million evacuees and refugees from the occupied areas of European part of Soviet Union and other republics.

In the Soviet period, considerable attention was dedicated to education in Central Asia. As a result of the measures undertaken to put an end to illiteracy, the level of literacy among Central Asian populations increased¹⁰. Language policy was another tool for destroying national consciousness and national spirit. In 1938 the USSR leaders adopted a resolution on the obligatory study of Russian in national schools, which entailed a reduction in the number of hours allocated for study of the mother tongue. In 1940 the Cyrillic alphabet was introduced by decree. These measures for raising Russian to the level of the state language, further limited opportunities for developing regional languages.¹¹

Due to Soviet educational policy, thousands of high schools and dozens of universities were formed in Central Asia. For instance, in Uzbekistan the number of higher schools reached 9,188 and the number of institutes and universities reached 42 by 1985. As a result, the general educational level of the population rose steadily and the ranks of qualified

⁹ Kriendberg, I. 1991 “Forging Soviet People” pp. 219-31 in Fierman W. (ed.), *Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press Pp. 156

¹⁰ Medlin W. at al, “Education and development in Soviet Central Asia” (Leiden, Brill, 1971).

¹¹ Kriendberg, I. 1991 “Forging Soviet People” pp. 219-31 in Fierman W. (ed.), *Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Pp. 219-13

specialists were actively expanded. However, positive changes were fragmentary and tended mostly to be in terms of quantity rather than quality.

In the Gorbachev period (1985-1991), Central Asia saw the birth of national movements, which expressed demands for national-democratic reforms and real sovereignty. Different political and social movements appeared which focused on the restoration of national culture and statehood. Specific expression of this process was found in the elevation of the Central Asian languages to the status of state language in 1989-90¹² and the drafting of measures aimed at resolving the most important national economic tasks, like the cotton monoculture in agriculture, and revealing national traditions and customs.

The policy of *Perestroika* (“restructuring”) proclaimed by Mikhail Gorbachev in April 1985 gave rise to hopes for a way out of the systemic crisis. Gorbachev and his supporters started cutting back the power of the *nomenklatura* elite, allowed relative pluralism in political and economic life, and proclaimed a ‘new thinking’ in foreign policy. However, Gorbachev’s attempts to modernize the Soviet system and give socialism a ‘human face’ ended in failure. *Perestroika* did not deal with the fundamental issues and suffered from half-heartedness. In short, there were little progressive changes in the political sphere, but the socio-economic conditions of society and the financial situation of the people was worsening. As with other Soviet republics, in the Soviet period the Central Asian republics were officially considered to be sovereign, possessing the right to enter independently into relations with foreign countries, to establish agreements with them and exchange diplomatic representatives. From 1944 former Soviet republics received the right to establish diplomatic representations in foreign relations¹³. These rights were guaranteed by relevant articles of the USSR and republican constitutions. However, the constitutional proclamation of international

¹² Fierman, W. 2006 “Language and education in post-Soviet Kazakhstan: Kazakh-medium instruction in Urban schools”. *The Russian Review* 65: 98-116.

¹³ TzGA RUZ.

rights of «sovereign republics» was purely cosmetic. In reality, the Central Asian nations were deprived of the possibility of directly entering the international community, lacked their own foreign policy institutions and lacked the right to establish independently external links. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek SSRs had no real authority, since all foreign relations were handled through Moscow. All international contacts were established only with Moscow's permission and under its strict control.

New Geopolicy of Central Asia

Central Asia faced considerable political, social, cultural changes in the whole period 20th century and the beginning 21 century start new stages of the geopolitical changes and dynamics of international relations in Central Asia. There are many factors, which make Central Asia an important region in the world arena. Among them is firstly, the availability of rich energy resources in Central Asia and the Caspian region, secondly, geopolitical location of Central Asia among such regional powers as Russia, China, India, Iran and highly interest of US, the EU and other major international actors and thirdly, issue of Afghanistan, can also be regarded as a source of possible threats to neighboring countries and other countries of the world because of the illegal drug production and trafficking, and terrorism.

All these and other factors have encouraged regional and global players for to compete in Central Asia in the post-Cold War era. As a result, post-Soviet Central Asia is important for the geopolitical interests of the major and regional powers and major international organizations and institutions – the UN, the EU, NATO, OSCE. From a strategic perspective, the Western countries have been attaching an increased importance to

Central Asia's central location at the crossroads of Eurasia¹⁴. There are some expert saying that it is retuning the Great Game of 19 century, but with the new players. It well known that Central Asia historically was in the center or important aspects of interest different emperies and we could say that region was more or less in Great Game all the time.¹⁵

It should be noted that the region started to be called as *Srednyaya Aziya* (Middle Asia), which was in reality for political reasons to refer only the four republics of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan was regarded as a separate entity and hence all regions referred separately as a *Srednyay Aziya i Kazakhstan* (Middle Asia and Kazakhstan). Since the collance of the Soviet Union, the terminology used in both Russia and the other former Soviet republics has undergone a change. The five newly independent southern states (now including Kazakhstan) have adopted the term *Sentralnaya Aziya* (the Central Asia states) as collective designation¹⁶.

Post-Soviet newly independent Central Asian nations are confronting by complex threads including the international terrorism, religion extremism, illegal drug trafficking,

¹⁴ See, for example, Akiner, Sh. (ed) 2004. *The Caspian: politics, energy and security*. Central Asian forum series. SOAS, University of London. Routledge Curzon publisher. P.405; Amineh, M.P., Houweling H. 2005. *Central Eurasia In Global Politics: Conflict, Security, And Development* (International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology, V. 92). Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands; Laumulin, M.T. 2005 *Sentralnaya Aziya v zarubejnoj politologii i mirovoy geopolitike. Volume 1*. Almaty: Institute of Strategic Studies; Allison R., Jonson L. (eds.), 2001 "Central Asian security: internal and external dynamics" *Central Asia security: the new international context*. Royal Institute of International affairs, London, UK; Starr, Frederic "Making Eurasia Stable", Foreign Affairs, vol.75, no.1(96).

¹⁵ For more details on Great Game of 19 century see: Martin Ewans (eds). *Britain and Russia in Central Asia 1880-1907*. Volume I-VI. Routledge, London and New York. 2008.

¹⁶ Agreed at a summit meeting of the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in Tashkent, January 1993: Akiner Sh. 1998 "Conceptual Geographies of Central Asia" pp.3-6 in Akiner et all. (eds) *Sustainable Development in Central Asia*, Curzon Press, Richmond; Mirzohid Rahimov, *From Soviet republics to independent states: Challenges of transitions in Central Asia* // in *The Greater Middle East in Global Politics: Social Science Perspectives on the Changing Geography of the World politics*. by Mehdi Parvizi Amineh (ed.). Brill Academic Publishers (Leiden & Boston). 2007. Pp.279-300.

transnational water sharing, transnational criminal, boundary issues. Security threads in Central Asia are transnational, also national and regional security is interdependent and interconnected.

Regional cooperation in Central Asia: institutional framework

It is well known that in the post-Soviet period Central Asian republics have been co-founders of regional organizations including Central Asian Cooperation Organizations (CACO), Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), Commonwealth of Independent (CIS) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), but their effectiveness is different.

CACO-EvrAzEC. From the beginning of the 1990s the Central Asia states have sought a new model of development and integration. The countries of the region have common social, economic, environmental and political problems and cooperation is necessary to solve these problems. The process of Central Asian inter-state cooperation began in 1994 when the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan signed a treaty creating a common economic space between the two countries. Later Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan joined them, and in 1998 this cooperation was named the Central Asia Economic Forum. In February 2002 the Central Asia Cooperation Organization was officially created at the meeting of the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

There are many problems in the processes of the Central Asian integration, among which is the prevalence of national interests prevailing over the regional, different customs policies of Central Asian, there are no information exchange programs (publications, TV programs etc). In the recent year among these security challenges transboundary water sharing getting more importance for interstates relation in Central Asia. Historically water issue and its sharing were important aspects of agriculture of the region, economic and political relation in Central Asia. During the Soviet time in whole Central Asia were

assimilated new areas of steppe land for agriculture and middle of 1980th in the region are fashioned more than several thousand irrigation systems, including 900 one in Uzbekistan as main cotton producer of the USSR. It was built hundred thousand km of irrigation channels and dozens water reservoirs and hydro power stations were built, included the Charvaq reservoir (Uzbekistan), Nurek (Tajikistan), Toktogul (Kyrgyzstan) and other. In recent years among all these challenges transnational water sharing issues getting be most important for Central Asia nations, first of all for downstream countries – Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Upstream countries Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan tried to build new huge hydro station for internal use and export electricity to other countries and make economic profit. The upstream and downstream countries have different position to this issue. Uzbekistan requesting international expertise for this new hydro stations Rogun (Tajikistan) and Kambarta (Kyrgyzstan) for possible its affect to water sharing and to the ecologic situation in Central Asia. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan is supported it. It is important the position of Russia in this issues and formally supporting dostream countries, in reality investing the construction of the hydro station in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The EU and other international actors tried to be more balanced. For instance, in the spring 2009, the president of World Bank Robert Zelik and Special representative of EU to Central Asia Pier Morrell also expressed that need to be careful international expertise of the new construction and Pier Morell suggested on the building small size hydro power stations.

The problem with water sharing in Central Asia is no legal framework of the status of regional rivers. I think it is necessary to finding common approaches and acceptance in the framework of the UN, SCO legal framework of the main regional rivers – Amudarya, Sirdarya and Zerafshan as a transnational and have dialog between Central Asian nations themselves and use international experiences in the solving water sharing in different part of the world, for instance like status of Danube in Europe.

In the last two decades Central Asian republics do not consider each other as main political and economic partner. For instance sociological survey in Kazakhstan shows that neighboring regional countries are not among priority economic partners¹⁷. The same could be say in all other Central Asia countries.

My interview and sociological survey among more than 50 experts from Central Asian republics, Russia, and the UK showed the main problems for regional cooperation: 1. Different national interests and economic development. (50%); 2. Rivalry between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan for leadership (35%); 3. Fear of sub-national structures (30%).¹⁸ But some experts think that CACO is the first step on the way of development and there are perspectives for a future development of cooperation. The majority of specialists (95%) consider the EU and ASEAN as good models for regional integration in Central Asia but with local peculiarities.

In November 2005, at the meeting of leaders of CACO in St.-Petersburg it was decided to include the CACO in Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). EurAsEC was founded in 2000 to establish an economic zone comprising of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Moldova, Ukraine, and Armenia have an observer status in the group. In the official media the main reason for CACO joining EurAsEC and the creation of EurAsEC was that both organizations had similar purposes and joining will increase effectiveness. In January 2006 -- Uzbekistan today became the sixth member of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) at a summit in St. Petersburg, but in October 2008 Uzbekistan paused its membership. Main reason is probably was attempt of other member

¹⁷ G.T.Telebaev. *Otnosheniya mejdu tyurko-musulmanskimi gosudarstvami v osenke kazahstansev*. (Relations between turk-muslimans in the avalucation of Kazakhts) \\Materiali mejdunarodnoy nauchno-teoriticheskoy konferensii «Istoricheskiy opit modernizatsii tyurko-musulmanskih narodov SSSR». Aktober, Kazakhstan. 2008. S..256-257.

¹⁸ Rakhimov M, *Security issues and regional cooperation in Central Eurasia // Democratization and human rights*. Tashkent Uzbekistan. 2006 Number 4. Pp. 64-65.

countries to built as it was mentioned new hydro energy stations in Central Asia, it's possible negative effect on the ecology, and most important for agriculture and make dependent downstream countries, including Uzbekistan.

CIS and SCO. Former Soviet republics also became founding members of the Commonwealth of Independent (CIS) States during the meeting held in Alma-Ata on 21 December 1991. Representatives of the CIS member states meet regularly to discuss economic, military, political and social issues of common interest. More than 2,000 agreements on various aspects of intra-CIS relations have been signed, but most of these agreements exist only on paper. But its lack of a clear purpose, and different perceptions on the part of its members, all have called into question the future viability of the CIS as a supranational entity.

In 1996 the presidents of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan established the “Shanghai Five” in order to resolve border disputes and to reduce the armed forces along their borders. The process started in 1996 and at a meeting in Shanghai on 15 June 2001 these countries founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Uzbekistan also joined the organization. During the meeting, the presidents signed a declaration establishing the SCO and the “Shanghai Convention to combat terrorism, separatism, and extremism”. It is clear that SCO is mainly supported by China but for Central Asian countries, the interest in the organization is to build an alliance with Russia and with China and with other countries in the struggle against militant Islamists, and to maintain stability in Central Asia. At a summit in St-Petersburg in June 2002, SCO leaders decided to create a secretariat in Beijing. During the SCO summit in Tashkent in June 2004 a counter-terrorist center was officially opened in Tashkent. India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan received observer status at SCO. But, there are some problems in SCO, majority projects sponsoring by Chinese investment but Russia and Kazakhstan have also investment potential

and could more actively participate in the SCO. It is necessary adopt regulation of new members and future development multilateral cooperation with different regional and international organizations including UN, NATO, OSCE and others. In future, the SCO should wider its activities in economy, transport, humanitarian and other fields.

Regional cooperation in Central Asia in general has very weak institutional framework and in the stage of forming. But prospects of economic and political cooperation in Central Asia, speed and scale of these processes will depend on the readiness of nations to work together in the contract regional projects, to carry out the proper reforms and introduce the forms and methods of economic regulation adopted in the world practice, as well as on the political will of the government of the member states.

Regional and International economic and transport communication strategies

Central Asia is a land-locked region and Uzbekistan, the region's most densely populated country, is one of the only two with Liechtenstein double land-locked countries in the world. And geographical remoteness of Central Asia from the main seaports is a serious disadvantage to the region's wildly fledged participation in the world trade. The Central Asia republics inherit common post-Soviet system of rail, road transport communications, gas and oil pipelines. And this communication went through European part of former Soviet Union. Newly independent Central Asia republics consider development of alternative regional transport communications as important of the national regional strategy and in results it was developed new transport communication to the East and South and link it with the transport systems of neighboring countries China, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. In particular, in May 1996 was completed a rail link Tejen – Serakhs – Meshkhed – Bandar – Abbas, which connected the railway systems of the Central Asia with Iranian ports on Persian Gulf, and

passed through Turkey to Europe. Reconstruction of the Tashkent-Andizhan-Osh-Sarytash-Irkeshtam motor highway would create conditions for intensive economic exchange between the Central Asian countries and China and would promote the intensification of regional economic cooperation not only in Central Asia, but also within the framework of the SCO and Organization of Economic Cooperation.

It is also growing interest from Central Asia and outside to alternative pipelines. In December 2005 the construction of a 988 km Kazakhstan –China oil pipeline from Atasu in West Kazakhstan to the Chinese border town Alashankou was completed and it enabled Kazakhstan to export up to 10 million barrel of oil a year.¹⁹ In May 2006, the Indian government also officially approved its participation in the \$5 billion US Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline project. In the perspective Central Asian countries could also participate at different international energy projects, including EU's NABUCCO project and in July 2009 Turkmen President Berdimuhamedov expressed that his country could participate at the NABUCCO projects.

Stabilization and positive changes in Afghanistan grant new opportunities for Central Asian cooperation. Improvement of transport connection between Central Asia and Afghanistan would be a significant contribution toward future economic recovery and political stabilization of Afghanistan and also development of transport communications of Central Asia countries with the South and East Asia. In June 2003 Uzbekistan, Iran and Afghanistan signed agreement “On creation International Trans-Afghan corridor” and the agreement comprise the construction of a 2400 km highway road (possibly railway network in future) through Termez-Maza-e-Sharif-Heart to Iranian seaports Bandar-e Abbas and Chorbakhor. This road will allow Central Asian countries reach the Persian Gulf and increase interlinks of Central Asia, Russia (West Siberia), and China (Hinjiaang) with the

¹⁹ “*Kazakhstanskaya nefi-vostochniy vector*”, *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, 18 April 2005.

Middle East, Southwest Asia and Europe. Another trans Afghan project is transport corridor – Uzbekistan-Afghanistan and Pakistan is important for Central Asian countries trade though the Arabian Sea on the doors of South, Southwest Asia and Middle East and it will reduce the distance by 1200-1400 km.²⁰ The transport road project Murghab-Kulma will connect Tajikistan with the Karakorum highway in China and Pakistan, and allow Central Asian nations access to the Pakistani ports of Karachi and Gwadar. These transport projects is develop alternative transport projects and will made positive changes in the geo-strategic and geo-economic situation in Central Asia.

From 2001 it is growing economic relations between trade relation between Central Asian republics and Afghanistan. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is exporting electro energy to Afghanistan and also Uzbekistan built new 11 bridges in the country. Kazakhstan is exporting wheat and other goods.

Central Asian republics - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, as well as China, Iran, Pakistan, and the Caucasian republics - Georgia and Azerbaijan are involved in the process of organization and harmonization of the transport arteries and communications connecting Europe and Asia, the West and the East. Including famous Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA), it has received serious support from the European Union in an effort to rebuilding sea, road and railway links. From the point of view of the regions of Europe, South Asia and North-East Asia, Central Asia is a crucial linkage area of interregional contact, which can either result in division and conflict, as in the Cold war and the hot conflict in Afghanistan, or in a new series of connections which allow more positive relationships.

²⁰ Aftab Kazi, “*Transit-roue politics and Central Asia`s Indus Basin Corridor*”, 4 July 2001 //http: //www.cacianalist.org

For more participation of Central Asia in the international communication projects it is necessary to involve investments more widely with a view of reconstruction, modernization, and upgrading the automobile roads and railways; to develop cooperation in the sphere of customs convention, to harmonize national legislations of the countries of region in the field of transport and customs houses.

A well-developed regional transport system in Central Asia is potential for regional prosperity and good opportunity develop regional and international transport network and substantial trade relations and will facilitate foreign investment from foreign countries. The perspective planning for transport development will depend on the degree of optimum correlation of global, regional, inter-regional and national interests in realization of the projects.

Challenges and perspectives of broader multilateral partnership

It is well known that Russia, US and China declared their support peace and stability in Central Asia and support regional cooperation and these declaration of course is welcomed in Central Asian countries. But, there are some contradictions between them. Turkey and Iran has also strong interest in region and in the last years it is grooving role of another actors – the EU, India, Japan, Korea.

The EU, OSCE, NATO declared that both have a clear interest in stable, prosperous and democratic states in Central Asia. Both also have a major need to cooperate with these states in terms of security (regional and global) and energy. At the same time there are facing common challenges in Central Asia. International organizations is faced with the difficulty of finding a suitable balance between, on the one hand, the strategic and economic interests of their member states and, on the other, the long-term objective of promoting fundamental political reform in the states of the region. Furthermore, they have had to reconcile regional

and bilateral approaches to take into account the highly divergent interests of very different states. More specifically, with regard to the promotion of democracy and human rights in the region, it appears particularly important for the EU and NATO to have clear and transparent objectives in order to avoid misunderstandings or suspicions. The West's action in this sphere is often perceived in the states of the region as an aggressive policy, which seeks to bring about regime change. The EU and NATO should avoid listing non-negotiable demands, and rather place emphasis on a step-by-step, flexible approach, developing at the same time, if possible, a dialogue both with the authorities and with independent groups and civil society. It would also be useful to re-evaluate the impact of conditionality and sanctions, and to adopt a coordinated, consistent policy.²¹

Central Asia partnership with international organization is important for promotion the stability and security of the Central Asia nations and to assist in their pursuit of sustainable economic development and poverty reduction. At the same time stabilization and restore economy of Afghanistan is key objectives. Presently NATO is leading ISAF, but the situation in Afghanistan very complicated.

There are many problems among different actors on Afghanistan, including NATO, EU, OSCE and other international organizations, because they different approaches and understanding of the situation. It should be noted that improvements in India-Pakistan relations would be a crucial input into linking South and Central Asia relations. Also we see that India diversification its cooperation with Russia, US, Iran on Afghanistan and Central Asian issues.

From Central Asian perspectives for US, Russia, China, the EU, Japan, Korean and other countries and international institutions the best to have strong dialog and cooperation in

²¹ NATO PA report on "Democracy and Security in Central Asia: NATO and EU cooperation?The full report can be downloaded at: <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1479> ; EUCAM watch issue 2. February 2009. P.8.

Central Asia based on bilateral and multilateral relations. Central Asian nations has strong bilateral relations with these major powers and the republics is take part at the different organizations – OCS, SCO, NATO (PfP programme), where interests is different, but coordination and transparent is crucial and needed cooperation between these organizations in security, economic and transport projects.

Cooperation of regional and international organizations, including the EU, NATO and partnership with Central Asia countries and regional organization is important for promotion the stability and security of the Central Asia nations and to assist in their pursuit of sustainable economic development and poverty reduction. At the same time stabilization and restore economy of Afghanistan is key objectives.

Conclusion

During centuries Central Asia at the very center of trade, commerce and the exchange of ideas between Europe and Asia. In the early 20th century Soviet rule was established in Central Asia and followed by creation of Central Asian soviet republics. In the soviet period Central Asian republics faced considerable positive and negative process in political, economic and social fields.

Central Asia an important region in the world arena because geopolitical location and rich energy resources in Central Asia and the Caspian region. At the same time region unstable first of all Afghanistan, can also be regarded as a source of possible threats to other countries of the world because of the illegal drug production and trafficking, and terrorism.

Regional cooperation in Central Asia and Eurasia can become an important factor in the maintenance of peace and security in the region, which are necessary for stable economic growth and development. Regional organizations need concentrate first of all on further

regional integration in Central Asia itself and to be adequate to the increase processes of globalization. It is important study experience of EU, ASEAN and develops with them bilateral and multilateral relations.

Central Asia republics consider development of alternative regional transport communications as important of the national, regional and international strategy and in results it was developed new transport communication to the East and South and link it with the transport systems of neighboring countries China, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey.

Major actors are it more effective to have strong dialog and cooperation in Central Asia based on bilateral and multilateral relations. Central Asian nations need to have strong bilateral relations with main powers and take part at the different organizations – OCSA, SCO, NATO (PfP programme), where interests is different, but coordination and transparent is crucial and needed cooperation between these organizations in security, economic and transport projects. At the same time the international organization needs to develop a concrete long- range strategy in Central Asia.

There are many problems among different actors in Central Asia and Afghanistan, including NATO, EU, OSCE and other international organizations, because they different approaches and understanding of the situation. Only in cooperation and with active participation of Central Asian nations could be solving the problem in Afghanistan. Secure and economic stable Afghanistan is very important for future of Central Asia.

Travels, Imagined Space, and the Creation of National Identity*

Kim, Sang Hyun

“...ethnography itself as a performance emplotted by powerful stories.”¹

I. Introduction

National identity, local community, ethnographic and folklore expedition, and examination of commonly shared values are terms which had reached a state of high fashion among contemporary scholars interested in memory and culture and the relations in which the last two realms are embedded. Yet, they need a special attention when we take a look at the socio-historical origins of the national identity in the time of Russian Great Reforms, 1855-1881. This article offers several preliminary views on the sources of Russian national identity during the time under review, which I seek to locate within the Imperial myth for creation of nation-building of the prerevolutionary peasantry. The essence of my hypothesis rests on two fundamental ways of approaches from the exterior (the Western, European world, the Other) to the inside (Russia, the Center) and vice versa. Simply out, the former is associated with travel accounts recorded by Western viewers, the latter with Russian imperial views toward

* An earlier version of this paper was originally published in the journal 「러시아연구」(*Russian Studies*) by Institute for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2005) with slightly changed version titled “Western Visitor’s Views of Russia and the Russians: Origin, Bias and National Mythology during the 16th-19th Centuries.” However, this paper has been pretty much changed and fitted to the Conference Topic. At the same time, most of materials and cited works done in this study were gleaned from my previous research conducted during my stay at Illinois Summer Research Laboratory, Urbana-Champaign, 2004.

¹ James Clifford and George E. Marcus, ed., *Writing Culture. The Poetics and Politics of Ethnology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), p. 98.

the interior world in order to set up nation-building and national identity of the Russian themselves.

In general, travel accounts provide a detailed and intimate glimpse of a given foreign country and consequently serve vital and invaluable sources to figure out how the countries are perceived by others. Drawing upon the travel accounts by the Western visitors in the first step and ethnographic records by the Russians themselves in the second stage, this study purports to map out the general outlook in which how the Russian tsarist government tried to establish its national identity as well as nation-building during the era of Great Reforms.

This study, in other words, is intended to advance the enterprise of generating a framework enable to figure out the historical origins and bases from which Russian national consciousness came out and in the long run contributed to create a national, more specifically, Russian peasant identity in the nineteenth century. Rather than describing most of important occasions and histories in great detail, this research will take a look at a few underlying factors which was functioning for the creation of a myth-making of Russian national identity at the time of Great Reforms.

As is well known, the topic under review has remained a largely underdeveloped field for historians. The same can be said of recent trends in the studies of Russian history as well as cultural history. Russian and Western writings on the Great Reforms are of relatively recent origin; a dearth of related materials, including reprinted ones, proves that this kind of approach to the period as such is rare.² Before turning to an elaboration of this argument, we will examine briefly the general outlook to understanding of how the Western visitors to Russia left their personal records, travel accounts, letters, diaries, etc. and how these materials

² Considering this condition, though, there is one remarkable monograph devoted to this topic in Western scholarship: Ben Elko, John Bushnell, and Larissa Zakharova, eds., *Russia's Great Reforms, 1855-1881* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), while in Russia Dzhnshiev's research is most wonderful and proper to our concern: Г. А. Джаншиев, *Эпоха великих реформ* (Москва Территория будущего, 2008).

influenced upon exterior stimulus to not just Russian tsarist government but intellectuals to take proper actions for Russia's future.

In what below, I would like to enlist all of those primary sources employed for this research; alphabetically the list reads. The European travelers who ventured into Russia during the nineteenth century in particular produced numerous accounts which evidenced remarkable insight into that empire's political, cultural, and social conditions:

- Berry, Lloyd Eason and Robert O. Crummey. *Rude and Barbarous Kingdom: Russia in the Accounts of Sixteenth Century English Voyagers* (1968).
- Bourke, Richard Southwell. *St. Petersburg and Moscow: A Visit to the Court of the Czar* (1846).
- Custine, Astolphe Marquis de. *The Empire of the Czar; or Observations on the Social, Political, and Religious State and Prospects of Russia, Made during a Journey through That Empire* (1843).
- . *The Journals of the Marquis de Custine: Journey for Our Time* (1951).
- Fletcher, Giles. *Of the Rus Commonwealth* (1966).
- Golovince, Ivan. *Russia under the Autocrat, Nicholas the First* (1846).
- Haxthausen, August von. *The Russian Empire: Its People, Institutions and Resources* (1856).
- . *Studies of the Interior of Russia* (1972).
- Herberstein, Sigmund von. *Descriptions of Moscow and Muscovy 1557* (1969).
- . *Rerum Moscoviticarum Commentarii* (1549, 1589).
- Langy, Germain de. *The Knout and the Russians; or the Muscovite Empire, the Czar and His People* (1854).
- Olearius, Adam. *The Travels of Olearius in Seventeenth-Century Russia* (1967).
- . *Voyages and Travels of the Ambassadors from the Duke of Holstein to the Great Duke of Muscovy and the King of Persia* (1647).
- Perry, John. *The State of Russia under the Present Tsar* (1716).

II. Travels, Travelogues and Travel Writings in the Nineteenth Century


Like in Western European countries, or relatively later formed, nineteenth-century Russia underwent three distinct steps in the sense of Eric Hobsbawm's classification: the age of Empire [imperial expansion], of Revolution [democratic revolt and the emancipation of serves], and of Capital [-led society]. That is, this period is one that stands for what so-called the principle of modernity governed entire society.

At the same time, nineteenth century Russia can be a strong counterpoint to what Marx Weber's ideological society expressed in his most representative work: *Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* (1905). In this rigid and vigorous picture of idealized Europe, focal point is placed on the status of Europe which seemingly encapsulate universal truth, the center itself, around which the Other is marginalized and isolated from this enlightened Europe. Although Russian microcosmic world of the nineteenth century is not exactly copy of the European one, Russian way of acceptance of the Center and its essential features are quite similar to those of her counterparts. It especially reminds of travels and travelogues by the Russian writers and intellectuals to other countries and vice versa.

In fact, since eighteenth century Europe was deeply engrossed in and affected by the rise of national consciousness through the travels and travel writings as well. When it comes to Russia this was also true; the "heyday of travel writing," as one seminal works notes, "coincided with the era in which Russia letters began a dedicated process of defining itself against Western European tradition."³ The influence of Western culture, the French one in particular, was enormous; this tendency which is termed as French '*gallomania*' produced more than cultural impact. Travels were equal to moving to the others for the Russians; likewise, travel writings were the records about life, local communities, small world, finally Russia herself compared to the center, the European countries. For this very reason, orientation toward the West certainly meant that Russia "had in fact no choice but to become [a nation]" and that its cultural endeavors were necessarily conceived in terms of 'Russianness,' a unique and particular entity."

³ Sara Dickinson, *Breaking Ground. Travel and National Culture in Russia from Peter I to the Era of Pushkin* (Amsterdam: Radopi, 2006), p. 17.

Let us now turn to our main issue, but it is necessary to define and understand what the term ‘national consciousness’ refers to throughout this study. One of the most-often-quoted passages that pertain to ‘national consciousness’ is found by Hans Rogger’s book *National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia* (1969). To use his phrase, it defined as “a striving for a common identity, character, and culture by the articulate members of a given community.” He goes on to say that “It is the expression of that striving in art and social life, and characteristic, therefore, of a stage of development in which thinking individuals have been able to emerge from anonymity, to seek contact and communication with one another.”⁴



[picture-1] Book Cover *Russia from the Foreign Visitors' Eyes in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century*

In this study I would like to overview the long history about the so-called “сказания иностранцев” (accounts of foreigners) in Russian historiography. One thing we should take into consideration is that Russian history and culture, especially of the nineteenth century, as such evolved “in the presence of an influential ‘other’ in the form of the Western social and cultural experience.”⁵ Indeed, as this paper shall explore, the first encounter between the West (the other, or чужой) with Russia (свой) and the idea-forces, which are a corollary of the countries’ relations, provide an epochal-making springboard to further development of another periphery, which is not being structurally ordered yet. As usual, history as memory of a past and culture as a collective concept, both of which continue

⁴ Hans Rogger, *National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 3.

⁵ Edith W. Clowes, Samuel D. Kassow and James L. West eds., *Between Tsar and People: Educated Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 11. Quoted from Sang Hyun Kim, “Western Visitor’s Views of Russia and the Russians: Origin, Bias and National Mythology during the 16th-19th Centuries,” op cit., p. 2.

to live and to change as one society succeeds another, are always linked to each other, assuming the continuity of the ethical, intellectual, and spiritual life of the individual, society, and humankind.⁶ What all materials by the Western visitors to Russia might be defined as cultural memory by the other. Viewed from this, the first chaotic and pejorative impressions that the Western viewers held became a center in their early stage of discovery of Russia and the Russians.

II. Embryonic Stage of Discovery of Russia during the 15th-17th Centuries⁷

As Richard Pipes in his introduction to *Of the Russe Commonwealth* (by Giles Fletcher in 1591) notes, Muscovite Russia, until the 15th century, had indeed been a “*terra incognita*,” the land hardly known to the West.⁸ Since the mid 16th century, however, the country drew foreigners’ attention as a place of legends and secrets. The Westerners’ visits to Russia and their cultural contacts with her people rapidly developed by the opening of the maritime route to northern Russia by the English in 1553, as well as the creation of the Muscovy Company in 1555. The result of this epoch-making was the establishment of commercial, diplomatic, and even cultural connections.⁹ The growth of Anglo-Russian trade resulted from Richard Chancellor’s journey to Moscow during Ivan IV’s reign (1547-1584). Since then, during the seventeenth century the Russians witnessed a transition as Muscovy

⁶ Jacques Le Goff, *Medieval Imagination* (Chicago and London: The University Chicago Press, 1988), p. 11.

⁷ From this chapter II to chapter III until the detailed list of ethnographic expedition appears, all of narratives are exactly the same ones once published in my previous article. See footnote *.

⁸ Giles Fletcher, *Of the Russe Commonwealth*, with intro. by Richard Pipes (Cambridge.: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 1.

⁹ Iu. D. Levin has recently overviewed this history between the countries in his essay, “Россия в анлийской ессейстике XVIII века,” *Образ россии. Россия и русские в восприятии запада и востока* (Санкт-Петербург: Наука, 1998), сс. 5-28.

embarked on state-building, Westernization, and territorial expansion during continuing upheaval at the dawn of modernity.

The visual impression of strangeness and exotic otherness, recorded by virtually every early visitor to Russia, were reinforced by curious customs. Muscovite Russia appeared to the novice-travelers not as a European country, but as “a Christian-exotic country of the New World.”¹⁰ This initial impression had been engraved upon the European imagination for centuries. In fact, “it was conventional for travel accounts to consist of a combination of first-person narration, recounting one’s trip, and description of the flora and fauna of regions passed through and the manners and customs of the inhabitants” by the early sixteenth century in Europe.¹¹ Since the middle of the 16th century, the rediscovery of Russia proliferated a sizeable body of literature that is known as “*сказания иностранцев*” in Russian historiography.¹² This literature, like the whole fabric of travel accounts of the age of discovery, has both specific strengths and weaknesses as a historical source. The early explorers were largely subjective and biased, and occasionally showed even blind criticism toward Russia and her common people. At the center of the earliest records was a clear-cut dichotomy characteristic of mostly negative views of Russia.

The first account of foreigners was written by an Italian **Ambrogio Contarini**, a Venetian diplomat and merchant. He was dispatched in 1474 to Persia, as one historian recalls, but on his return voyage in 1475 he was forced north and found himself unexpectedly in Moscow. He saw Russian people, and wrote an account of his travels, mainly focusing on

¹⁰ Karl H. Ruffman, *Das Ruslandbild im England Shakespeares* (Göttingen, 1952), p. 176.

¹¹ Mary Louise Pratt, “Fieldwork in Common Places,” in *Writing Culture. The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*, ed., James Clifford and George E. Marcus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), p. 33.

¹² В. О. Ключевский, *Сказания иностранцев о Московском государстве* (Москва: Прометей, 1991).

his contempt of the Orthodox faith.¹³ Almost seventy years later then we come across one of the most important early accounts by **Sigismund von Herberstein** (1486-1556). He was sent to Russia in 1526 as an Imperial ambassador to the Grand Duke Vasillii III. His book, *Commentarii rerum Moscoviticarum* (in Vienna in 1549), ran through several editions, and later was translated as *Notes on Russia*; it served as an extensive source for Western European knowledge of Russia in the period 1550 to 1700.¹⁴ The book was based on good knowledge of the written sources as well as intelligent personal observations, and it provided Westerners with the first serious vast description of Russian history, geography, government, and customs.

For Herberstein the prominence of religion was one of impressive pictures he received from the Russian people, but he observed at the same time the stubbornness of their religious obsession that influenced negatively upon the Habsburg statesman. **Giles Fletcher** (1546-1611), the ambassador to Moscow dispatched by Elizabeth in 1588, was a critic of Russian Orthodoxy. And one of the most scathing attacks on Russian beliefs was made by the Englishman. While in Russia, Fletcher kept a journal that furnished the basis of his book, *Of the Russe Commonwealth* (1591), during the return voyage from Russia. Fletcher himself, as we shall see later in details, including successive generations, saw “no writer capable of the penetration which he had shown in his book in spite of the multiplicity of political and above all commercial ties between the two countries.”¹⁵

¹³ Marshall Poe, “A Distant World: Russian Relations with Europe before Peter the Great,” in *Russia. Engages the World, 1453-1825*, ed., Cynthia Hyla Whittaker (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 12.

¹⁴ According to an authentic investigation, by 1620 Herberstein’s book “had appeared in eleven Latin, seven German, and two Italian editions.” John Quentin Cook, “The Image of Russia in Western European Thought in the Seventeenth Century,” Ph.D. Dissertation (University of Minnesota, 1959), p. 140.

¹⁵ M. S. Anderson, *Britain’s Discovery of Russia 1553-1815* (New York and London: Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1967), pp. 106-107.

In Fletecher's account, the tsarist government is based on the absolute power of tyranny, whose characteristic is “a monstrous vampire which sucks from the nation all wealth and robs it of all initiative.” The core of the work is a dissection and interpretation of the “manner of government by the Russe emperor.” Beginning with the description of Russian absolutism by stressing that the Russian tsar has all the principal points and matters of state wherein Sovereignty lies, Fletcher also presents a characterization of the Russian clergy as being ignorant and depraved. The condemnation of Russian vice, self-indulgence, and barbarity, together with of administrative setbacks, are key objects with which the author paints the gloomy picture of Russia at the time. He has been accused of being hostile to the Russians and giving an unfair picture of their intellectual and moral condition. The charge of distrust toward Russians is that he has reasons to dislike the country; his antipathy was invariably directed against the regime, and never against the people. One of the principal premises and conclusions of his account is that tyranny breeds barbarism. The total picture of Russian society is of an interlocking system of economic exploitations. This kind of class-based feudal system, one characteristic of the Middle Ages, was predominant in Russia.


III. Flourishing Period of Discovery of Russia during the beginning of the 18th-the early 20th Centuries

1. Negative and Pejorative Views of Russia and the Russians

Not surprisingly, western travelers hardly paid attention to peasant-lord relations, such as their ways of life, traditional rituals, mentalities regarding folk wisdom, etc. Rather, their focus was on the subservience of the Muscovite aristocracy toward the tsar, and of the peasantry toward the nobles. Along with this, those foreigners, Fletcher in particular, link this feature to Russian basic nature distinguished from other peoples. In a sense, the fact that “the Muscovite government was an absolute, autocratic tyranny became a cliché of the sixteenth

century,” as a critic writes, seemed to be a notable corollary shared by the early foreign viewers.¹⁶ Fletcher's description of Muscovite tyranny was intended, as he himself declares in his preface, to provide a programmatic antithesis to what the English regime should be. Be that as it may, one significant thing to be mentioned here is that the foreigner points out one important facet that upholds the Russian social structure: the subservient relation of the peasantry to the State, as well as the deep rooted origin of barbarous nature of the peasants. Regarding the relations between the servant and the lord, **Marquis de Custine** (1790-1857), a French traveler to Russia, beginning in 1843, deals with almost the same matter, providing his clear opinion to this issue. Citing Herberstein's journal of three hundred years ago, Custine posed the question under discussion as follows: “Here, then, is what von Herberstein has written in decrying the despotism of the Russian monarch.”

He (the Czar) speaks and everything is done: the life, the fortune of the laity and of the clergy, of the nobility and of the citizens, all depend on his supreme will. He has no opposition, and everything in him appears just—as in the Divinity—for the Russians are persuaded that the Great Prince is the executor of celestial decrees. Thus, God and the Prince will it; God and the Prince know best, such are the ordinary expressions among them; nothing equals their zeal for his service.¹⁷



[picture-2] Marquis de Custine's Book *Journey for Our Time* (English Translation)

Unlike his predecessors who enter the service of the tsar in Russia as well as of business enterprise, Custine's status was different. His journey “was motivated by a desire to find

¹⁶ Charles J. Halperin, “Sixteenth-Century Foreign Travel Accounts to Muscovy: A Methodological Excursus,” *Sixteenth Century Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1975), p. 99.

¹⁷ Phyllis Penn Kohler, ed. and trans, *Journey for Our Time. The Journal of the Marquis de Custine* (London: Arthur Barker Ltd, 1953), p. 55.

the model of a well-ordered society that could be invoked and held up as an alternative to the petty philistinism and egalitarianism of the regime of Louis Philippe in France.”¹⁸ For this political reason, it is no accident that his attention was mostly on political and social structure of Russia. His analytical insights reached their peak in describing the social structure of “chin,” the fourteen-class rank system of Russia, which was introduced by the Peter the Great. Gogolian outcry against the vanity of city dwellers in his *Petersburg Tales*, especially when the writer describes the ambitious and phantasmagoric nature of the city, Petersburg, in his *Nevskii Prospect* and *The Nose*, is echoed in one of Custine’s most impressive notes that examine this social class categorization. Gogolian stamp of criticism of the city’s profanity and evil environs is reflected in Custine’s insightful phrases.

Similar to the previous visitors to Russia, Custine was struck by the autocrat’s waging power over submissive peasants, and his aggressive pen does not fail to record the seamy side of the Russian people. Succinctly, and sometimes very aptly, Custine’s vision sees inside the Russian mindsets. Despite that his words seem to be on the basis of ethnocentric superiority over the “barbaric primitive people,” his observation reminds us of another aspect of Russian national character: “barbaric jealousy” and “xenophobic disposition.”¹⁹

¹⁸ Kevin J. McKenna, “Russia Revisited: A Cultural Update to the Marquis De Custine’s Journey for Our Time,” *Selecta: Journal of the Pacific Northwest Council on Foreign Languages*, Vol. 8 (1987), pp. 109-114.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 139.



[picture-3] John Augustus Atkinson and James Walker, *The Manners, Customs, and Amusements of the Russians in 3 volumes* (CD, 2005)

Remarkably, when Custine describes the atmospheric environs of the city Petersburg, some of his phrases such as “a sharp angle with the surface of the earth—stepchild of the Creator” (Petersburg, July 10, 1839) and “all Russians are born imitators characteristic of infant peoples” (Petersburg, August 1, 1839) are reminiscent of **Petr Chaadaev**’s famous passages in his *Philosophical Letter* (1836). Chaadaev, “forefather of Russian cultural studies and ethnic self-consciousness,”²⁰ wrote: “We Russians, who have come into the world *like illegitimate child (italics is mine)*, without a heritage, without any ties binding us to the men who came before us on this earth” clearly resonates in the foreigner’s journal. In addition, Chaadaev’s passage calling his Russians a “blind, superficial, and often clumsy imitation of other nations” is strongly echoed again in Custine’s scornful contempt. Likewise, a 19th century American traveler, **Robert Bremner**, writes about diverse aspects of Russian

²⁰ Dale E. Peterson, “Civilizing the Race: Chaadaev and the Paradox of Eurocentric Nationalism,” *The Russian Review*, Vol. 56, No. 4 (1987), p. 550.

character, mostly making a negative inquiry into them.²¹ Given the year of publication of Chaadaev's work (1836), the latter's accounts by American travelers such as Bremner (1839) and Maxwell (1850) lend a convincing premise that there are numerous **intertextualities** among their travel narratives. A further study demands whether these travel accounts either copy the Russian works' important passages or cite themselves. Yet, suffice it to say that these negative descriptions about the other, the Russian people, abound in the Westerners' ethnocentric superiority over the opposites as most travel accounts and records have demonstrated so far. **John Maxwell's** observation of the Russian peasants is consistent with that of his predecessors to Russia in general.²² A portrait of the physical figure of the peasants, for instance, allows the reader to think to what extent the foreigner's perceptions of Russia are alike. Maxwell's phrase—"His muscular strength is not remarkable, but his passive resistance of privation and fatigue, and his obstinacy under the most severe and painful punishment, is almost incredible"—is slightly copied in the French visitor's (Custine) diary. For foreign travelers Russian public bath was an object symbolizing not so much a cultural peculiarity of the Russian people as the backwardness and barbaric primitiveness they represent.

In Moscow we ourselves several times saw men and women come out of public baths to cool off, and, as naked as God created them, approach us and call obscenely in broken German to our young people. Idleness strongly prompts them to this kind of dissolute behavior. Daily you can see hundreds of idlers standing about or strolling in the market place or in the Kremlin. And they are more addicted to drunkenness than any nation in the world.²³

²¹ Robert Bremner, *Excursions in the Interior of Russia: Sketches of the Character and Policy of the Emperor Nicholas* (London: Henry Colburn, Publishers, 1839), vol. 1, p. 162. For the early history of American travelers to Russia during 1776-1861, see Anna M. Babey, *Americans in Russia 1776-1917. A Study of the American Travelers in Russia from the American Revolution to the Russian Revolution* (New York: The Comet Press, 1938), pp. 3-9.

²² John S. Maxwell, *The Czar, His Court and People: Including a Tour in Norway and Sweden* (New York: Baker and Scribner, 1850), p. 236.

²³ *The Travels of Olearius in the Seventeenth-Century Russia*, trans. Samuel H. Baron (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 142. Olearius, as secretary of the Duke of Holstein's embassies to Muscovy and Persia, left this travelogue, the one which "was almost

In addition, the Russians were compared to “a filthy animal.” One of typical condemnations made by the foreigners is found in **Adam Olearius**’s book (in 1662, in London). Olearius (1603-1671) was a learned German scholar as a court mathematician and director of the ducal library. His book became available during the 17th century in an



English translation, and “considerably influenced the ideas of the country generally held by Englishmen during the pre-Petrine period.”

[picture-4] Olearius’s map of mid-seventeenth-century Moscow in his book *The Travels of Olearius in Seventeenth-Century Russia* (1647)

Observations of “wife-beating” by husbands were also a shocking example of “inferior others” for the foreign travelers. A number of writers reported that whippings were so integral part of matrimony in Russia that the wife regarded them as a sign of her husbands’ affection. A couple of proverbs recorded by the foreigners vividly reflect what they saw, not to mention the Russian peasants’ moral constructs. For instance, “beat your fur coat, and it will be warmer; beat your wife and she will be sweeter, and a dog is wiser than a woman; he won’t bark at his master, or a hen is not a bird, a woman is not a person”—all of these proverbs indicate “the Russian husband’s brutal and contemptuous attitude toward his wife.” John Maxwell, too, writes a sweeping indictment of women of all classes. The position and dignity

certainly the most widely read book about Russia to appear during the seventeenth century.” John Quentin Cook, op. cit., p. 144. The book’s original title is “*The Voyages and Travels of the Ambassadors Sent by Frederick, Duke of Holstein, to the Great Duke of Muscovy and King of Persia, Begun in the Year 1633, and Finished in 1639.*”

of the Russian women are on the whole ignored in his travel narratives. Nor are cultural otherness or, cross-cultural variants are considered at all.

More importantly, the outsiders are no more than just bystanders, who have no intention to know further about the Russians' traditional rituals in their life-cycle patterns i.e. intercultural dimensions. This is generally true, except for **Samuel Collins** (1619-1670), who gives a detailed picture of marriage and funeral ceremonies, to which most observers pay scant attention.²⁴ In such a genre of travel narrative, the accounts-recorders recognize Russian peasant women as being made to work with overburdened labor lords, at if they were valued as labor resource, a passive inanimate one, and even like beasts that only know their loyalty and subservience to their mastershusband, father-in-law and mother-in-law after marriage, in particular.


In short, for more than three hundred years from the 15th century, it was English authors who made the first-hand descriptions of Russia. The number of their works greatly exceeded those of any other nationality. To use a good example, 38 Englishmen, 24 of them before 1600, wrote accounts of Muscovy that appeared in print.²⁵ The contents and their narrative point of view of Russian realities, unfortunately, show no drastic changes. Without making an effort to present their own descriptions, as a wealth of evidence substantiates, a great deal of records not only relies on each other, but cites the former ones for their information.

2. Positive and Considerate Views of Russia and the Russians

²⁴ Samuel Collins, *The Present State of Russia. In a Letter to a Friend at London* (London, 1671). For a complete and comprehensive report of Russian peasant women by a Russian woman at the time, see А. Ефименко's ethnographic expedition and her results in her book, *Крестьянская женщина* (1884), in *Исследования народной жизни*, Выпуск 1: Обычное право, Москва.

²⁵ For a graphic figure of the publication of the foreigners travel accounts, see John Quentin Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

The Westerners' accounts were not always negative, however. Mentioning the brutality and barbaric disposition of the Russians, most foreign visitors constantly write that they are primitive and hostile against foreigners. Given these hackneyed remarks, **Franz August Maria von Haxthausen's** (1792-1866) observation of the Russians regarding the relation between the country and the Finnish tribes should be of interest here. In one of his noticeable remarks it is suggested: "I believe it cannot be maintained that the Russians displaced the Finnish tribes in the north of Russia. The former were never nomadic, but were always colonists. They did not drive away the hunting tribes from the interior, for it was not their nature or disposition to penetrate inland. Nor were they hostile to these tribes. Thus the Finnish hunting tribes and the Russia settlers lived together in a peaceable and friendly manner."²⁶



[picture-5] Franz August Maria von Haxthausen's book
Studies on the Interior of Russia


Having undertaken his journey of discovery in 1843, Haxthausen was encouraged to pursue his former studies on rural institutions. One of his primary objects for research in Russia is thus working on the *mir*, or village commune. No doubt, Haxthausen's naïve enthusiasm partially kindled the quest for Russian national mythology, which the **Slavophiles** were attempting to project for their ideological target at the time. As one historian aptly points out, he "contributed richly to the myth of the Russian soul, although by the time this

²⁶ Franz August Maria von Haxthausen, *The Russian Empire. Two Volumes in One* (New York: Arno Press & The New York Times, 1970), p. 191.

myth surfaced in Western Europe the composition of the Russian soul had become noticeably more complex.”²⁷

In almost the same vein, an American visitor in the late 19th century, **Francis Palmer**, was more favorable, contrary to his predecessors. In his records, Palmer notes “the exceptional honesty of the Russian peasants,” praising the people that “There are few countries on the Continent in which theft of personal property is so rare.”²⁸

The idea of trespass is practically unknown. If the route through the garden chances to be the easiest way to the village, peasants with their carts will continually pass through. This is not done with any intention of insolently asserting what they believe to be their rights. *Russians are naturally kind-hearted, and, especially in the more remote districts*, where old-world ideas have least changed, many are often engaged simply because they are in want and distress (*italics is mine*).²⁹



[picture-6] Madame de Staël's book ***Politics, Literature, and National Character*** (1964). In this book, she observes character of the Russian people

Madame de Staël's (1766-1817) seemingly objective observation, on the other hand, takes more moderate stance. A few of her words and remarks can be parallels to that of domestic intellectuals' frank confession as in Chaadaev's writing. For instance, she employs such phrases as “public spirit,” “the devotedness inherent in the character of the people,” “the natural pride of the nobility,” and “profound influence of religion,” etc., while describing the psychological disposition of the peasantry. Russia's national history is assessed properly in her journals.

²⁷ Francesca Wilson, *Muscovy Russia through Foreign Eyes 1553-1900* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1970), p. 242.

²⁸ Francis H. E. Palmer, *Russian Life in Town and Country* (New York and London: G. P. Putmans Sons, 1904), pp. 100-101.

²⁹ Francis H. E. Palmer, op. cit., pp. 101-103.

To be sure, as Cook reminds, these kinds of negative accounts can derive from the foreigners' prepossessions, biases, and even unwarranted willful misrepresentation, but their recurrent themes and points at the same time make us think over the essential problem under discussion in a different perspective. First, for the most part, the strange visitors spent most of their time in the capital Moscow, or Petersburg in the residence of the dynasty, where imperial authority would likely be greatest.³⁰ In fact, members of diplomatic missions to Moscow spent only a brief period of time there, and consequently "they had to depend on interviews with Russians through interpreters, and on conversations with Western residents of Muscovy, for their information."³¹ Cook's investigation, at this point, is noticeable; he maintains that only "less than twenty-five percent of the sixteenth century English authors of descriptions of Muscovy knew Russian." Furthermore, while Herberstein knew Slavic, Fletcher did not; and "it is doubtful whether Olearius did."³² One of the more astonishing examples of this rare phenomenon is detected in Fletcher, who entered Russia in 1588 and spent less than a year, but nonetheless left the most important English work on Russia, and presents the first extensive, systematic analysis of Muscovite governmental institutions as well as their structures. Madame de Staël's achievements on her critical comments on Russian contemporary are even more remarkable, considering her extremely short-term sojourn in Russia from July 14 to September 7, 1812. In less than two months though, she


³⁰ John Q. Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

³¹ Regarding the period and scope of stay, Anthony Jenkinson, who was appointed by the Russia Company captain-general of the fleet sailing for Russia in 1557 and continued to travel to Russia until 1572, is a unique case to be noted here. In contrast to his former diplomatic and commercial officials, Jenkinson "won and retained the respect of Ivan IV and was therefore able to visit the court as an honored guest and travel freely through the country." See Francesca Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-44.

³² For an interesting citation regarding the language ability of the early visitors, see John Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

made significant journalistic and sharp observations on her environs.³³ While the former two travelers stayed in Russia very shortly, for an anonymous German, who resided for thirty three years, the Russian circumstances nonetheless are same: filthy, coarseness, superstitious nature, submissiveness, servility, disgraceful serfdom, and the like. Of particular significance of this unnamed work by a German nobleman is that it touches on the problem of “evils of slavery” and “human rights of the people,” which are relatively less dealt with in other travelers’ accounts.

By the same token, **Robert Lyall**, a nineteenth-century Scottish doctor in service of tsar Aleksandr, draws our attention from the Christian and philanthropist view. Not only in his deep sincerity toward the Russians, but also in his strong “defense against false imputations” of former illustrations of Russia, Lyall takes a quite unique place in the entire history of Western viewers of the country. First he was the first foreigner who dedicated his work to the Russian tsar directly. In his book, *The Character of the Russians, a Detailed History of Moscow* (in London in 1832), Lyall shows respect toward the tsar, Aleksandr. At any rate, he does not record any baneful, degrading, and contemptuous remark on the tsar in opposition to most of his predecessors.



[picture-7] The Kremlin from above the Stone Bridge, from Robert Lyall, *The Character of the Russians* (1823)

Making a comparison of his opinions with those of Samuel Collins, Madame de Staël, and Dr. Clarke, as to “the real state of the

³³ As the author herself writes, the most important was the discovery, noting that “the religious and military spirit so dominate the nation that many failings may be forgiven in the light of these two grand sources of fine human deeds.” Madame de Staël, op. cit., 150.

vassals of Russia,” the Scottish observer writes that “Russian peasantry are in the first, or agricultural stage of civilization; they are therefore not in a state of barbarism; neither are they civilized, but they are making progress towards civilization, especially to the imitative stage.”³⁴ To be sure, we recognize that he himself acknowledges Russia’s uncultured and uncivilized status, but his perception of Russia requires a different reading. Instead of comparison between Russia and other European countries, Lyall places his focus on Russian historical development itself: “Russia must be compared with Russia herself, at various epochs; and in order to ascertain her progress in the intellectual world, must be viewed through all her gradations and ramifications.”³⁵ I am far from asserting that Lyall is absolutely right in his disputes against other viewers. The point is here Lyall’s moderate and sound stance, not generalizing unfavorable false impressions, but discovering what has not been said before and at least doing justice to Russian characteristics. A typical observation by him is that: “Russia presents an anomaly, one of the most extraordinary in the history of nations; equally interesting in a political, a moral, or a religious point of view. Many of the descriptions which unduly degrade, or disingenuously extol this empire, have arisen from false principles.”³⁶ Second, his delineations, thus, are so far all the more objective and reliable because all of his accounts represent that he is neither a sycophant nor a down-right complainer of Russia. Judging from what has been said above, his statements in the preface to the book should be emphasized:


Two very opposite opinions may be formed with respect to the character which I have given of the Russians: the one that I may always have evinced a disposition to palliate their imperfections and their vices, and to relieve the gloomy ground-work of the picture by some redeeming light; the other; that the frequent severity of my remarks is consistent with general charity and Christian feelings. My answer to both of these anticipated accusations is the

³⁴ Robert Lyall, *The Character of the Russians, a Detailed History of Moscow* (London: Edinburgh, 1832), p. cxl.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, iv.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, ii.

same; viz. that I have formed my opinions from facts, and stated the convictions of my heart with impartiality. If any bias be discovered, may it rather be on the side of benevolence than on that of malice.³⁷



[picture-8] Selwyn Eyre, *Sketches of Russian Life and Customs Made during a Visit in 1876-1877* (1878)

In these ways, the overall impressions of the Muscovites and the Imperial Russia later created by the travel accounts are highly unfavorable and by and large constantly negative, except for a couple of cases such as Fletcher, Madame de Staël, and Lyall. The Russians were said to be ignorant, drunken barbarians, perpetrators of almost impressive series of vices, cruel, coarse, brutal and deceitful. Given the fact that the early visitors to Russia were political figures or rich merchants, with the additional drawback of ignorance of the Russian language, it is scarcely surprising that the foreigner's non-journalistic eyes expose "patriotic curiosity," taking a firm stance of ostracism over the inferior land, Russia. To use Pethybridge's words, these "self-styled ambassadors eager to advice the British public and government on Russian politics," especially during the early 19th century.³⁸ Simply stated, the early Victorian travelers to Russia, including the later time, were restricted in their interpretations of Russia by their class origins, which were nearly always upper or upper middle, not to mention the nobles and pure travelers from France and America respectively.³⁹

³⁷ Ibid., p. 8.

³⁸ Roger W. Pethybridge, "The Merits of Victorian Travel Accounts as Source Materials on Russia," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, Vol. 20 (1972), p. 11.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 14.

Second, some accounts, even in scholarly analysis of those descriptions, support this negative evaluation of Muscovite culture. Ernest Simmons, for example, asserts that the culture of Muscovy was “literally nil,” consisting of a collection of religious books and tracts without genuine cultural significance.⁴⁰ As Halperin disapprovingly writes, “this judgment is incorrigibly ethnocentric”; furthermore, like other travelers, Simmons does not treat the raw data as a primary source for the ethnohistorian. Instead, he rests on an ethnocentric bias which is focused on “the traveler’s attention not so much on what is actually seen but on what he *expects to see based on what he has heard in his own culture.*”⁴¹

Simmons’s statement reminds us of the foreign observer’s provocative words about Russians being ignorant and totally uncultured. From a perspective of social structure, Madame de Staël quite convincingly points out the general lack of taste of arts and of literature by the Russians, ascribing the reason for this to no middling class in Russia, which is a great drawback on the progress of literature and the arts. Noticing this cleavage, the author makes an important statement that “enlightenment is not spread widely enough for there to be any public judgment based on the opinion of each individual.” Considering Staël’s journey in Russia (July 14–September 7, 1812) which almost coincides with the emergence of national identity in Russia, her underestimation of literature by the common people is not misleading at all. As has generally been accepted, during the first half of the 19th century in Europe, “literature was utilized in national systems of education and privileged by elites as an expression of national culture.”⁴² This on the whole holds true of Russia. Staël’s estimate accordingly hints at the fundamental legitimation of the nation-state

⁴⁰ Ernest J. Simmons, op. cit., p. 4.

⁴¹ For a remarkable note regarding “travel accounts as texts,” see Caroline B. Brettell, “Introduction: Travel Literature, Ethnography, and Ethnohistory,” *Ethnohistory*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (1986), p. 128 (*italics added*).

⁴² Allen Carey-Webb, *Making Subject(s). Literature and the Emergence of National Identity* (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1998), p. 11.

apparatus by exploring the making of national identities at the juncture of imperial power and creating a model for national mythology.

While examining the overall history of the Western travelers' sketches, it is equally inviting to ask what is not said. In a sense, this notion will be fulfilled when further research fills in some serious lacunae in this genre of travel narrative. At the moment, it would be safe to say that this critical view addresses a seminal question pertaining to the transitional connection of how Russian intellectuals react to the foreigner's writings. It also, if so, indicates in what ways the domestic views of the others emerged and forged further philosophical debates about Russia's national fate as well as ethnographic expeditions carried out by the **Geographic Society** (1856-1862). It is of tremendous significance to screen this transitional period from 1830s to 1850s, given the national exertion to gather and disseminate information and authoritative descriptions of rural conditions under the direction of the commission. The primary goal of the eight **Russian-Ukrainian ethnographers'** journey was to overcome "disqualified older ways of reporting on rural culture" manifested by the foreign observers.⁴³ Providing a link through ethnographic reports, between the *narod*, the imperial state, and educated Russia, this special investigative commission "sought a new socio-political path for the public."⁴⁴

Most importantly, however, the expedition of the ethnographers aimed to forge a "nation." The movement hoped to bring imperial diversity, the ethos of the peoples, to "transform Uvarov's Official Nationality based on diverse ethnic and regional groups."⁴⁵ If

⁴³ Catherine Clay, "Russian Ethnographers in the Service of Empire, 1856-1862," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 54, No. 1 (1995), p. 51.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-51; Catherine Clay, p. 318. The political program of 'Official Nationality' was proposed and it embraced the most underlying principles of tsar Nicholas's three rules: Autocracy, Orthodox and Nationality. The program was a controlling ideological system based on Russian tradition and devised to strengthen the tsar's authority over the empire and people.

the philosophical debates between the opposite poles during the 1830s and 1840s and the ethnographic expedition in 1850s were the final step for establishing a model for a Russian national mythology, we can propose that the foreign observers' accounts and records contributed to the national building of a mythology, the so-called Russian soul in their embryonic stage, but most dynamically in their own Russian nature. Drawing upon "the recognition of legitimate diversity" among peasant cultures, potentially on "the rethinking of the official nationality formula," the expedition in the era of the Great Reforms played a formative role in the creation of the Russian national mythology. That is, for over three centuries as an exterior origin the foreign visitors' writings influenced Russian intellectuals and writers to look deep inside the lives of the Russian peoples in all of their cultural varieties.⁴⁶

From the perspective of ethnology and folklore, this type of travels and travelogues can be compared to ethnographic and folkloric expedition conducted by the Naval Ministry commissioned eight writers as '*komandirovtsy*' to gather information about the peasant way of life [*narodnyi byt*] in the Russian countryside.

Historically speaking, this expedition was the origins of ethnography in imperial Russia. Objective descriptions about the rural circumstances, or 'bytopisanie' (writing about byt=way of life and customs) are modern platform for establishing of national identity of what imperial Russia was caring for and aiming at her specific future plan.⁴⁷ To use ethnographic statements by James Clifford, the Russian expedition during the Great Reforms was "a performance emplotted by powerful stories," which functioned as allegory "at the

⁴⁶ For a complete discussion for this question there are useful works: Catherine B. Clay, *op cit.*

⁴⁷ Catherine Black Clay, *Ethos and Empire: The Ethnographic Expedition of the Imperial Russian Naval Ministry*, Ph.D dissertation (University of Oregon, 1989), p. 46.

level of its content (what it says about cultures and their histories) and of its form (what is implied by its mode of textualization).”⁴⁸

Now that we have screened the most basic setting on which the Russian expedition was based, it would be worthy of scrutinizing the list of surveyed items initially included from the commissioned writers. This presents and explores what our study intends to examine. As with the objects to be examined from each household, one research provides the following items: they consist of a total of 22 items, including Land Forms.

1. Land Forms: river / bays, beaches, shallows, marshes / floodplains / rapids / steppe
2. Raw materials / metals / oil
3. Climate
4. Seasons
5. Flora / Fauna
6. Housing
7. Wharfs / docks / piers
8. Architecture
9. Work: Industry / manufactures/
Agriculture
Stockraising
Fishing
Hauling and carting
10. Social relations:
Khoziain / fishermen relations
artman / Cossaks relations
pilot / crew relations
11. Technology construction and use:
Fishing boats
Rigging
Nets / hooks / tackle
Hauling and carting
12. Trade:
Prices
Local and regional markets
“all-Russian” market
Foreign markets
13. Family and gender:
Birth
Homelife
Childhood
Child / parent relations

⁴⁸ James Clifford and George E. Marcus, ed., op cit., p. 98.

- Courtship
- Sexuality
- Marriage
- Age relations
- Husband / wife relations
- Death
- 14. Ethnicity
 - Relations / prejudice
 - Character of a people
- 15. Regional habits / customs / mores
 - Medical lore and science
 - Clothing
 - Food
 - Holidays / Festivals
- 16. Religious culture
- 17. Folk works:
 - Songs
 - Stories / legends / sayings
- 18. Language:
 - Onomastics
 - Fishing dialect
 - Hauling / Carting dialect
 - Women's language
 - General dialect
 - Contribution to Dal'
- 19. Education
 - General or military
 - Elementary schools
 - Women's education
 - Professional training
 - Reading Habits
- 20. History
 - Novgorod
 - Ivan IV
 - Stenka Razin
 - Boghdan Khmel'nitskii
 - Raskol
 - Peter I
 - Pugachev Rebellion
 - Catherine II
 - Regional / Imperial History
 - Wars
- 21. Ethnographic method
 - Informants
 - Fieldwork Problems
 - "Strangeness"
 - Description / Analysis
- 22. Use of secondary sources
 - Pallas

Haxthausen
Kostomarov
Others⁴⁹

This list certainly refers to the basic conditions of way of life in the countryside, the result about which could be served for not only policy makers but also tsarist government to set forth nation's future plan, here we are saying national identity or nation-building.

As far as the travel accounts are concerned with national security and potential threat of Russia to the Western counterparts, the Europeans' views of Russia were related to one indelible impression—the danger of Russia posed to Europe as well as Russia's actual military capabilities during Nicholai's reign in particular.⁵⁰ Though this new topic goes beyond the scope of our study here, it is tempting to think the Western viewers' notes on the Russian powerful potentials to their countries from the perspective of either military base or vast physical territories.


IV. Conclusion

Regardless of the characteristic nature of genres, Western viewers' travelogues, personal diaries, anecdotes, non-professional essays continued to serve as a backdrop to the foreigners' historical investigations, providing the reference points that gave them an orientation from which to proceed. The specific inventories of the overall materials we have attested are placed into clear-cut binary dichotomy. Partly positive notions of course exist, but this “fixed and constricting identity was *confirmed* from without and *affirmed* from within Russia, creating a vicious circle of mutually validated stereotypes” as one critic succinctly summaries.

⁴⁹ Catherine Black Clay, op cit., pp. xiii-xiv.

⁵⁰ Olimpia P. Jones, *European Travelers in Nineteenth Century Russia: An Analysis of Travel Accounts on Russia under Tsar Nicholas I*, Ph.D Dissertation (University of Manitoba, 2003), p. 71.

Taken as a whole, Western viewers' descriptions were excessively absorbed with negative impressions of the Russians and very few positive or praising recommendations of their life-style or good attitudes. Despite that we consider Anthony Cross's stimulating remark that "As the eighteenth century moved toward its end, travelers, influenced by the Rousseauist notion of the particular strengths and attractions of primitive and backwardness peoples," the deep-rooted prejudices still remained intact.⁵¹



[picture-9] Anthony Cross, *Russia under Western Eyes, 1517-1825* (1971). One of the most influential and seminal research for our topic under review

For this overall reason, neither translations of their works into Russian, nor the circulation of them in the Russian reading public were imaginable. Similar to Herberstein's well-received reputation throughout Europe, Custine's book *The Journal of the Marquis de Custine*, enjoyed massive circulation. Aside from the Russian reactions, from the mid 16th century to the late 19th century, British, German, and American, and partially French, as well as Scottish impressions invariably remained much the same. For those civilized strangers, Russia was considered inferior, barbaric and primitive; any of these characteristics could not be compared to themselves.

All of these *topoi*, which are "commonly held notions about people, places, or things—as a literary device characteristic of these accounts," as Bretell succinctly defines, represent "a rhetorical baggage carried by the traveler,"⁵² but the Western outsiders' rhetoric in their accounts was all the same: not the least instructive, positive, and non-

⁵¹ Anthony Cross, op. cit., p. 41.

⁵² Caroline B. Bretell, op. cit., p. 128.

sympathetic to their new environs in Russia. Nevertheless, as this paper has demonstrated, I strongly stress that this cultural legacy by the strangers to Russia was instrumental in laying the rudimentary foundation of national mythology in the Russians' own basis later on, especially during the first three decades in the 19th century. The ideological and literary fulcrum for the national mythology indeed began to form *in medias res* during the first half of the nineteenth century in particular, along with the philosophical debates between the Slavophiles and the Westernizers.

Another thing to be unforgotten is that the foreigners' records and travel narratives, which are replete with overall stereotyped negative ways, are "a reflection of a certain fundamental lack of development in Russia herself," as an excerpt from Fedotov's book succinctly implies: "The Russian peasant had been living in the Middle Ages through the nineteenth century."⁵³ True, Russia "remained in many respects a medieval country until the 1860s or even later."⁵⁴ Additionally, the second substantial intercultural fossils were paradoxically not initiated by the Russians, but introduced by "European thought which provided the Russians with the intellectual categories of nationalism which enabled them to describe themselves as different from, hostile to, and superior over the West" as Robert Williams contends.⁵⁵ Apparently, the first carriers of those cultural interactions were the Western travelers to Russia. Although there needs to be a thorough examination of the extent to which these accounts were directly linked to the Russian intellectuals and writers, most of those negative, prejudiced *topoi*, at the same time, could be changed thanks to Western influence again, not the Russian one.

⁵³ George P. Fedotov, *The Russian Religious Mind. Kievan Christianity: the 10th to the 13th Centuries* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), Vol. 1, p. 3.

⁵⁴ M. S. Anderson, op. cit., p. 93.

⁵⁵ With this in mind, the author ascertains that the question of the Russian soul began not in Russia first, but under the influence from the West. See his article, "The Russian Soul: A Study in European Thought and Non-European Nationalism," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1979), p. 573.

To capitulate briefly, this paper has traced the historical process of how the so-called the Russian national character epitomized in the term of Russian national mythology was formed through the exterior origins from the foreign visitors' travel accounts and records from the middle of the 16th century to the second half of the 19th century. To this end, using various writing sources such as travel accounts, anecdotal episodes, and personal journals, this paper explores the conundrum of the Russian national characters multifaceted features.

Beyond that we have been able to trace and explore how strongly the tsarist government had tried to establish the so-called nation-building and Russian national identity through ethnographic and folklore expedition around his countryside. In Jacques Le Goff's words, we can construe that the 8 writers commissioned around the expedition and their activities stand for a specific society of having imperial vision toward putting tsarist world in order, thereby contributing to creation of myth of Russian identity when Russia herself began to present and distribute her images both interior and exterior.⁵⁶ In other words, like in the historical study of historical memory, beyond the primordial society whose first model built in Russia is essentially oral, Russian tsarist government aimed to put forth a modern society whose memory is essentially written, objective, and even palpable at tsar's hands. Likewise, the collected ethnographic data from the perspective of administrative control could be served "not only a conquest, it is also an instrument and an objective of power" as Le Goff succinctly observes.⁵⁷ The collective identity as a raw material played a platform from which tsarist administrative actions could produce its waging power over the *narod* for their own use.

⁵⁶ Distinguishing two different societies, Le Goff demonstrates that the latter one is "essentially written, and to the phrase of the passage from orality to writing—what Jack Goody calls "the domestication of primitive thought." See, Jacques Le Goff, *History and Memory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 54.

⁵⁷ Jacques Le Goff, *ibid.*, p. 98.

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From Barrels of Fur to Barrels of Oil: A Genealogy of Russia's Resource Curse

Alexander Etkind

Polities differ in the way in which they manage resources and violence. In his last book, the founder of institutional economics, Douglass North, and his coauthors see two modes of relations between these crucial spheres, resources and violence.¹ In the “natural state”, a dominant group limits access to valuable resources, creates rents out of these resources, and rules over the population by applying selective policies of suppression and bribery. Definitive for this social order is what the coauthors call “limited access” to the dominant group, which monopolizes the use of legitimate violence and rent-creation. North et al. call another social order “the open access state”. Working as a melting pot, this type of state controls internal violence by providing equal opportunities to its citizens. In such a society, there is no legal, cultural, or metaphysical difference between the elite and the populus. A few countries of the world have entered this modern condition. In the logic of North et al., while some states are at the doorstep of the transition to the open-access system, many others stagnate in their natural shape or actively resist their transformation into open-access. Arguably, the abundance of a valuable resource in a “natural state” leads not only to its economic over-reliance on this resource, but also prevents the development of a modern open-access system in such state.

¹ Douglass C North, John Joseph Wallis, Barry R. Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*, Cambridge University Press 2009.

With its economic dependency on oil and gas exports, reliance on the apparatus of violence, restrictions of democratic freedoms, growing social inequality, and elitist systems of education and employment, 21st century Russia clearly belongs to the group of “states of limited access.” Along with many recent authors, I believe that its resource dependency is the primary cause for this development. But unlike many recent authors, I argue that this dependency is much older than post-Soviet Russia and the Soviet Union. These *long durée* factors matter for the understanding of the present situation in Eurasia. As long and turbulent as Russian history itself, the genealogy of resource dependency deserves special study.

In this transdisciplinary essay, I will provide a brief survey of the current literature on Russia’s resource dependency, reveal a historical template for this resource-dependent state, discuss the cross-temporal links between this medieval template and the current Russia, and conclude that this intersection of history, economics, and the geography of Northern Eurasia is crucial for an understanding of the contemporary Russia.

protego ergo obligo

In political economy, Russia’s problems have been variously named the resource curse, the rentier effect, or the Dutch disease (named after the contraction of the Dutch manufacturing sector because of gas revenues from the North Sea in the 1970s). The wealth of a resource-bound nation depends upon a particular resource, which is located in a distant corner of the country, involves few people in its production, and is essentially separate from the life of the citizenry. In the contrary situation, the creative and competing work of citizens creates the wealth of a nation.

In a resource-bound nation, neither the state nor its citizens have much incentive to do other than consume the rent from the booming resource, which is usually but not necessarily a natural one (a recent over-dependency on booming real-estate prices, in England or

elsewhere, could work as a distant analogy here). Other assets appreciate as capital flows into a country in response to a resource boom. This appreciation renders domestic manufacturing, agriculture, education, and research uncompetitive. Growth in the resource-bound sector requires much investment but relatively little labor or knowledge. Since the whole population depends on the state redistribution of income that comes from a single resource, the state develops unusual muscle, which inevitably leads to abuse and corruption. The resource-bound nations have no reason to develop the governance mechanisms that enable fair taxation, competition, and rule of law. They can abolish a significant chunk of the modern political economy as well as representation, democratic accountability, and education. Their wealth leads to a form of patronage spending that keeps the population afloat but does not develop its social capital.

Commodities constitute about 85% of Russia's export, though the energy sector employs only 1.6% of the Russian workforce. Russia imports about 40% of its food; in Moscow and St. Petersburg this figure is well above 75%. Imported items dominate the markets of industrial equipment, cars, textiles, electronic gadgets, and consumption staples. As the experience of any Russian consumer shopping in major supermarket chains demonstrates clearly, most of the consumption gadgets bear Western brands, though some of them are assembled and packed by multi-national corporations on Russian territory. Russian energy revenues have fed the consumption boom, which accelerated from 2003 until 2008, as the authorities allowed gains in budget revenues from rising energy prices to trickle down into the economy.

In Iran, Russia, Venezuela, and Bolivia, the state turned from taxing the resource-mining firms to nationalizing them. The hope was that the state managers could produce more revenue than the private owners and that direct profits of the state would be higher than

taxes. The resulting protectionism, underinvestment, suppression of competition, and corruption undermine the resource sector and distort other parts of the economy as well. Though this nationalization theme goes beyond what was traditionally meant by the idea of “resource-bound”, it appears now to be its logical development. Since resource prices are highly volatile, being resource-bound results in the instability of the economy and the insecurity of the population.

“Political scientists believe that oil has some very odd properties”, writes the political scientist Michael Ross, who demonstrated the negative relation between oil or mineral exports and democratic development in an analysis of 113 states between 1971 and 1997.² (Ross did not mention Russia in his influential article). Thomas Friedman formulated in his First Law of Petropolitics that the price of oil and the pace of politics move in different directions.³ Friedman drew a remarkable chart for Russia that shows the inverse relation between the price of oil and the Freedom House’s indicator of the quality of electoral democracy. However, some economists admit that the actual problem comes not from the rich resources but from the poor institutions. As the deterioration of institutions strengthens the negative effect of the reliance on natural resources, those countries that are resource-rich but institution-poor suffer “a double resource curse”.⁴ In contrast to the economic growth that results from modernization and innovation, resource-led growth does not lead to higher education levels. “A natural resource economy that suffers from corruption, low investments,

² Michael L. Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy? *World Politics*, April 2001.

³ Thomas Friedman, First Law of Petropolitics, *Foreign Policy*, May/June 2006.

⁴ Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene, Ragnar Torvik, “Cursed by resources or Institutions?” *The world economy*. Working paper series no. 10/2005; Андрей Щербак, «Нефтяное проклятье» и постсоветские режимы (Политико-экономический анализ), *Общественные науки и современность*, 2007. № 1. С. 47-56.

protectionist measures, deteriorating terms of trade, and low educational standards will probably not benefit from its natural wealth.”⁵

Ideas of democracy, rule of law, and social capital are more congenial to those countries that rely on their citizenry, not their entrails, for creating wealth. In a country that is resource-bound, two classes or estates of citizens emerge: producers who extract, transport, and trade the resource, and create rent out of it, and consumers whose existence depends on the redistribution of this rent. The great principle, “no taxation without representation”, does not work in the situation in which small professional minorities of miners and bankers who toil on small parts of the national territory, extract wealth for all. These minorities are taxed and represented, but the general population is not involved. Social inequality of this origin creates a rigid, caste-like structure. The resource-bound wealth impedes the formation of social capital (civic institutions that lie above the family and below the state) and blocks a transition to democracy. Moreover, dependency on a single resource often translates into an actual retreat from modernity to some regressive or hybrid, pre-modern or antimodern condition.⁶

Resource-rich governments can spend a significant part of their rent on internal security. The growth of state violence provokes resistance and leads to the militarization of the country. Violence specialists convert their statuses into economic and political power. This circle is probably similar to the Mobius strip. One cannot run on one (say, only economic) side of this strip; inadvertently, such a businessman would find himself on another side, encircled by people whom he does not necessarily see as peers. Truly vicious, this

⁵ Elissaios Papyrakis, “The resource curse hypothesis and its transmission channels,” *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 32 (1) (2004) 181–193.

⁶ R. Rose, “Getting Things Done in an Antimodern Society: Social Capital Networks in Russia,” In P. Dasgupta and I. Serageldin (eds.) *Social Capital*, Washington D.C. : World Bank 2000 p. 147-171, also mentioned by Soili Nysten-Haarala in this volume.

Mobius strip embraces the economics of natural resources and the politics of violence in one inseparable construction.

Political philosophers have always known that those who provide security tend to grasp power, unless something or someone powerful prevents them from doing so. “The *protego ergo oblige* is the *cogito ergo sum* of the state”, wrote Carl Schmitt.⁷ As a Russian saying has it, “Что охраняем, то и имеем” (That which we guard is that which we have). But as Robert Bates argues in his important book, *Prosperity and Violence*, as long as the violence specialist receives more rent from defending a client than he receives from expropriating his wealth, he refrains from using violence against this client. When a client is taxed or robbed too harshly, he deteriorates. In this calculus, the long-term negative effects for security rents prevent expropriation of the client even when the short-term effects would be positive.⁸ In an economy that depends on the creativity of the citizens, it is easy to see why violence specialists prefer loyalty to expropriation. However, this effect works differently in the resource-based economy.

In Russia, there is one category of costs that is not outsourced and therefore, constitutes the native contribution to the production of oil and gas. That is, protection costs. In this respect, Russia is different from Nigeria and Iraq where the security apparatus has been imported, like technology and management. In Russia, local organizations provide the security of the oil and gas fields and pipes. Not accidentally, the same organizations provide protection to the banks that proceed the oil and gas revenues; to the personal estates of managers and bureaucrats; and to the political stability of the nation. In this situation, violence specialists gain political and economic control over flows of commodities and

⁷ Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1976) p.52

⁸ Robert H. Bates, *Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development*. New York: Norton 2001.

capital, creating exorbitant rents, legal or not. In Russian, *siloviki*, masters of violence, rhymes with *syrieviki*, masters of raw materials.

A divine marvel

In a lively tale dated 1096, the *Russian Primary Chronicle* describes the first resource curse in Russian history:

We have encountered a divine marvel that we have never heard of before... There are mountains, which slope down to the arm of the sea, and their height reaches to the heavens Within these mountains are heard great cries and the sound of voices and [some people] are struggling to cut their way out of this mountain ... And they pierced a small opening through which they converse, but their language is unintelligible. They point at iron objects and make gestures as if to ask for them. If given a knife or an axe, they supply furs in return.⁹

These people, the Iugra, were unclean, continues the *Chronicle*, and with God's help, Alexander of Macedonia locked them inside this mountain. They will be released when the world comes to its end; till then, they will be trading fur for iron. The chronicler had heard this tale from a boyar from Novgorod. Collecting the tribute in fur, his son went far to the east, to the northern Ural. There, he reached the crying tribe and no doubt, made a good trade. Apart from Alexander, the tale is precise. Combining barter with coercion, the Russians locked the peoples of the Arctic North into system of trade that led to the extermination of animals and humans. Sons of Novgorod thought that their operations would continue until the end of the world as they knew it; indeed, their termination signaled the end of Novgorod. In their quest for fur, the Russians colonized a huge, exotic, and inhospitable space, called "the land of darkness" by early Arabic travelers. It was an outright colonization that was named so by major historians, Russian and Western alike. This colonization led to a huge accumulation

⁹ *The Russian Primary Chronicle*, Laurentian Text. Trans. by Samuel H. Cross and Olgerd P. Sherbovitz-Wetzer. Cambridge, Mass. 1953, 184 (translation revised).

of wealth and a proportional desolation of the natives, both processes being of outstanding scale in colonial history.

The Russians came in small numbers and they did not hunt the animals. They needed locals to do the highly skilled and labor-intensive jobs of hunting animals and dressing furs. The natives had skills but were not much interested in fur, which they used mainly for their own warmth. Only force or commerce could turn these fishermen or reindeer herders into full-time hunters. Usually, the coming Russians started with force, then turned to barter and commerce. Gradually, Russian trappers replaced the natives in Western Siberia, but the natives dominated the fur trade in vast areas further east, in Yakutia, Kamchatka, the Pacific Coast, Aleut Islands, and Alaska. In Siberia, the state established the fur trade in several steps. First, the Cossacks confiscated the furs that were already stored there. In 1581, eight hundred men led by Ermak defeated the khan of Siberia; 2,400 sable, 800 black fox, and 2,000 beaver pelts were sent to Moscow.¹⁰ Second, the invaders established a tribute that obliged each native man to deliver a certain number of pelts annually. Third, servitors established customs in towns and on the roads that collected the tithe in fur, usually a tenth of every transaction. Corruption was high and uncontrollable; bribes and other illegal fees ate up a big part of the state income. Moscow had to send more servitors to these vast lands, though the number of Russian men was never high.

In many respects, the system of Russia's rule in Northern Eurasia was comparable with the British system in India. The rule was indirect, many tribes preserved their autonomy, and the number of colonizers in relation to the colonized territory was miniscule. However, there were many differences. Due to fur, Russian colonization was a more lucrative enterprise. Local tribes in Siberia were exterminated to an extent that would have been unbearable in India. Finally, even with the depletion of the key resource, fur, the Russian Empire kept its

¹⁰ Fisher 26.

hold in Siberia, while the Brits preferred to quit when they found maintaining the colony untenable.

The core of the system was at its forefront, where the natives were coerced to hunt animals, dress them, and deliver them to the Russians. Judging by the later evidence from the 18th and 19th centuries, the main method of extracting fur from the natives was kidnapping, which was known as “taking *amanats*”. Capturing the native women and children and holding them in captivity, Russians demonstrated them annually to their men in exchange for furs. If their fathers did not provide the tribute their children were either killed or sometimes baptized and raised as Russians. In 1788, the Russians held as many as 500 children of the Aleuts and other American tribes as *amanats*. Russian emperors, including the enlightened Catherine the Great, authorized this method for “taming the natives” in official documents. Broadly used as a method of Russian colonization of Siberia and Alaska, this institutionalized kidnapping was practically unknown in the British, French, or Spanish colonization of the Americas.¹¹ If they survived to maturity, *amanats* would speak Russian; baptized, they could marry Russians and contribute to the creolization of the locals.¹²

Even when the Russians used barter, it was barely distinguishable from robbing. They exchanged furs for iron and other products of their superior civilization, such as alcohol, tobacco, beads, knives, and later rifles. In the Soviet times, the Marxist-trained and nationalist-minded scholars politely called this method “the non-equivalent exchange” that was characteristic for the “initial accumulation of the capital”. Since in many cases, the partners did not share a language and were scared of one another, they developed a method of “silent trade”. The Chookchi trade in the 1860s was not much different from the Iugra trade of 1096:

¹¹ Андрей Гринёв, Туземцы-аманаты в Русской Америке, <http://america-xix.org.ru/library/grinev-indeans/>

¹² R.G.Liapunova. Aleuty. Ocherki etnicheskoi istorii. Leningrad 1987, 59

For many years, [the Chookchi] would have no dealings with [the Russians] except at the end of a spear. The would hang a bundle of furs ... upon a sharp polished blade of a long Chookchee lance, and if a Russian trader chose to take it off and suspend in its place a fair equivalent in the shape of tobacco, well and good, if not, there is no trade.¹³

Hunting the hunters, Russians met with formidable resistance on the part of some tribes such as the Chookchi, the Kamchadals, the Aleuts, or the Koryaks. When challenged, Russians responded with increasingly violent methods, starting from the public flogging and ending with the indiscriminate killing. The Russian Orthodox bishop, Innokentii Veniaminov, who later became the Metropolitan of Moscow, reported that in 1766, Ivan Soloviev with his seamen exterminated about 3000 Aleuts, more than a half of the rebellious tribe. Hundreds of the survivors were forced to resettle to another archipelago to hunt sea otters.¹⁴ Father Veniaminov was the first who reported the accomplished genocide to the literate world.

Reportedly, natives hated Russians so much that they did not accept their superior tools, such as traps, and continued to hunt with a bow and arrow, therefore losing the competition to the incomers. Technical terms that were foreign to both sides, usually of Arabic or Turkish origin, were meant to mask the rude force. *Iasak* referred to the special regime of taxation, a tribute in fur. First recorded in the late 16th century in the Southern steppes, “taking *amanats*” was practiced by all sides during the long Caucasian wars of the 18th and 19th centuries.¹⁵ Concepts and practices traveled across the empire, from the Caucasus to Alaska.

¹³ George Kennan, *Tent Life in Siberia and Adventures among the Koraks and other Tribes in Kamchatka and Northern Asia*. New York 1870, 286-287; John R. Bockstoe, *Furs and Frontiers in the Far North*. New Haven 2009, 93.

¹⁴ I. Veniaminov. *Zapiski ob ostrovakh Unalashkinskogo otdela*. St. Petersburg 1840, v.2, 188-190.

¹⁵ Michael Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier. The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800*. Bloomington, 2002, 57.

Steel, germs, and alcohol supported the Russian side of the Arctic war for fur. The extermination of humans occurred in parallel with the extermination of animals. Russian servitors gradually learned to bring the natives “under the exalted hand of the great sovereign” by demonstrating force rather than applying it. In a ceremonial way, cannons and muskets were discharged while the native chiefs took an oath to the sovereign and the tribesmen were lined up as if they were an imperial guard.¹⁶ While the sovereign understood the fur business as a kind of taxation and the natives understood it as a kind of slavery, the local servitors had to improvise a middle ground on which they could establish relatively peaceful and profitable trade. Giving “gifts” to the chiefs of the tribes, befriendng the shamans, upbringing or even adopting the “amanats”, and arming one tribe against another were ordinary methods of bringing people to tribute.

In their subarctic colony, the Russians created a four-layer political pyramid that consisted of the distant sovereign, his Russian servitors, the native hunters, and fur animals. Violence spread down from the top to the bottom and profit grew up from the bottom to the top. Philosophers Giorgio Agamben and Jacques Derrida wrote about an essential proximity between the sovereign and the beast, who are both exempted from the law. The connection, economic as well as aesthetic, between the fur-clad tsars and the fur-carrying animals has not been appreciated in this context.

The fur pyramid was fragile. The closer we are to the recorded history, the more we know about the rebellions of the locals, the depletion of the humans, the corruption of the servitors, and the discontent of the sovereign. The known story of the fur trade was punctuated by sudden, seemingly unmotivated outbursts of violence on both sides. The fur trade brought many tribes to the edge of extermination; in some cases the population loss was

¹⁶ George V. Lantzeff, *Siberia in the 17th Century. A Study of the Colonial Administration*. New York 1972, 93

so deep and fast that it would be proper to speak of genocide. In 1882, Nikolai Iadrintsev in his fascinating book, *Siberia as a Colony*, was able to mention about a dozen ethnicities that had been fully exterminated earlier but whose names were still remembered. From the mid-18th to the mid-19th centuries, the Kamchadals lost about 90% of its population, the Vogules about 50%, etc.¹⁷ Replacing the natives, Russian trappers had better access to markets and courts. With their arrival, fur trade normalized. But it coincided with the depopulation of animals, which made trapping more difficult and less profitable. Only sables provided enough profit to support a Russian trapper; squirrel, otter, and other animals remained the business of the locals. In the early 17th century, a good trapper could get as many as 200 sables a year; closer to the end of the century, the real numbers were 15-20 sables a year, which made the trade unprofitable.¹⁸ Correspondingly, Russian trappers either dropped the business or moved further east where forests were still virgin, but native hunters stayed in the trade. Despite the general depopulation caused by the fur trade and many waves of higher or lower profits, it continued from the time the *Primary Chronicle* registered the “great cries” in the mountains up to the late Soviet period.

Boom and Depletion

When the Viking expansion gave a boost to the trade activity in the Baltic, the core of this trade was fur. By 1199, German merchants had established a trade colony in Novgorod, with one or two hundred Germans residing there to trade furs. For Kiev, Novgorod, and Moscow, fur constituted the most important single commodity of export.¹⁹ The fur trade provided hard currency that Russian principalities needed for buying weapons,

¹⁷ Nikolai Iadrintsev, *Sibir kak koloniia*. Novosibirsk 2003, 137-139.

¹⁸ Pavlov 224.

¹⁹ Fisher 4

luxury goods, cloth, salt, and Western expertise, professionals, and mercenaries. The fur trade became the backbone of the Hanseatic League, which included Novgorod as its eastern member. From there, pelts traveled as far as Bruges, London, or Venice.

Objects of desire and vanity, Russian furs fed conspicuous consumption on the pan-European scale for a longer period of time than any other class of colonial goods. Silver from the Spanish colonies, spices from the Dutch colonies, or tea from British colonies could have (or have not) generated even more wealth and suffering; but in their symbolic value, furs were difficult to compete with. For just one of Henry IV's outfits, London skinnners used 12,000 squirrel and 80 ermine skins, which were extracted from the wild tribes many thousands of miles to the East.²⁰ Then, nobody in the West knew or cared about how Russians extracted millions of pelts from the Arctic North. And we do not know it now. Every historian imagines these events by analogy with more recent events.

We penetrated deeper and deeper into the heart of darkness. It was very quiet there. At night sometimes the roll of drums behind the curtain of trees would run up the river and remain sustained faintly... Whether it meant war, peace, or prayer we could not tell. ... We were wanderers on prehistoric earth, on an earth that wore the aspect of an unknown planet. We could have fancied ourselves the first of men taking possessions of an accursed inheritance, to be subdued at the cost of profound anguish and of excessive toil.²¹

In their quest for fur, the Russians explored the vast, cold, and barely populated lands that stretch to the north from the metropolitan centers, Novgorod and Moscow, all the way to the White Sea, cross the Ural Mountains, and open into Siberia. The fur trade was the main source of revenue of the Novgorodian and later, the Muscovite states. Though Russia was not the only source of furs for Europe, this source became increasingly important with the

²⁰ Veale, *The English Fur Trade* 20.

²¹ Joseph Conrad, *Heart of Darkness*, Penguin 199, 50.

devastation of European forests, which occurred during the Middle Ages. King Henry III preferred grey squirrel but later, kings and queens wore sables and ermines. All these furs came from Russia. In the late 14th century, about 95% of all furs that were imported to London were of Hanseatic origin and most of them came from Novgorod. The numbers were huge. During one year, 1391, London imported 350,960 squirrel skins, many of them coming from Russia.²² It was the time when the Novgorod teams had already crossed the Urals and collected tribute from the Siberian tribes of the Khanty, Mansi, and others.

The Hanseatic colony in Novgorod worked as a collection center for all these treasures. Upon purchase, the Germans banded the fur into bundles of forty pelts and packed them into barrels, each containing 5,000 to 10,000 pelts. In the spring, the Germans shipped the fur barrels by Russian lakes and rivers to the Neva and the Baltic. Thus, furs went to Livonia, Germany and then, to various parts of Europe. This trade accounted for the major part of income of certain Hanseatic merchants, who were mostly of the Baltic German origin. In addition, there was a terrestrial route from Novgorod through Poland and Silesia; the distribution center for this trade was Leipzig. In exchange, Russian merchants received weapons, silver, cloth, salt, and sweet wine; beer, herring, and metal products also appeared on the market. London's import of fur started declining in the 15th century, which some authors explain by the changing fashions in England; most probably it was the result of the depletion of the Russian forests. In its turn, the fall of revenue from the fur trade was a reason for the escalating conflict between Novgorod and Moscow.

The fall of Novgorod followed after the decline of both the export volumes and the prices of grey squirrel in Europe. Until the end of the 15th century, grey squirrel was available near Novgorod and beavers were trapped near Moscow.²³ When they disappeared, the

²² Elspeth M. Veale, *The English Fur Trade in the Later Middle Ages*. Oxford 1966, 76.

²³ V.N. Pavlov, *Pushnoi promysel v Sibiri 17-go veka*. Krasnoyarsk 1972, 57, 67.

burden of supplying the treasury moved east. In 1557, each male inhabitant of Iugra had to give one sable a year to the sovereign in Moscow; in 1609, he was obliged to pay seven sables.

²⁴ The routes to Siberia, the land of sable, went through the Oriental Kazan, which was taken in 1522 in what was the turning point of Russia's colonization. From Moscow, the Siberian pelts were delivered to Leipzig, its distribution base in Europe, by terrestrial routes. Though Hansa had other goods to trade over the Baltic, its collapse in the 16th century followed the changing routes of the Russian fur trade. Having lost its strategic role, Novgorod was taken and massacred by the Muscovite troops. Aspiring to replace Novgorod and Hansa, the Muscovites needed seaports in Livonia. Though they obtained Baltic ports when the fur shrunk to a minor part of the Russian export, the determination to reach the Baltic was rooted in the fur trade.

While some early Russian sources gave estimates of the proportion of fur trade in the Muscovite state revenue as high as one-fourth, an American historian believes in a more reasonable figure of one-tenth and a Soviet scholar, Pavel Pavlov, one-fifth. ²⁵ However, its part in state export was definitely higher. Providing the largest share of the state's disposable income, the fur trade played a significant role in financing military campaigns, diplomatic activities, and even religious treaties of the state. Though the profitability of colonies has been a subject of much debate, there is no doubt that Siberia was a very profitable colony.²⁶ The depletion of animals did not reduce the profit as long as hunting was moving to the new areas in the east. Chasing squirrel, beaver, sable, martin, ermine, otter, sea otter, and other wonders of the North, the Russians moved farther and farther into the North-Eastern corners of Eurasia, all the way to Kamchatka and Alaska.

²⁴ Pavlov 70

²⁵ Fisher 122;

²⁶ Fisher 121

In the mid-17th century, Moscow became by far the largest center for fur trade and processing.²⁷ Officials of the Muscovite state, officers in the army, and doctors in the court received a half of their salaries in fur.²⁸ Another Siberian scholar compared the effect of the fur trade for Russia's economy with the flood of silver that came to Spain and Portugal from the New World in the 16th century.²⁹ Indeed, pelts were widely used as currency at local fairs. But the trade was in decline. Afanasii Shchapov's statistics of the Muscovite "gifts" to foreign powers also demonstrated that, through the 17th century, hare had replaced sable and Siberian reserves were largely exhausted. As he formulated it, the depletion of its "zoological wealth" caused the crisis of the Russian state.

Because the forests were running out of sables and the rivers of fish, Moscow started issuing decrees that regulated, licensed, and taxed the trade. In the late 17th century, the state monopolized the export trade on all furs and the domestic trade in sables and black foxes.³⁰ These measures did not help. Hunters, dressers, tradesmen, servitors, and drivers had to find new ways of subsistence. Replacement could only come from cereals. Rye fields were carved out of the forests. Game had to be replaced with meat and milk. The ecological disaster turned adventurers into peasants, a long process that required generations who barely survived the transition. It was equally bad for the Russian state, whose infrastructure was fully dependent on colonial goods such as sable and caviar. When in the Kremlin treasury, hare replaced sable, and when sea otter had to be delivered from as far as the coast of the Pacific, the Moscow period of Russian history approached its end.

When the British established their White Sea trade with Archangelsk in 1555, they were interested in timber, wax, cordage, and other forest products; fur comprised a minor part

²⁷ Pavlov 78

²⁸ Pavlov 102

²⁹ V.V.Pokshishevskii, *Zaselenie Sibiri*. Irkutsk 1951, 57.

³⁰ Fisher 65

of the trade because it was depleted in the area. This British trade with Archangelsk was unusually successful because it bypassed Moscow. For practical purposes, the sea route from Archangelsk to London was shorter than the terrestrial route from Archangelsk to Moscow. King James estimated the value of the region high enough to conspire in its colonization in 1612-13, during the period that is known in Russian history as The Time of Troubles.³¹ The stateless war of all against all that unfolded in the early 17th century, resulted from the collapse of the fur trade. The Volga merchant, Kuzma Minin, saved Russia from default and defeat by financing the war effort from the revenue of the salt trade, a harbinger of the mining economy to come.

In the mid-18th century, the share of fur in Russia's budget was less than one percent.³² The foundation of the Empire and many wars, appropriations, innovations, and expenditures accompanied this radical drop in the fur revenue. However, even in its reduced form fur retained its traditional relation to the state. Converting the state monopoly into a royal one, Catherine II moved the fur trade from the Siberian Chancellery to the Royal Cabinet, the empress' personal treasury³³. To a certain extent, the superb collections of the Hermitage and the foremost *philosophes* of the Enlightenment were financed from the revenue that came from Siberian pelts. In his comments on the *Instruction*, a treatise by Catherine II, Denis Diderot wrote that he could imagine a nation getting rich by trade only when this nation 1) lacks nothing; 2) exclusively trades one commodity; and 3) has a surplus in that commodity. He meant Russian fur. In a different comment, Diderot advised Catherine that a state should maintain a monopoly over its trade when 1) it trades with a country that is far away, 2) when there is no law in that country, and 3) when the trader is at war with that

³¹ Chester Dunning, James I, the Russia Company, and the Plan to Establish a Protectorate over North Russia, *Albion*, 21/2, 1989, 206-226.

³² Pavlov 119.

³³ Slezkine 67.

country's inhabitants. This was evidently the situation in Siberia. Diderot started writing these comments while returning from his visit to St. Petersburg in 1773. He was receiving his annual salary from Catherine's Personal Cabinet.³⁴

Founded in 1799, the Russian-American Company traded fur for the next half century until the depletion of the biggest commodity, sea otter, made the company unprofitable. Nothing but fur attracted the government in St. Petersburg to Alaska and California. In 1867, the company was liquidated and the huge imperial domains in North America were sold to the US for about 2 cents per acre. Gold was found in Alaska thirteen years later.

During his Siberian exile in 1900-1902, the young Leon Trotsky worked for the Siberian merchant, Yakov Chernykh, who bartered fur with the local tribe of the Tungusy in exchange for vodka and cloth. Illiterate, Chernykh had revenue of millions and operated on the huge space that spanned from the Lena to the Volga. Many thousands of people, whom Chernykh called "my little Tunguses", were under his hand. This Chernykh was the "indisputable dictator" of the whole district, wrote Trotsky 1922, when he knew the meaning of the word "dictator" very well.³⁵ Leading the revolutionary country, Trotsky made it clear that his brief work under the illiterate Siberian millionaire contributed to his understanding of the country that he aspired to change. Trotsky shared this remembrance while debating the peculiarity of Russian history with the prominent Marxist historian, Mikhail Pokrovskii, who in 1920, wrote that the feudals of Novgorod were the colonizers "in the same way as later the Spaniards were in America".³⁶ Though the role of fur descended from its role as the

³⁴ Denis Diderot, *Observations sur le Nakaz*, in his *Political Writings*. Cambridge 1992, 159, 135.

³⁵ Lev Trotskii, "Ob osobennostiakh istoricheskogo razvitiia Rossii", *Pravda*, 1-2.06, 1922; also in his *Moia zhizn'*, ch.9

³⁶ M.N.Pokrovskii, *Russkaia istoriia v samom szhatom ocherke*. v.1, 1920, 5

backbone of Russia's economy to one article of export among many, the fur trade continued all the way to the early 20th century. Even after the revolution of 1917, the fur trade retained its role as an irreplaceable source of hard currency.

Studies in Zoological Economy

Though the fruits of the Russian Arctic, fur pelts, had been familiar to the Europeans since the times of the Vikings, only in the 18th century did the literate world learn about these lands from the German academics, Orthodox priests, and political exiles whom the imperial government sent to Siberia. By this time the Russian fur trade was already in decline. At this late stage, it was unfolding in competition with a similar trade in Canada. One of the first Russian historians of Siberia, the 18th century dissident Nikolai Radishchev who was exiled to Siberia by Catherine the Great, clearly understood the takeover of Siberia as colonization and its motive as fur. Writing his *Concise History of the Acquisition of Siberia* in the critical style of the *History of Two Indies* by Raynal and Diderot, Radishchev wrote that the tsars gave rights to the fur traders "over the lands that did not belong to Russia". The Siberian pioneers were exempted from taxes in exchange for supplying furs to Moscow. Their task was to discover new lands farther to the east that would provide even more fur³⁷. When the merchant family of Stroganovs, who owned a large part of Siberia, financed Russian tsars, and became counts in 18th century, obtained their cote of arms, they chose two sables as their emblem.

A brilliant Russian historian, Afanasii Shchapov, was the first to understand the crucial role of the fur trade in Russian history and geography. He also coined a wonderful term, 'zoological economy,' which I use for the heading of this section. A Siberian, Shchapov

³⁷ Nikolai Radishchev, *Concise History of the Acquisition of Siberia*, in his *Collected Works*.

realized the ecological dynamics of the fur trade and its historical significance: the mechanisms of extracting furs from the hunters; the role of hunting in the depletion of fur-carrying animals; the role of the depletion of animals in the further movement of men to the North and East; the extermination of the hunting tribes that sometimes occurred even earlier than the disappearance of the animals; and the central role of these activities for the history of the Russian state. For Shchapov, two ecological methods of Russia's colonization were primary: "fur colonization", with hunters harvesting and depleting the habitats of beavers, sables, squirrels, and otters; and "fishing colonization" which supplied Russian centers with fresh- or salt-water fish.³⁸ Shchapov knew the tragedies that developed at the frontlines of this hunting colonization, where the Cossacks hunted the peoples of the North in order to force them to hunt animals. One such event, which Shchapov used extensively, was the colonization of the Aleut Islands, where Russians forced the locals to hunt sea otter until almost all of them, otters and humans, perished. Shchapov proclaimed the typical character of this event. His anachronistic method, imagining the past by analogy with the present, was the only available in a situation in which the victims were illiterate and the perpetrators, complicit.

In the 1920s, an American scholar, Frank A. Golder, gave a boost to the studies of Russian colonial expansion in Siberia and Alaska. Born in 1877 in Odessa to a Jewish family that immigrated to the US when Frank was eight, Golder started his career with teaching English to the Aleuts in Alaska in 1899. Then, Alaska was still a country where the natives preferred Russian to English; Golder even gave his Fourth of July speech in Russian. After three years in Alaska, he chose to study Russian history at Harvard. He returned to Russia in 1914 for archival studies and later in 1921 to take part in the ARA mission. Teaching at

³⁸ [Shchapov](#), Историко-географическое распределение русского народонаселения, Русское слово, 1865, July, 11.

Stanford, he created the Russian collection at Hoover Institute and planned to open the American-Russian Institute, a plan that failed because of the lack of the Soviet participation and Golder's sudden death in 1929. Herbert Hoover, the President-elect, visited the dying historian. His work on the Russian expansion in the Pacific became seminal; other Californian historians, Harold Fisher (who was also Golder's associate in the ARA) and George V. Lantzeff, continued his work.³⁹ One of his central themes was the revealing of the actual role of the Russian traders (*promyshlenniki*), whom Golder wanted to distinguish from the great Arctic travelers.

Writers have too often confounded an explorer, like Perry, with a hunter, like Dezhnev. The former has an idea to draw him on, the latter has no such high purpose. ... The hunter is more like the ambitionless native than the enthusiastic explorer

Writing in the 1950s, Golder's follower, a historian from Berkeley, George V. Lantzeff, stated that "no search for any single commodity has ever resulted in the acquisition of as huge an area as the one acquired by Russia in this quest".⁴⁰ One could add that no other quest for any single commodity has been so well forgotten in the history of human suffering. We know a thing or two about Cortez or Kurtz; but looking at the splendid portraits of British kings, nobody thinks about those boyars who exchanged these furs for "protection" against themselves.

Beginning in the 17th century, European thinkers formulated "the four stages theory", the early version of economic anthropology that stated that the original mode of human subsistence was hunting and fishing, which gave way to one based on pasturage, which was replaced by agriculture and finally, by commerce. As Ronald Meek argued in his book,

³⁹ Alan Dubie, *Frank A. Golder, An adventure of a historian in quest of Russian history*. New York 1989

⁴⁰ George V. Lantzeff, Richard A. Pierce. *Eastward to Empire. Exploration and Conquest on the Russian Open Frontier, to 1750*. Montreal 1973, 34, 17.

Social Science and the Ignoble Savage, this theory was based mainly on news from the recently colonized America. John Locke famously said that “in the beginning all the world was America”, the land of hunting and war, and that was one of many formulations of the four-stage theory. Focusing on the American evidence for this idea, Meek cites plenty of sources that describe the barbaric ways of life and hunting among the Native Americans along with similar examples among the Tatars of Northern Europe. Indeed, European thinkers knew these Tatars longer and better than they knew the Americans; they were just less sensational. Meek also showed that the German-Swedish interpreter of Hobbes, Samuel von Pufendorf, who had an important readership in Russia and America, did not share the four-stage theory but “believed, on the authority of Genesis”, that three initial modes of subsistence, hunting, pasturing, and agriculture, had in fact coexisted from early times.⁴¹ Actually, the Russian fur trade demonstrated so deep a co-existence of distant stages such as hunting and commerce or, to put it into broader terms, of barbarity and statehood, that the four-stage theory folds and stops working. In his version of European history, Pufendorf gave a fair picture of the Russian Empire, which in his account, was “vastly extensive” though in great part, “barren and uninhabited,” or rather “inhabited only by Tartars, who live quite a savage life” and “are rather tributary than Subjects” of the Empire. Pufendorf knew that the Emperor’s revenue was “very considerable” and that “the Trade in Sables which is entirely in his own Hands is a vast Addition thereto.”⁴² It was not only the authority of Genesis but also his political experience with Russia that gave Pufendorf an idea of humanity that differed from his Anglo-Saxon followers, starting with Locke. Teaching philosophy in Sweden when the country was at war with Russia and having had multiple exchanges with the Russians,

⁴¹ Ronald Meek, *Social Science and Ignoble Savage*, Cambridge 1976, 20.

⁴² Samuel von Pufendorf, *An Introduction to the History of the Principal States of Europe*, v.2. London 1764, 347-348. Locke quoted Pufendorf without mentioning him; see e.g. Michael P. Zuckert, *Natural Rights and the New Republicanism*, Princeton 1998, ch.7.

Pufendorf knew that, though in the very beginning, all the world could have been like America, at its next stages the world had become like Russia, mixed and twisted.

Space is Destiny

A surprising feature of Russia's "fur empire" in the North is that it retained its hold on the colonized land even after the fur was depleted. Alaska was lost, but vast territories that Novgorod, Moscow and St. Petersburg acquired in their expansion into Asia, remained in the Russian Empire. In the 19th century, these lands were used almost exclusively as penal colonies and were partially developed only in the Soviet period. Apart from the booming mining industry in the Ural Mountains and agricultural communities in Southern Siberia, the huge expanse the Northern Eurasia, of the size much larger than Europe, remained underdeveloped and underpopulated. Even Soviet military-industrial sites did not change this large picture.⁴³

Amazingly, in the 20th and 21st centuries, these lands have played a new and precious role, which feels uncannily similar to the old fur trade. The same geographical areas that fed the fur trade of medieval Novgorod and Moscow, have provided the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia with their means for existence. The oil and gas fields of Western Siberia have been found in those very spaces that were once colonized by the greedy sons of Novgorod in their trade with the tribes of the North, such as the Iugra, Hanty, Mansi, and others. Later, with the exhaustion of some of the older sites, drillers moved to the East to find gas in Eastern Siberia and Sakhalin. The main consumers of Russian gas and oil are also located in many of those places, from Hamburg to London, which consumed Russian fur. The routes of transportation of these commodities also look similar on the map. The main pipelines of

⁴³ Fiona Hill, Clifford Gaddy, *The Siberian Curse. How Communist Planners Left Russia Out in the Cold*. New York, Brookings Press, 2003.

Gazprom run along the terrestrial route from Moscow through Poland to Leipzig and further to the West. The future North Stream, the underwater pipeline that will provide Northern and Western Europe with gas from Western Siberia, runs almost precisely along the routes of the ancient Hanseatic trade.

Geographically, this coincidence is accidental. Aesthetically, fur and oil could not be more different. Ecologically, there is no correlation between the places that are favorable for fur and the places favorable for oil. People drill oil and gas in Siberian or Canadian forests and marshes as well as in Arabian deserts or American shelf; but only forests and marshes featured fur animals. However, politically there is much in common between an economy that relies on the export of fur and an economy that relies on the export of gas. Both economies are victims of what the political scientists call the resource curse, the one-sided development of a highly profitable extraction industry that leaves the rest of the economy uncompetitive and undeveloped. The sources of these two commodities, fur and gas, are situated so far from their consumers that the transportation costs are comparable with the extraction costs.

In the *long durée* of Russian history, protecting the lines of transportation that stretch across Eurasia became and becomes the main task of the state. Taxing the trade in these commodities was and is the main source of income for the state; organizing the extraction and protecting the transportation was and is its main business. The consumption of both commodities, fur and oil, depended and depends on the changing taste of the consumer in the far West. Prices of these commodities changed and change rapidly and unpredictably, which made and makes their extraction a tough and often, unrewarding business. This extraction took and takes highly specialized skills that have little to do with the occupations of other parts of the population. Very little part of the population took and takes part in the actual extraction of fur or gas. Since the wealth of the state that relies on commodities such as fur or

gas, does not depend on the education, health, or prosperity of the population, such a state does not care about its population and the population does not care about its state. A caste-like society emerged and emerges in these conditions. Trade in both commodities destroys the environment, natural and cultural alike.

A resource-bound state makes a special case of what Douglas North calls “a natural state with limited access”. As in other such states, hereditary forms of social inequality are reproduced through rigid structures of education and employment. Places in the power structure are defined mainly by the access to this resource and various components of its trade, such as extraction, transportation, and security. Political outcomes are clear. “The *protego ergo obligo* is the *cogito ergo sum* of the state”.⁴⁴ Warriors become more important than traders and effectively substitute traders. The security apparatus becomes identical to the state. As long as the resource is available and profitable, this system has no incentive to change. When the resource is depleted, a resource-bound state changes in an apocalyptic way. However, after the crisis of the 17th century, the nation found various sources, economical and spiritual, for its self-transformation. The depletion of the Russian fur forced a radical change of the Muscovite mores, which included the election of the new dynasty by a broad vote, the re-orientation of the geographical expansion from the fur-rich Eastern forests to the grain-rich Southern steppes, the import of the European Enlightenment, and the establishment of the Russian Empire.

The resources of natural commodities are limited. With the depletion of their sources, extractors must always go further in the unknown. Eventually, any given source of such a commodity is exhausted; when all of them are depleted, the resource-bound state undergoes a serious crisis, a Time of Troubles, which changes the core of its ecology, economy, and

⁴⁴ Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1976) p.52

politics. Consumers also change; there is a little doubt that the taste for oil and gas will change in a similar way to that of fur. And as oil is now, fur was transported and counted in barrels.

Post-Russian Eurasia and the Proto-Eurasian Usage of the Runet in Kazakhstan: A Plea for a Cyberlinguistic Turn in Area Studies¹

Dirk Uffelmann

“Nowhere in the world has the management of multi-ethnic states, especially those which have a bilingual divide, proved to be a simple matter: [...]”
(Akiner 1995:81)

Abstract

In which medium have we observed the most significant trans-regional cultural dynamics in the first decade of the 21st century? On the internet. This diagnosis is true not only in global respects but also with regard to contemporary Eurasia. That is why it seems appropriate to address the question of cultural dynamics in contemporary Russia and Eurasia by focusing on the internet.

The breakdown of the Soviet Union demolished the plausibility of the tacit identification of everything Soviet with Russian, which had been practised for decades. New constructions of common features such as post-socialism, post-communism and post-colonialism came into usage. As the spatial turn reached Slavonic studies it seemed that the hitherto dubious geopolitical construction of a distinctive Eurasian entity as promulgated by Eurasianists and Neo-Eurasianists could be rehabilitated for heuristic purposes in cultural studies and political science.

¹ The author thanks Madlene Bruder, Michael Gorham and Victoria Hepting for helpful advice concerning the following article and the editors of the *Journal of Eurasian Studies* for encouraging this research.

Drawing on the theoretical discussion of common features of cultures in the post-Soviet space, this paper proposes to refocus on the linguistic dimension and to investigate post-Russian Eurasia. Is not the role of the Russian language coming under serious challenge in the post-Soviet context, where independent states are downgrading the status of Russian in administration and education and where ethnic Russians are ‘remigrating’ from former Soviet republics to the Russian Federation? There is, however, one medium in which Russian is gaining new significance as a language of inter-regional communication: the internet. Albeit to a lesser degree than English and Chinese, Russian serves as a means of communication between Russian-speaking communities all over the world. What is more, the Russian internet (Runet) offers access to elaborated resources of contemporary culture (video and music downloads etc.).

In the paper I am proposing, I aim to discuss the role the Russian-based Runet plays for Eurasian web-communities outside the Russian Federation, mostly relying on Kazakh material, and ask whether post-colonial anxieties about Russian cultural imperialism through the Runet are justified or not.

1. Introduction

1.1. In which medium have we observed the most significant trans-regional cultural dynamics in the first decade of the 21st century? On the internet. This diagnosis is true not only in global respects but also with regard to contemporary countries which are nowadays regarded as a part of the imagined entity of Eurasia.² That is why it seems appropriate to address the question of cultural dynamics in contemporary Russia and Eurasia by focusing on the internet. In this paper I aim to discuss the role the Russian-based Runet plays for Eurasian

² I deliberately refrain from providing any geographic definition of Eurasia in the beginning of my paper because I will later propose a tentative cyberlinguistic understanding of the imagined entity of Eurasia.

web-communities outside the Russian Federation, mostly relying on Kazakh material.³ With the focus on new electronic media, I intend to reformulate the common research agenda of Kazakhstan's "Russian problem" (see Kadyrshanov 1996:7; Eschment 1998) or the Kazakh-Russian "dilemma" (Kuzhabekova 2008:167) by narrowing the perspective to the question of whether Kazakhstan has a problem with the Russian internet. To answer this question I turn both to statistical data about Runet usage in Kazakhstan and to the webpage of the Kazakhstani president Nursultan Nazarbaev.

Based on the findings, I will ask whether post-colonial anxieties about Russian cultural imperialism through the Runet are justified or not and what the Kazakh, possibly post-colonial strategies of coping with this situation are. Essential to my essay is the notion of cyberimperialism (Rusciano 2001) which combines aspects of media studies with post-colonial studies. The interdisciplinary approach to internet studies as postulated by Pavlenko (2008a:305-306) will be completed by a linguistic focus on the performativity of language usage online for creating situational language identities. Instead of a conclusion I will round off by offering an analysis of Nazarbaev's ambiguous inclusive-exclusive logic of argumentation⁴ and confront it with Russian (Neo-)Eurasianism as represented by Petr N. Savitskii, Sergei N. Trubetskoi, Lev N. Gumilev and Aleksandr G. Dugin.

2. New paradigms for Eurasian studies?

2.1. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the cultural Sovietisation of Central Asia, which was most evident in Kazakhstan, the "most thoroughly Sovietized" Central Asian culture in the Soviet period (Akiner 1995:51), was no longer accepted common

³ My focus is exclusively on language performance, whereas other relevant aspects of Kazakhstani identity and politics such as religion, citizenship, authoritarianism, Pan-Turkism or the transfer of the capital from Almaty to Astana cannot be taken into account.

⁴ As defined in Uffelman 1999 and applied to (Neo-)Eurasianism in Höllwerth 2007.

ground. While Olzhas Suleimenov, the leading Russian-language author of Kazakh origin, became an important figure in the Kazakhstani ecological protest movement, the ideological construction of a Russian Soviet literature of/in Kazakhstan⁵ could not be transferred into the conditions of Kazakh independence. Thus the breakdown of the Soviet Union demolished the plausibility of the tacit identification of everything Soviet with Russian, which had been practised for decades. Since neither Russian studies nor Sovietology could provide convincing models to describe the new reality in the Central-Asian post-Soviet countries anymore, a debate about alternative concepts began.

2.2. In the wake of this debate, concurring constructions of common features of the former Soviet countries and cultures such as post-socialism, post-communism and post-colonialism were proposed, all of them in one way or the other using the communist past as their starting-point.

Without doubt the countries of the Socialist Second World share a political legacy of totalitarian experiences, but does “Post-Totalitarian Eurasia” (Saunders 2009:1) still constitute a coherent “Second World”, a world living in the mode “After” (Kujundžić 2000)? Does the feature of post-communism as advocated by Boris Groys (2005) really predetermine the future of the former communist countries by redirecting them back from the communist utopia to the past?⁶ The exclusive focus on the past – on historical trauma and memory

⁵ In her bibliography, published – according to the bibliographical information – in Alma-Ata in 1986, Akasheva still speaks of “Russian *Soviet* literature of Kazakhstan”, whereas in the continuation of 2002, published already in Almaty, she refers only to “Russian literature *in* Kazakhstan” and stresses that “[p]усская литература союзных республик, являясь «поток» русской литературы, одновременно принадлежала инациональному литературному процессу, ориентируясь на его традиции.” [The Russian literature of the federal republics (of the Soviet Union), while being one of the ‘streams’ of Russian literature, at the same time belonged to a hetero-national literary process and oriented itself towards the traditions of that process.] (Akasheva 2002:3).

⁶ „[A]us der Zukunft in die Vergangenheit“ (Groys 2005:48).

politics – clearly ignores hi-tech strategies, for example in Estonia, but also in Kazakhstan (cf. Halbach 2007:77).

The same orientation towards the past affects the theory of post-socialist or post-Cold War studies (Hann et al. 2002:17). Here the main problem concerns differences in regional economics: the effects of the colonial exploitation of Central Asia for agriculture differ enormously from the problems the industrialised Central and East European countries faced during transition:

“The implication is that the central insights gained from analyses of state socialism and postsocialist transformations in Central and Eastern Europe have little or nothing to offer for the study of Central Asian societies.” (Kandiyoti 2002:240)

Although Hann et al. regard post-Cold War studies as a concept broader than post-colonialism (Hann et al. 2002:18), the varying forms of hegemony, colonialism and imperialism which the Soviet Union applied to Central Asian regions in comparison to East Central European regions demand a differentiated post-colonial approach. In the case of East European post-colonial studies, the temptation is less the juxtaposition of post-colonial features in Eurasia with the “classical” post-colonial countries of Africa or Latin America (Moore 2001) but rather the ascription of global features to all post-socialist regions.⁷

A proponent of East European and Eurasian postcolonial studies, David Chioni Moore acknowledges that the various post-socialist and post-Soviet regions display huge differences, most palpably between the East Central European new member states of the EU and NATO on the one hand and Belarus and Turkmenistan on the other. This chasm becomes even more obvious if one looks at media technology:

⁷ “[Z]ones, by their rarity at least, stand not outside but *in relation to* a global (post)coloniality” (Moore 2001:123, emphasis in the original).

“[...] it is clear that there is no simple explanation for the current state of new media penetration in the Second World. One must look deeper to understand why Shanghai, St. Petersburg, and Split bristle with cyber-café, mobile phone users, and hipster digerati, while Tirana, Tyumen’, and Tashkent languish in virtual cul-de-sacs far from the information superhighway.” (Saunders 2009:2, cf. also Hann et al. 2002:12)

From this one might deduce the necessity of a regional turn in the various models of post-totalitarian, post-Second World, post-communist, post-socialist, post-Cold War and post-colonial studies.

2.3. Possessing some common features with the other “post-countries”, the Central Asian republics share other characteristics with South Asia, with the Muslim world etc. which makes it attractive to describe them in terms of in-betweenness. This notion occurs as an implicit diagnosis in many research texts, not only in those that are informed by post-colonial studies:

“Kazakhstan is a country at the periphery of three major civilizations, the Arab-Iranian Muslim, the European Christian and the South-Asian Buddhist world. A whole range of oppositions define its present status. Kazakhstan is not Europe, but not Asia either; it is a post-Soviet, but at the same time a postcolonial country; [...] Kazakh is by law the official state language, but Russian remains in usage.”⁸

Could a similar in-betweenness serve as a distinctive feature of a more strictly confined region, including Russia and the former southern republics of the Soviet Union but excluding the Baltic and East Central Europe? Might the notion of in-betweenness, which is

⁸ „Kasachstan ist ein Land an der Peripherie der drei großen Zivilisationen, der arabisch-iranisch muslimischen, der europäisch christlichen und der südasiatisch buddhistischen Welt. Eine ganze Reihe von Oppositionen bestimmen seinen gegenwärtigen Zustand: Kasachstan ist nicht Europa, aber auch nicht Asien; es ist einerseits ein postsowjetisches Land, aber zugleich auch ein Postkolonialland; [...]; die kasachische Sprache ist zwar per Gesetz die Staatssprache, dennoch bleibt das Russische weiterhin im Gebrauch.“ (Ibraeva 2005:407).

so prominent in post-colonial studies, provide a new definition for the Russian (Neo)Eurasianists' suspicious hegemonic concept of Eurasia?

2.4. As the spatial turn reached Slavic studies it seemed that the hitherto dubious geopolitical construction of a distinctive Eurasian entity as promulgated by Eurasianists and Neo-Eurasianists could be rehabilitated for heuristic purposes in cultural studies and political science. The first signs are appearing that the disregard of Central Asia, practised in cultural and social sciences over decades, is now being countered. The most recent step in this direction was the decision taken by the members of AAASS (American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies) to change the organisation's name to ASEES (Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies) – a change which becomes effective in 2010. The new global label, however, is not accompanied by a new all-embracing conceptualisation of the cultural peculiarities of post-Soviet Central Asia. It rather provides the general framework for specialised, regionally differentiated area studies. One of the research fields which has not gained much attention yet is Central Asian internet studies.

The Russian concept of (Neo) Eurasianism is viewed in different ways in the Central Asian republics. It is either identified as an ideological mask for Russian hegemonic aspirations or as a promising synthesis (cf. Hann et al. 2002:14). Kazakhstan's official state ideology is built around the notion of Eurasia but remains vague. This means that research in Central Asian internet studies must be conducted in a way which differentiates both according to different regions and to divergent understandings of the notion Eurasia. One has to ask in each case: are we dealing with a phenomenon of a 'Eurasianet' which includes or excludes Russia, the Russian language and/or the Russian understanding of Eurasianism?

3. Kazakhstan beyond Russian?

But is not the answer to this question obvious because Eurasian countries tend more and more towards a post-Russian political and linguistic situation? Is not the role of the Russian language coming under serious challenge in the post-Soviet context, where independent states are downgrading the status of Russian in administration and education and where ethnic Russians are ‘remigrating’ from former Soviet republics to the Russian Federation?

3.1. After the breakdown of the Soviet Union millions of Russian native speakers found themselves in a “beached diaspora” (Laitin 1998:29). The new Kazakhstan consisted of over 100 ethnic groups, among which Kazakhs and Russians are by far the biggest, which gives one the right to speak of an almost bi-national Kazakh-Russian populace in Kazakhstan. Ethnic Russians are concentrated in the North and the East of Kazakhstan (Kadyrshanov 1996:15.26), the only area in Central Asia where there is a common border with Russia. The new interstate border cut the ties of the Northern territories of the Kazakh Soviet Republic with the Russian Federation. The North’s economy is directly dependent on the neighbouring Russian industry (Olcott 1997:113), and roads connect Kazakhstan’s North with Russia rather than with the rest of Kazakhstan (cf. Olcott 2002:195). Thus on the cognitive map of the North-Kazakhstan Russian population the old orientation towards Russia remained immanent (Braun 2000:92).

This cognitive map was challenged by what appeared at first glance to be typical post-colonial attempts of Kazakh officials⁹ towards “a deliberate ‘removal’ of the ‘colonial’ language from the public sphere” in the Central Asian republics in the early 1990s (Pavlenko 2008a:282). Russian toponyms were Kazakhised (for example Tselinograd – Akmola –

⁹ One of the official strategies for providing a cultural memory which unites all inhabitants of Kazakhstan – and of other parts of the former Soviet Union – is the argument that they were all victims of Soviet colonial repression: “The entire history of the Soviet Union, beginning with the revolution in 1917, is a history of violation of human rights and even of genocide [...]” (Nazarbaev 1998:110).

Astana; Akiner 1995:61) and traces of Russian in Central Asian languages erased (Pavlenko 2008a:283), while calques from Kazakh in the Kazakhstanis' spoken Russian language increased (Shaibakova 2004). Simultaneously the role of Russian in administration and education was downgraded (Pavlenko 2008a:282-283). Nevertheless it would be too simple to approach the Kazakh case with the topos of minority rights (in this case for the big Russian minority) which must be defended alone. The generalisation of all Central Asian states as "nationalising regimes" (Smith et al. 1998:139-164, still defended in Dave 2007:140) which prevailed in studies of nationalism in the 1990s is evidently inconsistent with regard to bi-national Kazakhstan, because the "ethnic redress" (Schatz 2000:493) is only one side of the coin in Kazakhstani internal policy. Justified fears of a "logic of titular nationalism"¹⁰ and Kazakhisation arose in the mid-1990s (Akiner 1995:71-72), but in the long run Kazakhstan witnessed fewer linguistically motivated conflicts than the neighbouring republics (Halbach 2007:89). Thus the impression that the Russian milieu in Kazakhstan is "narrowing" is deceiving (Ileuova 2008).

3.2. Despite government support for the Kazakh language in official contexts the media situation remains plural. The media law of 1999 prescribing that 50 % of all media programmes must be in Kazakh and only 20 % may consist of rebroadcast material from abroad could not be fulfilled by the media (Adams et al. 2007:85). A majority of the mass media still publishes or broadcasts in Russian (Shaibakova 2004:180; Kaftan 2004; Bensmann 2007:536-537). The blocking of Russian TV from Kazakhstan's broadcasting network in the mid-1990s was neutralised by satellite receivers (Bensmann 2007:533). The banning of publications like the journal *Lad* in 1995 or *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* in 1996 (Eschment 1998:61–62) occurred occasionally, before in the early 2000s the state made more systematic efforts to subordinate the free media to state control (Ibareva 2005:434.452).

¹⁰ „Logik des Titularnationalismus“ (Kadyrshanow 1996:6).

3.3. The demographic situation changed in the 1990s due to the emigration of members of the “beached diaspora” of Russians who after 1991 found themselves as minorities in post-Soviet states other than the Russian Federation (cf. Eschment 1998:80-89), due to the immigration of Kazakhs from other countries and to higher birthrates among Kazakhs than Russians.¹¹

Nevertheless there is and will be a high percentage of ethnic and – what is even more important – cultural Russians.¹² If one argues in terms of language skills and not ethnic self-description, the numbers of members of the titular nation and of the Russian-speaking minorities (Russians, Ukrainians, Germans and others) are roughly equal. Even more impressive are the numbers cited by research literature on the secondary Russian skills of non-Russian Kazakhstanis: Braun estimates that 2/3 of ethnic Kazakhs in urban areas use Russian as their daily language (Braun 2000:110), while Altynbekova guesses that the figures concerning linguistic self-information given in official contexts are too low and that probably more than 3/4 of Kazakhstanis know Russian (Altynbekova 2004:83). Laitin adds that in their private lives many representatives of the titular nation subvert the official imperatives of Kazakhisation and deploy “slyness” to avoid becoming more familiar with the state language and use Russian instead (Laitin 2002:137–138). Even according to official data the level of members of the titular nation fluent in the Russian language *increased* from 64,2 % in 1989 to 75,0 % in 1999/2004 (Pavlenko 2008a:289).

There is no need to check the reliability of such statistics, suggestions and estimations in detail to understand that the sheer size of the minority and the widespread

¹¹ Since this article is devoted to tropes of argumentation and performative situational identities there is no room for discussing the sometimes outdated, sometimes unreliable and divergent numbers provided in empirically oriented research literature on the Kazakh-Russian language question.

¹² Olcott estimates that despite all demographic factors the future will still see 20-25% Russians and other Slavs in Kazakhstan (Olcott 2002:222).

command of Russian in the titular nation is a factor which cannot be ignored in Kazakhstani language policy. The reality of a bilingual populace demands a smoother, nuanced language policy toward the Russian language than in other post-Soviet countries (Pavlenko 2008a:297). This is echoed in Nazarbaev's rhetorical question "How could there be a separate problem of the Russian-speaking population, when all Kazakhs are Russian speakers?" (q. in Dave 2007:104–105).

3.4. The early period of independent Kazakhstan's language policy continues late Soviet traditions. As early as September 1989, Kazakh was elevated to the rank of official state language of the Kazakh Soviet Republic. This move was reinforced in the 1993 constitution, which mentioned only Kazakh as a state language. In response to Russian protests and the peak of the remigration wave of ethnic Russians, this was corrected in § 7 (2) of the constitution of 1995: "In state organisations and organs of local self-administrative bodies the Russian language shall be officially used on equal grounds along with the Kazakh language."¹³ The same status was conferred in the 1997 *Law on Languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan*, which constitutes the basis for all subsequent legal acts concerning mass media etc. (Kuzhabekova 2008:170). In all these documents the interrelation of Kazakh and Russian remains more or less vague and indistinctive.¹⁴

¹³ "В государственных организациях и органах местного самоуправления наравне с казахским официально употребляется русский язык." (http://www.akorda.kz/www/www_akorda_kz.nsf/sections?OpenForm&id_doc=DB26C3FF70789C84462572340019E60A&lang=ru&L1=L1&L2=L1-7, the English translation is taken from Nazarbaev's website as well: http://www.akorda.kz/www/www_akorda_kz.nsf/sections?OpenForm&id_doc=DB26C3FF70789C84462572340019E60A&lang=en, accessed 1 June 2010).

¹⁴ „In diesem Gesetz [vom Juli 1997] fehlen fixe Termini [...] völlig.“ (von Gumpfenberg 2002:101, cf. also Olcott 1997:115, Dave 2007:102). But in 2006, in his *Kazakhstanskii put'* [*The Kazakhstani Way*] Nazarbaev admits that the legally non-binding term "language of interethnic communication" had to be made more precise in the constitution of 1995: "[...] русский язык, как объективно наиболее распространенный, перестал называться юридически ничего на значащим термином «язык межнационального общения» и получил конституционные гарантии равного с государственным языком

President Nazarbaev, who, from the very beginning, favoured a double solution with Kazakh and Russian as official languages, was forced into compromises but again and again promoted a double solution (Eschment 1998:36-38). He has tirelessly repeated the compromise formulas in his publications and speeches since the mid-1990s. His rhetoric of equality does not, however, exclude ongoing support for the Kazakh language in administration and education. A specialized plan of Kazakhisation for the years 2001–2010 seems to have been “relatively successful” in fostering the Kazakh language (Kuzhabekova 2008:172), but the question of the parallel function of Russian remains.

4. Trans-regional Russian communication online

So far my overview of the bilingual situation in Kazakhstan has ignored one major factor – mediated language usage, especially in the new interactive media which transcend the one-to-many communication scheme of the traditional mass media. What is the role of Russian in Kazakhstanis’ internet usage?

Albeit to a lesser degree than English and Chinese, Russian serves as a means of communication between Russian-speaking communities all over the world (cf. Saunders 2004:186). Speaking about Kazakhstan, one cannot confine the definition of the Russian Internet or Runet to communication inside the Russian Federation or on sites with the domain name *.ru* (or still *.su* and recently also *.pp*; see Gorham 2010). Referring to the broadest possible Runet definition as proposed by Schmidt, Teubener and Zurawski – “all Russian language communication flows (including e-mail etc.)” (Schmidt et al. 2006:125) – I

функционирования.” [(...) the Russian language, as the language that, objectively speaking, was the most widespread, ceased to be defined by the legally non-binding term ‘language of interethnic communication’ and received the constitutional guarantee of equal functioning with the state language.] (Nazarbaev 2006:80).

understand the Russian Internet as consisting of all Russian-language-based internet activities taking place anywhere in the world.

4.1. The Kazakhstani internet or Kaznet shared the developmental lag with the Russian internet; the domain name *.kz* was registered on 19 September 1994, half a year after the registration of the neighbour's *.ru* (17 March 1994). The first webpage in Kazakh (www.sci.kz) was designed three to four years later. For 2009, the website for international internet usage www.interworldstats.com counted 2,300,000 users in Kazakhstan, which corresponds to a penetration of 14,9 %.¹⁵

Access to the Kaznet is controlled by an oligopoly of providers, the state-owned Kazakhtelekom and the private companies Ducat and Beeline, with Kazakhtelekom in an almost monopoly position (Kurgannikov 2009). The main instruments for organising and filtering information are half-state, half-private media holdings such as *Alma Media* which was controlled by Nazarbaev's daughter Dariga and his former son-in-law Rakhat Aliev then (Bensmann 2007:538). During the 2000s the state established centralised control over the Kaznet, recently by transferring responsibility for the domain *.kz* to the state Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Informatisation and Communications¹⁶ in 2004 and by merging this agency with the Ministry of Culture and Information¹⁷ into the Ministry of Communications and Informatisation¹⁸ in 2010. Since 2009 private blogs have been subject to the same juridical liability as mass media.¹⁹

¹⁵ <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm>, accessed 29 May 2010.

¹⁶ Agentstvo RK po informatizatsii i sviazi.

¹⁷ Ministerstvo kul'tury i informatsii.

¹⁸ Ministerstvo sviazi i informatsii.

¹⁹ *O vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v nekotorye zakonodatel'nye akty Respubliki Kazakhstan po voprosam informatsionno-kommunikatsionnykh setei* [On the Introduction of Changes and Completions in Some Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Information-Communication Networks], N 178-4 of 10 June 2009, <http://www.pavlodar.com/zakon/?dok=04418&all=all>, accessed 31 May 2010)

4.2. How far does this control by the Kazakh state concern the Russian internet as defined above? It cannot but affect internet use in Kazakhstan due to the popularity of webpages from the Russian Federation in the Central Asian republic. Spylog data from 2005 reveals that 1,1 % of worldwide Russian site visitors access them from Kazakhstan (Schmidt et al. 2006:126), and the Alexa ranking lists 15 *.ru*-addresses among the 40 most popular websites in Kazakhstan, but only 8 *.kz*-addresses.²⁰ The Runet offers access to elaborated resources of contemporary culture (video and music downloads etc.), whereas the Kazakh section has – apart from poor access speed (Kurgannikov 2009) – a serious quality problem which expels about 80% of the Kaznet-users to non-Kazakhstani sites (Berikova 2010). The most popular website in Kazakhstan is www.mail.ru, while www.vkontakte.ru takes fourth place (30 May 2010). Even if at first glance there is a Kazakh domain name this does not automatically mean that the site has an administrator inside Kazakhstan. For example www.odnoklassniki.kz leads directly to www.odnoklassniki.ru (30 May 2010, Alexa-rank 11), a site on which Kazakhstan appears only in the bottom-right-hand corner, beneath all the regions of the Russian Federation.

4.3. As far as internet control is concerned, Kazakhstan adopted the Russian model of special registration software obligatory for all internet providers (Deibert et al. 2008:181). Kazakhstan's centralised internet control became discernible in 2005 when Kazakhtelekom blocked the webpage www.borat.kz (Saunders 2006b:236). This censoring strategy was subsequently questioned by (younger) Kazakhstani officials (Saunders 2006b:242), but the practice was revived when Kazakhtelekom banned *ZhZh* (*Russian LiveJournal*) in 2009 because of Nazarbaev's former son-in-law Rakhat Aliev's blog rakhataliev.livejournal.com/ containing *kompromat* [compromising material] against the Kazakhstani president

²⁰ The rest goes to the domain names *.org* and *.com* (www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/KZ, accessed 21 May 2010).

(Taratuta/Zygar' 2010). This strategy of “‘event-based’ information control, which temporally ‘shapes’ internet access” is viewed by Deibert et al. as characteristic of many countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (2008:183).

4.4. But is access to Russian websites which are critical of President Nazarbaev that dangerous for the Kazakhstani government? Or to broaden this out: how does Runet use affect the political, cultural and linguistic self-positioning of its users?

Robert Saunders argued in 2006 that the prevailing understanding of the internet usage of minorities as “a cause of resurgent nationalism” (Saunders 2006a:49) is misleading – at least for the majority of the users. Saunders refers to an advanced group of globalised digerati (digitally literate users; Saunders 2006a:63 note 6) whose internet use does not imprison them in “virtual ghettos” (Saunders 2006a:45) but makes them more open for the globalised world. Saunders’ optimism is based on a positive version of media determinism in the sense of MacLuhan (Saunders 2006a:51, 56): if one is to believe him, the “emancipatory medium” internet has “inclusionary rather than exclusionary” (Saunders 2006a:46.51) effects. According to the researcher, “cyberspace promotes *Gesellschaft*”, not ethnically defined *Gemeinschaft* (Saunders 2006a:62). It serves as an antidote to nationalism and Soviet nostalgia:

“[...] internet acts as a dampening agent for both emergent Russian nationalism and backward-looking Soviet nostalgia, and instead tends to promote notions of difference rather than sameness across the Russian ethnic space.” (Saunders 2006a:45)

The Russian aspect of the users’ identity is not emphasised by being integrated in a transnational and deterritorialized network:

“Rather than being ‘Russified’ by their cyberspatial experiences, ethnic Russians roaming the electronic corridors of the virtual near abroad are instead being ‘globalized’, that

is, undergoing identity shifts which promote the inclusion in the deterritorialized community of transnational elites [...]” (Saunders 2006a:50)

4.5. It would demand extensive and representative empirical research to prove whether Saunders’ statements about Russian internet usage in general apply for the suggested transnational identity of ethnic Russian internet users in Kazakhstan as well. What is certain is the fact that for the near abroad and for the digital diaspora (cf. Schmidt et al. 2006:122-123) in general the ethnic criterion is insufficient because Russian webpages are not only visited by ethnic Russian minorities in the near abroad:

“In addition to ethnic Russians, a generation of elapsed cultural Russians, i.e., *homo post-Sovietici* [sic], are also drawn to the RuNet. Russian is the dominant language of Internet use in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and a number of other CARs [Central Asian Republics]. Due to the robustness of Russian-language cyberspace, Russophones from all over the FSU [Former Soviet Union] choose to spend their cyber-time in the RuNet rather than their indigenous cyberspaces.” (Saunders 2009:18)

4.6. As far as a more advanced understanding of identity than the one adopted by Saunders in this quote is concerned, one needs to say farewell to the outdated idealistic notion of cultural subjects who – determined by their identity – must perform certain cultural actions. It is much more promising to approach cultural identity as a performative category. Russian as a medium of communication (online and offline) is relevant not only for cultural Russians (cf. Pavlenko 2008a:298) or the actively “Russian speaking-population” (Laitin 2002:263-264, Pavlenko 2008b:60), but for all people who at least occasionally communicate in Russian or consume Russian cultural and commercial offers. I suggest calling them *virtual Russians*, giving preference to this term over Saunders’ “kiberruskie” [cyber-Russians] (Saunders 2004:189) because the notion of *virtual habits* is less technical and better reflects the potential of coexistence with other situational identities.

5. Normative Trilinguality

To what extent can such a performative and situational linguistic cyberhabit pose a threat to the country's official language policy? On the one hand, Nazarbaev, who originally voted against the dissolution of the Soviet Union, has since 1991 made big efforts to stay on good terms with his Russian neighbour. On the other hand, the internet is actively used by Kazakhstani officials for the creation of a Kazakhstani state brand (Saunders 2006b:226), promoting a particular understanding of *Kazakshilik* (Kazakhness). The internet is one of the arenas of Nazarbaev's hi-tech feudalism (cf. Ibraeva 2005:429), with its ambitious Norwegian-style investment program.

5.1. In order to achieve the ambitious goals of this hi-tech programme, skills in languages other than Kazakh are essential, and Nazarbaev acknowledged this very clearly in *Novyi Kazakhstan v novom mire. Poslanie prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan Nursultana Nazarbaeva narodu Kazakhstana* [*A New Kazakhstan in a New World: Address by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev to the People of Kazakhstan*] in 2007: "Kazakh as the state language, Russian as the language of interethnic communication, and English as the language of successful integration into the global economy."²¹

²¹ „[...] казахский язык – государственный язык, русский язык как язык межнационального общения и английский язык – язык успешной интеграции в глобальную экономику“ (<http://www.nomad.su/?a=3-200703010020>, accessed 31 May 2010). The reappearance of the adjective “interethnic” which Nazarbaev himself criticised a year before shows the exchangeability of rhetoric formulae and the inclusiveness of his rhetoric.

One may find this trilingual strategy utopian (especially when it comes to English competence, but also to Kazakh proficiency among non-Kazakh citizens),²² but it is definitely not exclusivist. What is more, languages are not regarded essentially as a goal in themselves but functionally as means for other – rather economic – purposes, something that becomes clear from the addition of a fourth postulate: of advanced computer competence (cf. Khruslov 2006:146). In 2006 Nazarbaev emphatically linked the Kazakhs' nomadic tradition with the mobility and multilocality of internet communication (2006:366). Therefore one cannot but agree with Edward Schatz, who assumes that “the imperatives of globalisation and the concomitant need to create a technocratic elite” have tempered the concomitant ethnicisation process in Kazakhstan (Schatz 2000:495).

5.2. There is another level where the trilingual programme is clearly not a utopian postulate but a consistent practice – official state webpages, with their embracing trilingual strategy such as *Официальный сайт Президента Республики Казахстан [Official Site of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan]* www.akorda.kz.²³ What is more, it transpires that the staff behind this webpage (employees of the company RealSoft) are working in Russian first with English translations appearing later and even the Kazakh version being less complete than the Russian one.²⁴ The page title in the top line of the browser remains Russian in all language versions.²⁵

²² As the strategy targets the youngest generations (children's books are published in three languages: www.almatykitap.kz, accessed 31 May 2010) this utopian character may at some point be overcome.

²³ Accessed 30 May 2010. The same trilinguality concerns other official webpages such as www.parlam.kz, www.government.kz or www.astana.kz (accessed 1 June 2010).

²⁴ When accessed on 31 May 2010, the column “Official Documents – Decrees of the President” in the English version listed 63 times the Russian negation “нет” in Cyrillic before providing the first available document “On conferring State Premium to the Republic of Kazakhstan in the area of science and technology” (http://www.akorda.kz/www/www_akorda_kz.nsf/sections-main?OpenForm&ids=380&id_doc=3FD5E7ADC12680BD062576F7005B68E0&lang=en&L1=L3&L2=L3-24). The Kazakh version seems to be secondary to the Russian one as well

6. Towards a cyberlinguistic definition of Eurasia

6.1. Nazarbaev links his trilingual strategy to an alleged Eurasian quality in the multiethnic Kazakhstan. In his 2005 book *V serdtse Evrazii [In the Heart of Eurasia]* he ascribes an information mission for the “Eurasian supercontinent” to the new capital Astana: “Kazakhstan is a Eurasian country, its new capital one of the geographical centres of the huge Eurasian continent. [...] In the new century the economic, technological and information streams of the emerging Eurasian space will flow through our capital.”²⁶

The geographic European dimension of Kazakhstan is comparably counterfactual as the postulated English proficiency, as Robert Saunders pointed out in 2006:

“Kazakhstan – a country which sees itself as categorically different from its troubled fellow ‘Stans’ to the south – has worked hard to build a credible brand as a resource-rich, multi-cultural, and stable outpost in an otherwise troubled portion of the globe. In fact, the descriptor ‘central Asia’ is eschewed by some elites, who instead opt for a ‘Eurasian’ distinction. Such ‘branding’ relies on the fact that roughly five percent of Kazakhstani territory lies west of the Ural River, thus allowing a claim to Europe-Asian transcontinentality alongside Turkey and the Russian Federation.” (Saunders 2006b:241)

What helps to maintain the vision of the imagined Eurasian space is less the indisputably European language English than the linguistic reality of the European and Asian language

although in the Kazakh equivalent “Ресми құжаттар – Президент Жарлықтары” there were less scattered “нет” than in the English version (http://www.akorda.kz/www/www_akorda_kz.nsf/sections-main?OpenForm&id_doc=3FD5E7ADC12680BD062576F7005B68E0&ids=380&lang=kz).

²⁵ In the case of www.astana.kz the top line appears in Russian first as well. Only if one clicks the link to the Kazakh version kz.astana.kz this changes to Kazakh (1 June 2010).

²⁶ „Казахстан – евразийская страна, его новая столица — один из географических центров огромного Евразийского материка. [...] Через нашу новую столицу будут протекать в новом столетии экономические, технологические, информационные потоки развивающегося евразийского пространства.“ (Nazarbaev 2005:107).

Russian. Thus one might deduce that Nazarbaev's notion of "Eurasia" is co-constituted by the Russian language and that the connection of Russian with internet usage justifies referring to a proto-Eurasian function of the Russian internet. To provide a – slightly provocative – definition: *Eurasia is the post-Russian space where a virtual community occasionally returns to the Russian language in online communication.* The Russian-language section of the Kaznet can thus be regarded as a *sine qua non* component of a Eurasianet (which, however, is not embracing all of the Eurasian real space).

6.2. This thesis encompasses a re-linguistification of the spatial turn. When it comes to the internet, the connection of space and language cannot be described in terms of geolinguistics, but of virtual linguistics. And since Russian-language usage of the internet in Nazarbaev's "Eurasia" is a communicative reality, it possesses a higher degree of performative practicality than the imagined spaces of geopoetics (Marszałek/Sasse 2010). Due to the decentralised nature of the web, this communicative, cyberlinguistic space can only vaguely be circumscribed because its concrete localities are extremely difficult to grasp. For the proto-Eurasian Russian webspace national boundaries are relevant only in the case of filtering (Deibert et al. 2008).

6.3. When developing similar *cyberlingual criteria for the Eurasian virtual space*, one must not fall back into the assumption of stable identities or continuous linguistic habits. As in the case of the multiple identities which the multinational citizens of Kazakhstan combine in themselves (cf. Schatz 2000), there are *multiple cyberlingual habits* as well. The linguistic habits of the Russian-using web community vary depending on the communicative, interactive or consumerist purpose of their internet usage. The Russophone identity of the Eurasian web community provides no more than a situational linguistic habit.

7. Cybercolonisation of Eurasia via the Runet?

7.1. Have we thus, thanks to virtual communication, arrived at a harmonious coexistence of situational language habits without any hegemonic implications? In 1998 Pål Kolstø observed that supra-ethnic linguistic identities as “Russophones” were seen as “politically incorrect” in Kazakhstan (1998:63). Thus naive diffusion models of technological development (Ellis 1999, Rose 2006) cannot grasp the power implications of cyberglobalization (Ebo 2001). If Marx is right that quantity transforms into quality, the impact of big linguistic cybercommunities like English, Chinese or Russian on other national communities does imply possible hegemonic tendencies.

7.2. In all the cases mentioned associations with the colonial past come as a reflex. The colonialist use of Russian mass media in Soviet propaganda (cf. Saunders 2009:3) is vividly remembered in Kazakhstan, which justifies asking whether there is any continuity of Soviet strategies in the present media policy of the Russian Federation. Is there a Russian cyberimperialism following the American model (Saunders 2009:5)? The theoretician of cyberimperialism Frank L. Rusciano gives a critical answer because of the decentralized structure of the Internet (2001:15) and of its potential to be used by grassroots organisations. One might add the widely practised anti-disciplinary use (in the sense of Certeau) of the internet, for example in jokes about Russian politicians available on the Runet.²⁷ What then about jokes about Nazarbaev, stored in the Runet?²⁸

And might the linguistic dimension of the sort of cyberimperialism which Rusciano calls “metrocentric cyberimperialism” not be relevant to the Russian-Kazakh case as well?

²⁷ See search.anekdot.ru/?query=%EF%F3%F2%E8%ED&rubrika=j, accessed 1 June 2010.

²⁸ For example <http://search.anekdot.ru/?query=%ED%E0%E7%E0%F0%E1%E0%E5%E2&rubrika=j> (accessed 30 May 2010). For a possible confirmation of this suspicion see www.gorychiy.narod.ru/2001/K/0033.htm, accessed 1 June 2010. For more on www.anekdot.ru see Gorny 2006.

Do Russians from the Russian Federation like representatives of other “[...] core nations consciously or unconsciously define and disseminate language and linguistic constructs for understanding the world through the media of cyberspace” (Rusciano 2001:11) and perform acts of linguistic imperialism in so doing?

7.3. Historically, Soviet (Russian language) TV included the Soviet Republics as a culturally Russian territory. Such inclusive TV entertainment can be understood as a non-dividing, as a strategy of cultural hegemony. In contrast to the hegemonic strategy of *divide et impera*, in this case cultural hegemony is established by non-exteriorisation. It goes hand in hand with the non-acceptance of the external colonizing character of this imagined “internal” cultural diffusion as described by Stefan Rohdewald (2010).²⁹ In this sense, Russian politicians from all parts of the political spectrum have demanded support for the external-internal Russian diaspora in the near abroad ever since 1991 (cf. Saunders 2005:174).

7.4. After Russia’s withdrawal from the Central Asian scene in the 1990s due to internal political and economic priorities, one could observe Russia’s return to Central Asia in the 2000s (see Matveeva 2007). Russian TV entertainment is once more used for promoting Russian cultural hegemony (Rantanen 2002), and political strategists [*polittekhnologi*] look at the near abroad again.

As some of the present political strategists are trained computer specialists, use of the Runet can be understood as a tool of soft power as well: “Language and the internet are being viewed and used as tools for ‘soft power’ in promoting Russian national interests both at home and abroad” (Gorham 2010:<1>). Thus what Michael Gorham calls “virtual *Russophonia*” (2010:<2>) is not just a consumers’ and communicators’ decision alone.

²⁹ Rohdewald draws on the concept of internal colonisation as advocated in the 2000s by Aleksandr Etkind (2001).

Russophonia has been promoted since the Putin administration's "international turn" with the declaration of the "Year of the Russian Language" in 2007.

A special target is the near abroad. The webpage of the state organisation responsible, *Russkii mir* [The Russian World], founded in 2007, explicitly says of its target group:

"*Russkii mir*' is not just Russians, not just citizens of the Russian Federation, not just compatriots in the countries of the near and far abroad, emigrants, natives of Russian and their descendants. It is also foreign citizens who speak Russian, who study or teach it, all those who are sincerely interested in Russian and who are concerned about its future."³⁰

This broad and inclusive notion obviously comes very close to my earlier definition of virtual Russians, but in the case of *Russkii mir* the broad definition is envisaged as a means of metrocentric cyberimperialism in the sense of Rusciano (2001). The Diasporas are a special goal of the foundation, mentioned directly after the promotion of positive public opinion about Russia around the world.³¹

The advocates of a Russian world have detected the implicit, subcutaneous "propaganda" effect of the Runet:

"The Runet is an 'impersonal' but highly effective carrier of the language, the very .ru-zone which gives all users the possibility to get information and communicate

³⁰ "*Русский мир* – это не только русские, не только россияне, не только наши соотечественники в странах ближнего и дальнего зарубежья, эмигранты, выходцы из России и их потомки. Это еще и иностранные граждане, говорящие на русском языке, изучающие или преподающие его, все те, кто искренне интересуется Россией, кого волнует ее будущее." (*Russkii mir*, <http://www.ruskiymir.ru/ruskiymir/ru/fund/about>, accessed 30 May 2010).

³¹ "[...] формирование благоприятного для России общественного мнения, распространение знаний о нашей стране;/ взаимодействие с диаспорами" (*Russkii mir*, <http://www.ruskiymir.ru/ruskiymir/ru/fund/about>, accessed 30 May 2010).

independently from citizenship and at the same time to broaden the Russian-speaking space.”³²

On 9 April 2010 Russkii mir held a conference devoted exclusively to *Russkoijazychnye v Tsentral’noi Azii [Russian Speakers in Central Asia]*.³³ So far the actual effects of Russkii mir’s internet-based linguistic imperialism in the near abroad seem insignificant.³⁴ But the possibility that the Russian minority in Kazakhstan could be targeted by Russkii mir as a “fifth column” and that the foundation’s traditional linguistic imperialism may advance to more modern means of linguistic cyberimperialism cannot be denied.

8. Resistance by emulation

What are the Kazakhstanis’ strategies of resistance to the potential new Russian linguistic-cyberimperialistic threat?

8.1. It would be misleading to return to the outdated research stereotype of “nationalising regimes” (Smith et al. 1998:139-164) all over Central Asia, which suggests an antagonistic postcolonial attitude towards the colonialist in the sense of Frantz Fanon. Adams et al. try to describe the Kazakhstani strategy with a deductive pattern of postcolonial resistance directed simultaneously against international consumerism and the previous colonizer, but admit a specifically defensive gesture instead of antagonism:

“[...] we can explore the dimensions of cultural conflict in post-Soviet Kazakhstan as an example of a post-colonial resistance to cultural globalization: the target is both internal (the colonized mentality and the remaining settler population), and external (the continuing

³² “Рунет – это «неодушевленный», но весьма эффективный носитель языка, та самая зона .ru, которая дает возможность воспринимать информацию и общаться всем пользователям независимо от гражданства и тем самым расширять русскоязычное пространство.” (Iatsenko 2007).

³³ www.rusскиymir.ru/rusскиymir/ru/new/fund/news0274.html, accessed 30 May 2010.

³⁴ Even inside the Russian Federation Russkii mir ranks no higher than 31,596 on Alexa (www.alexa.com/siteinfo/rusскиymir.ru#, accessed 26 May 2010).

colonial domination of the culture markets); the actions tend to be proactive, intended to reaffirm and bolster local culture rather than being concerned with ‘pollution’ [...] the tone of the response tends to be defensive, in part because of continued dependence on the colonizer and, again, in part of the colonized mentality.” (Adams et al. 2007:84)

As shown above, the presidential administration of Kazakhstan addresses the “Russian problem” with a non-antagonistic and rather inclusive strategy. It tries to avoid a direct opposition between Kazakh (nation) and Russian (language). After a short period of concessions to Kazakh ethnic nationalism around 1993, Nazarbaev returned to his inclusive strategy for constructing Kazakhstani identity from the early 1990s (Akiner 1995:69) and has since then been preserving his rhetoric of trilinguality. But is not the Russian component of this trilingual constellation a paradoxical or even counterproductive means of “resistance” against Russia?

8.2. No, because Kazakh identity has over centuries developed by departing from a Russian or Soviet starting point. Kazakh national identity was invented in early Soviet times – during the so-called *korenizatsiia* - by Russians in Russian (Saunders 2006b:244) and in distinction from the Russian identity. The Sovietisation of Kazakhstan followed a “dual course, enacting russification policies at the same time that it maintained and strengthened national institutions” (Pavlenko 2008a:281). Nazarbaev, former secretary general of the Communist Party of the Kazakh Soviet Republic, based his early politics on the Soviet model, from which he made small steps toward Kazakhisation. Kazakh identity has thus always developed by starting from a Russian or Soviet model, by first emulating this model and by slowly introducing non-Russian aspects such as nomad identity or clan lineage. In contrast to what Homi K. Bhabha describes as the hegemonic imposition or else subversive appropriation of a “not quite” identity of the colonized in comparison to the colonizers (Bhabha 1994:87), the Kazakhstani way of resisting and gaining agency starts from the

“almost exactly” and then introduces small steps of differentiation. This defensive, slow tactic renounces of the more widespread overtly antagonistic post-colonial attitude (cf. Schatz 2000:489). It is more post-colonial in the temporal than anti-colonial in the antagonistic sense.

8.3. One expression of this emulative-defensive strategy can be found in the inclusive and embracing logic of argumentation of the “both ... and...” type. On the object level this was already observed in the existing research literature, for example concerning Nazarbaev’s “balancing act between russification and nativization” (Pavlenko 2008a:302) or his deliberate avoidance of “making a choice between an ethnic and a civic nation concept” (Kolstø 1998:56). Nazarbaev tried to give the impression that he was “both forward- and backward-looking” (Saunders 2006b:244) and pursued “both a multinational society and a homeland for the ethnic Kazakhs at the same time” (Kolstø 1998:56).

The vagueness and apparent contradiction of Nazarbaev’s inclusive arguments as diagnosed in research literature is not a problem for understanding this strategy but the solution for a better understanding itself. Differing from antagonistic postcolonial attitudes, this “both... and...” strategy tries to overcome the being “in the gap” as it is known from Petr Chaadaev’s famous first *Filosoficheskoe pis'mo [Philosophical Letter]*, according to which Russia belonged “neither to the Occident nor to the Orient”.³⁵

9. Towards a Eurasian post-colonial logic of argumentation?

In contrast to the geocultural gap envisaged by the Russian Westerniser Chaadaev in 1829, the Russian traditional Eurasianism of the 1920s implemented an argumentative strategy which is predominantly inclusive.

³⁵ “[N]i de l’Occident, ni de l’Orient” (Chaadaev 1991:89).

9.1. This becomes obvious at a first glance from the manifesto of Russian Eurasianism of the 1920s, *Iskhod k Vostoku [Exodus to the East]*. The argumentation starts with a self-exclusion from Europe comparable to Chaadaev's:

“Russians and those who belong to the peoples of ‘the Russian world’ are neither Europeans nor Asians. Merging with the native element of culture and life which surrounds us, we are not ashamed to declare ourselves *Eurasians*.” (Savitskii et al. 1996:4)

But then the authors Savitskii, Suvchinskii, Trubetskoi and Florovskii advocate a new figure of “inclusion of a whole circle of East European and Asian peoples into the mental sphere of the culture of the Russian world” (Savitskii et al. 1996:4). The functional relationship between the argumentative tropes of exclusion and inclusion becomes clear from the following quote: “[...] Russia is not merely ‘the West’ but also ‘the East,’ not only ‘Europe’ but also ‘Asia,’ and even not Europe at all, but ‘Eurasia’” (Savitskii 1996:6). Internal inclusion (Eurasia) serves as a means for external exclusion (of Europe).

A comparable functional sequence of inclusion for the sake of exclusion can be found in Russian Neoeurasianism, as Alexander Höllwerth described in his analysis of the obscure logic of Aleksandr Dugin's argumentation: “The ‘logic of connecting’ is always an instrument of the ‘logic of division’.”³⁶

9.2. Although in the case of Dugin the alleged internal inclusion jeopardizes Kazakh independence and masks Russian cultural and political expansionism, the Russian Eurasianism has served as a philosophical model which the Kazakh government propagated actively (Khruslov 2006:148) and that can be institutionally seen in the example of the L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University in Astana, which in its self-description links the

³⁶ „Die ‚Logik des Verbindens‘ ist dabei stets ein Instrument der ‚Logik des Trennens‘.“ (Höllwerth 2007:702).

Kazakhstani president with the Russian Eurasianist, the neoracist Lev Gumilev, in embracing rhetoric:

“The president of the Republic of Kazakhstan, N.A. Nazarbaev, gave the Eurasian National University the name of Lev Nikolaevich Gumilev. [...] The head of state is a convinced supporter of Kazakhstan’s national revival and of the Eurasian idea. [...] The most important point for Kazakhstan is that he [Gumilev] worked [...] on the problem of the mutuality of Turks and Slavs in the context of the unity of the peoples of Eurasia.”³⁷

Apparently Nazarbaev has learned not only from the content of Russian Eurasianism but also from its argumentative forms: he includes Russian (and English) in his internal trilingual strategy while the Kazakh information space is protected against Russian cable TV and against certain Russia-based webpages, as Khruslov points out:

“At the same time the national mass media have to fulfil the task of gaining information independence from the Russian mass media and to form a homogeneous information space of the Republic [of Kazakhstan].”³⁸

Nazarbaev’s “Authoritarianism 2.0” (Kalathil 2003:43) deploys cybertrilinguality for the sake of excluding critical media from abroad. Kazakh webpages are written in Russian to promote the president’s world view (parallel to the dozens of translations of his books into foreign languages), but the domain name .kz is supposed to remain an emblem reserved for the privatized state brand Kazakhstan/Nazarbaev.

³⁷ “Президент Республики Казахстан Н.А. Назарбаев присвоил Евразийскому национальному университету имя Льва Николаевича Гумилева. [...] Глава государства – убежденный сторонник национального возрождения Казахстана и евразийской идеи. [...] Для Казахстана первостепенное место имеет то, что он [Гумилев] работал [...] над проблемой взаимодействия тюрков и славян в контексте единства народов Евразии.” (Selivestrov n.d.).

³⁸ „Одновременно перед республиканскими СМИ поставлена задача обретения информационной независимости от российских СМИ, формирования единого информационного пространства республики [Казахстан], ...“ (Khruslov 2006:147).

In camouflaging the purpose of division under a cover of multiple connections, Nazarbaev is diplomatically more successful³⁹ than the Russian Eurasianists who – in every generation – have not held back from declaring that among the Eurasian peoples “the Russian people has the central position” (Savitskii et al. 1996:4, sic). Nevertheless the similarity in the connecting-disconnecting or including-excluding strategies is striking. One might risk providing a second, rather abstract, non-spatial (and slightly ironic) definition of Eurasia: *“Eurasian” is a rhetoric of inclusion for the sake of pragmatic exclusion.*

10. Unsurprising Coincidences

10.1. This Kazakhstani “Eurasian” logic displays rather unsurprising coincidences with various Russian, Soviet, post-Soviet and post-colonial argumentative logics. As seen above, the Kazakhstani and the Russian Eurasianisms share a connection-dividing logic. The Nazarbaev administration’s ambiguous russification and kazakhisation cannot deny its traces in Soviet language policy. As Schatz diagnoses:

“Post-Soviet Kazakhstani internationalism was shaped by many of the discursive and institutional legacies of its Soviet-era predecessor. As in the Soviet era, the Kazakhstani elite propagated ambiguous cultural categories designed for universalistic appeal and broad resonance.” (Schatz 2000:491)

The Kazakhstani preservation of the “colonial” language Russian as a means of interethnic communication is akin to the majority of African post-colonial countries, which retained the former colonial languages for the analogous purpose of transregional, interethnic and international communication (cf. Pavlenko 2008a:300).

³⁹ One needs to distinguish this authoritarian strategy of inclusion from a postmodern paradoxical inclusion of contradictions. Nazarbaev, however, made a postmodern attempt of self-defuting when he changed Kazakhstan’s politics towards Borat, becoming self-ironic and therefore ultimately embracing all contradictions (Saunders 2008:127).

10.2. What is more surprising is that Nazarbaev's "both... and..." strategy meets with approval from a Western human rights perspective. Eschment echoes Nazarbaev in 1998: "A rational solution would be a 'both... and...', a balanced bilinguality."⁴⁰ The German scholar even subscribes to the topos of Kazakhstanis as predestined to think in Eurasian inclusive categories (Eschment 1998:117).

10.3. Less surprising is the last – but politically most relevant – coincidence: the structural similarity of the Kazakhstani linguistic internationalism and the recent Russian media expansionism. The new Russian embracement strategy of non-distinction and the Kazakh rhetoric of non-exclusion come – as far as the logic of connection is concerned – close to each other. The two authoritarianisms – the post-Soviet Kazakhstani and the Russian of the Putin era – share a comparable embracing rhetoric designed for exclusive purposes. This makes it possible for Russian Neo-Eurasianists to quote Nazarbaev's renewed appeal to the Kazakhstani people of 23 May 2010 to learn Russian and English authoritatively on their webpage evrazia.org (evrazia.org/news/13273; accessed 31 May 2010).

Time will show whether the two inclusive strategies – the Russian and the Kazakhstani one – will engage in open conflict with each other or whether eventually the decentralized structure of the internet wins out against both unfriendly inclusion strategies.

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⁴⁰ „Eine rationale Lösung läge in einem Sowohl-Als-Auch, in einer ausgewogenen Zweisprachigkeit [...]“ (Eschment 1998:45).

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Этнокультурное развития современной России: динамика конфессиональных отношений

Vladimir Tikhonov

Современный этап развития мирового сообщества характеризуется возрастающей противоречивостью. С одной стороны, наблюдается все большее единение и взаимозависимость человечества как результат глобализации. В отличие от прежних эпох, развитие общества определяется не столько борьбой за существование между государствами и большими социальными группами, сколько готовностью к компромиссу, к сосуществованию, непременным условием которого является толерантность.

С другой стороны, в последние годы мы наблюдаем резкий рост количества проявлений этнических и конфессиональных фобий как в России, так и в мире в целом. Это не может не вызывать опасений в отношении возможности обострения межкультурных конфликтов. Такие опасения тем более обоснованны, что в радикально-экстремистские движения все больше втягивается молодое поколение. Учитывая возрастные особенности молодежи, ксенофобские настроения приобретают, с одной стороны, особенно опасную (насильственную) форму, а, с другой – устойчивый, долговременный характер, поскольку стереотипы восприятия и модели поведения, сложившиеся в подростковую и юношескую поры, продолжают влиять на умонастроения людей и во взрослом состоянии. В связи с этим проблема толерантности еще больше актуализируется в современном мире.

Настоящая работа посвящена анализу этноконфессиональных взаимоотношений в современной России и, более конкретно, в Приволжском Федеральном округе (ПФО).

Приволжский Федеральный округ – это регион, в котором тесное взаимодействие тюрко-мусульманской и славяно-христианской культур имеет глубокие, давние корни. Он является одним из самых многонаселенных, полиэтнических регионов России – на территории округа проживают около 140 этнических групп (из 150 этносов и народностей, населяющих Российскую Федерацию). В то же время здесь самая низкая в России доля русских – если в целом по России доля русского населения составляет 83%, то в ПФО она существенно ниже и составляет около 69%. Здесь же проживает наибольшая часть татар РФ – почти три четверти, 73,2%. В совокупности русские и татары — это 82 % всего населения ПФО, составляя соответственно 69% и 13%. Еще около 15% — это титульные народы республик Поволжья. Остальные — представители практически всех этнических групп России. Татары, помимо Татарстана, где они составляют почти 53%, живут компактно и достаточно крупными группами в Башкортостане (24,1%), Удмуртии (7%), Ульяновской (12%), Оренбургской (7,6%), Пензенской (6%) областях. Татары составляют также значительную, хотя и менее многочисленную часть населения других республик и областей Поволжья.

Не менее разнообразна и конфессиональная ситуация в ПФО. На территории округа зарегистрировано 5269 религиозных организаций. Среди верующих 49% принадлежат Российской православной церкви, 38% - исламу, 9% - протестантизму, около 4% — к другим конфессиям.¹ В регионе представлены все 5 мировых религий - христианство, ислам, иудаизм, индуизм и буддизм. Особенностью региона является высокая степень концентрации российских мусульман: на территории ПФО их проживает более 40%.

¹ Подсчитано по данным представленным в статье А.Красикова «Глобализация и православие» // Религия и глобализация на просторах Евразии // Московский Центр Карнеги. — М., 2005, с. 50.

Сложившееся в регионе этноконфессиональное соотношение, на первый взгляд, хорошо «вписывается» в активно обсуждаемую в последние годы концепцию С. Хантингтона о столкновении цивилизаций². Согласно автору концепции наиболее значимые конфликты глобальной политики будут определяться культурно-цивилизационными различиями, связанными с религиями, и в первую очередь имеется в виду столкновение мира ислама и мира христианства. Одной из линий будущих фронтов, линией разлома между русско-православной и тюрко-мусульманской цивилизациями, должен стать Волго-Уральский регион, в т.ч. Республика Татарстан.

Проблема межэтнических и межконфессиональных отношений в РФ является одной из основных тем проводимых в настоящее время научных исследований. Нужно отметить, что данные этих исследований показывают негативную динамику межнациональных отношений: в России отмечается активный рост ксенофобии (и особенно среди молодежи). Так, если вначале 1990-х годов признаки открытой нетерпимости к чужому проявляли примерно 20% населения России, то к 2005 году уже около 47% населения убеждены, что в социальных бедствиях страны повинны их нерусские сограждане.³

Напряженный характер межэтнических отношений все более связывается с ростом значимости этничности и этноконфессиональных идентичностей как одним из следствий происходящих в мире процессов глобализации.

Материалы проведенных исследований ярко демонстрируют динамику степени актуализированности этнической идентичности. Так, если в середине 1990-х в городах, например, Республики Татарстан для 72,9% русских и 49,5% татар

² Хантингтон С. Столкновение цивилизаций // Полис, 1994, № 1.

³ Гудков Л; Дубин Б. Своеобразие русского национализма // Pro et Contra, № 2(29), 2005, т. 9, с. 13–17.

национальность была незначима, то в последние годы их доля заметно снизилась, особенно среди русских – почти на 12%. (см. табл. 1).

Таблица 1

Суждения об актуализированности этнической идентичности

в современном обществе

| Суждения | 1990-е г. | | Наст. время | |
|---|-----------|------|-------------|------|
| | рус | тат. | рус. | тат. |
| 1. Я редко задумываюсь, кто я по национальности | 72,9 | 49,5 | 61,0 | 46,0 |
| 2. Я никогда не забываю о том, что я татарин (русский) | 27,1 | 50,5 | 37,8 | 51,9 |
| 3. Современному человеку необязательно чувствовать себя частью какого-то народа | 60,1 | 42,9 | 35,8 | 31,0 |
| 4. Современному человеку необходимо ощущать себя частью своего народа | 39,9 | 57,1 | 55,4 | 61,9 |

Необходимо заметить, что среди молодежи, которая является прогностическим слоем населения, во многом определяющим облик нашего будущего общества, национальность также обладает высокой степенью самооценности (см. табл. 2).

Таблица 2

Степень актуализированности этнической идентичности

| Суждения | Татарстан | | Удмуртия | | | Нижегород- ская обл. | |
|--|-----------|------|----------|------|------|-------------------------|------|
| | рус. | тат. | рус. | тат. | удм. | рус. | тат. |
| 1. Для меня не имеет значения национальность | 46,5 | 29,5 | 39,9 | 28,6 | 29,3 | 31,6 | 30,8 |
| 2. Я никогда не забываю о своей национальности | 24,2 | 41,5 | 28,4 | 42,9 | 43,7 | 30,9 | 42,3 |
| 3. Я помню о своей национальности в определенных ситуациях | 29,3 | 29,0 | 31,7 | 28,6 | 26,9 | 37,5 | 26,9 |

Данные таблицы свидетельствуют также о том, что актуализированность этнической идентичности среди русской молодежи несколько ниже, чем у других обследованных народов. Однако настораживает динамика ее роста, равно как и агрессивный характер вербального поведения всех этнических групп (см. табл. 3).

Таблица 3

Мнение по поводу средств отстаивания интересов своего народа

| Суждение: «Любые средства хороши...» | Татарстан | | Удмуртия | | | Нижегородская обл. | |
|--------------------------------------|-----------|------|----------|------|------|-----------------------|------|
| | рус. | тат. | рус. | тат. | удм. | рус. | тат. |
| 1. Да, согласен | 19,1 | 20,5 | 24,6 | 16,9 | 19,8 | 22,2 | 26,9 |
| 2. Нет, не согласен | 50,3 | 47,7 | 52,5 | 51,9 | 47,3 | 55,3 | 34,6 |
| 3. Затрудняюсь ответить | 30,6 | 31,8 | 23,0 | 31,2 | 32,3 | 22,5 | 38,5 |

Вполне естественно, что далеко не все слова соответствуют реальным поступкам. В действительности всегда существует определенное пространство между вербальным и реальным поведением. Однако согласно теореме Томаса справедливо и другое - «Если люди определяют ситуации как реальные, то они являются реальными и по своим последствиям»⁴, т.е. возможность поступков по своим представлениям достаточно высока. Поэтому очень важным является выяснение причин, обуславливающих различные этностереотипы.

Одним из стереотипов, широко бытующим в обыденном сознании, является представление о негативном влиянии религии на характер межэтнических отношений.

Материалы проведенных исследований показывают, что в ПФО за последние годы значительно вырос уровень религиозного сознания. Так, среди взрослого населения в начале 1990-х годов к верующим в городах относили себя 34% татар и 28% — русских, к концу 1990-х их уже было соответственно 66% и 56%. Среди них были выделены группы верующих, соблюдающих обычаи, обряды («активные» верующие) — 32% и 23%, и верующих, не соблюдающих обрядов («пассивные» верующие) — 34% и 33%. В настоящее время верующими считают себя уже 81% татар и 72% русских. В селах эти показатели еще выше. Следует сказать, что рост религиозного сознания наблюдается во всех социальных и возрастных группах.

Несколько иная конфессиональная ситуация отмечается среди молодежи. Достаточно высокий уровень религиозного сознания молодежи был отмечен в ходе молодежного исследования 2001 года в республике Татарстан. Более двух третей опрошенных (67,9%) отнесли себя к верующим, а каждый десятый отметил, что он колеблется в этом отношении. Практически все из назвавших себя неверующими

⁴ Thomas W.L., Znanieck F. The Polish Peasant in Europe and America. N. Knopty, 1918. Vol. 1. P. 79. Цит. по: Социология межэтнической толерантности. М., 2003, с. 8.

(14%) уважительно относятся к чувствам тех, кто верует, 6,8% респондентов затруднились с ответом на данный вопрос. Среди опрошенных молодых татар две трети (66,3%) отметили, что они исповедуют ислам, 8,8% назвали себя православными христианами (из них приблизительно две трети составляют молодые люди-представители субконфессиональной группы татар-кряшен и еще около трети — выходцы из смешанных русско-татарских семей), одна шестая выбрали вариант «Верю в своего Бога».

Среди русских православными себя назвали три четверти (76%), 12,9% ответили, что верят «в своего Бога». К другим конфессиям отнесли себя только 3% татар и 4,2% русских. Затруднились с ответом на этот вопрос около по 5–6% татар и русских.

Необходимо отметить, что данные по конфессиональной принадлежности татарской молодежи носят изменчивый характер, их взгляды и собственная оценка идентичности подвижны и подвержены изменениям. Возможно, это обусловлено постоянным ассоциированием в СМИ ислама с ваххабизмом и терроризмом, начиная с 1999 года и в связи с обострением ситуации в Чечне. Массовый опрос среди молодежи, который был проведен вскоре после террористического акта 11 сентября 2001 года в США, т.е. на пике широкого обсуждения исламского терроризма в СМИ, свидетельствовал о том, что на волне таких настроений часть татарской молодежи предпочла выбрать вариант ответа «Верю в своего Бога».

Следует сказать, что рост религиозности не связывается напрямую с усилением конфессионального сознания и ростом религиозных чувств. Зачастую рост религиозности людей обуславливается усилением их этнонационального самосознания. По данным одного исследования середины 2000 годов среди молодых людей русской национальности 30,5% отнесли себя православным верующим, и соблюдающим

религиозные обычаи и обряды, 52,3% также назвали себя верующими, но не соблюдающими религиозных обрядов. Среди опрошенной татарской молодежи, назвавшихся мусульманами, эти показатели составляют соответственно 41,0% и 42,5%. Более 17% молодых людей отнесли себя к православию или исламу, но не считают себя при этом верующими.

Итак, можно констатировать тесное переплетение разных форм самосознания — религиозного (уровень религиозной веры), конфессионального (соотнесение с определенной конфессией), этнического (принадлежность к определенному этносу). При этом религиозность выступает своеобразной формой этноконфессионального самосознания, а взаимоотношения представителей различных конфессий являются по сути этноконфессиональными отношениями.

Рассмотрим далее этноконфессиональные отношения в Республике Татарстан (РТ), в которой, как было показано выше, доля русского населения очень близка численности населения титульной национальности. Названные отношения характеризуются достаточно высоким уровнем толерантности. В отличие от обыденного понимания, когда «толерантность» интерпретируется как «умение терпеть, мириться с чем-то, быть снисходительным», в социологии утвердилось иное понятие толерантности - как «готовности принять других какими они есть и взаимодействовать с ними на основе согласия»⁵.

Преимущественно доброжелательный характер этноконфессиональных отношений в РТ, выявленный в ходе исследований конца 90-х годов, подтверждают и недавние исследования. Так, по данным последних опросов, более 82% татарской и русской молодежи готовы видеть представителей контактируемого этноса в качестве

⁵ Дробижева Л.М. Толерантность и рост этнического самосознания: пределы совместимости // От толерантности к согласию. — М., 1997, с. 52–53.

коллеги, 75–80% - в соседском и дружеском общении, около 75% татар и русских вполне приемлют отношение дружбы между православными и мусульманами.

Влияние уровня религиозности на этноконфессиональные отношения характеризуется, при этом некоторыми противоречиями. С одной стороны, верующие среди татар в 1,5 раза чаще неверующих оценивают русских как близких для себя людей. Большая толерантность верующих проявляется и в их отношении к культуре соседствующего этноса: 43% верующих русских в РТ считают необходимым проведение специальных мер по сохранению и дальнейшему развитию татарской культуры, 72% считают желательным для своих детей знать татарский язык.

С другой стороны, старшее поколение верующие чаще ориентировано на некоторые ограничения этнонациональных контактов, особенно в сфере близкородственных отношений: 42,4% верующих татар, соблюдающих обряды, а также 15,5% верующих русских считают нежелательными межнациональные браки. Вероятней всего, главными факторами, препятствующими установлению таких контактов, являются культурно-бытовые отличия, значимость которых усиливается с ростом этнонационального самосознания. Однако среди верующей молодежи эти же характеристики имеют другие показатели - такую позицию занимают лишь 25,7% молодых верующих татар и 13,9% верующих русских.

Говоря о культурных отличиях, следует отметить наличие в татарском этносе этноконфессиональной группы татар-кряшен, всплеск самосознания которых наблюдался накануне переписи 2002 года. Согласно данной переписи 24 668 человек этой этнической группы определили свою национальность как «кряшены». 18 760 человек из них проживает в Республике Татарстан, составляя 0,5% ее населения. Результаты исследований показывают, что кряшены значительно меньше дистанцированы от русских в сравнении с основной массой татар - они в 1,5 раза

чаще, чем другие группы татар, имеют родственников, состоящих в браке с людьми другой национальности, главным образом, с русскими. Несмотря на их более позднюю урбанизированность, татары-кряшены в большей степени ориентированы на работу в смешанном коллективе, для них чаще не имеет значения национальность руководителя и национальность брачного партнера. При этом, они реже ориентированы на деловые и брачные контакты с людьми своей национальности (здесь имеется в виду татарский этнос в целом, а не своя этноконфессиональная группа). Возможной причиной этому является реакция данной группы на элементы дискриминации, высокомерного и снисходительного отношения к ним со стороны некоторой части татар-мусульман.

Итак, анализ межэтнических отношений между основными группами в РТ позволяет констатировать, что в целом русские и татары, мусульмане и православные воспринимают друг друга как очень близкие народы и конфессии. Доля татар, например, оценивающих отношения с русскими как очень близкие, составляет 16%, как просто близкие — 79%, среди русских аналогичные отношения составляют, соответственно, — 17% и 73%. Характерно, однако, что при уменьшении межэтнической дистанции между русскими и татарами (за последние годы на 19%), межконфессиональная дистанция имеет тенденцию к росту (увеличилась на 7–9%). При этом уменьшение межэтнической дистанции между татарами и русскими и увеличение межконфессиональной дистанции между мусульманами и православными характерно для разных по степени религиозности групп⁶.

Более высокую степень этнической толерантности в сравнении с конфессиональной демонстрируют и материалы исследований, проведенных среди татар Санкт-Петербурга и Н. Новгорода. При оценке символической дистанции по

⁶ Коростелев А.Д. Религиозность в контексте межэтнических отношений // Социальная и культурная дистанции... С. 222, 225.

отношению к русским и православным, татары Н. Новгорода и Санкт-Петербурга оценивали их как достаточно близкие: при максимальной степени близости в 7 баллов они показали 5 и 5,3 в первом случае (по отношению к русским) и 4,1 - во втором (по отношению к православным)⁷.

При выявлении отношения к православию как явлению и символическому понятию, 84,6% татар, опрошенных в Н.Новгороде, определили его как «хорошее», а 13,4% — как «плохое». В Санкт-Петербурге соответственно: 89,7% и 10,3%. В данном случае на более толерантное отношение татар Санкт-Петербурга могло повлиять как большая ассимилированность петербуржцев, так и их более высокий образовательный уровень⁸.

Необходимо заметить, что существенным фактором, определяющим этноконфессиональные взаимоотношения, являются демографический фактор и опыт совместной жизни. В Татарстане, где практически поровну представлены татары-мусульмане и русские — православные, мирно соседствовавшие более четырех столетий, население сейчас показывает достаточно высокую степень конфессиональной толерантности. По последней статистике лишь 3,9% татарской молодежи высказали свое отрицательное восприятие религии контактируемого этноса и 5,4% русской молодежи. В других регионах, в которых татары являются этническим и конфессиональным меньшинством, отмечается большая толерантность татар по отношению к православию, нежели русских к исламу. Особенно критично, по

⁷ Отчет по результатам социологического исследования «Этническое и религиозное сознание мусульман Санкт-Петербурга и Нижнего Новгорода». Научный руководитель З.В. Сикевич, апрель–май 2002 г.

⁸ Там же.

данным исследования в Ульяновской области, к возрождению ислама относятся жители русских сел⁹.

Высокий уровень толерантности в РТ как русского населения к исламу, так и татар к русской православной церкви, подтверждает и исследование Д. Фурмана и К. Каарияйнена, проведенное ими в различных регионах России, включая РТ. По их данным положительное отношение к исламу выявлено у 92% русских, проживающих в республике и лишь у 57% — русских России в целом. Отрицательное отношение соответственно у 3% — в первом случае и 21% — во втором¹⁰.

Наряду с этим, отдельные исследовательские проекты («Культура народов Татарстана») указывают на растущий уровень настороженности по отношению к исламу. В определенной степени, такая ситуация объясняется усилением влияния средств массовой информации, которые, приписывая исламу радикализм и агрессивность, провоцируют рост отчуждения. В качестве еще одной причины можно назвать влияние государственной политики, поставившей православие, как религию большинства, на роль государственной, что усиливает ее неприятие со стороны представителей других конфессий.

При этом следует иметь в виду, что элементы ксенофобии неизбежно встречают ответную жесткую реакцию, рост проявлений которой особенно ощутим в кризисных ситуациях¹¹.

Этноконфессиональная толерантность, формируется под влиянием различных факторов - микросферы, социальных, демографических, исторических, культурных,

⁹ Сабинова Г. Этническое самосознание в социокультурном контексте провинциального региона // Другое поле. Социологические практики. — Ульяновск, 2001.

¹⁰ Фурман Д., Каарияйнен К. Старые церкви, новые верующие. Религия в массовом сознании постсоветской России. — М.-СПб., 2000, с. 214.

¹¹ Малащенко А.В. Ксенофобии в постсоветском обществе // Нетерпимость в России: старые и новые фобии // Моск. Центр Карнеги. — М., 2000.

политических, социально-экономических параметров межэтнических и межконфессиональных контактов. В современных условиях отмечается значительное усиление политического фактора.

Принятие «Закона о свободе совести и религиозных объединениях» (1997 г), формально привел к восстановлению государственного контроля над религиозной жизнью страны. Традиционные для России религии (в том числе ислам, язычество, буддизм, иудаизм) объявляются разрешенными, но в действительности наблюдается государственное предпочтение православной религии. Московский патриархат подписал специальные соглашения о сотрудничестве с рядом государственных органов - министерствами обороны, образования и другими. По всей стране развернулось массовое открытие православных храмов на территории воинских частей. На Архиерейском соборе было сообщено, что только в военных городках Министерства обороны сейчас насчитывается 117 православных храмов и ведется строительство новых. Почти в каждом воинском коллективе и исправительном учреждении имеется если не храм, то маленькая комната для православных¹². Для прочих конфессий такое сотрудничество ограничено и является, как правило, теоретической вероятностью.

Вызывают недовольство и некоторые другие формы сотрудничества Церкви и государства, в частности, в сфере школьного образования. Федеральный закон о свободе совести и о религиозных объединениях предусматривает обеспечение прав школьной молодежи на получение религиозного образования. Еще в начале 1999 г. Русская православная церковь (РПЦ) пыталась включить в базовую школьную программу изучение основ вероучения, что вызвало неприятие этой идеи со стороны значительной части мусульманского населения России.

¹² Красиков А. Указ. соч. С. 63–64.

В начале 2000-х годов Министерством образования РФ было проведено исследование по вопросу об отношении к преподаванию религии в школе во всех территориально-экономических регионах РФ¹³. По данным массовых опросов в рамках этого исследования доля сторонников религиозного образования в РФ составила 45,2%, 33,3% - не поддержали эту идею, 21,4% респондентов затруднились принять конкретное решение. Применительно к конфессиональной принадлежности, особенно высока доля сторонников введения религиозного образования в школе среди православных и мусульман — 64,7% и 63,1% (противники составляют соответственно — 18,5% и 26,2%). Заметим, что доля противников религиозного образования в школе - около 44,0% - выявилась и среди представителей других религий, а также среди 50,5% неверующих.

Большой резонанс в обществе вызвала новая инициатива Минобразования РФ о введении в школах курса «Православная культура», учебная программа которого была разослана в российские регионы. Предложение о введении этого предмета, за культурологическим названием которого по оценке комментаторов скрывается религиозное содержание, было расценено как попытка воссоединения церкви и государства, превращения православия в государственную религию¹⁴. Повсеместное распространение этого курса, не учитывающее полиэтнический и поликонфессиональный состав населения РФ, могло привести к осложнению и без того непростых отношений в стране.

Анализ аналогичной темы о преподавании ислама в общеобразовательных школах Татарии показал, в основном, что мусульманские лидеры, а также преподаватели мусульманских учебных заведений, и молодые активисты

¹³ Шереги Ф.Э. Социология образования, прикладные исследования. — М.: Academia, 2001, с. 221–232.

¹⁴ Мачнева О. Пускать ли религию в школы? // Вечерняя Казань, 22.11.2002.

национальных движений отмечают целесообразность изучения не столько основ религий, сколько их истории: 45,5% респондентов-татар высказались за введение в рамках школьной программы истории религий, тогда как около 25% - за преподавание основ ислама.

Введение учебных предметов религиозного содержания противоречит Конституции РФ и Закону «Об образовании», по которому общее образование в стране носит светский характер. В Законе РТ «О свободе совести и религиозных объединениях», принятым в 1999 году также существует положение, по которому религиозное обучение выводится за рамки школьного образования. Тем не менее, возросшая за последние годы потребность в знаниях о религиях может быть удовлетворена за счет культурологической, исторической информации, учитывая при этом наличие различных конфессий, также как и значительной части общества, придерживающейся атеистических взглядов. Представляется, что в основе образовательной политики полиэтнического государства должно быть поликультурное образование, как составная часть общего образования, способствующая усвоению знаний о других культурах, уяснению общего и особенного в традициях, образе жизни, культурных ценностях различных народов.

Этноконфессиональная толерантность/интолерантность имеет разные формы проявления, включая язык религиозных проповедей и соответствующей литературы. Мощные миграционные потоки в центральную Россию с Кавказа привели в тому, что в ряде российских мечетей, где языком общения уммы традиционно был татарский язык, стали читать проповеди и на русском языке, понятном для всех прихожан.

Православная церковь, прежде использовавшая язык национальных меньшинств в качестве инструмента миссионерской политики, и в настоящее время в местах их компактного поселения функционирует на родном языке своих прихожан. Так, в

Казани татары-кряшены посещают, в основном, свою, Тихвинскую церковь, чуваша — свою, где священнослужители — представители этих этнических групп проводят службы на родном языке. Появились и новые тенденции. В Удмуртии священники начали запрещать прихожанам-удмуртам читать православную литературу на удмуртском языке, если они это делают, то им отказывают в требах¹⁵. Это явление можно объяснять по-разному: и как ответную реакцию на растущее этнонациональное возрождение малых народов, и как всплеск имперских амбиций.

Этноконфессиональное неприятие, а иногда и откровенное противостояние вылилось в ряде регионов в форму затяжных конфликтных ситуаций, связанных, например, со строительством мечетей в Вологде, Волгограде, Сергиев Посаде. Подчас поводом для конфликтов на религиозной почве становится недальновидная политика местной администрации. Именно непродуманность решений татарских городских властей явилась основой конфликта, связанного со строительством православного храма св. Татьяны в Набережных Челнах.

Приведенные данные и факты по современному этноконфессиональному состоянию России, со всей очевидностью указывают на то, что приоритетной основой внутренней политики государства должно стать сбалансированное развитие полиэтнического, поликонфессионального, поликультурного сообщества. В значительной степени, именно политика соблюдения баланса конфессий и культур, обеспечивает толерантный характер этноконфессиональных отношений. Хорошими примерами таких отношений в Татарстане является то, что наряду с Пасхой, объявленной федеральным центром, выходным и праздничным днем, таким же днем в Республике объявлен и мусульманский праздник «Корбан-байрам». Зримым

¹⁵ Вахитов М. Каково нерусскому в русской церкви // Звезда Поволжья, 11–17.07.2002.

проявлением толерантной поликультурной политики являются два храма, соседствующих на территории Казанского Кремля: Благовещенский Собор и Мечеть Куль-Шариф.

Одобрение православных не только Татарстана, но и других регионов РФ получило возвращение в 2005 году в Казань иконы Казанской Божьей Матери, хранившейся у Римского Папы. Другая политическая акция — вступление России в Организацию Исламской конференции (2005 г.), имеющее не только геополитическое, но и внутривнутриполитическое значение, была весьма благосклонно встречена российскими мусульманами. Вызывают одобрение и ставшие уже традицией ежегодные трансляции на российских каналах телевидения праздничных религиозных богослужений: в честь Рождества Пасхи и праздника «Корбан-байрам».

Принцип поликультурализма, который предполагает «модель равноправного существования различных культур в противовес модели гегемонии одной культуры»¹⁶, является основой толерантной этнокультурной политики государства. Современные политологи считают, что политика и идеология государства должны основываться на концепции «позитивной толерантности», используемой как важнейшей либерально-демократической ценности, объединяющей понятия свободы, равенства и многообразия¹⁷. Вне всякого сомнения, толерантность, включая и этноконфессиональную, должна поддерживаться и культивироваться государством, в том числе и через законы, учитывающие особенности и интересы всех народов и конфессий. Все большее признание получает в настоящее время точка зрения, согласно которой «важен не столько момент вынужденного и институционального

¹⁶ Воронков В. Мультикультурализм и деконструкция этнических границ // Мультикультурализм и трансформация постсоветских обществ. — М., 2002, с. 39.

¹⁷ Капустин Б.Г. Либеральное сознание в России // Общественные науки и современность, 1994, № 4, с. 32–33.

упорядочения сожительства несхожих этносов и субкультур, сколько осознанный принцип внутренней сообщенности непохожих друг на друга, но сродных в человеческом естестве, в задачах экологического выживания в гражданском общежитии людей¹⁸.

¹⁸ Рашковский Е. «Кавказский меловый круг»: трагические судьбы региона // Pro et Contra. Том 7, № 3, 2002, с. 177.